Hoffman v. Genpact

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ELIZABETH HOFFMAN,

Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:22-CV-00009

v.

(MEHALCHICK, M.J.)

GENPACT,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

Presently before the Court is a motion to compel arbitration filed by Defendant

Genpact on June 28, 2022. (Doc. 33; Doc. 34). Pro se Plaintiff Elizabeth Hoffman

(“Hoffman”) initiated the above-captioned actions by filing two complaints against Genpact

asserting claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.

(“Title VII”), the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (“ADA”), the

Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (“FMLA”), and the Pennsylvania

Human Relations Act, 43 P.S. § 951 et seq. (“PHRA”). (Doc. 1); Hoffman v. Genpact, No. 3:22-

CV-00154 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 2022), ECF No. 1. On February 25, 2022, upon the parties’

concurrence, the Court consolidated the above-captioned actions into this civil action. (Doc.

13; Doc. 14). On March 31, 2022, the parties consented to proceed before the undersigned

United State Magistrate Judge pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 73 and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Doc.

23). For the following reasons, Genpact’s motion shall be GRANTED. (Doc. 34).

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 8, 2018, Hoffman began employment for Genpact, a global professional

services firm, as a payroll specialist. (Doc. 1, at 10). On Hoffman’s first day of work, she

electronically completed and signed various onboarding documents, policies, procedures, and

acknowledgments, including the At-Will Employment, Confidential Information, Invention

Assignment, and Arbitration Agreement (“Employment Agreement”), through Genpact’s

online human resources management system, SilkRoad Technology. (Doc. 1, at 11; Doc. 35,

at 7-12). According to her complaint, Hoffman made several ADA accommodation requests

to Genpact’s human resources department regarding her Central Auditory Processing

Disorder (“CAPD”), Mixed Receptive-Expressive Language Disorder (“MERLD”), and

Tinnitus. (Doc. 1, at 3-4, 12). However, Hoffman avers that Genpact discriminated against

her, mocked and ridiculed her, and subjected her to a hostile work environment. (Doc. 1, at

3-5). In addition, Hoffman’s complaint alleges that Genpact unlawfully released her private

medical information, excluded her from training and work tasks for seven months, and

excluded her from pay increases and bonuses that other non-disabled staff was provided.

(Doc. 1, at 3). On September 11, 2020, Hoffman’s employment for Genpact was terminated

for “low quality scores.” (Doc. 1, at 28).

On January 2, 2022, Hoffman commenced civil action No. 3:22-CV-00154 by filing a

complaint against Genpact in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County, Pennsylvania,

which Genpact removed to the United States District Court for the Middle District of

Pennsylvania on January 28, 2022, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Hoffman v. Genpact, No.

3:22-CV-00154 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 2, 2022). On January 3, 2022, Hoffman commenced civil

action No. 3:22-CV-00009 by filing a complaint against Genpact in the Middle District, along

with the motion to seal the case. (Doc. 1; Doc. 2). In both complaints, Hoffman alleges claims

of discrimination, retaliation, and harassment based on her disability and national origin

under Title VII, ADA, FMLA, and PHRA. (Doc. 1, at 6); Hoffman v. Genpact, No. 3:22-CV-

00154 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 2, 2022), ECF No. 1, at 3.

On February 4, 2022, Genpact filed a motion to compel arbitration. (Doc. 7). On

February 18, 2022, Hoffman filed a brief in opposition to the motion, which argued that the

agreement is unenforceable based on procedural and substantive unconscionability. (Doc. 10,

at 2). On the same day, Genpact filed a brief in support of the motion to compel, attaching an

arbitration agreement signed by Hoffman and arguing that the agreement requires her to

resolve her claims through binding arbitration. (Doc. 16, at 11-12; Doc. 16-1, at 22). On

February 25, 2022, the Court consolidated the two actions under civil action No. 3:22-CV-

00009, and unsealed the case record. (Doc. 13; Doc. 14). On March 14, 2022, the Court

denied Genpact’s motion to compel arbitration without prejudice and granted the parties

thirty days to conduct limited discovery on the issue of whether Hoffman’s claims are

governed by a valid arbitration agreement. (Doc. 19; Doc. 20).

Hoffman filed the first motion for extension of time to complete discovery on March

22, 2022, which the Court granted on April 4, 2022. (Doc. 21; Doc. 24). Hoffman filed the

second motion for extension of time to complete discovery on April 13, 2022, which the Court

granted on April 26, 2022. (Doc. 27; Doc. 29). Hoffman filed the third motion for extension

of time to complete discovery on May 27, 2022, which the Court granted in part and denied

in part on June 3, 2022, stating that discovery was due by June 28, 2022, and that “[n]o further

extensions of time will be permitted.” (Doc. 30; Doc. 32). On June 17, 2022, Hoffman filed

the fourth motion for extension of time to complete discovery.1 (Doc. 33).

1 In her motion for extension of time, Hoffman asserts that she “ha[s] been having

some difficulty with obtaining directly related documents for the Limited discovery process

regarding [ ] the formation of the Arbitration Agreement.” (Doc. 33, at 1). Specifically,

Hoffman states that she is having difficulty obtaining correspondences that are directly related

to the limited discovery issued, including “being denied to print out documents and

On June 28, 2022, Genpact filed a renewed motion to compel arbitration, as well as a

brief in support and a statement of facts. (Doc. 34; Doc. 35; Doc. 36). Hoffman filed a brief

in opposition to the motion and supplemental exhibits on June 28, 2022, and July 5, 2022,

respectively. (Doc 37; Doc. 38). Genpact filed a reply brief on July 12, 2022. (Doc. 39). The

motion to compel arbitration has been fully briefed and is ripe for review. (Doc. 34; Doc. 35;

Doc. 36; Doc. 37; Doc. 38; Doc. 39).2

A. ARBITRATION AND EQUITABLE RELIEF PROVISION OF THE EMPLOYMENT

AGREEMENT

In the brief in support of the motion to compel, Genpact append a document that

purports to be the Employment Agreement that was signed by Hoffman. (Doc. 35-5, at 2). In

relevant part, paragraph 11 of the Employment Agreement, the arbitration provision, provides

in all capital letters that:

In consideration of my employment with the company, . . . I agree that any and

all controversies, claims, or disputes that I may have with anyone (including

the company and any employee . . .), arising out of, relating to, or resulting

from my employment or relationship with the company or the termination of

my employment or relationship with the company, including any breach of this

agreement, shall be subject to binding arbitration under the Federal Arbitration

Act . . . . I agree to arbitrate any and all common law and/or statutory

claims . . . including, but not limited to, claims under [Title VII], the [ADA] . . .

the [FMLA], . . . and claims of harassment, discrimination, [and] wrongful

termination . . . . With respect to all such claims and disputes that I agree to

agreements on the day of hire which are directly related all the continued requests that went

on for the next 4+ months later.” (Doc. 33, at 3). However, as discussed infra, the Court finds

that there is no dispute of material fact that the Employment Agreement is a valid and

enforceable contract, the arbitration agreement is not unconscionable, and that Hoffman’s

claims are within the scope of the arbitration agreement. Therefore, the Court shall grant

Genpact’s motion to compel arbitration and stay judicial proceedings. (Doc. 35).

Accordingly, Hoffman’s fourth motion for extension of time is DENIED AS MOOT. (Doc.

33).

2 Hoffman has also filed two motions for leave to file sur-reply briefs in support of her

opposition to the motion. The Court finds that there is no basis for the filing of a sur-reply

brief, and as such, those motions (Doc. 42; Doc. 51) are DENIED.

arbitrate, I hereby expressly agree to waive, and do waive, any right to a trial

by jury.

(Doc. 35-5, at 26-27).

Furthermore, the arbitration agreement expressly state that those provisions are governed by

the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), and that the Judicial Arbitration and Mediation

Services, Inc. (“JAMS”) Employment Arbitration Rules & Procedures govern the arbitration

process and provides a link to those rules. (Doc. 35-5, at 27). The arbitration agreement also

contains a provision regarding the voluntary nature of the agreement, which states, in all

capital letters, that:

I acknowledge and agree that I am executing this agreement voluntarily and

without any duress or undue influence by the company or anyone else. I further

acknowledge and agree that I have carefully read this agreement and that I have

asked any questions needed for me to understand the terms, consequences, and

binding effect of this agreement and fully understand it, including that I am

waiving my right to a jury trial. Finally, I agree that I have been provided an

opportunity to seek the advice of an attorney of my choice before signing the

agreement.

(Doc. 35-5, at 28) (emphasis in original).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

When deciding a motion to compel arbitration, a court must ascertain whether “(1) a

valid agreement to arbitrate exists, and (2) the particular dispute falls within the scope of that

agreement.” Aetrex Worldwide, Inc. v. Sourcing for You Ltd., 555 F. App'x 153, 154 (3d Cir. 2014)

(quoting Kirleis v. Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C., 560 F.3d 156, 160 (3d Cir. 2009)). The

FAA provides the “body of federal substantive law establishing . . . the duty to honor

agreements to arbitrate disputes.” Century Indem. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London,

584 F.3d 513, 522 (3d Cir. 2009). Section 2 of the FAA states that “[a] written provision in . . .

a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a

controversy . . . arising out of such contract [or] transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable,

and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any

contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. Section 3 requires courts, upon motion, to stay litigation “upon being

satisfied that” the issues involved are “referable to arbitration” under a written arbitration

agreement. 9 U.S.C. § 3. The stay shall remain in effect until the arbitration, in accordance

with the arbitration agreement, concludes. See 9 U.S.C. § 3. Furthermore, under Section 4,

“[a] party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a

written [arbitration] agreement . . . may petition any United States district court . . . for an

order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement.”

9 U.S.C. § 4.

The Supreme Court has construed the FAA as establishing a nationwide policy

favoring the resolution of disputes via arbitration that requires courts to “rigorously enforce

agreements to arbitrate.” Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985).

Arbitration agreements may only be invalidated by “generally applicable contract defenses,

such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.” AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333,

339 (2011) (quoting Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)).

In disposing of a motion to compel arbitration, the court applies the motion to dismiss

standard of either Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, where (1) the

existence of an arbitration agreement is apparent from the face of the complaint; (2) the

contract containing the pertinent arbitration agreement is attached to the complaint; or (3) the

plaintiff does not contest that an enforceable arbitration agreement exists. Guidotti v. Legal

Helpers Debt Resolution, L.L.C., 716 F.3d 764, 773-74 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). If the

existence of an arbitration agreement is not apparent, the court must order discovery limited

to the issue of arbitrability and, in disposing of the motion to compel, must apply “the same

standard it applies to a motion for summary judgment.” Kaneff v. Del. Title Loans, Inc., 587

F.3d 616, 620 (3d Cir. 2009); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The court applies the summary judgment

standard because a motion to compel arbitration is “in effect a summary disposition of the

issue of whether or not there had been a meeting of the minds on the agreement to arbitrate.”

Century Indem. Co., 584 F.3d at 528. Under this standard, “the party opposing arbitration is

given the benefit of all reasonable doubts and inferences that may arise.” Kaneff, 587 F.3d at

620. “Only when there is no genuine issue of fact concerning the formation of the agreement

should the court decide as a matter of law that the parties did or did not enter into such an

agreement.” Vilches v. Travelers Cos., 413 F. App'x 487, 491 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted).

In this case, the Court found that the complaint was silent with respect to the existence

of an arbitration agreement, that no documents were attached to the complaint, and that the

complaint did not expressly reference any documents. (Doc. 19, at 6). Thus, in accordance

with Guidotti, the court ordered additional, limited discovery focused on the issue of whether

a valid agreement to arbitrate was entered into by the parties and whether Hoffman’s claims

are governed by that agreement. (Doc. 19, at 8). The parties have conducted this discovery

and Genpact has filed a renewed motion to compel arbitration. Therefore, the Court applies

the summary judgment standard of review to this motion. See Zirpoli v. Midland Funding LLC,

No. 1:19-CV-01428, 2021 WL 2826720, at *3 (M.D. Pa. July 7, 2021) (applying summary

judgment standard of review to renewed motion to compel arbitration after parties completed

limited discovery).

B. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 56

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment should be

granted only if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” only if it might

affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A

dispute of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence “is such that a reasonable jury could return

a verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In deciding

a summary judgment motion, all inferences “should be drawn in the light most favorable to

the non-moving party, and where the non-moving party's evidence contradicts the movant's,

then the non-movant's must be taken as true.” Pastore v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 24 F.3d 508, 512

(3d Cir. 1994).

A federal court should grant summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a

judgment as a matter of law.” Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2000).

The Court need not accept mere conclusory allegations, whether they are made in the

complaint or a sworn statement. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990). In

deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court's function is not to make credibility

determinations, weigh evidence, or draw inferences from the facts. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.

Rather, the court must simply “determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson,

477 U.S. at 249.

“Although the party opposing summary judgment is entitled to the ‘benefit of all

factual inferences in the court's consideration of a motion for summary judgment, the

nonmoving party must point to some evidence in the record that creates a genuine issue of

material fact.’”3 Velentzas v. U.S., No. 4: CV-07-1255, 2010 WL 3896192, *7 (M.D. Pa. August

31, 2010) (quoting Goode v. Nash, 241 F. App'x 868, 868 (3d Cir. 2007)) (citation omitted).

The opposing party “cannot rest solely on assertions made in the pleadings, legal

memorandum, or oral argument.” Goode, 241 F. App'x at 868 (internal quotation marks

omitted). If the non-moving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence

of an element essential to [the non-movant's] case, and on which [the non-movant] will bear

the burden of proof at trial,” Rule 56 mandates the entry of summary judgment because such

a failure “necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

322–23 (1986).

With respect to cross-motions for summary judgment, “[e]ach movant must

demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists; if both parties fail to carry their

respective burdens, the court must deny [both] motions.” Quarles v. Palakovich, 736 F. Supp.

2d 941, 946 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (citing Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1023 (3d Cir.

2008)). However, a federal court should grant summary judgment “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Farrell, 206 F.3d at 278.

III. DISCUSSION

In the renewed motion to compel arbitration, Genpact requests that the Court issue an

3 See also Beenick v. LeFebvre, 684 F. App’x 200, 206 (3d Cir. 2017) (stating the purpose

of requiring parties to cite to particular parts of the record in their briefs about a motion

for summary judgment is to “assist the court in locating materials buried in a voluminous

record”) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A)).

Order: (1) “compelling [Hoffman] to arbitrate her claims in accordance with the terms of the

enforceable arbitration agreement with [Genpact]; and (2) “staying this action under 9 U.S.C.

§ 3 until an arbitration is had in accordance with the Court’s order to arbitrate.” (Doc. 34, at

1). Genpact asserts that Hoffman “is a party to an enforceable agreement to arbitrate whereby

she agreed to submit all employment-related disputes with [Genpact] to binding arbitration.”

(Doc. 34, at 2). In opposition, Hoffman argues that she should not be bound by the arbitration

provision in the Employment agreement for multiple reasons, including the “[f]raudulently

coercive obtained signature on the Arbitration Agreement by means of fraud on the part of

Genpact.” (Doc. 37, at 1). As noted supra, when deciding a motion to compel arbitration, a

court must ascertain whether “(1) a valid agreement to arbitrate exists, and (2) the particular

dispute falls within the scope of that agreement.” Aetrex Worldwide, 555 F. App'x at 154.

First, Hoffman maintains that she was not provided an opportunity to receive a printed

copy of the Employment Agreement and Genpact failed to provide an explanation of the

Employment Agreement. (Doc 37, at 2). Hoffman also asserts that she was not informed that

she could log into the electronic signing system at any time to print a document and that she

was not given the time or resources to obtain the web link to view the policies, agreements,

and modules contained within the Employment Agreement. (Doc. 37, at 6). Second, Hoffman

avers that Genpact used coercive tactics, such as keeping the lights in the onboarding room

“mostly off,” and telling the participants they could not leave the conference room until

everything was completed. (Doc. 37, at 6). Next, Hoffman contends that the Employment

Agreement is procedurally and substantively unconscionable. (Doc. 37, at 7-11).

A. A VALID CONTRACT EXISTS.

Applying basic principles of Pennsylvania contract law, the Court finds that the

Employment Agreement, which includes the arbitration provision, is a valid, enforceable

contract. Arbitration is a matter of contract, and a party cannot be forced to arbitrate “unless

that party has entered an agreement to do so.” Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,

Inc., 7 F.3d 1110, 1114 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Century Indem. Co., 584 F.3d at 524. Thus, before

compelling arbitration, a court must determine (1) “that a valid agreement to arbitrate exists

between the parties.” Pritzker, 7 F.3d at 1114. “Because arbitration is a matter of contact,”

“[t]o determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate, we turn to ordinary state-law

principles that govern the formation of contracts.” Kirleis, 560 F.3d at 160. Under

Pennsylvania law, a valid contract requires: (1) a mutual manifestation of intention to be

bound by the agreement; (2) terms sufficiently definite to be enforced; and (3) consideration.

Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595, 603 (3d Cir. 2002). “In the employment context,

arbitration agreements will be upheld when they are ‘specific enough (i.e. unambiguous) to

cover the employee's claims’ and ‘the employee has expressly agreed to abide by the terms of

[the] agreement.’ ” Kirleis v. Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C., 560 F.3d 156, 160-61 (3d Cir.

2009) (quoting Quiles v. Fin. Exch. Co., 879 A.2d 281, 285 (Pa. Super. 2005)).

In this instance, the mutual intent to be bound by the agreement to use JAMS for

dispute resolution is evident in the fact that Hoffman read and electronically signed the

Employment Agreement on October 8, 2018. (Doc. 35-5, at 30). In Pennsylvania, as in most

jurisdictions, a signature on a contract is evidence of legal assent. Dicent v. Kaplan Univ., 758

F. App’x 311, 313 (3d Cir. 2019); Morales v. Sun Constructors, Inc., 541 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir.

2008) (“Acceptance is not measured by the parties’ subjective intent, but rather by their

outward expressions of assent.”). Importantly, Pennsylvania recognizes e-signatures “as a

valid means to register legal assent.” Dicent, 758 F. App'x at 313; see also 73 P.S. § 2260.305

(“An electronic record or electronic signature is attributable to a person if it was the act of a

person. The act of a person may be shown in any manner, including a showing of the efficacy

of any security procedure applied to determine the person to which the electronic record or

electronic signature was attributable.”). Furthermore, it is well-settled that an employer has

“no obligation to ensure [an employee] digested the contract terms, consulted with counsel

or had time to deliberate or negotiate. An employer may offer a contract to a prospective

employee on a take-it or leave-it basis.” Smith v. Creative Res., Inc., No. 97-CV-6749, 1998 WL

808605 *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 23, 1998) (“A literate adult may not avoid a contractual obligation

on the ground that he did not read or understand the terms of the contract.”).

Hoffman asserts that she was fraudulently coerced to sign the Employment

Agreement. (Doc. 37, at 1). In response, Genpact argues that Hoffman “failed to offer any

specific factual allegations, let alone any evidence, that she was tricked or coerced into signing

the Employment Agreement.” (Doc. 29, at 9). The Court finds that Hoffman was not “by the

unlawful act of another, [ ] induced to enter into [a] contractual relationship[ ] under such

circumstances as to indicate that [s]he has been deprived of the exercise of free will.” Harsco

Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 911 (3d. Cir. 1985). In Harsco, the Third Circuit found that

despite the defendant alleging that he was “humiliated, harassed, cursed at and threatened by

plaintiff’s employees, to force defendant to sign the Employment Agreement against his

will . . . [t]he court concluded that [defendant] was not the victim of economic duress because

the situation that caused him to fear the loss of his job . . . was of his own making.” Harsco

Corp., 779 F.2d at 911. The Third Circuit also noted that “[The plaintiff] did not manipulate

[the defendant’s] financial circumstances to render him more susceptible to economic

pressure.” Harsco Corp., 779 F.2d at 911. Similarly, Hoffman has not suggested that Genpact

has engaged in such conduct here. See Mason v. Lowe's Companies, Inc., No. CV 19-973, 2020

WL 3574313, at *4 (W.D. Pa. June 30, 2020).

Next, the terms and conditions of the Employment Agreement and arbitration

provision are sufficiently definite to establish a binding and enforceable agreement. In

Pennsylvania, it is a well-settled legal principle that adequate consideration exists for an

agreement attendant to an employment relationship where the agreement was entered into at

the inception of the relationship, even where the employment is at-will. See Rullex Co., LLC v.

Tel-Stream, Inc., 232 A.3d 620, 627 (Pa. Supreme 2020) (“for a restrictive covenant executed

after the first day of employment to be enforceable absent new consideration, the parties must

have agreed to its essential provisions as of the beginning of the employment relationship.”);

see also Modern Laundry & Dry Cleaning v. Farrer, 370 Pa.Super. 288, 536 A.2d 409, 411 (Pa.

Super. 1988) (discussing consideration and restrictive covenants in employment agreements

and stating, “as long as the restrictive covenant is an auxiliary part of the taking of

employment and not a later attempt to impose additional restrictions on an unsuspecting

employee, a contract of employment containing such a covenant is supported by valid

consideration and is therefore enforceable.”); Barb-Lee Mobile Frame Co. v. Hoot, 206 A.2d 59

(Pa. 1965) (stating that if a noncompetition clause is executed at the inception of the

employment, the consideration to support the covenant may be the award of the position

itself); Morgan's Home Equipment Corp. v. Martucci, 390 Pa. 618, 136 A.2d 838 (Pa. 1957)

(holding covenant not to compete may be enforceable if contained in an employment

agreement executed upon the taking of employment); see generally Grant v. Phila. Eagles LLC,

No. 09-1222, 2009 WL 1846231, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 24, 2009) (collecting cases that discuss

employment as consideration in support of an arbitration agreement).

The Employment Agreement and arbitration provision are clearly supported by

consideration. As noted supra, the arbitration provision itself clearly states that by accepting

employment with Genpact and electronically signing the Employment Agreement, Hoffman

both understood the terms of the arbitration agreement and agreed to be bound by them. (Doc.

35-5, at 28). The arbitration provision unambiguously notified Hoffman that her employment

with Genpact meant that she agreed “to arbitrate any and all common law and/or statutory

claims under local, state, or federal law,” and that she waived any right to trial by jury. (Doc.

35-5, at 26-27). The provision provided a web link to the JAMS rules and procedures so that

Hoffman may obtain information about the arbitration process. (Doc. 35-5, at 27). The

arbitration provision noted that by agreeing to the Employment Agreement, Hoffman

acknowledged that she read the agreement and asked any questions needed for her to

understand the terms, consequences, and binding effect of the agreement. (Doc. 35-5, at 28).

In this instance, both Genpact and Hoffman agreed to resolve employment-related

disputes through the JAMS program. (Doc. 35-5, at 27). The provision states, “I agree that

any arbitration will be administered by [JAMS].” (Doc. 35-5, at 27). These mutual promises

to submit claims to dispute resolution in and of themselves are sufficient consideration to

support the enforceability of the arbitration provision. See Asberry-Jones v. Wells Fargo Bank,

Nat'l Ass'n, No. 19-CV-83, 2019 WL 2077731, at *5 (E.D. Pa. May 10, 2019) (finding that

consideration was sufficient where plaintiff signed the arbitration agreement as a condition of

her employment and arbitration agreement recited parties’ mutual exchange of promises to

be bound by arbitration). Additional consideration exists in this instance based on the fact

that Hoffman was employed by Genpact after electronically signing the Employment

Agreement on October 8, 2018, until her employment was terminated on September 11, 2020.

(Doc. 1, at 28). Therefore, the Court finds that the Employment Agreement is supported by

adequate consideration as both parties agreed to be mutually bound by arbitration and

Hoffman signed the Employment Agreement, which contains the arbitration agreement, as a

condition of her employment. See Asberry-Jones, 2019 WL 2077731, at *5.

Accordingly, the Court finds that there is no genuine dispute of material fact that the

Employment Agreement, which contains the arbitration agreement, is a valid and enforceable

contract supported by consideration.

B. THE ARBITRATION PROVISION IS NOT UNCONSCIONABLE.

Hoffman argues that the arbitration agreement is unenforceable because it is

substantively and procedurally unconscionable under Pennsylvania law. (Doc. 37, at 7-11).

Genpact counters that there is nothing unconscionable about the arbitration agreement. (Doc.

35, at 18-26).

Unconscionability is a “contractual remedy which serves to relieve a party from an

unfair contract or from an unfair portion of a contract.” Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183

F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Germantown Mfg. Co. v. Rawlinson, 491 A.2d 138, 145

(Pa. Super. Ct. 1985)). “To prove unconscionability under Pennsylvania law, a party must

show that the contract is both substantively and procedurally unconscionable.” Quilloin v.

Tenet HealthSystem Phila., Inc., 673 F.3d 221, 230 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Salley v. Option One

Mortg. Corp., 925 A.2d 115 (Pa. 2007)) (emphasis added). This requires the plaintiff show “(1)

that the contractual terms are unreasonably favorable to the drafter (‘substantive

unconscionability’), and (2) that there is no meaningful choice on the part of the other party

regarding the acceptance of the provisions (‘procedural unconscionability’).” Cardinal v.

Kindred Healthcare Inc., 155 A.3d 46, 53 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citing MacPherson v. Magee Mem.

Hosp., 128 A.3d 1209, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015)).

“[T]he Pennsylvania Supreme Court has indicated that it might be appropriate to use

a ‘sliding scale approach’ so that where the procedural unconscionability is very high, a lesser

degree of substantive unconscionability may be required and presumably, vice-versa.”

Cardinal, 155 A.3d at 53. “This ‘sliding scale approach’ does not, however, eliminate a party's

obligation to demonstrate the existence of both procedural and substantive

unconscionability.” Caparra v. Maggiano's Inc., No. 14-5722, 2015 WL 5144030 *5 (E.D. Pa.

Sept. 1, 2015). The burden of proof for unconscionability rests on the party challenging the

arbitration agreement. Salley, 925 A.2d. at 119-20. If there is a high degree of procedural

unconscionability, then “a lesser degree of substantive unconscionability may be required.”

Quilloin, 673 F.3d at 230 (quoting Salley, 925 A.2d at 125 n.12). Regardless, a party

challenging a contract as unconscionable must prove both prongs—procedural and

substantive unconscionability—to succeed. Quilloin, 673 F.3d at 230.

1. The arbitration agreement is not substantively unconscionable.

Hoffman argues that the Employment is substantively unconscionable because: (1) “it

required the employee to pay excessive unknown costs for arbitration;” (2) “it prohibited the

employee from recovering attorneys’ fees or other costs, but also charging the Plaintiff with

the expense of the attorneys’ fees;” (3) “it restricted the arbitrator’s award to money damages

only, forbidding the arbitrator from awarding punitive damages, statutory penalties, or

equitable remedies;” and (4) “it prohibited the employee from arbitrating any State, Federal

and Constitutional, NLRB, FMLA etc. claims.” (Doc. 37, at 10-11).

“Substantive unconscionability refers to contractual terms that are unreasonably or

grossly favorable to one side and to which the disfavored party does not assent.” Harris, 183

F.3d at 181. The U.S. Supreme Court has rejected the broad assertion that arbitral panels are

inherently favorable to one side, thereby invalidating the argument that a contract requiring

arbitration is, on its own, substantively unconscionable. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson

Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30 (1991) (“declin[ing] to indulge the presumption that the parties

and the arbitral body conducting a proceeding will be unable or unwilling to retain competent,

conscientious and impartial arbitrators.”) (cleaned up). The U.S. Supreme Court has further

clarified that this principle applies even though it limits employees' rights, holding that

mandatory arbitration that takes away employees' access to courts and attendant procedural

protections is not inherently problematic. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105,

120-21 (2001). So in the absence of specific additional facts suggesting unconscionability or

other grounds for invalidation, an arbitration agreement, even in an employment contract,

must be enforced. Circuit City Stores, 532 U.S. at 120-21; Edwards v. Hovensa, LLC, 497 F.3d

355, 363 (3d Cir. 2007). That is true even if the agreement goes so far as to specify an

individual arbitrator or the rules that will govern the arbitration. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138

S.Ct. 1612, 1621 (2018) (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court has “often observed that the

Arbitration Act requires courts rigorously to enforce arbitration agreements according to their

terms, including terms that specify with whom the parties choose to arbitrate their disputes and

the rules under which that arbitration will be conducted”) (emphasis in original) (cleaned up).

First, the arbitration agreement is not substantively unconscionable as it does not

require Hoffman to pay excessive fees. Rather, the Employment Agreement, by incorporating

the JAMS Rules, provides that Genpact will pay all of the arbitration fees, less the initial case

management fee. (Doc. 35-5, at 27); see JAMS Rule 31(c) (providing that “[i]f an Arbitration

is based on a clause or agreement that is required as a condition of employment, the only fee

that an Employee may be required to pay is the initial JAMS Case Management Fee.”); see

also JAMS, Arbitration Schedule of Fees and Costs, available at

https://www.jamsadr.com/arbitration-fees, last accessed July 13, 2022. Furthermore, the

Employment Agreement states that fees will be divided evenly “to the extent allowed under

the applicable law,” and that Hoffman “shall only pay so much of the filing fees as [she] would

have instead paid had [she] filed a complaint in a court of law.” (Doc. 35-5, at 27). The JAMS

Rules provide that Hoffman may only be required to pay the initial JAMS Case Management

Fee, which is $400 compared to the $402 filing fee to initiate a civil action in this Court, with

Genpact paying all remaining fees. See JAMS Rule 31(c). These provisions do not make “the

arbitral form prohibitively expensive” for Hoffman. See Golden Gate Nat’l Senior Care, LLC v.

Sulpizio, No. 1:15-CV-00174, 2016 WL 1271333, at *5-6 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2016) (holding

that the $250 fee required by plaintiff was “the approximate cost of filing a court action” and

not unconscionable).

Second, Genpact and Hoffman dispute whether the arbitration agreement is

unconscionable regarding the recovery of attorneys’ fees. “Provisions requiring parties to be

responsible for their own expenses, including attorneys' fees, are generally unconscionable

because restrictions on attorneys' fees conflict with federal statutes providing fee-shifting as a

remedy.” Quillion, 673 F.3d at 230-231 (collecting cases); see Nino v. Jewelry Exch., Inc., 609

F.3d 191, 203 (3d Cir. 2010) (cleaned up). This generalization is only applicable when the

provision requires the litigant to bear legal fees and costs regardless of the outcome of the

arbitration and disallows fee-shifting. See Quillion, 673 F.3d at 231; Alexander v. Anthony Int'l,

L.P., 341 F.3d 256, (3d Cir. 2003) (fee provision substantively unconscionable under Virgin

Islands law where the agreement substantially limited the available remedies to plaintiffs);

Spinetti v. Serv. Corp. Intern., 324 F.3d 212, 214-15 (3d Cir. 2003) (addressing a provision that

required the litigant to bear costs regardless of the outcome of arbitration). If the agreement

is ambiguous with respect to the arbitrator's ability to fashion an appropriate award, this

ambiguity must be addressed by the arbitrator in the first instance. See Quillion, 673 F.3d at

231. In Quillion, the Third Circuit found an ambiguity with respect to the employee's ability

to obtain fees as a remedy where explicit provisions in the parties' agreement contradicted

each other as to the availability or non-availability of fees and costs. Quillion, 673 F.3d at 231.

Here, in relevant part, the arbitration provision provides:

I also agree that the arbitrator shall have the power to award any remedies

available under applicable law, and that the arbitrator may award attorneys’

fees and costs to the prevailing party . . . . I understand that to the extent allowed

under applicable law, the company and I will evenly divide any and all costs

for any administrative or hearing fees charged by the arbitrator or JAMS except

that I shall pay any filing fees associated with any arbitration that I initiate, but

only so much of the filing fees as I would have instead paid had I filed a

complaint in a court of law.

(Doc. 35-5, at 27).

The Court finds that the arbitration agreement is ambiguous regarding the award of attorneys’

fees because one provision provides that Hoffman will bear her own legal costs and another

provision provides that the arbitrator may award attorneys’ fees to the extent allowed under

applicable law. However, the Supreme Court has clearly established that ambiguities in

arbitration agreements must be interpreted by the arbitrator. PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book,

538 U.S. 401, 406-07 (2003). The Court explained that “we should not, on the basis of mere

speculation that an arbitrator might interpret . . . ambiguous agreements in a manner that

casts their enforceability into doubt, take upon ourselves the authority to decide the

antecedent question of how the ambiguity is to be resolved.” PacifiCare, 538 U.S. at 406-07

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Alabama State Fed'n of Labor v.

McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 461 (1945) (“It has long been [our] considered practice not to decide

abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions . . . .”). Rather than speculate as to whether a

certain interpretation of an ambiguity might render an arbitration agreement unenforceable,

“the proper course [in such a case] is to compel arbitration.” PacifiCare, 538 U.S. at 406-07.

Accordingly, the Court finds that compelling arbitration is appropriate.

Finally, the Third Circuit has held that an arbitration agreement is not substantively

unconscionable, even if it requires an employee to submit all of his claims to arbitration, if

the agreement “does not alter or limit the rights and remedies available to that party in the

arbitral forum.” Edwards, 497 F.3d at 364 (applying Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20). Nothing in this

agreement to arbitrate limits or alters the rights available to Hoffman in an arbitral forum, and

contrary to Hoffman’s assertion, the arbitration provision expressly provides that an arbitrator

may award any remedies available under applicable law. (Doc. 35-5, at 27). Moreover, the

arbitration agreement applies with equal force to both Genpact and Hoffman.

The Supreme Court has rejected the sort of “generalized attacks on arbitration” that

“rest on suspicion of arbitration as a method of weakening the protections afforded in the

substantive law to would-be complainants.” Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30 (cleaned up). This includes

speculation “that arbitration panels will be biased[,]” or concerns about matters such as the

“more limited” discovery available in arbitration, the lack of “written opinions”

accompanying arbitration decisions, and “[m]ere inequality in bargaining power” between

parties. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30-33. Here, Hoffman offers only the general concern that the

arbitration provision prohibits her “from arbitrating any State, Federal and Constitutional,

NLRB, FMLA etc. claims.” (Doc. 37, at 11). However, the arbitration agreement appears to

establish a fair arbitration process that applies equally to Genpact and Hoffman, and does not

impose undue costs or burdens on Hoffman, the complaining former employee. The provision

expressly provides: “nothing in this agreement constitutes a waiver of any rights [Hoffman]

may have under applicable law.” (Doc. 35-5, at 27). In addition, the arbitrator is directed to

“apply applicable law” and is empowered to issue a binding award of any remedies and

attorneys’ fees available under applicable law. (Doc. 35-5, at 27).

The Court finds that this is a fair arbitration provision. In any event, Hoffman has

failed to cite or identify any of the “series of provisions” that she believes unduly favor

Genpact. If such provisions do exist, it was her burden to direct them to the Court's attention

and explain why they are unconscionable. See DeShields v. Int'l Resort Props. Ltd., 463 F. App'x

117, 120 (3d Cir. 2012) (“If factual support for DeShields's claim existed in the record, it was

incumbent upon her to direct the District Court's attention to those facts.”); Bernard v. Webb-

McRae, et al., No. 17-7030, 2020 WL 1329934, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 23, 2020) (“It is not the

Court's responsibility to sift through the record in order to make Plaintiff's arguments for

him.”) (citation omitted).

Accordingly, the Court finds that the purported arbitration agreement is not

substantively unconscionable because it does not favor either party, hinder either party's

substantive rights, or limit remedies unfairly. The Court finds that there is no genuine dispute

of material fact regarding substantive unconscionability.

2. The arbitration agreement is not procedurally unconscionable.

Even if Hoffman had raised a genuine dispute of material fact as to substantive

unconscionability, the Court nonetheless finds that Hoffman did not raise a genuine dispute

of material fact as to whether the arbitration agreement was procedurally unconscionable.

Hoffman argues that procedural unconscionability arises because the agreement (1) “was

imposed as a ‘take it or leave it’ proposition at the time of hiring without offering the employee

any opportunity to negotiate any of its terms;” (2) “was a complex, 15 page document ‘riddled

with complex legal terminology for 4 different types of legal arguments which require different

types of state & federal law/s that apply;” (3) “there is a huge amount of ‘in-equality of

bargaining power throughout the entire arbitration agreement;” and (4) “failed to state what

arbitration rules would apply to the proceeding has a misleading confusing link to another

area which was also not able to be printed out for review.” (Doc. 37, at 7-9) (emphasis in

original). Genpact asserts that Hoffman’s claims are patently false.

The Third Circuit has explained procedural unconscionability as follows:

“Procedural unconscionability pertains to the process by which an agreement

is reached and the form of an agreement, including the use therein of fine print

and convoluted or unclear language.” Harris, 183 F.3d at 181 (citing E. Allan

Farnsworth, Contracts § 4.28 (2d ed. 1990)). This element is generally satisfied

if the agreement constitutes a contract of adhesion. A contract of adhesion “ ‘is

one which is prepared by the party with excessive bargaining power who

presents it to the other party for signature on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.’ ”

A contract, however, is “not unconscionable merely because the parties to it

are unequal in bargaining position.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts, supra,

§ 208 cmt. d; see also, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,

33, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991); Great Western Mortgage Corp. [v.

Peacock], 110 F.3d [222, 229 (3d Cir. 1997)]; Pritzker, 7 F.3d at 1118. An

adhesion contract is not necessarily unenforceable. See, e.g., Seus [v. John Nuveen

& Co., Inc., 146 F.3d 175, 184 (3d Cir. 1998)].

Alexander, 341 F.3d at 265 (citations omitted).

In evaluating procedural unconscionability, courts consider “the take-it-or-leave-it

nature of the standardized form of the document, the parties' relative bargaining positions,

and the degree of economic compulsion motivating the adhering party.” Quilloin, 673 F.3d at

235 (quoting Salley, 925 A.2d at 125) (cleaned up).

Here, Genpact offered Hoffman the arbitration agreement on a “take-it-or-leave-it”

basis. Genpact asserts that Hoffman was given the opportunity to ask questions about the

Employment Agreement during the onboarding process, and that she did indeed ask

questions about the assignment of inventions provision, but did not ask about the arbitration

provisions. (Doc. 35, at 23-24). In an affidavit signed by Joseph Fernandez, the previous

Management Trainee at Genpact, Fernandez attested that “[n]ew hires were allowed to take

breaks as needed and were not forced to stay in the conference room until they finished the

onboarding documents;” “new hires could print documents from SilkRoad at home by

logging in to their account with the instructions provided in the initial email sent to them;” “I

did not give new hires a time limit to complete the onboarding documents;” and “[a]t no point

did Ms. Hoffman ask me for additional time to complete any onboarding document.” (Doc.

35-2, at 2-6). However, the arbitration agreement provides that it is a condition of employment

with Genpact to arbitrate all employment-related disputes. (Doc. 35-5, at 26). Further, the

Employment Agreement does not provide that employees may negotiate or modify the

provisions contained therein unless such modification is “in a writing signed by the CEO or

CFO of [Genpact] and [Hoffman].” (Doc. 35-5, at 29); see (Doc. 35-5, at 19). Yet, “[t]he fact

that [an employer] essentially made the terms of the application a precondition to

employment does not rise to the level of procedural unconscionability.” Noye v. Johnson &

Johnson, No. 1:15-CV-2382, 2017 WL 5135191, at *8 n.9 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 6, 2017) (quoting

Sams v. Common Ground, No. 329600, 2017 WL 430233, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2017)).

The parties' relative bargaining position or “economic strength” lends little support to

Hoffman's unconscionability argument. Admittedly, Genpact is represented to be a “global

professional services firm.” (Doc. 36, at 1). However, as of October 8, 2018, Hoffman was

fired by Genpact to work full-time as a “payroll specialist,” which is a “back office operations

position.” (Doc. 1, ¶ 20). Hoffman avers that she has “13 years experience in back office

banking operations at a bank,” and “previously worked in the capacity of setup, training and

processing of corporate payroll clients.” (Doc. 1, ¶ 20). Thus, the Court is unpersuaded that

Hoffman “lack[ed] a meaningful choice” at the time she signed the arbitration agreement as

she had significant employment experience and was qualified to search for positions

elsewhere. See Quilloin, 673 at 237.

Nonetheless, to the extent that any disparity in bargaining power or economic strength

exists, the Court notes that the arbitration agreement is only three pages, is titled in large font-

size “ARBITRATION AND EQUITABLE RELIEF,” and states in bold typeface: “I agree

to arbitrate any and all common law and/or statutory claims under local, state, or federal law,

including, but not limited to, claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the

[ADA], . . . the [FMLA], . . . and claims of harassment, discrimination, wrongful termination,

and breach of contract, except as prohibited by law.” (Doc. 35-5, at 26-27). Finally, as to the

“degree of economic compulsion” or “alternative sources of supply,” Hoffman has not

demonstrated that she lacked alternatives or faced a “degree of economic compulsion” when

she signed the arbitration agreement. Quilloin, 673 F.3d at 235-36. Thus, the Court finds that

Hoffman has not adequately demonstrated that the arbitration agreement is procedurally

unconscionable.

Accordingly, having determined that the arbitration agreement is neither

unconscionable, the Court finds that there is no genuine dispute that a valid arbitration

agreement exists between Hoffman and Genpact. Flintkote Co. v. Aviva PLC, 769 F.3d 215, 220

(3d Cir. 2014). The Court turns next to whether Hoffman’s claims against Genpact fall within

the scope of the arbitration agreement.

C. HOFFMAN’S CLAIMS AGAINST GENPACT ARE WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE

ARBITRATION AGREEMENT.

To determine whether Hoffman's claims fall within the scope of the arbitration

agreement, the Court shall apply ordinary principles of contract interpretation. See Russell v.

Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., No. 4:14-CV-00148, 2014 WL 6634892, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Nov.

21, 2014) (“Because arbitration is strictly a matter of contract, arbitration agreements are

subject to the principles of contract interpretation.”). “The fundamental rule in contract

interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the contracting parties. In cases of a written contract,

the intent of the parties is the writing itself.” Lesko v. Frankford Hosp.-Bucks Cty., 15 A.3d 337,

123 (Pa. 2011) (cleaned up). In Pennsylvania, “in determining the intent of the contracting

parties, all provisions in the agreement will be construed together and each will be given

effect.” Lesko, 15 A.3d at 123 (cleaned up). This means that courts should “not interpret one

provision of a contract in a manner which results in another portion being annulled.” Lesko,

15 A.3d at 123 (cleaned up); see also Lawson v. City of Philadelphia, No. 18-CV-1912, 2019 WL

934976, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 2019) (“As a general principle, a contract should be read as

a whole and no provision should be interpreted to be meaningless.”); Comm'cns Workers of

Am., AFL-CIO v. Verizon Servs. Corp., Dist. 13, No. 10-CV-6840, 2011 WL 3438193, at *4 (E.D.

Pa. Aug. 5, 2011) (“Plaintiff's interpretation of these two sections of the agreement would put

them at odds with one another, and render the bargaining agreement meaningless. However,

in making a determination concerning the clarity or ambiguity of a contract term, the Court

should avoid interpreting contractual language in a way that renders any term of the contract

meaningless or superfluous. In order to avoid applying a meaning that would render a portion

of the contract superfluous, the Court finds that each of the two aforementioned quotations

deal with separate issues.”).

Hoffman does not respond to the scope of arbitration requirement and fails to make

any argument her employment discrimination and retaliation claims are outside the scope of

the arbitration agreement. As noted supra, under the arbitration agreement, Hoffman and

Genpact agreed to “arbitrate any and all common law and/or statutory claims . . . including,

but not limited to, claims under [Title VII], the [ADA] . . . the [FMLA], . . . and claims of

harassment, discrimination, [and] wrongful termination . . . .” (Doc. 35-5, at 26-27).

Therefore, based on the clear language of the arbitration agreement, there is no dispute of

material fact that Hoffman’s claims under Title VII, the ADA, the FMLA, and the PHRA for

harassment, discrimination, and wrongful termination related to her employment with

Genpact and fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement. (Doc. 1); Asberry-Jones, 2019

WL 2077731, at *5 (finding that plaintiff did not respond to scope of arbitration requirements

and language of arbitration agreement “clearly and unambiguously requires arbitration” of

all her claims).

Accordingly, Genpact’s motion (Doc. 34) shall be GRANTED, and this action shall

be referred to arbitration in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Employment

Agreement.

D. THIS MATTER SHALL BE STAYED.

Having concluded that Hoffman's claims are subject to arbitration, the Court considers

whether to stay this action pending the completion of arbitration. If a court determines that

an issue in a case or proceeding is referable to arbitration it must, upon application of one of

the parties, stay the proceedings until the conclusion of the arbitration. 9 U.S.C. § 3; see also

Puleo v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 605 F.3d 172, 181-82 (3d Cir. 2010); Lloyd v. HOVENSA, L.L.C.,

369 F.3d 263, 269 (3d Cir. 2004). District courts in the Third Circuit have no discretion in

deciding whether to stay or dismiss the proceedings upon determining that any of the claims

or issues are referable to arbitration. If one of the parties applies for a stay, a stay must be

granted. Lloyd, 369 F.3d at 269. Here, Genpact moves to stay proceedings in the present action

pending the completion of the arbitration. (Doc. 35, at 27). Accordingly, the Court shall stay

this matter pending the completion of the arbitration.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Genpact’s motion to compel arbitration (Doc. 34) is

GRANTED. The Court shall stay this matter pending the completion of the arbitration.4

An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

Dated: September 12, 2022 s/ Karoline Mehalchick

KAROLINE MEHALCHICK

Chief United States Magistrate Judge

4 As this matter is stayed pending the completion of arbitration in this matter,

Hoffman’s remaining motions (Doc. 43; Doc. 46; Doc. 48) are DENIED as moot, without

prejudice to Hoffman revisiting these motions upon completion of arbitration in this matter.