Redclift v. Schuylkill County

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SEAN REDCLIFT, ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:21-CV-1866

Individually and as ADMINISTRATOR )

of the Estate of Stacy Redclift, )

Plaintiff )

v. ) (ARBUCKLE, M.J.)

)

SCHUYLKILL COUNTY ,et. al. )

Defendants )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

PrimeCare Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 88)

I. INTRODUCTION

Tragically, Stacy Redclift took her own life when she was detained at the

Schuykill County Prison. Her family now brings this civil rights action against a

variety of actors, from the police officers who arrested her to prison guards, alleging

they displayed deliberate indifference to her known risk of suicide. The medical

providers at the Prison have now moved to partially dismiss the claims against them.1

For the reasons that follow, I will deny the medical providers’ Motion to Dismiss.

II. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case began on November 2, 2021, when Sean Redclift (“Plaintiff” or

Sean),2 acting individually and as the administrator of Stacy Redclift’s estate, filed

1 They do not move to dismiss the negligence claim (Count VII) against them.

2 At times, for simplicity, I will refer to members of the Redclift family by their first

names, without intending any disrespect or undue familiarity.

a Complaint. (Doc. 1). On January 6, 2022, Plaintiff amended his complaint as of

right, and that is now the operative pleading. (Doc. 21).

In this motion to dismiss stage, I will take all facts presented in the Amended

Complaint as true. Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2010). In the early

morning of January 6, 2020, Stacy Redclift was involved in a domestic dispute with

her husband, Sean, and her son, Alexander. (Doc. 21, ¶ 45). Coledale Borough Police

Officer Matthew Jungbaer and Coledale Borough Police Officers John Doe 1 and

John Doe 2 arrived at her residence, and arrested Stacy “due to her allegedly erratic

and non-compliant behavior.” (Id. at ¶ 46). Stacy was later arraigned and released to

her mother’s house. (Id. at ¶ 47).

However, instead of staying at her mother’s house, Stacy returned to her

home, and engaged in erratic and non-compliant behavior. (Id. at ¶ 48). Officer

Jungbaer, and the two John Doe police officers responded to the Redclift home and

arrested Stacy. (Id. at ¶ 49). The officers brought Stacy to the Schuykill County

Prison (the “Prison”). (Id.). However, before she arrived, Sean and Alexander told

the officers that Stacy “had a history of mental illness, psychotic episodes, suicide

attempts/ tendencies, and psychiatric hospitalizations.” (Id. at ¶ 50). Despite this

knowledge, the officers did not communicate this information to anyone at the

Prison, including its medical providers. (Id. at ¶¶ 51-52).

On January 6, 2020, at 12:11 p.m., Stacy was booked and processed at the

Prison. (Id. at ¶ 54). At 1:51 p.m., Nurse Hysock performed a medication verification

for Stacy. (Id. at ¶ 56). Nurse Hysock ordered various medications for Stacy, but

failed to order Stacy’s Paxil, a psychotropic drug. (Id.).

In the early morning of January 7, 2020, Nurse Hollywood conducted a

Stacy’s mental health and suicide screening. (Id. at ¶ 58). Stacy told Nurse

Hollywood that (1) she suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, depression and

bipolar disorder type two, (2) had a history of suicide attempts, (3) had a lengthy

history of inpatient psychiatric hospitalizations, (4) she was currently being cared

for by a psychiatrist for her mental health disorders, (5) that she was on medications

for her medical illnesses, and (6) that she felt like she needed to see a mental health

provider at that time. (Id. at ¶ 62).

The screening indicated that Stacy needed “further psychiatric evaluation,”

but it was never performed. (Id. at ¶ 59). Further, Nurse Hollywood incorrectly

conducted the screening because she failed to obtain information from the Coaldale

Borough Police Officers, and failed to “accurately appreciate, report, or record the

information given to her by Officer Jungbaer, John Doe Coledale Police Officer 1,

John Doe Coaldale Police Officer 2, or Ms. Redclift.” (Id. at ¶ 61). Nurse Hollywood

“reviewed and verified” Stacy’s screening and medication forms at 4:07 a.m. on

January 7, 2020. (Id. at ¶ 63).

Sometime on January 7, 2020, someone discovered that Stacy did not have

her Paxil, and Nurse Practitioner McGowan ordered it for her. (Id. at ¶¶ 64-65).

Despite it being ordered, the order was never approved, and Stacy did not receive

any Paxil during her incarceration. (Id. at ¶ 65). However, Nurse Gross attempted to

give Stacy her other medications, but she refused. (Id. at ¶ 69).

In the late evening of January 7, 2020, Stacy’s cellmate found her hanging by

a noose. (Id. at ¶ 71). Stacy Redclift died the next day. (Id. at ¶ 74).

Because of the aforementioned actions, Plaintiff pleads nine counts against

the various defendants. As applied to this motion, Plaintiff brings a negligence claim,

a wrongful death claim, a survival act claim against Nicole Hollywood LPN, Alyssa

Hysock LPN, Cayla Sullivan LPN, Tara Hamm, LPN, HSA, Paula Dillman-

McGowan, CRNP, Nicole Macaluso CRNP, Catherine Galle, LPN, Kimberly Ryan

LPN, Carina Gross, LPN, Kendle Jemiola, and PrimeCare (“Moving Defendants”).

Plaintiff also brings a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment deliberate

indifference to medical care claim against the individual defendants (all Moving

Defendants besides PrimeCare). Finally, Plaintiff brings a distinct Monell claim for

violations of the Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference to medical needs.

On April 7, 2022, Moving Defendants moved to dismiss some of the claims

against them for failing to state to claim upon which relief can be granted. (Doc. 88).

Moving Defendants seek to dismiss Counts III (deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs and suicide risk), IV (Monell claim against PrimeCare), VIII

(wrongful death), and XI (survival action) of the Amended Complaint.3 Their Brief

in Support was filed on April 12, 2022. (Doc. 94). Plaintiff filed a Brief in Opposition

on May 9, 2022. (Doc. 100). Moving Defendants filed a Reply Brief on May 23,

2022. (Doc. 102). Thus, this Motion is ripe for resolution.

III. THE MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD

A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. It is proper for

the court to dismiss a complaint in accordance with Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure only if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When reviewing a motion to dismiss, the

court “must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, construe the

complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and ultimately determine

whether Plaintiff may be entitled to relief under any reasonable reading of the

complaint.” Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2010). In review of a

motion to dismiss, a court must “consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to

the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents

if the [plaintiff’s] claims are based upon these documents.” Id. at 230.

3 Hence, Moving Defendants did not seek to dismiss the negligence claim against

them at this stage.

In deciding whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted, the court is required to accept as true all factual allegations in the

complaint as well as all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the complaint.

Jordan v. Fox Rothchild, O’Brien & Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir.

1994). These allegations and inferences are to be construed in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff. Id. The court, however, “need not credit a complaint’s bald

assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v. Lower

Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Further, it is not proper to

“assume that the [plaintiff] can prove facts that [he] has not alleged.” Associated

Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519,

526 (1983).

“A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009). Rather, a complaint must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the

plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation. Id. To

determine the sufficiency of a complaint under the pleading regime established by

the Supreme Court, the court must engage in a three-step analysis:

First, the court must take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to

state a claim. Second, the court should identify allegations that, because

they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of

truth. Finally, where they are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court

should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly

give rise to an entitlement for relief.

Santiago v. Warminister Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 675, 679). “In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the

plaintiff’s entitlement to relief” and instead must “‘show’ such an entitlement with

its facts.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009).

As the Court of Appeals has observed:

The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the “plausibility” standard for

overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The

plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege “enough facts to

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard

when the factual pleadings “allow the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,

129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955).

This standard requires showing “more than a sheer possibility that a

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint which pleads facts

“merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, “stops short of the line

between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement of relief.’” Id.

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955).

Burtch v. Millberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011).

IV. DISCUSSION

Moving Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to plead any facts involving the

actions of some of the Moving Defendants, that there was no underlying

Constitutional violation, that Plaintiff failed to properly plead a Monell claim against

PrimeCare, and that Pennsylvania Wrongful Death and Survival Act does not

provide a cause of action. I’ll discuss each argument in turn.

A. THE PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT OF SOME OF THE DEFENDANTS

Moving Defendants argue that Plaintiff “alleges no facts of personal

involvement of Cayla Sullivan, LPN, Catherine Galle, LPN, Kimberly Ryan, LPN

or Kendal Jemiola.” (Doc. 95, p. 6). Plaintiff counters by arguing that all these

defendants were personally involved, and they knew about Stacy’s condition but

failed to act appropriately.4 (Doc. 100, pp. 25-27). Here, I agree with Plaintiff. He

has alleged enough facts, though just barely.

To state a § 1983 claim, a Plaintiff must allege that each defendant had

“personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing.” Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347,

353 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir.

1988)); Clemens v. Warden SCI Greene, 290 F. Supp. 3d 388, 395 (E.D. Pa. 2018).

This includes “describing the defendant’s participation in or actual knowledge of

and acquiescence in the wrongful conduct.” Id. Simply put, “[l]iability under § 1983

is personal in nature and can only follow personal involvement in the alleged

wrongful conduct shown through specific allegations of personal direction or of

actual knowledge and acquiescence in the challenged practice.” Quarles v.

Palakovich, 736 F. Supp. 2d 941, 949 (M.D. Pa. 2010).

4 In support of this argument, and of others, Plaintiff asks the Court to consider parts

of Stacy’s medical records that he attached to his Brief in Opposition. The Court

declines to consider them, as they are not integral to the Amended Complaint, nor

does the Amended Complaint rely on it. Borough of Moosic v. Darwin Nat. Assur.

Co., 556 F. App’x 92, 95 (3d Cir. 2014).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that these defendants had:

(1) the responsibility of preventing inmate suicide, (Doc. 21, ¶118);

(2) worked at the Prison during Stacy’s short incarceration, (Id. at ¶ 120);

(3) knew or should have known that Stacy had “ a history of mental illness,

psychotic episodes, suicide attempts/tendencies, and psychiatric

hospitalizations prior to the time she was incarcerated at the Schuylkill

County Prison, and that she was currently treating for mental illness and

was on medication for the same,” (Id. at ¶ 121);

(4) knew or should have known that she was especially vulnerable to suicide,e

(Id. at ¶ 123); and,

(5) knew or should have known that Stacy needed a proper evaluation of her

self-harm risk. (Id. at ¶ 125).

The Court finds that Plaintiff has plead sufficient facts against these

individuals at this stage.5 These individuals have fair notice of the claims Plaintiff is

making against them, and once discovery begins, the Court and the parties will have

a better picture about what these defendants knew about Stacy and her condition.

But until then, and assuming Plaintiff’s allegations are true, the claims against Cayla

Sullivan, LPN, Catherine Galle, LPN, Kimberly Ryan, LPN, and Kendal Jemiola

must survive. See Ponzini v. Monroe Cnty., 897 F. Supp. 2d 282, 298 (M.D. Pa.

5 I acknowledge that Moving Defendant asked me to follow the holding in

McCracken v. Fulton Ctny., No. 19-cv-1063, 2020 WL 2767577 (M.D. Pa May 28,

2020) to support their proposition that Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts in this

case. However, “[c]omity persuades; but it does not command.” Mast, Foos & Co.

v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485, 488 (1900). At this stage of litigation, I believe

Plaintiff has asserted enough facts, and to any extent the McCracken complaint and

this complaint are similarly pled, I disagree with the holding in McCracken.

2012) (“At this preliminary stage, it would be inappropriate for the Court to make

any findings of fact or to cast doubt upon any allegations as set forth in Plaintiffs’

Amended Complaint.”).

B. WHETHER PLAINTIFF STATED A COGNIZABLE SECTION 1983

DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE TO MEDICAL CARE/SUICIDE RISK CLAIM

Plaintiff has lodged two distinct, but similar claims against the Individual

Defendants: a Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference to Stacy’s known risk

of suicide and a Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference to Stacy’s need of

medical care. (Doc. 21, ¶¶28-31). While these claims are quite similar, I will discuss

them separately to avoid confusing the issues.

1. Deliberate Indifference to Suicide

The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from the infliction of cruel and

unusual punishment. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. To prevail on any Eighth Amendment

claim, an inmate must show: (1) a deprivation that is objectively, “sufficiently

serious;” and (2) “a sufficiently culpable state of mind” of the defendant official.

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Beyond this general standard, there

are different types of Eighth Amendment claims, and different criteria apply

depending upon the type of violation alleged. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1,

8 (1992).

When a plaintiff seeks to hold prison officials or medical staff accountable for

failing to prevent a prison suicide, the “vulnerability to suicide” framework applies.

This framework “is simply a more specific application of the general rule set forth

in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) which requires that prison officials

not be deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of prisoners.” Palakovic

v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209 (3d Cir. 2017). “In essence, a ‘particular vulnerability to

suicide’ is just one type of ‘serious medical need.’” Id. (citing Colburn v. Upper

Darby Twp., 946 F.2d 1017, 1024 (3d Cir. 1991). To plead a claim under this

framework, a plaintiff must allege:

(1) the prisoner had a particular vulnerability to suicide, (2) the prison

official knew of that vulnerability, and (3) the prison official acted with

deliberate indifference to that prisoner’s vulnerability.

Shirey v. Ladonne, No. 18-4960, 2019 WL 1470863, at * 18 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 3, 2019)

(citing Palakovic, 854 F.3d at 223-24 (3d Cir. 2017)).

Moving Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint does not allege

sufficient facts to assert a Section 1983 claim. (Doc. 95, p. 15). Moving Defendants’

analysis in favor of dismissing the claims against the individual defendants is

reproduced in its entirety below:

Mrs. Redclift underwent influenza, suicide, mental health, drug use,

and medication verification screenings upon her admission to the

prison. Medications were ordered and offered to Mrs. Redclift. Despite

all of these efforts, Mrs. Redclift chose to take her life. This was a tragic

but not preventable suicide. Simply stated, the Amended Complaint

does not demonstrate deliberate or reckless indifference on the part of

any of the medical staff.

(Id.).

As to the first factor, Moving Defendants do not meaningfully address

whether Stacy had a particular vulnerability to suicide. Plaintiff argues that he

pleaded sufficient facts to support this, including the allegation that Stacy had

multiple mental health conditions, a history of past suicide attempts, her altered

mental status, and that Stacy was acting erratically and non-compliantly before her

family and the Coledale Borough Police Officers. (Doc. 100, pp. 12-14).

“A particular vulnerability to suicide represents a serious medical need. The

requirement of a particular vulnerability to suicide speaks to the degree of risk

inherent in the detainee's condition. There must be a strong likelihood, rather than a

mere possibility, that self-inflicted harm will occur.” Woloszyn v. Cnty. of Lawrence,

396 F.3d 314, 320 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

However, this standard was “was never intended to demand a heightened showing

at the pleading stage by demonstrating . . . that the plaintiff’s suicide was temporally

imminent or somehow clinically inevitable. A particular individual's vulnerability to

suicide must be assessed based on the totality of the facts presented.” Palakovic v.

Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 230 (3d Cir. 2017).

Here, Plaintiff established that Stacy had a particular vulnerability to suicide.

Sean alleges that Stacy suffered from multiple mental illnesses, suicidal tendencies,

psychotic episodes, had a history of past suicide attempts, and past psychiatric

hospitalizations. (Doc. 21, ¶ 50). Additionally, Stacy was undergoing a tumultuous

domestic dispute, to the point where her family asked Prison officials to disallow her

calls to their house. (Id. at ¶¶ 45, 66-67). The cumulative circumstances of these facts

satisfy Plaintiff’s pleading burden and other courts in this circuit have denied

arguments to the contrary. See, e.g., Nealman v. Laughlin, No. 15-cv-1579, 2016

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116881, at *23 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2016) (finding that the

cumulative nature of the plaintiff’s mental health history, marital discord, prior

suicide attempts, and delusional behavior satisfied the particular vulnerability to

suicide pleading burden).

In reply, Moving Defendants ask me to rely on Estate of Thomas v. Fayette

Cnty., 194 F. Supp. 3d 358, 376-77 (W.D. Pa. 2016) and Nealman v. Maben, No.

15-cv-1579, 2019 WL 4781348 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2019) for the proposition that

Plaintiff has only offered generic suicide risks, and as such, did not have a particular

vulnerability to suicide. Both are distinguishable from this case because these

decisions evaluated evidence at summary judgment. In re Generic Pharms. Pricing

Antitrust Litig., 338 F. Supp. 3d 404, 442 n. 211 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (“Defendants rely

heavily on decisions that evaluated evidence on summary judgment. . . . Plaintiffs’

allegations need not meet the summary judgment bar on a motion to dismiss.”). In

both of Moving Defendants’ cited cases, the plaintiffs could not produce evidence

that countered the defendants’ version of the facts.6 But at the motion to dismiss

stage, I only have one set of facts, and those facts support the finding that Stacy had

a particular vulnerability to suicide.

Additionally, Plaintiff has satisfied the second and third pleading

requirements. Plaintiff asserts that the individual defendants knew or should have

known that Stacy was at a high suicide risk (Doc. 21, ¶¶ 122-23), but were

deliberately indifferent to that risk by failing to, inter alia, ensure she was on suicide

watch, that she not have the implements to commit suicide, and that she see a mental

health provider. (Id. at ¶ 132). Those are enough facts at this stage, and regardless,

Moving Defendants do not meaningfully analyze the second or third pleading

requirement: See (Doc. 95, p. 15) (describing Stacy’s suicide as “tragic but not

6 In Estate of Thomas, plaintiff’s only evidence to support the decedent’s particular

vulnerability to suicide is “a reference to two medical textbooks. . . .” Estate of

Thomas, 194 F. Supp. 3d at 375. The court found this evidence woefully inadequate,

considering that defendants presented an expert report at summary judgment. Id. In

Nealman, the plaintiff could not carry her summary judgment burden by trying to

prove that an inmate “belonged to a demographic with higher rates of suicide.”

Nealman, 2019 WL 4781348, at *15. Additionally, the evidence showed that the

decedent was, inter alia, “relaxed, cooperative, and compliant,” in the time before

his suicide. Id. at 20. In fact, Judge Conner in Nealman distinguished his Rule 12

decision with the pending Rule 56 decision. Id. at 18. In his motion to dismiss

opinion, Judge Conner found that the decedent had a particular vulnerability to

suicide because he had “delusional, and psychotic behavior; recent marital discord;

depression; a previous mental health hospitalization; and a prior suicide attempt.”

Id.

preventable” and that she underwent suicide and mental health screenings).

Therefore, Plaintiff has adequately pled a deliberate indifference to suicide.

2. Deliberate Indifference to Medical Care

The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, and

consistent with that demand, it requires prison officials to “provide humane

conditions of confinement, including adequate medical treatment.” Hankey v.

Wexford Health Sources, 383 F. App’x 165, 168 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976)). To establish a violation of a constitutional

right to adequate medical care, an inmate must show (1) a serious medical need, and

(2) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate indifference to that

need. Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). Deliberate indifference

to a serious medical need involves the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. Such indifference may be evidenced by an intentional

refusal to provide care, delayed provision of medical treatment for non-medical

reasons, denial of prescribed medical treatment, denial of reasonable requests for

treatment that results in suffering or risk of injury, Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d

64, 68 (3d Cir. 1993), or “persistent conduct in the face of resultant pain and risk of

permanent injury,” White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 109 (3d Cir. 1990).

A deliberate indifference to medical care claim is near identical to a deliberate

indifference to suicide risk claim. Therefore, for substantially the same reasons why

the deliberate indifference to suicide risk claim will survive, the deliberate

indifference to medical care claim will survive. Plaintiff alleged that Stacy had a

particular vulnerability to suicide and therefore, had a serious medical need. Further,

at this stage, Plaintiff has successfully plead that the Individual Defendants displayed

deliberate indifference to her serious medical need. Therefore, the deliberate

indifference to medical care claim will survive.

C. THE MONELL CLAIMS

Moving Defendants assert that the Monell claim against PrimeCare must be

dismissed because “Plaintiff has alleged no facts to substantiate the boilerplate

allegations of deficient custom or policy.” (Doc. 95, p. 17). Plaintiff clarifies that his

Monell claims are distinct: he is pleading both that PrimeCare failed to adopt policies

and that it failed to train its employees. (Doc. 100, p. 27). Additionally, Plaintiff

counters that he adequately pled sufficient facts to support his claims, and he is

proceeding with single incident failure to train claim, and thus, does not need to

plead a pattern of similar constitutional violation. (Doc. 100, pp. 27-35). I agree with

Plaintiff, and before I discuss why, I will generally discuss Monell claims.

A municipality or corporation, like PrimeCare, cannot be held liable for the

unconstitutional acts of its employees on a theory of respondeat superior. Monell v.

Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Rather, “under § 1983, local

governments are responsible only for ‘their own illegal acts.’” Connick v. Thompson,

563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479

(1986) (emphasis in original). To state a claim against PrimeCare, Plaintiff must

allege that the violation of his rights was caused either by a policy or by a custom of

the corporation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; Berg v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261,

275 (3d Cir. 2000); Luck v. Mount Airy No. 1, LLC, 901 F. Supp. 2d 547, 564 (M.D.

Pa. 2012) (holding that Monell applies to private corporations who are state actors).

Municipal or corporate policies include the decisions of a government’s

lawmakers and the acts of its policymaking officials as well as customs, which are

acts or practices that, even though not formally approved by an appropriate decision

maker, are so persistent and widespread as to have the force of law. Id.; Natale v.

Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 583 (3d Cir. 2003). In other words, a

municipality or corporation “‘can be held responsible as an entity when the injury

inflicted is permitted under its adopted policy or custom.’” Mulholland v Gov’t Cnty.

of Berks, 706 F.3d 227, 237 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89

F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 1996)).

A policy or custom can be shown in any of four ways:

(1) the existence of a formal policy, officially promulgated or adopted

by a municipality; Monell, 436 U.S. at 690; or

(2) that an official or officials responsible for establishing final policy

with respect to the subject matter in question took action or made a

deliberate, specific decision that caused the alleged violation of

plaintiff's constitutional rights, Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S.

469, 483-84 (1986)(citation omitted); or

(3) the existence of an unlawful practice by subordinate officials so

permanent and well settled as to constitute “custom or usage” and proof

that this practice was so manifest or widespread as to imply the

constructive acquiescence of policymaking officials, City of St. Louis

v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127-30 (1989); or

(4) if liability is based on a claim of failure to train or supervise, that

“the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of

persons with whom...[municipal employees] came into contact.” City

of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989).

Nye v. Cumberland Cnty., No. 1:14-CV-713, 2016 WL 695109, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Feb.

19, 2016).

“To satisfy the pleading standard, [a plaintiff] must identify a custom or

policy, and specify what exactly that custom or policy was.” McTernan v. City of

York, 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009). Additionally, there must be a direct causal

link between the policy or custom and the alleged constitutional violation. City of

Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989).

As to his absence of policy Monell claim, Plaintiff adequality pleaded the lack

relevant policies and how that absence harmed him. Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr.

Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 584 (3d Cir. 2003) (recognizing that the failure to promulgate

policies can lead to Monell liability).7 Plaintiff contends that PrimeCare lacks

7 In Natale, a prison had no policy or requirement “that a doctor see an inmate during

the first 72 hours of incarceration and no one was charged with determining whether

an inmate should be seen by a doctor earlier in the 72-hour period.” Id. at 584-85.

The court concluded that “the failure to establish such a policy is a ‘particular[ly]

glaring omission’ in a program of medical care,” and thus denied summary judgment

on plaintiff’s Monell claim.

appropriate policies in a plethora of situations, including a policy: on training its

staff to assess and identify inmates with mental illness and a suicide risk; ensuring

that inmate’s required medications are being administered, and “safely and

appropriately treat[ing], manage[ing], and car[ing] for an inmate who manifests risk

factors for self-harm and suicide;” and ensuring that inmates with suicide risks are

not with tools they can use to kill themselves. (Doc. 21, ¶ 146). Plaintiff contends

that the lack of appropriate policies “was so wide spread and pervasive that it

developed into a customary practice, of which [PrimeCare] was aware of and

condoned.” (Id. at ¶ 149). This is sufficient to state a viable absence of policy claim.

Plaintiff also contends that PrimeCare failed to train its employees. (Doc. 100,

pp. 32-34). To succeed on a failure to train Monell claim, a plaintiff must “show[]

that the failure amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom

those employees will come into contact.’” Thomas v. Cumberland Cty., 749 F.3d

217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Carter v. City of Phila., 181 F.3d 339, 357 (3d Cir.

1999)). “Additionally, ‘the identified deficiency in a city's training program must be

closely related to the ultimate injury;’ or in other words, ‘the deficiency in training

[must have] actually caused’ the constitutional violation.” Id. (quoting City of

Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391 (1989)).

Here, Plaintiff has pleaded enough facts to support both of the requirements

of a failure to train Monell claim. Plaintiff pled that PrimeCare was responsible for

the health and wellbeing of inmates at the Prison, (Doc. 21, ¶ 141-42), responsible

for training its staff towards that goal, (Id. at ¶ 140), didn’t train their staff (Id. at ¶

145), knew or should have known it would lead to harm (Id.), and thus, Stacy’s death

was “a highly predictable, and even expected, consequence.” (Id. at ¶ 153). This is

sufficient for Plaintiff’s claim to continue. Additionally, while Moving Defendants

claim in their legal standard that Plaintiff must plead a pattern of past

unconstitutional behavior, they do not analyze or apply this law to this case.

Therefore, I decline to discuss it.8

D. THE WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL ACTION CLAIMS

Moving Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s wrongful death claim (42 Pa. C.S. §

8301) and survival action claim (42 Pa. C.S. § 8302) fail because they “do not create

8 Moving Defendants’ legal standard is only half right. Generally, “[a] pattern of

similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to

demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train.” Connick v.

Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011) (citing Board of Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v.

Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997)). But, in some instances “single-incident liability”

can be enough. Id. at 63. Single incident liability contemplates that, “in certain

situations, the need for training can be said to be so obvious, that failure to do so

could properly be characterized as deliberate indifference to constitutional rights

even without a pattern of constitutional violations.” Thomas v. Cumberland Cnty.,

749 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 n.10) (internal

quotations omitted). Whether Plaintiff’s claims appropriately fits into single incident

liability was not briefed by Moving Defendants so I will decline to discuss it.

independent causes of action; rather, they are derivative in the sense that the

substance of the claims derives from the injury to the decedent.” (Doc. 95, p. 18).

Plaintiff concedes that those two statutes did not create a new cause of action, but

argues that his claims should proceed, as other federal courts in the Commonwealth

have allowed those claims to proceed. (Doc. 100, pp. 35-37). I agree with Plaintiff.

The Pennsylvania Wrongful Death and Survival Act “did not create a new

theory of liability but merely allow[s] a tort claim of the decedent to be prosecuted.”

Ferencz v. Medlock, 905 F. Supp. 2d 656, 674 n.10 (W.D. Pa. 2012). So, if “no

underlying tort has been pled, there can be no wrongful-death or survival action.”

McCracken v. Fulton Cnty., No. 19-cv-1063, 2020 WL 2767577, at * 27 (M.D. Pa.

May 28, 2020). Therefore, if a plaintiff has pled successful Section 1983 claims,

then their wrongful death and survival action claims should be allowed to proceed.

See, e.g., Summers v. City of Phila., No. 17-191, 2017 WL 2734277, at * 28-29 (E.D.

Pa. June 26, 2017); Beaty v. Delaware Cnty., No. 21-cv-1617, 2021 WL 4026373,

at * 3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 5, 2021); Maldet v. Johnstown Police Dep’t, No. 19-cv-325,

2019 WL 2435869, at *7 n.7 (W.D. Pa. June 11, 2019). And because Plaintiff has

successful pled a Section 1983 claim Plaintiff’s survival action and wrongful death

claims will continue.

V. CONCLUSION

PrimeCare Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss will be denied. An appropriate

Order will issue.

Date: August 31, 2022 BY THE COURT

s/William I. Arbuckle

William I. Arbuckle

U.S. Magistrate Judge