Federoff v. Geisinger Clinic

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CHRISTINE LYNN FINKBEINER, No. 4:21-CV-01903

individually and on behalf of all others

similarly situated, (Chief Judge Brann)

Plaintiffs,

v.

GEISINGER CLINIC, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

AUGUST 26, 2022

In November 2021, unvaccinated employees of various Geisinger Healthcare

affiliates were given a choice: vaccinate, test, or lose your job. Today’s suit involves

some 100 that opted for the latter. Led by Christine Finkbeiner, these former

Geisinger employees now argue that their dismissal was unlawful. Though contorted

into six claims, each begins from the same premise: COVID-19 vaccines and tests

are unsafe and ineffective.

Now, there is good reason to reject this statement outright. By this Court’s

estimation, Finkbeiner’s evidence consist of nothing more than a collection of

distorted statements and anti-vaccine hocus-pocus. But even if that was not the

case—and indeed, suspended disbelief is the modus operandi at the pleading stage—

her claims still fail. And for that reason, her complaint is dismissed with prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

This dispute arose on November 8, 2021, when 73 Geisinger employees

sought an injunction to stop their employer from requiring unvaccinated employees

to be tested twice weekly for COVID-19.1 After allowing the employees to amend

their complaint two times and hearing oral arguments, I denied this request.2 Shortly

thereafter, Geisinger moved for summary judgment, seeking to dismiss the

employees’ claims for good.3 But in May 2022, I denied this motion without

prejudice, finding that it was premature, and instead instructed the employees to

again amend their complaint.4

They did, filing a Third Amended Complaint, this time with Christine

Finkbeiner as the lead plaintiff for a putative class of former employees.5 Geisinger

soon responded by moving to dismiss the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) or strike the class action allegations under Rule 12(f).6 Finkbeiner failed to

timely submit a brief in opposition.7

1 Doc. 1.

2 Doc. 10; Doc. 14; Federoff. v. Geisinger Clinic, 571 F. Supp. 3d 376 (M.D. Pa. 2021).

3 Doc. 26.

4 Doc. 36; Doc. 41.

5 Doc. 44.

6 Doc. 47.

7 Doc. 50; Doc. 54. The Court notes that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a) does not bear

on this District’s briefing schedule because, quite simply, “a brief is not a pleading.”

Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dept. of Corrections, 806 F.3d 210, 232 (3d Cir. 2015); see also Local

Rule 7.6 (“Any party opposing any motion, other than a motion for summary judgment, shall

file a brief in opposition within fourteen (14) days after service of the movant's brief, or, if a

B. Finkbeiner’s Factual Allegations

This suit’s precipitating event remains Geisinger’s August 2021 decision to

require that all employees be vaccinated unless eligible for a religious or medical

exemption.8 Soon after this policy was announced, Finkbeiner and the other named

members in this suit requested religious exemptions.9 As Finkbeiner’s complaint

does not detail this request, I will assume that her attached affidavit (from just a few

months later) is representative. In it, she writes,

I am a Christian and hold a sincere religious belief that I have a God

given right to make my own choices regarding what is good or bad for

me. The Bible says that man has free will and I am using my free will,

granted to me by God, to reject the vaccine. I have faith in my own

immune system and the ability for my own body to heal itself. With the

99% plus survival rate from Covid, I do not feel injecting chemicals

into my body is a better choice than what my own immune system can

do with fighting this virus, should I contract Covid.10

According to Finkbeiner’s complaint, her request was conditionally approved, but

weeks later, Geisinger told her that to keep her job she must take a PCR or Antigen

COVID-19 test twice a week.11 At the same time, she was also informed that she

must quarantine for 14 days if she was exposed to someone who tested positive

service of the motion. Any party who fails to comply with this rule shall be deemed not to

oppose such motion. Nothing in this rule shall be construed to limit the authority of the court

to grant any motion before expiration of the prescribed period for filing a brief in

opposition.”). The Court nonetheless reviewed Finkbeiner’s belated submission, see Doc. 56,

and was unmoved.

8 Doc. 44 ¶ 13.

9 Id.

10 Doc. 44-1 at 3

COVID-19 and could not take paid time off for this period.12 (Geisinger, however,

later reversed this policy, thus allowing quarantining unvaccinated employees to

take paid time off.)13

After this announcement, Finkbeiner sought a further religious exemption.14

And as the beliefs that underpinned this request are also not described in the

complaint, I’ll again turn to her affidavit. Here, Finkbeiner writes,

I am a Christian and hold a sincere religious belief that I have a God

given right to make my own choices regarding what is good or bad for

me. The Bible says that man has free will and I am using my free will,

granted to me by God, to reject the testing conditions placed on my

approved religious exemption. I work from home and [am] required to

test twice weekly using the at home kit – Quick Vue SARS Antigen

Test. Per the information on the packaging, it states: The QuickVue

SARS Antigen Test has not been FDA cleared or approved but has been

authorized by the FDA under an Emergency Use Authorization (EUA).

I believe it is not an emergency for Geisinger to require an employee

who works from home, with zero patient/employee contact to test in

this with manner with a product that is not FDA approved. This violates

my sincerely held religious belief and I believe testing in this manner is

a bad choice for my health and body. I believe there are

chemicals/carcinogens associated with the swab and testing material.

I’m afraid of the side effects and potential future health risks these

chemicals may cause with this repetitive use. I believe this testing is

toxic and it’s only EUA approved, therefore I do not want to be part of

an experiment.15

12 Id.

13 Id.

14 Id. ¶ 19.

But Geisinger denied Finkbeiner’s request, instead telling her that it would take her

refusal as a voluntary resignation.16 And so it went. By early December 2021, she

was out of a job.17

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court may dismiss a

complaint, in whole or in part, if the plaintiff has failed to “state a claim upon which

relief can be granted.” Following the landmark decisions Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly18 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,19 “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint

must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that

is plausible on its face.’”20 In its assessment, the Court must “accept as true all factual

allegations in the complaint and draw all inferences from the facts alleged in the light

most favorable to [the plaintiff].”21 Still, “the tenet that a court must accept as true

all of the allegations contained in the complaint is inapplicable to legal

conclusions.”22 “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported

by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”23

16 Doc. 44 ¶ 16.

17 Id. ¶ 20.

18 550 U.S. 544 (2007).

19 556 U.S. 662 (2009).

20 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007)).

21 Phillips v. Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008) (Nygaard, J.).

22 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210

(3d Cir. 2009) (Nygaard, J.) (“After Iqbal, it is clear that conclusory or ‘bare-bones’

allegations will no longer survive a motion to dismiss.”).

III. ANALYSIS

Though spanning six counts, Finkbeiner’s claims can be boiled down to three

categories. Two allege violations of federal and state religious antidiscrimination

laws. Two others center on constitutional violations. While still two more allege

tortious infliction of emotional distress.24 Each are addressed in turn.

A. Title VII Religious Discrimination Claims

In Counts I and III, Finkbeiner alleges that Geisinger’s testing requirement

violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Pennsylvania Human Relations

Act.25 She contends that Geisinger failed to offer her a reasonable accommodation

to the vaccine mandate because PCR and Antigen tests are ineffective, carcinogenic,

24 Finkbeiner’s complaint also references the Nuremberg Code and 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-

3(e)(1)(A)(ii)(III)’s emergency use authorization designation. Doc. 44 ¶¶ 1, 13, 25, 34, 36–

38, 47, 49, 53, 71–72, 81–83, 85–86, 89, 91, 93, 101, 105. Although neither are fashioned as

independent causes of action, any such attempt would be futile. Courts have been uniform

that the statute has no bearing in cases involving employer mandates. See, e.g., Klaassen v.

Trustees of Indiana Univ., 549 F. Supp. 3d 836, 870 (N.D. Ind. 2021), aff’d, 7 F.4th 592 (7th

Cir. 2021). What’s more, when Finkbeiner refers to the vaccines as being “EUA approved

only,” she is simply wrong—and has been since the suit was first filed; the two-dose Pfizer-

BioNTech vaccine has been full approved by the Food & Drug Administration since August

23, 2021. Burcham v. City of Los Angeles, 562 F. Supp. 3d 694, 707–08 (C.D. Cal. 2022);

Rhoades v. Savannah River Nuclear Solutions, LLC, 574 F. Supp. 3d 322, 344–45 (D.S.C.

2021); Valdez v. Grisham, 559 F. Supp. 3d 1161, 1171–72 (D.N.M. 2021). Courts have been

similarly dismissive of base analogies between the forced medical experiments of the Nazi

regime and the choice that Finkbeiner, and other workers, have been given. Anderson v.

United Airlines, Inc., 577 F. Supp. 3d 1324, 1335 (M.D. Fla. 2021); Bridges v. Houston

Methodist Hosp., 543 F. Supp. 3d 525, 528 (S.D. Tex. 2021); Johnson v. Brown, 567 F. Supp.

3d 1230, 1248 (D. Or. 2021); Doe v. Franklin Square Union Free Sch. Dist., 568 F. Supp. 3d

270, 293 (E.D.N.Y. 2021); McCutcheon v. Enlivant ES, LLC, 2021 WL 5234787, at *3

(S.D.W.V. Nov. 9, 2021); Miranda v. Alexander, 2022 WL 832576, at *16 (M.D. La. Feb.

24, 2022); Legaretta v. Macias, 2022 WL 1443014, at *13 (D.N.M. May 6, 2022); Johnson

v. Tyson Foods, 2022 WL 2161520, at *10 (W.D. Tenn. June 15, 2022).

only approved for emergency use in the United States, and thus solely serve to punish

her for her religious beliefs.26

To establish a prima facie case under these laws,27 plaintiffs must show “that

(1) they held a sincere religious belief that conflicted with a job requirement, (2)

they informed their employer of the conflict, and (3) they . . . [were] disciplined for

failing to comply with the conflicting request.”28 But the “prima facie case is ‘an

evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement.’”29 Plaintiffs are not required to

establish each element to survive a motion to dismiss; they must simply “allege

sufficient facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will uncover proof

of [their] claims.”30 Geisinger, however, argues that Finkbeiner’s allegations show

that her stated beliefs about testing are medical, not religious, and therefore cannot

support a religious discrimination claim. The Court agrees.

In this circuit, to determine whether a belief is religious in nature, courts look

to the three Africa factors: whether the belief (1) “address[es] fundamental and

ultimate questions having to with deep and imponderable matter,” (2) is

“comprehensive in nature,” and (3) is “accompanied by certain formal and external

26 Id. ¶¶ 45, 46, 47, 63, 81.

27 Finkbeiner’s claims under Title VII and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act are

coextensive and are thus considered under the same framework. Federoff, 571 F. Supp. 3d at

391; see also Prise v. Alderwoods Grp. Inc., 657 F. Supp. 2d 564, 584 (W.D. Pa. 2009); Pa.

State Univ. v. Pa. Hum. Rels. Comm’n, 505 A.2d 1053 (Pa. 1986).

28 Id. at 387 (quoting Fallon v. Mercy Cath. Med. Ctr, 877 F.3d 487, 490 (3d Cir. 2017)) (internal

alterations and quotations omitted).

29 Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 789 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Swierkiewicz v.

Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002)).

signs.”31 Simply put, Finkbeiner’s statement—which centers on her free will and

belief that Covid-19 vaccines and tests are harmful and unnecessary—fails to

establish sincere religious opposition under this framework.32 To the extent that it

addresses any of the three Africa factors, it touches on the second. But even here,

problems abound.

To start, her belief that she has a “God given right to make [her] own

choices”33—which, implicitly, her employer must unfailingly respect—would

amount to “a blanket privilege” and a “limitless excuse for avoiding all

unwanted . . . obligations.”34 Though fungible enough to cover anything that

Finkbeiner trains it on, this belief “is an ‘isolated moral teaching’ . . . not a

comprehensive system of beliefs about fundamental or ultimate matters.”35

Beyond that, her statement only reinforces that her opposition stems from her

medical beliefs. As Finkbeiner writes, she believes,

 that “it is not any emergency for Geisinger to require an employee who works

from home, with zero patient/employee contact to test in this manner”;

 that “there are chemicals/carcinogens associated with swab and testing

material”;

31 Brown v. Children’s Hosp. of Phila., 794 Fed. App’x 226, 227 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Fallon,

877 F.3d at 491) (internal quotations omitted); see generally Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d

1025, 1030, 1031 (3d Cir. 1981).

32 Doc. 44-1 at 3–4.

33 Id.

34 Africa, 662 F.2d at 1030, 1031.

 that “testing is toxic”—making her “afraid of the side effects and potential

future health risks these chemicals may cause”; and

 that “testing in this manner is a bad choice for [her] health and body.”36

In sum, “it would be a step too far to count everything [Finkbeiner] believes about

healthy living as a religious practice.”37

Counts I and III are therefore dismissed with prejudice.

B. Constitutional Claims

Like past complaints, the Third Amended Complaint also alleges that

Geisinger’s vaccinate-or-test requirement is unconstitutional. Finkbeiner first

contends that by treating vaccinated and unvaccinated employees differently,

Geisinger violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.38 And in a

later count, she also claims that this same policy violates the Due Process Clause of

the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and Article I, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania

Constitution, thus entitling her to a recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.39 Both theories

have substantial defects. But here, there is no need for analysis past the first step. To

make out a constitutional or § 1983 claim, Finkbeiner must allege facts showing that

Geisinger is a state actor.40 And she has not.

36 Doc. 44-1 at 4.

37 Geerlings v. Tredyffrin/Easttown Sch. Dist., 2021 WL 4399672, at *20–21 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27,

2021).

38 Doc. 44 ¶¶ 70–72.

39 Id. ¶¶ 107–122.

40 See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil. Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982) (“Our cases have

For the law underlying each count, there are differences in verbiage. Under

the Fourteenth Amendment, “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,” while § 1983 “provides a remedy for

deprivations of rights secured by the constitution and laws of the United States when

that deprivation takes place ‘under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage of any State . . . .’”41 But as the Supreme Court emphasized in

Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., the analysis for each is “identical,” so I’ll consider the

counts together.42

Subjecting a private entity to constitutional scrutiny requires that there be

“such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action that seemingly

private behavior may be treated as that of the state itself.”43 In assessing whether this

nexus exists, courts in this circuit look to three broad tests:

(1) whether the private entity has exercised powers that are traditionally

the exclusive prerogative of the state; (2) whether the private party has

fairly attributable to the State. These cases reflect a two-part approach to this question of ‘fair

attribution.’ First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege

created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the state or by a person for whom the

State is responsible. . . . Second, the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who

may fairly be said to be a state actor. This may be because he is a state official, because he

has acted together with or has obtained significant aid from state officials, or because his

conduct is otherwise chargeable to the State.”)

41 Id. at 929–30. Despite referencing the Fifth Amendment, Finkbeiner has not articulated a

Bivens claim. Doc. 44 ¶¶ 106–122; see generally Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of

Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (finding that a § 1983-like private right of

action exists for constitutional violations committed by federal officials); see also Davis v.

Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248–49 (1979) (holding that violations of the Fifth Amendment’s

Due Process Clause can be remedied through a Bivens action). But if she had, this action

would similarly fail because Geisinger is not a state actor.

42 457 U.S. at 935. But see id. n.18 (noting two caveats to this general rule).

43 Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Leshko v. Servis, 423 F.3d 337, 339

acted with the help of or in concert with state officials; and (3) whether

the state has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence

with the acting party that it must be recognized as a joint participant in

the challenged activity.44

Finkbeiner’s complaint touches on the first and the second.

To start, proving that a private entity “performed a function that has

traditionally be the exclusive province of the state” is no small task.45 As the United

States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has noted, this first test “imposes a

rigorous standard that is rarely satisfied, for while many functions have been

traditionally performed by government, very few have been exclusively reserved to

the State.”46 That is the case here.

Finkbeiner begins from the premise that only Pennsylvania’s Department of

Health and its Governor have the power to mandate a vaccine.47 For support, she

first cites to Pennsylvania laws that task the Department of Health with “protect[ing]

the health of the people of this Commonwealth[] and . . . determin[ing] and

employ[ing] the most efficient and practical means for the prevention and

suppression of disease.”48 She then asserts that in August 2021, Geisinger

44 Id. (internal quotations omitted).

45 Robert S. v. Stetson Sch., Inc., 256 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2001).

46 Id. at 165–66 (quoting Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1142 (3d Cir. 1995) and

Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 158 (1978)) (internal alterations, citations, and

quotations omitted).

47 Doc. 44 ¶ 114.

implemented a vaccine mandate.49 And as a result of this action, she contends that

Geisinger therefore assumed the role of the state and acted under color of state law.

But this syllogism begins from a false premise. The Pennsylvania Department

of Health’s duty to protect the health of the people and employ the most effective

methods of disease suppression is not exclusive. The statute’s plain language

provides no such limitation.50 And Finkbeiner’s allegations in no way suggest that

healthcare providers are, or ever have been, prohibited from doing more than the

state-mandated minimum to protect their patients and staff.51

Finkbeiner does no better at the second step. Here, she alleges that Geisinger

“acted in concert with federal officials by implementing the vaccine mandate as a

result of the CDC’s recommendations and the recommendations of other federal

officials such as Dr. Anthony Fauci.”52 But “[a]ction taken by private entities with

the mere approval or acquiescence of the State is not state action.”53 Plaintiffs must

49 Id. ¶ 117.

50 See Kach, 589 F.3d at 647 (finding that nothing in the “plain language” of the statute creating

the Office for State Schools “suggest[ed] that school security is the exclusive province of the

state”).

51 The complaint also alleges that Geisinger received over $120,000,000 in state and federal

funding to combat the COVID-19 pandemic. Doc. 44 ¶ 42. To the extent that this factual

allegation is intended to support Finkbeiner’s state actor claim, it falls short. See Blum v.

Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1005–12 (1982) (rejecting a state actor claim against a private nursing

home that received 90% of its funding from the state); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830,

839–42 (1982) (rejecting a state actor claim against a private school that received 90% of its

funding from the state).

52 Doc. 44 ¶ 119.

show that the government is indeed responsible for the conduct.54 So even if the

Court takes Finkbeiner’s allegation—that she “believes and therefore avers that

Geisinger was working with the federal government in implementing the EUA

approved only ‘vaccine’ mandate”55—and expands it to testing, her complaint still

fails to show that the government was responsible for the conduct. Indeed, its

opening paragraph—which begins, “Without any official mandate from the federal

or state government, Geisinger mandated . . . .”56—and its admission that the

mandate resulted from a recommendation suggest quite the opposite.57

Counts II and VI are therefore dismissed with prejudice.

C. State Tort Law Claims

Finally, Finkbeiner newly alleges that Geisinger’s conduct constituted

intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress under Pennsylvania law. She

asserts that Geisinger caused her emotional distress by implementing its policy,

though it knew or should have known that vaccines and tests were unsafe and

ineffective.58 But these allegations, even if accepted as true, provide no relief.

To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, plaintiffs must

allege facts showing “that the defendant's conduct: (1) was intentional or reckless;

54 Borrell v. Bloomsburg Univ., 870 F.3d 154, 160 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing Blum, 457 U.S. at

1004).

55 Doc. 44 ¶ 36 (emphasis added); see also id. ¶¶ 37–38.

56 Id. ¶ 1.

57 Id. ¶ 119.

(2) was extreme and outrageous; (3) actually caused the distress; and (4) caused

distress that was severe.”59 And in doing so, they must show that the conduct was

“so extreme in nature as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency such that it

would be regarded as utterly intolerable to civilized society” and “demonstrate

physical injury or harm,” supported by “competent medical evidence.”60

Finkbeiner fails to meet this standard. To begin with, she only alleges that she

“suffered great emotional distress” because of Geisinger’s vaccinate-or-test

requirement—failing to back this conclusory assertion with medical evidence of a

physical harm.61 This deficiency alone would sink her claim.

But even if she had met this requirement, it is not extreme and outrageous for

a health system to present employees with the choice of a jab, a swab, or their job.

Intentional infliction of emotional distress claims require plaintiffs to go beyond

showing “that the defendant has acted with an intent which is tortious or even

criminal, or that [it] has intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that [its]

conduct has been characterized by malice, or a degree of aggravation which would

entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort.”62 And while Finkbeiner’s

allegations on this front strain credulity, if the Court were to credit them, it’s not as

59 Regan v. Township of Lower Merion, 36 F. Supp. 2d 245, 251 (E.D. Pa. 1999).

60 Lawson v. Pa. SPCA, 124 F. Supp. 3d 394, 409 (E.D. Pa. 2015); K.A. ex rel. J.A. v. Abington

Heights Sch. Dist., 28 F. Supp. 3d 356, 376 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (Mariani, J.).

61 Doc. 44 ¶ 88.

62 Rorke v. Aubrey Alexander Toyota, 2016 WL 7404617, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2016)

though she was vaccinated or tested against her will. There was no gun-to-the-head,

needle-to-the-shoulder, or swab-to-the-nostril moment. She refused and was fired.

At most, this would amount to a wrongful dismissal. And that does not meet the

“utterly intolerable” standard.

To state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, meanwhile,

plaintiffs must first plead a prima facie case of negligence. Once they have done that,

they must then establish that they either (1) suffered a physical injury that caused the

emotional distress; (2) suffered no injury, but experienced emotional distress from

having been in the “zone of danger”; (3) witnessed an accident that seriously injured

a close family member; or, under the most, and perhaps an overly, expansive reading

of current Pennsylvania law, (4) had a special relationship with the defendant that

included in it an implied duty to care for their emotional well-being.63

Finkbeiner meets neither requirement. Her allegations contain no reference to

Geisinger having breached a duty that caused them damages; nor do they touch on

the categories of claims where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court permits recovery

for emotional harm. Across three paragraphs, she simply repeats the name of the

tort, without regard to its elements. In the first two paragraphs, she asserts that

Geisinger “should have known” that its vaccinate-or-test policy “would cause

emotional distress”; while in the final paragraph, she concludes that Geisinger had

indeed “negligently inflicted emotional distress.”64 These are not even “[t]hreadbare

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements . . . .”65

Counts IV and V are therefore also dismissed with prejudice.

IV. CONCLUSION

While cloaked in the language of religious discrimination, due process, equal

protection, and tortious infliction of emotional distress, Finkbeiner’s complaint

makes plain that she’s after a modern-day Scopes trial. She believes that COVID-19

vaccines and tests are a hoax. And she wants this Court to vindicate her views,

overturn Geisinger’s policy, and find that she and her colleagues should have been

allowed to work—unvaccinated and untested. But courts cannot simply weigh-in on

every issue an employee has with its employer’s policy. There must be a legal hook.

And she has not provided one.

An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

Chief United States District Judge

64 Doc. 44 ¶¶ 102–105.