The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
GENEIA RICE and : Civil No. 1:21-CV-01528
WALTER PARKER :
:
vs. :
:
KBR :
: Judge Sylvia H. Rambo
O R D E R
AND NOW, this 23rd day of August, 2022, upon consideration of Defendant
KBR’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 17) and pro se Plaintiff Walter Parker’s Opposition
to the Motion (Doc. 22), and after review of the Report and Recommendation of
United States Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson, dated April 4, 2022 (Doc. 28),
and Defendant Walter Parker’s Objections to the Report and Recommendation
(Docs. 37, 39), IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
I. The Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge
Martin C. Carlson, dated April 4, 2022, is APPROVED and ADOPTED;
II. Plaintiff Walter Parker’s Objections to the Report and Recommendation
are OVERRULED;1
1 The procedural history and background facts are set forth in detail in the Report and
Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson, dated April 4, 2022, and
need not be repeated. The Report and Recommendation recommends that pro se Plaintiff Walter
Parker’s claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Pennsylvania Human
Relations Act (PHRA) be dismissed for failure to state a claim, without prejudice to Parker’s right
to amend the complaint. This court agrees with the recommendation.
When objections are timely filed to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation, the district
court must conduct a de novo review of those portions of the report to which objections are made.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2011). Although the standard
is de novo, the extent of review is committed to the sound discretion of the district judge, and the
III. Defendant KBR’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and all claims
asserted by Plaintiff Walter Parker are DISMISSED without prejudice to
Parker’s right to file an amended complaint within 30 days; and
IV. Plaintiff Walter Parker is PROVIDED NOTICE that he may file an
amended complaint within 30 days of the date of this order.
/s/ Sylvia H. Rambo
Sylvia H. Rambo
United States District Judge
court may rely on the recommendations of the magistrate judge to the extent it deems proper.
Rieder v. Apfel, 115 F. Supp. 2d 496, 499 (M.D. Pa. 2000) (citing United States v. Raddatz, 447
U.S. 667, 676 (1980)). For those sections of the report and recommendation to which no objection
is made, the court should, as a matter of good practice, “satisfy itself that there is no clear error on
the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b), advisory
committee notes; see also Univac Dental Co. v. Dentsply Intern., Inc., 702 F. Supp. 2d 465, 469
(M.D. Pa. 2010) (citation omitted). Regardless of whether objections are made, the district court
may accept, not accept, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by
the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); L.R. 72.31.
The Report and Recommendation carefully analyzes the standard for assessing whether an
employment relationship exists under Title VII and the PHRA and appropriately concludes that
Parker’s complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to support such a relationship. The complaint
indicates that Parker’s hiring and firing was controlled by a non-party employment agency, and
the pleading does not contain any specific allegations as to who paid Parker’s salary; who
controlled his daily tasks; who provided his tools/equipment; or who possessed discretion
regarding his work schedule. As the Report and Recommendation lays out, the existence of an
employment relationship is an important prerequisite to recovery under both discrimination
statutes, and the court cannot merely assume that Parker will be able to prove facts that he never
alleges in the complaint.
Parker’s objections to Report and Recommendation do not engage with its analysis or otherwise
substantively argue that the complaint contains sufficient facts to state a claim for discrimination.
Parker instead focuses his argument on new facts, ones which are absent from the complaint, and
ones which—as the Report and Recommendation explains in detail—cannot be considered on a
motion to dismiss. Nevertheless, because amendment would not necessarily be futile, Parker may
amend his complaint within 30 days if he believes he can cure the defects outlined in the Report