Cooper v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JELANI T. COOPER, : Civil No. 1:19-CV-2230

:

Plaintiff, :

:

v. :

: (Magistrate Judge Carlson)

PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN :

RELATIONS COMMISSION :

:

Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. Factual Background

This workplace discrimination case has been lodged against the Pennsylvania

Human Relations Commission (PHRC) by an attorney formerly employed by that

agency. In his complaint, the plaintiff, Jelani Cooper, claims that his former

employer engaged in a campaign of race-based discrimination that led to a hostile

work environment throughout his tenure with the organization. According to

Cooper, the hostile work environment based on race discrimination started in 2016

and continued through the administrations of two executive directors, culminating

in his allegedly retaliatory firing in 2019 by the current PHRC executive director,

Chad Dion Lassiter. Cooper’s race discrimination claims were previously raised

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with the EEOC and settled pursuant to an agreement that PHRC create a diversity

committee. Cooper alleges he was terminated in retaliation for complaining about

the alleged failure of PHRC to comply with the terms of this settlement agreement.

Cooper’s hostile work environment and state law whistleblower claims were

dismissed on summary judgment, with only this retaliation claim moving forward to

trial.

The PHRC has now filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude any evidence

that pertains to claims that have been dismissed in this litigation, specifically the

hostile work environment claim under Title VII and the state-law whistleblower

claim. (Doc. 89). According to the PHRC, because these claims have been

dismissed, any evidenced related to the claims is not relevant. The PHRC also argues

that the probative value of such evidence is substantially outweighed by the

prejudicial effect and the danger that it would confuse and mislead the jury, cause

undue delay, and waste time. This motion is fully briefed and is, therefore, ripe for

resolution.

For the reasons set forth below, the plaintiff’s motion in limine is granted in

part, without prejudice to the plaintiff making a specific offer of proof as to the

admissibility of such evidence at trial.

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II. Discussion

In considering the admissibility of the evidence of these previously dismissed

claims, we note that the Court is vested with broad inherent authority to manage its

cases, which carries with it the discretion and authority to rule on motions in limine

prior to trial. See Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n.4 (1984); In re Japanese

Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 260 (3d Cir. 1983), rev’d on other

grounds sub nom., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574

(1986) (the court exercises its discretion to rule in limine on evidentiary issues “in

appropriate cases”). Courts may exercise this discretion in order to ensure that

juries are not exposed to unfairly prejudicial, confusing or irrelevant evidence.

United States v. Romano, 849 F.2d 812, 815 (3d Cir. 1988). Courts may also do so

in order to “narrow the evidentiary issues for trial and to eliminate unnecessary trial

interruptions.” Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 913 F.2d 1064, 1069 (3d Cir.

1990) (citation omitted). However, courts should be careful before doing so.

In considering motions in limine that call upon the Court to engage in

preliminary evidentiary rulings under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, we

begin by recognizing that these “evidentiary rulings [on motions in limine] are

subject to the trial judge's discretion and are therefore reviewed only for abuse of

discretion.... Additionally, application of the balancing test under Federal Rule of

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Evidence 403 will not be disturbed unless it is ‘arbitrary and irrational.’” Abrams v.

Lightolier Inc., 50 F.3d 1204, 1213 (3d Cir. 1995) (citations

omitted); see Bernardsville Bd. of Educ. v. J.H., 42 F.3d 149, 161 (3d Cir. 1994)

(reviewing in limine rulings for abuse of discretion). One of the key guiding

principles governing the exercise of this discretion is reflected in the philosophy that

shapes the rules of evidence. The Federal Rules of Evidence can aptly be

characterized as evidentiary rules of inclusion, which are designed to broadly permit

fact-finders to consider pertinent factual information while searching for the truth.

Adopting this broad view of relevance, it has been held that

Under [Rule] 401, evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make

the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of

the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the

evidence.” [Therefore] “[i]t follows that evidence is irrelevant only

when it has no tendency to prove the fact. Thus the rule, while giving

judges great freedom to admit evidence, diminishes substantially their

authority to exclude evidence as irrelevant.”

Frank v. Cnty. of Hudson, 924 F. Supp. 620, 626 (D.N.J. 1996) (citing Spain v.

Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 452 (3d Cir. 1994) (quotations omitted)). Rule 402 of the

Federal Rules of Evidence, in turn, provides that all “[r]elevant evidence will be

admissible unless the rules of evidence provide to the contrary.” United States

v. Sriyuth, 98 F.3d 739, 745 (3d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).

This principle is then tempered by Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence

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which sets legal grounds for exclusion of some evidence, stating that:

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative

value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,

confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of

undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative

evidence.

Fed. R. Evid. 403.

These broad principles also shape and define the scope of this Court's

discretion in addressing motions in limine like those filed here, which invite us pre-

trial to rule that evidence relating to claims that have been dismissed should be

excluded at trial. Reasoning that evidence regarding dismissed claims that have

failed as a matter of law typically has little relevance, courts have often excluded

evidence of dismissed claims from trial. See, e.g., Branch v. Brennan, No. 2:17-CV-

00777, 2019 WL 3892850, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2019); Brown v. Johnson &

Johnson, No. CV 12-4929, 2015 WL 12834346, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28,

2015); Moore v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of Commonwealth Sys. of Higher Educ., No.

CV 02-1734, 2005 WL 8165154, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2005); Devine v.

Pittsburgh Bd. of Pub. Educ., No. 2:13-CV-220, 2015 WL 7301149, at *4 (W.D. Pa.

Nov. 18, 2015). However, those courts that have excluded this evidence often have

done so without prejudice to the plaintiff presenting some specific and narrowly-

tailored offer of proof as to the relevance and admissibility of particular evidence. Id.

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Guided by these principles, we turn to consideration of the

instant motion in limine. In this case, the plaintiff argues that some evidence

concerning the previously dismissed hostile work environment claim is still relevant

to his sole remaining claim, a Title VII retaliation claim. The plaintiff asserts that

evidence regarding the plaintiff’s working conditions and underlying reasons he

filed a discrimination complaint with the EEOC are relevant to the jury’s

understanding of the case. (Doc. 104, at 3). Indeed, the proffered evidence proposed

by Cooper highlights the potential for unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, and

undue delay which Rule 403 forbids. In his response to this motion in limine Cooper

suggests that he would like to present a 2016 article from the Philadelphia Inquirer,

a press declaration from the former auditor general of Pennsylvania calling for the

resignation of PHRC officials, and matters involving an unrelated PHRC settlement

with the Reading School District as evidence in this wrongful discharge case. These

matters are far afield from the precise issues the jury must decide in this case;

namely, the question of whether Cooper was fired by the PHRC in 2019 in retaliation

for his filing a complaint with the EEOC and protesting the failure to implement

specific terms of a settlement agreement between the plaintiff and the PHRC that

was mediated by the EEOC. The presentation of this evidence concerning these

unrelated matters is potentially prejudicial, confuses the issues at trial, and would

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result in undue delay as the parties litigated collateral matters that are not directly

related to Cooper’s retaliatory discharge claim. Further, allowing plaintiff to offer

evidence of claims he has failed to prove as a matter of law to bolster his remaining

claim, without providing a tailored offer of proof for the precise relevance of such

evidence, would be contrary to the well settled standard that evidence regarding

claims that have failed as a matter of law typically have little relevance.

Accordingly, consistent with caselaw governing the exercise of discretion in

this field, this motion in limine will be granted without prejudice to the plaintiff

making specific offers of proof as to the relevance of evidence relating to

previously dismissed claims during the course of the trial.

By adopting this course, we avoid the concerns that justify motions in limine,

excluding unfairly prejudicial, confusing, cumulative or irrelevant

evidence, Romano, 849 F.2d at 815, and “narrow[ing] the evidentiary issues for trial

and to eliminate unnecessary trial interruptions.” Bradley, 913 F.2d at 1069 (citation

omitted). Yet following this course does not absolutely preclude the plaintiff from

presenting specific evidence if he can first demonstrate its relevance through an offer

of proof.

An appropriate order follows.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JELANI T. COOPER, : Civil No. 1:19-CV-2230

:

Plaintiff, :

:

v. :

: (Magistrate Judge Carlson)

PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN :

RELATIONS COMMISSION :

:

Defendant. :

ORDER

For the reasons set forth in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, with

respect to the Plaintiff’s Motion In Limine which seeks the exclusion of any evidence

that pertains to claims that have been dismissed in this litigation, (Doc. 89), IT IS

ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED without prejudice to the plaintiff making

specific offers of proof as to the relevance of evidence relating to

previously dismissed claims during the course of the trial. IT IS FURTHER

ORDERED that the plaintiff’s pleading, styled as a Motion in Opposition to this

motion in limine (Doc. 104), is DENIED.

/s/ Martin C. Carlson

Martin C. Carlson

United States Magistrate Judge

Dated: August 16, 2022

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