noting that “a section 2255 motion filed in the sentencing court is the presumptive means for a federal prisoner to challenge the validity of a conviction or sentence”
How later courts described this case
- noting that “a section 2255 motion filed in the sentencing court is the presumptive means for a federal prisoner to challenge the validity of a conviction or sentence”
- “It is firmly established that the remedy available to a federal prisoner under 2255 is - 4 - exclusive in the absence of a showing that such remedy ‘is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [the prisoner’s] detention.’ ”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
EDWARD JAMES MAYCOCK, JR., :
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:20-2036
Petitioner :
(JUDGE MANNION)
v. :
WARDEN STEPHEN SPAULDING :
Respondent :
MEMORANDUM
Petitioner, Edward James Maycock, an inmate formerly confined in the
United States Penitentiary, Lewisburg, Pennsylvania,1 filed the instant
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2241. (Doc. 1).
He challenges his 2014 federal sentence imposed by the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland. Id. For the reasons set forth below,
the Court will dismiss Petitioner’s §2241 petition without prejudice for lack of
jurisdiction.
I. Background
On March 20, 2014, Maycock was indicted by a federal grand jury
sitting in the United District Court for the District of Maryland for Distribution
of Child Pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §2252(a)(2); for Receipt of
Child Pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §2252(a)(2); Possession of Child
Pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §2252A(a)(5)(B); and Forfeiture in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §2253. (Doc. 8-1 at 1, Indictment in United States v.
Maycock, Case No. 1:14-cr-00133 at 1-9 (D.C. MD).
On December 22, 2014, Maycock entered into an amended plea
agreement in which he stipulated to being guilty of Distribution of Child
Pornography including the element that the pornography “was shipped or
transported in and affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means,
including computer.” (Doc. 8-2 Amended Plea Agreement).
On April 10, 2015, the sentencing court issued a judgment after
accepting Maycock’s guilty plea to count one of the indictment, Distribution
of Child Pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) and (b)(1). (Doc.
8-3, Judgment). Maycock was sentenced to sixteen (16) years or 192 months
of imprisonment and a term of supervised release for life. Id. Maycock
received a criminal monetary penalty assessment of $100.00 as well as
being ordered to make restitution of $4,000. Id.
On January 7, 2016, Maycock filed a motion to vacate his sentence
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2255. (Doc. 8-4, docket for United States v. Maycock,
Case No. 1:14-cr-00133 at 1-9 (D.C M.D.). Counsel was appointed to
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represent him. Id. After supplemental pleadings were filed by both parties
and after an evidentiary hearing was scheduled for October 24, 2018,
Maycock withdrew his §2255 motion on October 18, 2018. Id.
On November 3, 2020, Maycock filed the instant petition for writ of
habeas petition on November 3, 2020, alleging the following:
[H]e is actually innocent of violating 18 U.S.C Sec. 2252 (a)(2)
because in his factual basis for the plea, the Government
presented no evidence nor did Maycock ever admit that anyone
accessed, viewed, or downloaded files from what he uploaded.
Maycock strongly avers that uploading child pornography without
anything more, does not amount to Distribution under Sect. 2252
(a)(2).
(Doc. 2, Memo. at 4-5). Maycock further avers that “United States v.
Husmann defined ‘distribute’ in 18 U.S.C. Sect. 2252 (a)(2) to mean ‘to
apportion, give out, or deliver and that distribution necessarily involves the
transfer of materials to another person.’” (Doc. 2 at 5; citing United States v.
Husmann, 765 F.3d 169 (3d Cir. 2014).) Maycock argues that because of
the decision, his conviction for Distribution of Child Pornography should not
stand based on his conduct and that “he is being detained for conduct that
has subsequently been rendered non-criminal by an intervening Supreme
Court decision.” Id.
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II. Discussion
It is well settled that to challenge the validity of a sentence, a federal
prisoner must file a motion to vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2255 in the
sentencing court, which is “already familiar with the facts of the case.” See
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 774-75 (2008); see also Russell v.
Martinez, 325 F. App’x 45, 47 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting that “a section 2255
motion filed in the sentencing court is the presumptive means for a federal
prisoner to challenge the validity of a conviction or sentence”). Conversely,
a federal prisoner may challenge the execution of his sentence, such as the
denial or revocation of parole or the loss of good-time credits, by filing a
petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2241 in the district court for the federal
judicial district where he is in custody. See 28 U.S.C.§2241(a); Rumsfeld v.
Padilla, 542 U.S. 443-44 (2004); Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 485 (3d
Cir. 2001). However, if a petitioner shows “that a §2255 motion ‘is inadequate
or ineffective to test the legality of his detention,’ ... [he may] resort to §2241
to challenge the validity of the conviction or sentence.” See Brown v.
Mendez, 167 F. Supp. 2d 723, 726 (M.D. Pa. 2001); see also 28 U.S.C.
§2255(e); Litterio v. Parker, 369 F.2d 395, 395 (3d Cir. 1966) (“It is firmly
established that the remedy available to a federal prisoner under 2255 is
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exclusive in the absence of a showing that such remedy ‘is inadequate or
ineffective to test the legality of [the prisoner’s] detention.’ ”).
A motion under §2255 is not “inadequate or ineffective” if the
sentencing court has previously denied relief. See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d
245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997). Nor is a §2255 motion “inadequate or ineffective”
merely because the inmate “is unable to meet the requirements of [28
U.S.C.] §2244 and §2255(h), which require a federal prisoner to obtain
preauthorization from the appropriate United States Court of Appeals before
filing a second or subsequent §2255 motion in the sentencing court.” See
Miller v. United States, No. 3:19-cv-2159, 2020 WL 820334, at *2 (M.D. Pa.
Jan. 9, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 815777 (M.D.
Pa. Feb. 18, 2020). Moreover, Ҥ2255 is not inadequate or ineffective merely
because the petitioner cannot satisfy §2255’s timeliness or other
gatekeeping requirements.” See Long v. Fairton, 611 F. App'x 53, 55 (3d Cir.
2015) (citing Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251). The Third Circuit:
permits access to §2241 when two conditions are satisfied: First,
a prisoner must assert a “claim of ‘actual innocence’ on the
theory that ‘he is being detained for conduct that has
subsequently been rendered non-criminal by an intervening
Supreme Court decision’ and [Third Circuit] precedent construing
an intervening Supreme Court decision”—in other words, when
there is a change in statutory caselaw that applies retroactively
in cases on collateral review. And second, the prisoner must be
“otherwise barred from challenging the legality of the conviction
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under § 2255.” Stated differently, the prisoner has “had no earlier
opportunity to challenge his conviction for a crime that an
intervening change in substantive law may negate.”
Bruce v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 868 F.3d 170, 180 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting
Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251). If a petitioner improperly challenges a federal
conviction or sentence under §2241, the §2241 petition must be dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction. See Cradle v. United States, 290 F.3d 536, 539 (3d
Cir. 2002).
In the instant case, the decision of Hussmann was rendered on
September 3, 2014, prior to when Maycock signed his Amended Plea
Agreement and prior to his sentence hearing, giving Maycock two distinctly
different opportunities to address his claims for relief. Previous to this instant
habeas petition, Maycock filed a motion to vacate his sentence on January
1, 2016; however, after counsel was appointed to represent him, after
supplemental pleadings were filed by both parties, and after an evidentiary
hearing was scheduled for October 24, 2018, Maycock withdrew his §2255
motion on October 18, 2018. As such, Maycock has had two opportunities to
address his claims for relief and, to date, he has not raised his claims in a
direct appeal or a Section 2255 motion.
While Petitioner has not filed a §2255 motion challenging his conviction
and sentence, this Court has noted that “[t]he remedy afforded under §2241
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is not an additional, alternative, or supplemental remedy to that prescribed
under §2255.” See Dusenberry v. Oddo, No. 17-cv-2402, 2018 WL 372164,
at *4 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2018). Likewise, as noted above, Ҥ2255 is not
inadequate or ineffective merely because the petitioner cannot satisfy
§2255’s timeliness or other gatekeeping requirements.” See Long, 611 F.
App’x at 55. Therefore, Petitioner may not rely upon §2241 to raise his
claims, and the Court will dismiss his §2241 petition for lack of jurisdiction.
III. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, Maycock’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2241 will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction without
prejudice to Petitioner’s right to file a §2255 motion in the sentencing court,
subject to the pre-authorization requirements set forth in 28 U.S.C. §§2244
and 2255(h), as they may apply. Because Petitioner is not detained because
of a process issued by a state court and the petition is not brought pursuant
to §2255, no action by this Court with respect to a certificate of appealability
is necessary.
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An appropriate Order follows.
s/ Malachy E. Mannion
MALACHY E. MANNION
United States District Judge
Dated: April 25, 2022
20-2036-01
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