The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ESTATE OF EDWARD L. No. 4:21-CV-01731
HIMMELWRIGHT, Deceased,
(Chief Judge Brann)
Plaintiff,
v.
BOBBIE JO BRUNGARD,
LYCOMING-CLINTON MENTAL
HEALTH-INTELLECTUAL
DISABILITY PROGRAM, DR.
JAMES SWEETLAND, UPMC LOCK
HAVEN, TROOPER BENJAMIN J.
CAMPANA, and THE
PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
APRIL 29, 2022
In September 2021, the Estate of Edward Himmelwright1 sued Bobbie Jo
Brungard, Lycoming-Clinton Mental Health-Intellectual Disability Program, Dr.
James Sweetland, UPMC Lock Haven, Corporal Benjamin Campana, and the
Pennsylvania State Police. The Estate alleges that these Defendants violated
1 An Estate is not a legal entity capable of suing or being sued. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 17; Brennan
v. Smith’s Estate, 301 F. Supp. 307, 308 (M.D. Pa. 1969) (Sheridan, J.); In re Harrisburg
Trust Co., 80 Pa. Super. 585, 586–87 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1923). Though the Defendants have
raised no objection, the case should instead be brought by Anna M. Douty, who is identified
as the Executrix of Himmelwright’s estate in the Complaint. See Doc. 1-3 ¶ 2; Fed. R. Civ.
Pro. 17(a)(1)(A) (“An action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. The
following may sue in their own names without joining the person whose benefit the action is
Himmelwright’s state and federal rights in responding to a mental health episode he
suffered just over a year before his death. Each Defendant has now moved to dismiss
these claims under Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons detailed
below, their motions are granted.
I. FACTS ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT
On July 10, 2019, Himmelwright experienced a mental health episode.2 After
he was taken into custody, Bobbie Jo Brungard, an employee of the Lycoming-
Clinton Mental Health-Intellectual Disability Program (“Lycoming-Clinton
MHID”), initiated an involuntary mental health commitment under Pennsylvania’s
Mental Health Procedures Act.3 But according to the Estate, the Act’s procedures
were not employed when Himmelwright arrived at UPMC Lock Haven that
afternoon.
The Estate first alleges that his hospital records only reflect that his rights
were explained to him, with no mention of the forms having been provided to him.4
Second, the Estate contends that he was not seen within two hours, alleging that
while he arrived at 2:06 PM, according to Hospital Records, his 302-Commitment
Form suggests that he was not seen until 7:15 PM—some five hours later.5 And third,
the Estate states that while UPMC Lock Haven Doctor James Sweetland found him
2 Doc. 1-3 ¶ 9.
3 Id. ¶ 10.
4 Id. ¶ 13.
“severely mentally disabled and in need of treatment” and directed that he “be
admitted to a facility designated by the County Administrator for a period of
treatment not to exceed 120 hours,” Himmelwright was never committed.6 Instead,
he was transferred to Penn State Hershey Medical Center later that evening for
further treatment.7
In the Estate’s view, this last violation resulted in another deprivation of
Himmelwright’s rights. Despite never having been committed, the Estate alleges that
Lycoming-Clinton MHID and Brungard informed the Pennsylvania State Police that
he had been.8 Based on this incorrect information, Corporal Benjamin Campana and
the Pennsylvania State Police obtained a warrant for Himmelwright’s residence and
seized his firearms, damaging his property in the process.9
II. THE LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court may dismiss a
complaint, in whole or in part, if the plaintiff has failed to “state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.” Following the landmark decisions Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly10 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,11 “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that
6 Id. ¶¶ 18–19.
7 Id. ¶ 19.
8 Id. ¶¶ 19, 22.
9 Id. ¶ 23.
10 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
is plausible on its face.’”12 In its assessment, the Court must “accept as true all factual
allegations in the complaint and draw all inferences from the facts alleged in the light
most favorable to [the plaintiff].”13 Still, “the tenet that a court must accept as true
all of the allegations contained in the complaint is inapplicable to legal
conclusions.”14 “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported
by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”15 And of particular importance here,
while “a district court ruling on a motion to dismiss may not consider matters
extraneous to the pleading. . . . an exception to the general rule is that a document
integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be considered without
converting the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment.”16
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Claims Against UPMC Lock Haven and Dr. Sweetland
As a result of Himmelwright’s alleged wait once he arrived at the Hospital,
the Estate claims that UPMC Lock Haven and Dr. Sweetland committed the tort of
false restraint or false imprisonment, which it in turn alleges is a constitutional
12 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)).
13 Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008) (Nygaard, J.).
14 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210
(3d Cir. 2009) (Nygaard, J.) (“After Iqbal, it is clear that conclusory or ‘bare-bones’
allegations will no longer survive a motion to dismiss.”).
15 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
violation entitling it to damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.17 But neither count may
proceed.
To start, there are the claims’ legal failings. The first count, false
imprisonment, requires physical confinement or in its absence, an attempt by the
person to determine whether they are actually confined.18 Yet nothing in the Estate’s
claim can plausibly be read as alleging that UPMC Lock Haven, its employees, or
Sweetland restrained or prevented Himmelwright from leaving. At the same time,
section 1983 only applies to state actors.19 And UPMC Lock Haven, which employs
Sweetland, is a private, nonprofit corporation. So neither the Hospital or its Doctor
can sustain the second count.
Now, these failings alone would justify dismissal. But even if they did not, a
broader flaw in the Estate’s case would prove its undoing. The Estate rests its claims
on the hospital’s alleged failure to examine Himmelwright within two hours of his
arrival, as required by 50 P.S. § 7302(b). According to the Estate, “[p]er medical
records,” Himmelwright arrived at 2:06 PM and was not treated until at least 7:15
PM.20 The invocation of “per medical records” means that this Court may properly
17 Doc. 1-3 ¶¶ 27–31, 46–52.
18 Chicarelli v. Plymouth Garden Apartments, 551 F. Supp. 532, 540–41 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
19 Leshko v. Servis, 423 F.3d 337, 339 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Section 1983 subjects to liability those
who deprive persons of federal constitutional or statutory right ‘under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage’ of a state. . . . We consider actions ‘under color of
law’ as the equivalent of ‘state action’ under the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . Thus, to state a
claim of liability under § 1983, [Plaintiffs] must allege that [they were] deprived of a federal
constitutional or statutory right by a state actor.”).
consider his emergency record on a 12(b)(6) motion.21 And this record shows that
he was treated within two hours of his arrival.22
The sole basis for the Estate’s case is its own interpretation of a doctor’s
handwriting. In the 302 petition, Sweetland lists 3:01 PM as Himmelwright’s arrival,
while the exact time of examination is listed in military time. The Estate contends
that this handwritten time is ambiguous, and the only time that could make sense
would be 1915, or 7:15 PM, some five hours after his arrival.23 But this assertion is
belied by the numeral’s dissimilarity to the other “9” on the page and, most
importantly, the electronically recorded log of Himmelwright’s visit. The report lists
his arrival at 14:06,24 his triage at 2:07 PM,25 his physical assessment by nurses at
14:48,26 and his visits with Sweetland at 15:13—aligning with a “1515” time of
examination—and once again at 15:35.27
In short, these counts fail on the law and the facts. They are therefore
dismissed with prejudice.
21 In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d at 1426.
22 Doc. 18-4 at 13.
23 Id. at 34.
24 Id. at 6.
25 Id. at 7.
26 Id. at 8.
B. The Claims Against Bobbie Jo Brungard and Lycoming-Clinton
Mental Health-Intellectual Disability Program
The Estate also alleges that it’s entitled to money damages under section 1983
because Brungard and Lycoming-Clinton MHID violated Himmelwright’s
constitutional and statutory rights. This claim focusses on two separate violations.
First, the Estate emphasizes that the Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures
Act requires that individuals subject to involuntary examination be given copies of
certain forms and informed of their right to counsel. But according to the Estate, the
hospital records and 302 petition do not show that Brungard provided these forms to
Himmelwright. Instead, they note just that Brungard “explained” these rights to him,
thus violating the law.28 Second, the Estate contends that by incorrectly informing
the Pennsylvania State Police that Himmelwright had been committed to a mental
health facility, resulting in his firearms being seized, Brungard violated
Himmelwright’s right to be free from unlawful searches and seizures under the
Fourteenth Amendment.29 Finally, the Estate alleges that these violations are
evidence of Lycoming-Clinton MHID’s failure to properly supervise and train
Brungard, which renders the Facility liable under Monell.30 The problem for the
Estate, however, is that none provide the basis for a section 1983 claim.
28 Doc. 1-3 ¶¶ 13, 33(a).
29 Id. ¶ 33(b).
The first, centered on a violation of the Mental Health Procedures Act, fails
because section 1983 “does not provide a cause of action for violations of state
statutes.”31
The second, though based on a federal constitutional right, does little better.
While this matter is complicated by the fact that Brungard neither applied for the
warrant nor seized Himmelwright’s guns, “[a]s a general rule, a government
official’s liability for causing an arrest is the same as for carrying it out.”32 And under
Franks v. Delaware, a government official may violate the Fourth—and thus the
Fourteenth—Amendment by providing a false statement in a warrant application
intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth.33
Provided this approach applies here, the Estate’s Complaint fails to allege
facts showing that Brungard’s decision to relay the message to the State Police
amounted to more than a mistake. As it stands, the 302 petition shows that Sweetland
found Himmelwright “severely mentally disabled and in need of treatment,” and
therefore directed that he “be admitted to a facility designated by the County
Administrator for a period of treatment not to exceed 120 hours.”34 But later, after
speaking with Himmelwright’s cardiologist at Penn State Hershey Medical Center,
31 Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1113 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S.
1 (1980)).
32 Berg v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 272 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Gordon v. Degelmann,
29 F.3d 295, 298 (7th Cir. 1994) and Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S 168, 200 (1880)).
33 Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978).
Sweetland arranged for his care there instead, meaning Himmelwright was not
committed, despite Sweetland’s initial finding.35 For Brungard to be held liable, the
Estate must allege facts showing that Brungard’s incorrect report to the police was
made intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth. It has not done so here.
Without an underlying constitutional violation against Brungard, the Estate
cannot sustain a claim against Lycoming-Clinton MHID for failing to train and
supervise her.36
As a result, Brungard and Lycoming-Clinton MHID’s motion to dismiss is
granted. The Estate, however, is granted leave to amend these counts.
C. The Claims Against the Pennsylvania State Police and Corporal
Campana
The Estate finally alleges that, in obtaining a warrant and seizing his firearms,
Corporal Campana and the Pennsylvania State Police committed trespass to chattel,
which violated his state and federal rights and therefore entitles it to recovery under
section 1983.37
To begin with, the Estate’s counts against the Pennsylvania State Police are
barred by the Eleventh Amendment.38 So its motion to dismiss is therefore granted
with prejudice.
35 Doc. 18-4 at 15.
36 Monell, 436 U.S. at 692 (noting that the Act “imposes liability on a government that, under
color of some official policy, ‘causes’ an employee to violate another's constitutional rights”).
37 Doc. 1-3 ¶¶ 24–26, 39–45.
A like, but not identical, fate is accorded to the Estate’s counts against
Corporal Campana. The Commonwealth has not consented to suits in federal court
alleging that its officials have, in the course of their employment, committed trespass
to chattel.39 At the same time, state law violations cannot underpin section 1983
claims, and the violations of federally protected rights are not alleged clearly enough
to sustain the claim. Indeed, unlike its count against Brungard and Lycoming Clinton
MHID, the Estate’s count against Corporal Campana and the Pennsylvania State
Police makes no mention of an “unlawful search and seizure.”40 Corporal Campana’s
motion to dismiss both counts is accordingly granted.
The Estate, however, is granted leave to amend these counts. To proceed with
the first, the Estate must allege facts showing that Corporal Campana violated
Himmelwright’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, entitling it to monetary
damages under section 1983. While to proceed with the second, it must allege facts
showing that Campana was acting outside the scope of his employment and
committed trespass to chattel. Whether these claims, in amended form, are afflicted
with legal infirmities is a question for another day.
39 1 Pa. C.S. § 2310 (providing Commwealth officials immunity from suit); 42 Pa. C.S.
§ 8522(b) (delineating the nine categories of claims that the Commonwealth has waived
immunity to). In its response brief, the Estate newly asserts that Campana was acting outside
the scope of his employment. But a response brief is no place to amend a complaint.
40 Compare Doc. 1-3 ¶ 33 with id. ¶ 40. In its response brief, the Estate newly asserts that
Corporal Campana’s conduct violated the Fourteenth Amendment, as it was an unlawful
IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, the Defendants’ motions to dismiss are granted. But only the counts
against UPMC Lock Haven, Dr. Sweetland, and the Pennsylvania State Police are
dismissed with prejudice. The Estate shall have leave to amend its counts against
Bobbie Jo Brungard, Lycoming-Clinton MHID, and Corporal Campana.
An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Matthew W. Brann
Matthew W. Brann
Chief United States District Judge