Korman v. Honesdale Pennsylvania State Police

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ALLISON KORMAN, : CIVIL No.: 3:21-CV-01516

:

Plaintiff, : (Magistrate Judge Schwab)

:

v. :

:

PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE :

HONESDALE BARRACKS, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction.

Plaintiff Allison Korman (“Korman”) brings claims of libel, slander, and

civil rights violations against the defendants—Trooper Nicholas Scochin

(“Scochin”) and the Pennsylvania State Police Honesdale Barracks (“PSP”).

The defendants have filed a motion for a more definite statement under Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(e) seeking basic details about Korman’s claims. Because the

defendants should be provided with those basic details, we will grant the motion

for a more definite statement and order Korman to file an amended complaint.

II. Background and Procedural History.

Korman, a pro se plaintiff, began this action by filing a complaint against

Scochin and the PSP in the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne County,

Pennsylvania. Doc. 1-2. Korman’s statement of her claim in her complaint is

brief. It reads in its entirety:

Honesdale station violated my civil rights, numerous times,

with intentional malice. Honesdale committed libel against me

3 times, resulting in loss of income, loss of vision, pain and

suffering, and violation of my rights after filing a sodomy rape

report.

Doc. 1-2 at 5. Korman is seeking monetary damages. Id. The defendants

removed the action to the United States District Court for the Middle District

of Pennsylvania. Doc. 1. The parties subsequently consented to proceed before

a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), and the case was referred to

the undersigned. Doc. 16.

The defendants filed a motion for a more definite statement with a brief

in support of that motion on September 9, 2021. Docs. 5, 6. The defendants

contend that the complaint fails to comply with the pleading requirements of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and that Korman should be ordered to file

an amended complaint that identifies the claims she is asserting, the defendant

or defendants implicated, and the precise actions of each defendant that

allegedly violated her rights. Doc. 6. We ordered Korman either to file a brief

in opposition to the defendants’ motion for a more definite statement or to file

an amended complaint by October 11, 2021. Doc. 8. Korman then filed a

document titled “Plaintiff’s Answer to Motion for a More Definite Statement”

and another document titled “Plaintiff’s Motion and Brief in Support of Motion

to Change Compensatory and Punitive Damages.” Docs. 9, 10.1 Korman later

filed a motion for discovery without a brief in support of that motion. Doc. 11.2

The defendants then filed a reply brief in support of their motion for a

more definite statement. Doc. 12. In the defendants’ reply brief to Korman’s

first “answer,” they continue to seek a more definite statement from Korman.

Id. at 1. Specifically, they seek clarification on Korman’s claims she is

asserting, the defendants implicated, and the precise actions of each defendant

that allegedly violated her rights. Id. at 2, 4.

Korman then filed, without leave of court, several additional documents:

a document she titled as “Plaintiff’s Second Answer to the Motion for a More

Definite Statement,” a document titled “Plaintiff’s Brief Asking To Amend

Second Statement Filed,” and a letter addressed to the court. Docs. 13, 14, 15.

1 To the extent that Document 10 is construed as a motion for leave to

amend the complaint, we will grant that motion to the extent that Korman will be

ordered to file an amended complaint consistent with the rest of this Memorandum

Opinion.

2 By a separate order, we have deemed that motion withdrawn because

Korman has not filed a brief in support of that motion as required by M.D. Pa. L.

R. 7.5.

III. Motion for More Definite Statement.

Defendants contend that Korman’s complaint violates Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)

because her complaint fails to set forth a short, plain statement of her claim. Doc.

6 at 3, 4.

“If a pleading fails to specify the allegations in a manner that provides

sufficient notice, a defendant can move for a more definite statement under Rule

12(e) before responding.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 514

(2002). Rule 12(e) provides that a “party may move for a more definite statement

of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or

ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(e). The Rule requires that the motion “must be made before filing a

responsive pleading and must point out the defects complained of and the details

desired.” Id.

A motion for a more definite statement will generally be granted “‘only if a

pleading is so vague or ambiguous that the opposing party cannot reasonably be

required to make a responsive pleading.’” Synagro-WWT, Inc. v. Rush Township,

204 F. Supp. 2d 827, 849 (M.D. Pa. 2002) (quoting SEC v. Saltzman, 127 F.

Supp. 2d 660, 668 (E.D. Pa. 2000)). “The United States Court of Appeals for the

Third Circuit has, however, highlighted the usefulness of a motion for a more

definite statement when a complaint does not disclose the facts underlying a

plaintiff’s claim for relief such that the defendant cannot reasonably be expected

to frame a proper, fact-specific defense.” Miller v. Atlantic Freight Systems, Inc.,

No. 1:11- CV-01954, 2013 WL 1308235 at *3 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2013), report

and recommendation adopted, 2013 WL 1292907 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2013). In

that circumstance, “‘the Rule 12(e) motion for a more definite statement is

perhaps the best procedural tool available to the defendant to obtain the factual

basis underlying a plaintiff’s claim for relief.’” Id. (quoting Thomas v.

Independence Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 301 (3d Cir. 2006)). “The decision to grant a

motion for a more definite statement is committed to the discretion of the district

court.” Woodard v. FedEx Freight East, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 178, 182 (M.D. Pa.

2008). In civil rights cases, “pro se plaintiffs often should be afforded an

opportunity to amend a complaint before the complaint is dismissed in its

entirety.” Gary v. Pa. Dep’t of Labor and Indus., No. 1:13-CV-2540 (M.D. Pa.

2014), report and recommendation adopted, 2014 WL 2720805 (M.D. Pa. June

13, 2014).

In this case, the defendants contend that they are unable to file a responsive

pleading due to the lack of clarity in Korman’s complaint and subsequent filings.

Doc. 12 at 1, 2. Specifically, they request that their motion for a more definite

statement be granted. Id. at 1, 4.

Korman’s complaint lists libel, slander, and violation of civil rights as her

claims. Doc. 1-2 at 4. But considering the allegations in the complaint, we can’t

determine the precise nature of Korman’s claims because her complaint does not

specify how each defendant caused harm to Korman. The defendants have not

been provided fair notice of the nature of Korman’s claims and of the grounds for

those claims. Further, Korman’s numerous additional filings fail to clarify her

allegations. Moreover, this court may not address the factual allegations in those

filings. Pennsylvania ex rel. Zimmerman v. PepsiCo, Inc., 836 F.2d 173, 181 (3d

Cir. 1988). ‘“[I]t is axiomatic that the complaint may not be amended by the

briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss.’” Id. (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v.

Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1107 (7th Cir. 1984)).

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we will grant the defendants’

motion for a more definite statement and require Korman to file an amended

complaint containing the details requested by the defendants, i.e., her specific

claims, the defendants implicated, and the defendants’ direct role in each alleged

violation.

For Korman’s benefit in filing an amended complaint, we will set forth

basic pleading standards. Korman’s amended complaint must comply with the

pleading requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. “Pleadings must be construed so as

to do justice.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e). “This already liberal standard is ‘even more

pronounced’ where a plaintiff files the complaint without the assistance of

counsel.” Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 92 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). “[A] court must make reasonable

allowances to protect pro se litigants from the inadvertent forfeiture of important

rights due merely to their lack of legal training.” Id. Thus, “[c]ourts are more

forgiving of pro se litigants for filing relatively unorganized or somewhat lengthy

complaints.” Id.

Nevertheless, a pro se complaint still must comply with the basic pleading

requirements of Rule 8. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires, among other

things, that a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the grounds

for the court’s jurisdiction”; “a short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief”; and “a demand for the relief sought, which

may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(1), 8(a)(2), 8(a)(3). Rule 8 also requires that each allegation in a complaint

“must be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). “Fundamentally,

Rule 8 requires that a complaint provide fair notice of ‘what the . . . claim is and

the grounds upon which it rests.’” Garrett, 938 F.3d at 92 (quoting Erickson, 551

U.S. at 93). Korman should not assume that the court and the defendants are

aware of the events at issue; rather, she should draft her amended complaint “as

if [she] were telling a story to people who knew nothing about [her] situation.”

Wrhel v. United States, No. 16-CV-758-JDP, 2017 WL 4352088, at *2 (W.D.

Wis. Sept. 29, 2017).

“Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a

‘short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2)). The statement required by Rule 8(a)(2) must give the defendant fair

notice of the nature of the plaintiff’s claim and of the grounds upon which the

claim rests. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93. Under Rule 8, detailed factual allegations

are not required, but more is required than “labels,” “conclusions,” or “a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “In other words, a complaint must do more

than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578

F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). “A complaint has to ‘show’ such an entitlement

with its facts.” Id.

In considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be

granted, the court “‘must accept all facts alleged in the complaint as true and

construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.’”

Krieger v. Bank of Am., N.A., 890 F.3d 429, 437 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Flora v.

Cty. of Luzerne, 776 F.3d 169, 175 (3d Cir. 2015)). But a court “need not credit

a complaint’s bald assertions or legal conclusions.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch.

Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). A court also need not “assume that a . . .

plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not alleged.” Associated Gen.

Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526

(1983).

A well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and

conclusions. Rather, it must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the

plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation. In

practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-step

analysis:

First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff

must plead to state a claim.” Second, the court should identify

allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions,

are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Finally, “where

there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should

assume their veracity and then determine whether they

plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.”

Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (footnote and

citations omitted) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675, 679).

Any amended complaint must be titled as an amended complaint and must

contain the docket number of this case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). “The plaintiff is

advised that any amended complaint must be complete in all respects.” Young v.

Keohane, 8 09 F. Supp. 1185, 1198 (M.D. Pa. 1992). “It must be a new pleading

which stands by itself as an adequate complaint without reference to the

complaint already filed.” Id. “In general, an amended pleading supersedes the

original pleading and renders the original pleading a nullity.” Garrett, 938 F.3d

at 82. “Thus, the most recently filed amended complaint becomes the operative

pleading.” Id. In other words, if an amended complaint is filed, the complaint

will have no role in the future litigation of this case.

For Korman’s benefit, we will also set forth some general standards for

two legal concepts that may assist her in formulating an amended complaint—the

Eleventh Amendment and personal involvement regarding 42 U.S.C. § 1983

claims.

Eleventh Amendment.

To the extent that Korman is considering suing the PSP, the PSP would

have Eleventh Amendment immunity. “Our federalist system of government

accords respect for the sovereignty of the States in a variety of ways, including

the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, which immunizes

States from suits brought in federal court by both their own citizens and citizens

of other States.” Maliandi v. Montclair State Univ., 845 F.3d 77, 81 (3d Cir.

2016). The Eleventh Amendment provides:

The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed

to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted

against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or

by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.

U.S. Const. Amend. XI. Although its text appears to restrict only the Article III

diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, the Eleventh Amendment has been

interpreted ‘“to stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition . . .

which it confirms.”’ Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996)

(quoting Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991)). That

presupposition is that each state is a sovereign entity in our federal system and it

is inherent in the nature of sovereignty that a sovereign is not amenable to suit

unless it consents. Id.

“Immunity from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment is

designed to preserve the delicate and ‘proper balance between the supremacy of

federal law and the separate sovereignty of the States.’” Karns v. Shanahan, 879

F.3d 504, 512 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 757

(1999)). It “serves two fundamental imperatives: safeguarding the dignity of the

states and ensuring their financial solvency.” Id. It serves those interests by

barring suits against the nonconsenting states. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents,

528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000) (stating that “the Constitution does not provide for federal

jurisdiction over suits against nonconsenting States”); Pennhurst State Sch. &

Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984) (“It is clear, of course, that in the

absence of consent a suit in which the State or one of its agencies or departments

is named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment.”).

There are two circumstances when the Eleventh Amendment does not bar

a suit against a state or state agency.3 First, a state may waive its Eleventh

Amendment immunity by consenting to suit. College Savings Bank v. Florida

Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999). Second,

Congress may abrogate a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity when it

unequivocally intends to do so and when it acts pursuant to a valid grant of

constitutional authority. Geness v. Admin. Off. of Pennsylvania Cts., 974 F.3d

263, 269–70 (3d Cir. 2020). The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has not

waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity. See 42 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann.

§ 8521(b) (“Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to waive the

immunity of the Commonwealth from suit in Federal courts guaranteed by the

Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”); Downey v.

Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., 968 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir. 2020) (“Pennsylvania

has not waived its sovereign immunity defense in federal court.”). And 42

U.S.C. § 1983 does not override a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity. Quern

3 Additionally, under Ex parte Young, claims against a state official in his

or her official capacity for prospective injunctive relief are not barred by the

Eleventh Amendment. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). But Ex parte

Young “has no application in suits against the States and their agencies, which

are barred regardless of the relief sought.” Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth.

v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993).

v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979). The PSP is entitled to Eleventh Amendment

immunity. Atkin v. Johnson, 432 F. App’x 47, 48 (3d Cir. 2011).

Personal Involvement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

We note the following regarding actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

“Section 1983 imposes civil liability upon any person who, acting under the

color of state law, deprives another individual of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Shuman v.

Penn Manor School Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005). Section 1983 “does

not create any new substantive rights but instead provides a remedy for the

violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right.” Id. To establish a claim

under § 1983, the plaintiff must establish a deprivation of a federally protected

right and that this deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of

state law. Woloszyn v. County of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 319 (3d Cir. 2005).

Liability in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is personal in nature, and to be

liable, a defendant must have been personally involved in the wrongful conduct.

Thus, respondeat superior4 cannot form the basis of liability. Jutrowski v. Twp.

4 “Liability based on respondeat superior arises ‘solely on the basis of the

existence of an employer-employee relationship,’ regardless of whether the

employer had any part in causing harm.” Santiago, 629 F.3d at 128 (quoting

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978)).

of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 290 (3d Cir. 2018). In other words, “each

Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her

own misconduct.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. And so, a constitutional deprivation

cannot be premised merely on the fact that the defendant was a supervisor when

the incidents set forth in the complaint occurred. See Alexander v. Forr, 297 F.

App’x 102, 104–05 (3d Cir. 2008). Rather, “[b]ecause vicarious liability is

inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each

Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has

violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.

The Third Circuit has “recognized that ‘there are two theories of

supervisory liability, one under which supervisors can be liable if they

established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused the

constitutional harm, and another under which they can be liable if they

participated in violating plaintiff’s rights, directed others to violate them, or, as

the persons in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in their subordinates’

violations.’” Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 330 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting

Santiago, 629 F.3d at 129 n.5).

“Where a supervisor with authority over a subordinate knows that the

subordinate is violating someone’s rights but fails to act to stop the subordinate

from doing so, the factfinder may usually infer that the supervisor ‘acquiesced’

in (i.e., tacitly assented to or accepted) the subordinate’s conduct.” Robinson v.

City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1294 (3d Cir. 1997) (footnote omitted),

abrogated on other grounds, Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548

U.S. 53, 67 (2006). “A plaintiff makes sufficient allegations of a defendant’s

personal involvement by describing the defendant’s participation in or actual

knowledge of and acquiescence in the wrongful conduct.” Chavarriaga v. New

Jersey Dep’t of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 222 (3d Cir. 2015).

To set forth a claim for supervisory liability under the policy-and-practice

strand of supervisory liability, a plaintiff must:

(1) identify the specific supervisory practice or procedure

that the supervisor failed to employ, and show that (2) the

existing custom and practice without the identified, absent

custom or procedure created an unreasonable risk of the

ultimate injury, (3) the supervisor was aware that this

unreasonable risk existed, (4) the supervisor was indifferent

to the risk; and (5) the underling’s violation resulted from

the supervisor’s failure to employ that supervisory practice

or procedure.

Id. at 227 (quoting Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir.

2001)). “Put another way, the inmate must identify the supervisor’s specific acts

or omissions demonstrating the supervisor’s deliberate indifference to the

inmate’s risk of injury and must establish a link between the supervisor, the act,

and the injury.” Id.

IV. Conclusion.

For the foregoing reasons, we will grant the defendants’ motion (doc. 5)

for a more definite statement, and we will order Korman to file an amended

complaint. An appropriate order will be issued.

S/Susan E. Schwab

Susan E. Schwab

United States Magistrate Judge