reliance on the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment is not appropriate when the conduct at issue is “governed by a specific constitutional amendment.”
How later courts described this case
- reliance on the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment is not appropriate when the conduct at issue is “governed by a specific constitutional amendment.”
- holding that municipalities are “immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. §1983.”
- holding that claims of excessive force to effect arrest analyzed under a 4th Amendment standard
- “[plaintiff’s] Fifth Amendment claim fails because the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment only applies to federal officials, and Officer[s] [are] state official[s]”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CLEO FIDDEMON, :
Plaintiff : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:21-144
v. : (JUDGE MANNION)
PATROLMAN ROBERT MAHOLIK, :
PATROLMAN JOSEPH WOZNIAK,
and WILKES-BARRE TOWNSHIP, :
Defendants :
MEMORANDUM
Presently before the court, in this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C.
§1983, is the defendants’ motion to dismiss, (Doc. 7), plaintiff’s amended
complaint, (Doc. 4), pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), for
failure to state a cognizable 4th Amendment false arrest and excessive force
claims as well as due process claims under the 5th and 14th Amendments.
The defendants also contend that the plaintiff failed to state cognizable
municipal liability claims against Wilkes-Barre Township, (“W-B Twp.”),
under Monell. After the defendants filed their motion to dismiss, and after
discovery was completed, the defendants then filed a motion for summary
judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), (Doc. 23). The motion for summary
judgment has been fully briefed and Exhibits were submitted, and it is
pending before the court.
In Count I, plaintiff, an African American, who ostensibly committed a
minor traffic violation, alleges that defendants violated his “Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by
falsely arresting Plaintiff and then brutalizing him.” The court construes
plaintiff as raising false arrest and excessive force claims in Count I under
the 4th Amendment.
The court has reviewed the briefs of the parties regarding the
defendants’ motion to dismiss. Accepting the allegations in the amended
complaint as true, as the court must, see Wheeler v. Wheeler, 639 Fed.Appx.
147, 149 (3d Cir. 2016) (“In evaluating a motion to dismiss, [the court]
consider[s] the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint, accepting factual
allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the
plaintiff.”), the plaintiff has stated plausible 4th Amendment claims against the
individual defendant officers in Count I. Plaintiff has plead sufficient facts that
make it plausible that the two defendant officers lacked probable cause to
arrest him and to believe that plaintiff had committed the offenses with which
he was charged. (See Doc. 4, ¶’s 11-17). See Watson v. Witmer, 183
F.Supp.3d 607, 614-15 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (finding that a determination that
probable cause must have existed [by defendant officer] was premature at
the motion to dismiss stage). Thus, defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s
false arrest claim against the defendant officers is denied.
The plaintiff has also plausibly stated a 4th Amendment excessive force
claim against the defendant officers in Count I and, the defendants’ motion
to dismiss it is denied. (See Doc. 4 at 4) (alleging that after his arrest,
“Maholik then placed [plaintiff] in a ‘headlock’ and began choking him”, and
then “Patrolman Maholik, Patrolman Wozniak and two other officers dragged
[plaintiff] by his neck down a long hallway to a holding cell.”).
Plaintiff sues the two defendant officers in both their individual and
official capacities. The plaintiff’s claims in Count I to the extent that they are
asserted against the individual defendants in their official capacities are
dismissed. See Watson, 183 F.Supp.3d at 614 n. 3 (noting that “the assertion
of an official capacity claim against a government official is duplicative of a
claim against the governmental entity itself.”) (citing Kentucky v. Graham,
473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985)).
As such, the plaintiff’s false arrest and excessive force claims against
the defendant officers in Count I will proceed only to the extent that they are
sued in their individual capacities.
The court will also dismiss the plaintiff’s 5th Amendment due process
claim in Count II since, as plaintiff now concedes, the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment only applies to federal officials, see Bergdoll v. City
of York, 515 Fed.Appx. 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[plaintiff’s] Fifth Amendment
claim fails because the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment only
applies to federal officials, and Officer[s] [are] state official[s]”), and there are
no federal official defendants in this case. As such, plaintiff’s 5th Amendment
claim is dismissed against all defendants.
Further, the plaintiff’s 14th Amendment due process claim in Count II is
dismissed since his false arrest and excessive force claims are cognizable
under the 4th Amendment. In Wheeler, 639 Fed.Appx. at 151, the Third
Circuit explained:
The Supreme Court has noted that, “[w]here a particular
Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional
protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that
Amendment, not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due
process,’ must be the guide for analyzing these claims.” Albright
v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114
(1994) (internal quotations omitted). More specifically, redress
for alleged false arrest or malicious prosecution “cannot be
based on substantive due process considerations, but instead
must be based on a provision of the Bill of Rights” such as the
Fourth Amendment. Merkle, 211 F.3d at 792.
See also Berg v. Cty. of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 268 (3d Cir. 2000)
(reliance on the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment is not
appropriate when the conduct at issue is “governed by a specific
constitutional amendment.”); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394, 109
S.Ct. 1865, 1871 (1989) (holding that claims of excessive force to effect
arrest analyzed under a 4th Amendment standard).
Thus, Count II of the amended complaint is dismissed in its entirety
with prejudice.
The defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief
is granted since plaintiff does not oppose and concedes to the dismissal of
his stated claims.
Moreover, plaintiff’s claims for declaratory judgment in his amended
complaint seeking a “declaration that Defendants’ conduct as set forth herein
is in violation of Section 1983”, are dismissed, as plaintiff now concedes they
should be dismissed, since plaintiff failed to allege ongoing violations of his
constitutional rights. See Blakeney v. Marsico, 340 Fed.Appx. 778, 780 (3d
Cir. 2009) (Third Circuit held that to satisfy the standing requirement of Article
III, a party seeking declaratory relief must allege that there is a substantial
likelihood that he will suffer harm in the future)(citations omitted). However,
plaintiff is not entitled to declaratory relief that defendants violated his rights
in the past as he alleges. Id. (citing Brown v. Fauver, 819 F.2d 395, 399-400
(3d Cir. 1987)) (Third Circuit directed district court to dismiss plaintiff’s §1983
claim for prospective relief where he “has done nothing more than allege past
exposure to unconstitutional state action”).
Next, the court finds that plaintiff has stated cognizable municipal
liability claims against W-B Twp. in Count I under Monell v. Dep’t of Social
Servs., 436 US 658, 694 (1978), based on his allegations that the
defendants’ actions were the result of a policy, custom or practice of pulling
over African Americans and jailing them, and he has alleged sufficient facts
to establish a failure to train and supervise claim against W-B Twp. (See Doc.
4, 30-37, 40-46). The plaintiff has been afforded the opportunity to present
facts and evidence through discovery regarding his Monell claims against W-
B Twp. and these claims may be reconsidered with defendants’ summary
judgment motion. Thus, defendants’ motion to dismiss the municipal liability
claims against W-B Twp. in Count I is denied. See Watson, 183 F.Supp.3d
at 614-15.
Finally, the plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages against W-B Twp.
and against the defendant officers in their official capacities are dismissed.
See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271, 101 S.Ct.
2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981) (holding that municipalities are “immune from
punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. §1983.”). However, to the extent plaintiff
seeks punitive damages against defendant officers in their individual
capacities, defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied since punitive damages
are recoverable in individual capacity suits against state actors for conduct
exhibiting “reckless or callous disregard for the plaintiff’s rights, as well as
intentional violations of federal law”, Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 51, 103
S.Ct. 1625 (1983), and, plaintiff’s allegations sufficiently allege such conduct
by defendant officers. However, the court may revisit this issue when
considering the evidence along with defendants’ summary judgment motion.
Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss, (Doc. 7), plaintiff’s
amended complaint, (Doc. 4), is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN
PART, as specified above.
s/Malachy E. Mannion
MALACHY E. MANNION
United States District Judge
DATED: April 13, 2022
21-144-06