Beavers v. Saul

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DAVID BEAVERS,

Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:20-cv-01415

v. (SAPORITO, M.J.)

KILOLO KIJAKAZI,

ACTING COMMISSIONER OF

SOCIAL SECURITY,1

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

In this matter, the plaintiff, David Beavers, seeks judicial review of

the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying his

claims for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security

income, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3). The

matter has been referred to the undersigned United States magistrate

judge on consent of the parties, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed.

1 Kilolo Kijakazi became the Acting Commissioner of Social

Security n July 9, 2021. She has been automatically substituted in place

of the original defendant, Andrew Saul. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d); see also

42 U.S.C. §405(g) (action survives regardless of any change in the person

occupying the office of Commissioner of Social Security). The caption in

this case is amended to reflect this change.

R. Civ. P. 73.

I. BACKGROUND

On May 23, 2018, Beavers protectively filed claims for disability

insurance benefits and supplemental security income, both asserting a

disability onset date of April 10, 2018. Both claims were initially denied

by state agency reviewers on November 5, 2018. The plaintiff then

requested an administrative hearing.

A video hearing was subsequently held on September 16, 2019,

before an administrative law judge, Frank Barletta (the “ALJ”). In

addition to the plaintiff himself, the ALJ received testimony from an

impartial vocational expert, Tanja H. Hubacker (the “VE”). The plaintiff

was represented by counsel at the hearing.

On July 30, 2019, the ALJ denied Beavers’s application for benefits

in a written decision. The ALJ followed the familiar five-step sequential

evaluation process in determining that Beavers was not disabled under

the Social Security Act. See generally Myers v. Berryhill, 373 F. Supp. 3d

528, 534 (M.D. Pa. 2019) (describing the five-step sequential evaluation

process). At step one, the ALJ found that Beavers had not engaged in

substantial gainful activity since his alleged disability onset date. At step

two, the ALJ found that Beavers had the severe impairments of: a

neurocognitive disorder due to traumatic brain injury, fractures of the

skull and facial bones, myocardial infarction, atherosclerotic heart

disease, heart failure, mixed conductive and sensorineural hearing loss

of both ears, alcohol abuse, anxiety, depression, and an adjustment

disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood. At step three, the ALJ

found that Beavers did not have an impairment or combination of

impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of an

impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

Between steps three and four of the sequential evaluation process,

the ALJ assessed Beavers’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”). See

generally id. at 534 n.4 (defining RFC). After evaluating the relevant

evidence of record, the ALJ found that Beavers had the RFC to perform

“light work” as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b),2 with

the following limitations:

[Beavers] could frequently climb ramps and stairs, but

never ladders, ropes, and scaffolds; could frequently

balance, stoop, kneel, and crouch; could occasionally

2 The Social Security regulations define “light work” as a job that

“involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting

or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b);

id. § 416.967(b).

crawl; could perform jobs that require no more than

occasional hearing ability (due to his limited hearing);

must avoid even moderate exposure to hazards; must

avoid noise above a moderate level; would be limited to

unskilled work, involving only simple tasks that are

not performed in a fast-paced production environment;

would be limited to low-stress occupations with only

occasional simple decision-making and only occasional

changes in work duties or work setting; and could have

only occasional interaction with coworkers,

supervisors, and the public.

(Tr. 19).

In making these factual findings regarding Beavers’s RFC, the ALJ

considered his symptoms and the extent to which they could reasonably

be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other

evidence of record. See generally 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929; Soc. Sec.

Ruling 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304. The ALJ also considered and articulated

how persuasive he found the medical opinions and prior administrative

medical findings of record. See generally 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c,

416.920c.

At step four, based on this RFC and on testimony by the VE, the

ALJ concluded that Beavers was unable to perform his past relevant

work as an electrician. Based on the testimony by the VE, however, the

ALJ determined there were jobs that existed in substantial numbers in

the national economy that Beavers could perform, such as a router (DOT#

222.587-038) and a non-postal mail clerk (DOT# 209.687-026). Based on

this finding, the ALJ concluded that Beavers was not disabled for Social

Security purposes.

The plaintiff sought further administrative review of his claims by

the Appeals Council, but his request was denied on July 9, 2020, making

the ALJ’s July 2019 decision the final decision of the Commissioner

subject to judicial review by this court.

Beavers timely filed his complaint in this court on August 11, 2020.

The Commissioner has filed an answer to the complaint, together with a

certified copy of the administrative record. Both parties have filed their

briefs, and this matter is now ripe for decision.

II. DISCUSSION

Under the Social Security Act, the question before this court is not

whether the claimant is disabled, but whether the Commissioner’s

finding that he is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and

was reached based upon a correct application of the relevant law. See

generally 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)(sentence five); id. § 1383(c)(3); Myers, 373 F.

Supp. 3d at 533 (describing standard of judicial review for social security

disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income

administrative decisions).

Beavers asserts on appeal that the ALJ erroneously found that the

evidence of record was insufficient to establish that he could not engage

in substantial gainful activity. (Doc. 16, at 5). This is because, according

to Beavers, the ALJ’s findings were irrational, were not based on the

substantial competent evidence of record and were not in accord with

applicable case law. Id.

A. The ALJ’s Step 3 Determinations

Beavers argues that the evidence in the record documents per se

disabling hearing loss. (Doc. 16, at 5). More specifically, Beavers contends

that his hearing impairment satisfies Listing 2.10, Hearing Loss Not

Treated with Cochlear Implantation. Id. at 6. He further asserts the

records also establish the equivalency of listing 2.07. Id. In addition to

his hearing loss, Beavers claims that his brain injury satisfies Listing

11.18. Id at 7. Lastly, Beavers argues that his cardiac condition satisfied

Listing 4.04. Id. at 9. Because the ALJ did not find that any of these

conditions constituted a listed impairment, Beavers claims, the ALJ’s

decision is not supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 6.

At Step 3 of this sequential analysis, the ALJ is required to

determine whether, singly or in combination, a claimant’s ailments and

impairments are so severe that they are per se disabling and entitle the

claimant to benefits. As part of this Step 3 disability evaluation process,

the ALJ must determine whether a claimant’s alleged impairment is

equivalent to a number of listed impairments, commonly referred to as

listings, that are acknowledged as so severe as to preclude substantial

gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii); 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt.

P, App. 1; Burnett v. Comm’s of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 119

(2000).

In making this determination, the ALJ is guided by several basic

principles set forth by the social security regulations and case law. First,

if a claimant’s impairment meets or equals one of the listed impairments,

the claimant is considered disabled per se and is awarded benefits. 20

C.F.R. §416.920(d); Burnett, 220 F.3d at 119. However, to qualify for

benefits by showing that an impairment, or combination of impairments,

is equivalent to a listed impairment, a plaintiff bears the burden of

presenting “medical findings equivalent in severity to all the criteria for

the one most similar impairment.” Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 531

(1990) (citing 20 C.F.R. §416.920(d); SSR 83-19 at 91). An impairment,

no matter how severe, that meets or equals only some of the criteria for

a listed impairment is not sufficient. Id.

The determination of whether a claimant meets or equals a listing

is a medical one. To be found disabled under Step 3, a claimant must

present medical evidence or a medical opinion that his or her impairment

meets or equals a listing. An ALJ is not required to accept a physician’s

opinion when that opinion is not supported by the objective medical

evidence in the record. Maddox v. Heckler, 619 F. Supp. 930, 935-936

(D.C. Okl. 1984); Carolyn A. Kubitschek & Jon C. Dubin, Social Security

Disability Law and Procedure in Federal Courts, § 3:22 (2014). However,

it is the responsibility of the ALJ to identify the relevant listed

impairments, because it is “the ALJ’s duty to investigate the facts and

develop the arguments both for and against granting benefits.” Burnett,

220 F.3d at 120 n.2.

On this score, however, it is also clearly established that the ALJ’s

treatment of this issue must go beyond a summary conclusion, since a

bare conclusion “is beyond meaningful judicial review.” Id. 220 F.3d at

119. Thus, case law “does not require the ALJ to use particular language

or adhere to a particular format in conducting his analysis. Rather, the

function . . . is to ensure that there is sufficient development of the record

and explanation of findings to permit meaningful review.” Jones v.

Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 2004). This goal is met when the

ALJ’s decision, “read as a whole,” id., permits a meaningful review of the

ALJ’s Step 3 analysis. However, when “the ALJ’s conclusory statement

[at Step 3] is . . . beyond meaningful judicial review,” a remand is required

to adequately articulate the reasons for rejecting the claim at this

potentially outcome-determinative stage. Burnett, 220 F.3d at 119.

1. Listing 2.10

Beavers first argues his hearing impairment satisfies Listing 2.10

(Hearing Loss Not Treated with Cochlear Implantation). (Doc. 16, at 6).

Listing 2.10 requires the following to be met: (A) an average air

conduction hearing threshold of 90 decibels or greater in the better ear

and an average bone conduction hearing threshold of 60 decibels or

greater in the better ear; or (B) a word recognition score of 40 percent or

less in the better ear determined using a standardized list of phonetically

balanced monosyllabic words. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix

1, § 2.10.

The ALJ reasonably concluded Beavers’s hearing loss did not

satisfy Listing 2.10. The ALJ reasoned the record did not contain

objective evidence and testing results necessary to satisfy listing-level

criteria. (Tr. 15). Furthermore, the ALJ determined that Beavers had

“clearly demonstrated that he was able to hear by providing responsive,

relevant, and coherent answers at the hearing.” Id.

Beavers had the burden to demonstrate his hearing impairment

met or medically equaled a listed impairment. See 42 U.S.C. §

423(d)(5)(A) (“An individual shall not be considered to be under a

disability unless he furnishes such medical and other evidence of the

existence thereof as the Commissioner of Social Security may require.”);

see also Bryan v. Saul, 2021 WL 707594, at *14 (S.D. Fl. Feb. 6, 2021)

(upholding ALJ’s conclusion claimant did not satisfy Listing 2.10 where

he relied on lack of test results demonstrating the listing’s criteria and

claimant’s ability to understand during an interview). Beavers also

claimed that his air and bone conduction hearing thresholds satisfied

Listing 2.10A but cited no pages of the record to support this. (Doc. 16, at

6). In our review of the record, we find only one test result, which clearly

satisfies neither A nor B criteria for Listing 2.10. (See Tr. 1845.)

Accordingly, we find the ALJ’s determination of Beavers’s hearing

impairment regarding Listing 2.10 is supported by substantial evidence

and was reached based upon a correct application of the relevant law.

2. Listing 2.07

Beavers also claims his hearing impairment satisfies Listing 2.07

(Disturbance of labyrinthine-vestibular function [including Meniere’s

disease], characterized by a history of frequent attacks of balance

disturbance, tinnitus, and progressive loss of hearing). (Doc. 16, at 6).

This listing requires both: (1) a disturbed function of vestibular labyrinth

demonstrated by caloric or other vestibular tests; and (2) hearing loss

established by audiometry. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, §

2.07.

Beavers does not cite to any evidence to support his claim, nor does

the record appear to contain any evidence that would satisfy the

diagnostic criteria of the listing. Regardless, this Court has no obligation

to search through the record to locate evidence on a claimant’s behalf or

to flesh out a claimant’s arguments. See Atkins v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 810

Fed. App’x 122, 129 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Doeblers’ Pa. Hybrids, Inc. v.

Doebler, 442 F.3d 812, 820 n.8 (3d Cir. 2006)).

Accordingly, we find the ALJ’s determination of Beavers’s hearing

impairment regarding Listing 2.07 is supported by substantial evidence

and was reached based upon a correct application of the relevant law.

3. Listing 11.18

Beavers also argues that his brain injury satisfies Listing 11.18

(Traumatic brain injury). (Doc. 16, at 7). To meet Listing 11.18, a

claimant must have:

A. Disorganization of motor function in two

extremities…resulting in an extreme

limitation…in the ability to stand up from a seated

position, balance while standing or walking, or use

the upper extremities, persisting for at least 3

consecutive months after the injury [].

OR

B. [A] Marked limitation…in physical

functioning…and in one of the following areas of

mental functioning, persisting for at least 3

consecutive months after the injury:

1. Understanding, remembering, or

applying information…or

2. Interacting with others…or

3. Concentrating, persisting, or

maintaining pace…or

4. Adapting or managing oneself

20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, Listing 11.18 (citations omitted).

Beavers invokes Paragraph A, and we find that Beavers’s argument

is without merit. Beavers claims he cannot balance, and that this

constitutes major disorganization of motor function in his legs. (Doc. 16,

at 7). It is true that Beavers was observed to be unable to walk when

hospitalized in September 2017. (Tr. 537). Also, he indicated to Dr. Stone

that he had balance issues. (Tr. 1809).

Ultimately, however, the record reflects less than an “extreme

limitation” in Beavers’s ability to balance. For example, he walked for

exercise and was often observed with a normal gait without use of an

assistive device. (Tr. 796-97, 799, 802, 1713, 1742, 1798, 1809-11).

Additionally, Dr. Stone actually noted Beavers merely had “poor”

balance, rather than an actual inability to do so. (Tr. 1814).

Thus, we find the ALJ’s determination of Beavers’s brain injury as

it pertains to Listing 11.18 is supported by substantial evidence and was

reached based upon a correct application of the relevant law.

4. Listing 4.04

Beavers also briefly asserts that the ALJ failed to address any

physical limitations to account for his cardiac impairment. (Doc. 16, at

9). To the contrary, the ALJ thoroughly addressed each criterion of the

cardiac listings and found the evidence did not satisfy the requirements

of Listing 4.04. (Tr. 16-17). Still, the ALJ accounted for Beavers’s heart

disease in his RFC assessment by limiting him to light work (Tr. 19).

In doing so, the ALJ discussed Dr. Stone’s opinion that Beavers

could lift and carry up to 100 pounds occasionally and 50 pounds

frequently. (Tr. 21-22). The ALJ found the opinion unpersuasive,

believing that Dr. Stone overestimated Beavers’s functional abilities. (Tr.

22). The ALJ acknowledged, however, that the records indicated Beavers

had some periods of increased symptomatology and that he retained a

degree of restriction due to his traumatic brain injury and heart issues.

Id. He determined from this that Dr. Stone’s opinion, which suggested a

greater RFC than medium, was unpersuasive given that Beavers’s signs,

symptoms, and RFC were more consistent with an individual who retains

a light RFC. (Tr. 21-22).

The ALJ found persuasive the opinion of Dr. Bart, who opined that

Beavers had the capacity for light work. (Tr. 23). The ALJ stated that Dr.

Bart’s opinion was supported by Beavers’s daily activities, such as

performing household chores, attending to his personal care needs,

mowing the lawn, and preparing simple meals. (Tr. 23). The ALJ also

noted that the objective examination findings in the record supported a

light RFC. Id. For example, Beavers reported no upper or lower

extremity numbness, tingling, weakness or pain; and physical

examinations reflected normal strength, bulk, and tone; intact

coordination; normal sensation; a normal gait; a negative straight-leg

raising test; a full squat; no joint abnormalities; normal range of motion;

no extremity edema; no muscle atrophy; intact hand and finger dexterity;

5/5 grip strength; and the ability to walk on his heels and toes without

difficulty. (Tr. 797-802, 1742, 1750-51, 1798, 1811-12, 1819-22).

Accordingly, we find the ALJ’s evaluation of Beavers’s cardiac

condition under listing 4.04 is supported by substantial evidence and it

was reached based upon a correct application of the relevant law.

B. Evaluation of Medical Opinions

Beavers further contends that the ALJ’s decision is not supported

by substantial evidence because the ALJ erred in his evaluation of

conflicting medical opinions and prior administrative findings presented

in the administrative proceedings. As a preface, we note the well-

established principle that, in evaluating the medical opinion evidence of

record, an “ALJ is not only entitled, but required to choose between”

conflicting medical opinions. Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 706 (3d Cir.

1981). “[T]he possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the

evidence does not prevent [an ALJ’s decision] from being supported by

substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Fed. Maritime Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607,

620 (1966). Moreover, “[i]n the process of reviewing the record for

substantial evidence, we may not ‘weigh the evidence or substitute [our

own] conclusions for those of the fact-finder.’” Rutherford v. Barnhart,

399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d

1178, 1182 (3d Cir. 1992)). Ultimately, to reverse the ALJ’s findings and

decision, “we must find that the evidence not only supports [a contrary]

conclusion, but compels it.” Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Elias-

Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1 (1992); see also Smith v. Chater, 99 F.3d

780, 782 & N.3 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Elias-Zacarias in the context of

social security disability benefits); Hert v. Barnhart, 234 F. Supp. 2d 832,

837 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (“The court may reverse the Commissioner’s decision

only if the evidence ‘compels’ reversal, not merely because the evidence

supports a contrary decision.”) (citing Elias-Zacarias).

Here, Beavers originally filed his administrative claim for benefits

in May 2018. Thus, a relatively new regulatory framework governing the

evaluation of medical opinion evidence applies to this case.

“The new regulations have been described as a ‘paradigm shift’ in

the way medical opinions are evaluated.” Knittle v. Kijakazi, Civil No.

1:20-CV-00945, 2021 WL 5918706, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 15, 2021). “Prior

to March 2017, ALJs were required to follow regulations which defined

medical opinions narrowly and created a hierarchy of medical source

opinions with treating sources at the apex of this hierarchy.” Densberger

v. Saul, Civil No. 1:20-CV-772, 2021 WL 1172982, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Mar.

29, 2021). Under this prior regulatory scheme, the Social Security

Administration “followed the ‘treating physician rule,’ which required the

agency to give controlling weight to a treating source’s opinion, so long as

it was ‘well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory

diagnostic techniques’ and not ‘inconsistent with the other substantial

evidence’ in the record.” Michelle K. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 527 F. Supp.

3d 476, 481 (W.D. Pa. 2021). However, the regulations governing the

evaluation of medical evidence were amended and the treating physician

rule was eliminated effective March 27, 2017. See Revisions to Rules

Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 5,844 (Jan.

18, 2017); see also Densberger, 202 WL 1172982, at *7–*8; Michelle K.,

527 F. Supp. 3d at 481. “The range of opinions that ALJs were enjoined

to consider were broadened substantially and the approach to evaluating

opinions was changed from a hierarchical form of review to a more

holistic analysis.” Densberger, 2021 WL 1172982, at *7.

Under these new regulations, the agency “will not defer or give any

specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical

opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), including those

from [the claimant’s] medical sources.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a),

416.920c(a). “Rather than assigning weight to medical opinions, [an ALJ]

will articulate ‘how persuasive’ he or she finds the medical opinions.”

Knittle, 2021 WL 5918706, at *4; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b),

416.920c(b). If a medical source provides one or more medical opinions,

the agency will consider those medical opinions from that medical source

together using the following factors: “(1) supportability; (2) consistency;

(3) relationship with the claimant, including the length of the treatment

relationship, the frequency of examinations, purpose and extent of the

treatment relationship, and the examining relationship; (4)

specialization; and (5) any other factors that ‘tend to support or

contradict a medical opinion or prior administrative medical finding.’”

Michelle K., 527 F. Supp. 3d at 481; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a),

416.920c(a); Densberger, 2021 WL 1172982, at *8. Under the new

regulations, “[t]he two ‘most important factors for determining the

persuasiveness of medical opinions are consistency and supportability,’

which are the ‘same factors’ that formed the foundation of the treating

source rule.” Densberger, 2021 WL 1172982, at *8; see also 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520c(b)(2), 416.920c(b)(2); Michelle K., 527 F. Supp. 3d at 481;

compare 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1), 416.920c(c)(1) (supportability), and

id. §§ 404.1520c(c)(2), 416.920c(c)(2) (consistency), with id.

§§ 404.1527(c)(3), 416.927(c)(3) (supportability), and id.

§§ 404.1527(c)(4), 416.927(c)(4) (consistency).3 An ALJ is specifically

required to address these two factors in his or her decision. See 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520c(b)(2), 416.920c(b)(2); see also Densberger, 2021 1172982, at

3 With respect to supportability, the new regulations provide that

“[t]he more relevant the objective medical evidence and supporting

explanations presented by a medical source are to support his or her

medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), the more

persuasive the medical opinions or prior administrative medical

finding(s) will be.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1), 416.920c(c)(1). With

respect to consistency, the new regulations provide that “[t]he more

consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s)

is with the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources

in the claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior

administrative medical finding(s) will be.” Id. §§ 404.1520c(c)(2),

416.920c(c)(2).

*8; Michelle K., 527 F. Supp. 3d at 482. “The ALJ may—but is not

required to—explain how he considered the remaining factors.” Michelle

K., 527 F. Supp. 3d at 482; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b)(2),

416.920c(b)(2); Densberger, 2021 WL 1172982, at *8. “However, when the

ALJ has found two or more medical opinions to be equally well supported

and consistent with the record, but not exactly the same, the ALJ must

articulate how he or she considered [the remaining] factors . . . .”

Densberger, 2021 WL 1172982, at *8; see also 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520c(b)(3), 416.920c(b)(3); Michelle K., 527 F. Supp. 3d at 482.

Here, the ALJ evaluated Dr. Ziba Monfared’s opinions properly and

in compliance with the new regulatory scheme. Dr. Monfared opined that

Beavers could not hear, understand simple instructions, communicate

simple information, or use a telephone. (Tr. 22, 1836-43). The ALJ found

this opinion unpersuasive and explained his reasoning. The ALJ

discussed that Dr. Monfared’s opinion appeared to exaggerate Beavers’s

degree of limitation. (Tr. 22). For example, Beavers was able to respond

to questions posed to him by both the ALJ and his representative with

clear, cogent, and responsive answers. Id. To the ALJ, this ability

discredited Dr. Monfared’s suggested limitations. Id. Additionally, the

ALJ found Beavers’s testimony that he could talk on a telephone to

directly contradict Dr. Monfared’s opinion that he could not. (Tr. 22,

1842). Still, the ALJ acknowledged Beavers’s hearing difficulty by

limiting him to no more than moderate noise in his RFC assessment (Tr.

19).

The ALJ also properly evaluated the opinion of Dr. Jennifer Betts,

Psy.D. Dr. Betts opined that Beavers had an extreme limitation

responding appropriately to usual work settings and changes in a routine

work setting, finding only a moderate limitation in those areas. (Tr. 19,

22, 1831-32). The ALJ found this opinion unpersuasive and explained his

reasoning. The ALJ found that Dr. Betts’s assessed marked and extreme

limitations overestimated Beavers’s actual degree of limitation. (Tr. 22).

He noted that, although Beavers had some periods of increased

symptoms, overall, his examinations were more consistent with mild to

moderate symptoms. Id. The ALJ explained that Dr. Betts’s opinion of

extreme limitations was inconsistent with her own examination. Id. For

example, other than some impaired recent and remote memory,

Beavers’s mental status examination was unremarkable. Id. Beavers’s

ability to complete some household tasks and address his personal care

needs were consistent with the objective evidence showing no more than

mild to moderate symptoms. Id.

Beavers further argues the ALJ erroneously found the opinion of

Dawn Long, Psy.D., the state agency psychologist, more persuasive than

the opinion of Dr. Betts. However, the ALJ appropriately evaluated the

opinion of Dr. Long and explained why he found it persuasive. Dr. Long

reviewed Beavers’s records and opined that Beavers could understand,

remember, and carry out simple instructions (i.e., one and two-step

tasks); make simple decisions; perform simple, routine, repetitive tasks

in a stable environment; interact appropriately with the public; and get

along with others in the workplace. (Tr. 22, 109). The ALJ explained that

he found Dr. Long’s opinion persuasive because it was consistent with

the psychological evidence in the record, including mental status

findings. (Tr. 23, 1827-28, 1831). Furthermore, the ALJ determined that

Beavers’s documented focus, concentration, and cognition difficulties

supported the limitations to unskilled work. (Tr. 23). The opinions of

state agency medical consultants “merit significant consideration.”

Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 361 (3d Cir. 2011). As

such, the ALJ appropriately determined that Dr. Long’s opinion was

more persuasive than the opinion of Dr. Betts.

In essence, Beavers argues we should re-weigh evidence and

resolve evidentiary conflicts in his favor. However, it is not the role of

this Court to substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. See Social

Security Act, § 205(g), 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g). The standard here is

substantial evidence, which is deferential to the judgment of the ALJ.

Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005). The ALJ’s duty

is to weigh the evidence and resolve conflicts. See Richardson v. Perales,

402 U.S. 389, 410 (1971) (clarifying that when the record contains

conflicting medical evidence, the ALJ must weigh that evidence and

resolve the conflict); Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 40 (3d Cir. 2001)

(citations omitted) (explaining that an ALJ may weigh the credibility of

the evidence).

Accordingly, we find the ALJ’s evaluations of the medical opinions

of record are supported by substantial evidence and were reached based

upon a correct application of the relevant law.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the Commissioner’s

finding that Beavers was not disabled is supported by substantial

evidence and was reached based upon a correct application of the

relevant law. Accordingly, the Commissioner’s decision denying

disability benefits is AFFIRMED.

An appropriate Order follows.

Dated: March 31, 2022 s/Joseph F. Saporito, Jr.

JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.

United States Magistrate Judge