Tyger v. Precision Drilling Corp.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RODNEY TYGER, et al., No. 4:11-CV-01913

Plaintiffs, (Chief Judge Brann)

v.

PRECISION DRILLING CORP. et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

MARCH 25, 2022

“[A] fair day’s pay for a fair day’s work.”1 That was the promise of the 1938

Fair Labor Standards Act. But in practice, this promise has proven easier stated than

applied. While the Act generally requires employers to compensate their employees

for time they are required to be at work, Congress has carved out two exceptions,

one for “travel to and from the location of the employee’s ‘principal activity,’” and

the other for “activities that are preliminary or postliminary to that principal

activity.”2 And this case—involving a class of oil rig workers seeking backpay for

time spent walking back and forth from their rigs to change in and out of their steel-

1 A.H Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945) (citing Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message

of the President to Congress, May 23, 1937).

2 Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 690–91 (1946); IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546

U.S. 21, 28 (2005); see generally Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §

toed boots, hard hats, safety glasses, fire retardant coveralls, gloves, and earplugs—

implicates both.

Quite a bit then hinges on what “principal activity” encompasses. Though not

defined by the statute, the Supreme Court has determined that the term “embraces

all activities which are an ‘integral and indispensable part of the principal

activities.’”3 The question here is whether donning and doffing basic personal

protective equipment (“PPE”) was “integral and indispensable” to the oil rig

workers’ principal activities. And that, as I’ll explain, turns on whether this PPE

guards against workplace hazards that accompany those activities and transcend

ordinary risks.4

Because I find that the donning and doffing of the basic PPE at issue here does

not meet this standard, I grant Precision Drilling and its various affiliates’ motion

for summary judgment on the Plaintiff Employees’ remaining claims under the Fair

Labor Standards Act. The Employees’ cross-motion, which conversely asks that I

find Precision Drilling liable under the Act, is accordingly denied.

I. FACTS

Precision Drilling operates oil and gas drilling rigs.5 The work is intense—

rigs are generally staffed by two crews that alternate 12-hour drilling shifts, often

3 Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 252–53 (1956).

4 See Perez v. City of New York, 832 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2016).

for multiple weeks in a row—and it is not free of hazards.6 Indeed, these hazards,

and the protection provided by the basic PPE that Employees don and doff each day,

are now at the center of this suit.7 I’ll begin by detailing the three types of hazards

the Employees have homed in on, before addressing the protection this PPE

provides.8

A. Hazards of the Job

1. Mechanical Risks

The Employees begin by highlighting an array of mechanical risks their job

entails, most of which Precision Drilling acknowledges.9 The Employees note that

their eyes may be exposed to pieces of metal, dirt, and dust; that their hands may be

“pinche[d], burn[ed], blister[ed], bruise[d], [or scratched]”; and that their toes may

6 Doc. 393 ¶¶ 3–5; Doc. 401 ¶¶ 3–5. Rig workers are compensated at a time-and-a-half rate

once they exceed a forty-hour workweek. Doc. 392-2 ¶ 6; Doc. 404 ¶ 6.

7 Despite rulings that have narrowed the issues in this case, the fact-related filings exceed 100

pages. See Doc. 392-2 (Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of Renewed

Motion for Summary Judgment); Doc. 393 (Plaintiffs’ Statement of Undisputed Material

Facts); Doc. 401 (Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts

on Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment); Doc. 404 (Plaintiffs’ Answer to Defendants’

Statement of Facts in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment). As a result, I have

attempted to highlight the material most relevant to the remaining claims—with particular

attention paid to material the parties cite in their briefing. Facts relating to Precision Drilling’s

supposed take-home policy are not addressed. For a broader treatment of the facts of this case,

see Tyger v. Precision Drilling Corp. (Tyger I), 308 F. Supp. 3d 831, 835–39 (M.D. Pa. 2018).

8 Doc. 393 at 4, 5, 7 (setting out in separate sections “Mechanical Risks,” “Fire and Burn

Risks,” and “Exposure To Drilling Fluids and Hazardous Materials”).

9 See Doc. 401 ¶¶ 11–16. Here, Precision Drilling either acknowledges the risk (though

sometimes with the caveat the risk is irrelevant given the type of PPE donned), id. ¶¶ 12–15,

or emphasizes that these are the sort of “hazards and risks that exist in industrial workplaces

and construction sites generally, not hazards and risks that are an intrinsic element of drilling

be “crushed.”10 They also describe how they may suffer hearing loss from workplace

noise.11 And they further assert that “cementing . . . ‘can cause severe damage’”—

though the Employees leave the magnitude of these risks, and the particularities of

the cementing process, otherwise unexplained.12 In addition, the Employees’

statement of facts delves into how during “tripping pipe” operations they are again

exposed to danger when they lift, by elevator, drilling materials weighing in the

thousands of pounds before “lower[ing] [them] into the bore hole for drilling.”13

The Employees relatedly claim that objects may be dropped on their head,

with deadly consequences.14 The Employees at first rested this assertion on a

statement in Precision Drilling’s Safety Manual: “[t]ools dropped from a height have

caused significant injuries, including fatalities.”15 But in an attachment to their reply

brief, they now seek to bolster this claim with documents relating to a workplace

incident.16 In particular, the Employees highlight three documents showing that in

10 Doc. 393 ¶¶ 11, 15–16 (detailing risk to the eyes and hands); Doc. 401 ¶¶ 11, 15–16 (same);

Doc. 395 at 12–13 (admitting the risk to workers’ toes).

11 Doc. 393 ¶ 16; Doc. 401 ¶ 16; Doc. 242 at 22:8–9 (Deposition Testimony of Michael Adkins)

(“Earplugs protect workers from hearing loss.”). The Employees delve further into this risk

in their response to Precision Drilling’s statement of facts. See Doc. 404 ¶ 43 (citing Doc.

242-14 at 29:21–22) (Deposition Testimony of Brian Shulte) (“I’m deaf because I didn’t wear

[ear protection] because it wasn’t a rule.”).

12 Doc. 393 ¶ 14; Doc. 401 ¶ 14.

13 Doc. 393 ¶ 12; Doc. 401 ¶ 12.

14 Doc. 393 ¶ 13.

15 Doc. 282-1 at 170.

16 See Doc. 405-1; Doc. 405-2; Doc. 405-3; Doc. 405-4; Doc. 405-5; Doc. 405-6. Precision

Drilling objects to the consideration of these documents under the summary judgment

2014, a North Dakota-based rig hand was struck by a pin that fell some 80 feet,

causing him a serious brain injury.17

Beyond this North Dakota incident, the Employees’ reply brief attachment

also highlight two other accidents, both of which are unrelated to drop risks but seem

to fall within the broad ambit of “Mechanical Risks.”18 One attachment, a Canadian

court decision, describes a 2010 incident in Alberta, Canada, where a rig hand died

from blunt force trauma and cranial fractures during a work process called “tripping

out.”19 At the same time, two other attachments center on an incident that occurred

in the mid-2010s, when a rig hand died after being backed over by a front loader.20

2. Fire and Burn Risks

The second category that the Employees highlight is fire and burn risks.21 To

start, the Employees emphasize the risk of blowouts, leading to “violent” and

“uncontrolled” releases of gas, which in their view create both an “explosion” and

“burn risk.”22 Precision Drilling takes issues with a few parts of this claim. For one,

it contends that the Employees garble the mechanism of the risk, emphasizing

correctly that nothing in the testimony that the Employees cite discusses the “risk of

17 See Doc. 405-1 (Precision Drilling’s Root Cause Incident Assessment for Robby Williams

Incident); 405-2 (Precision Drilling’s Preliminary Investigation Details for Robby Williams

Incident; Doc. 405-5 (Deposition Testimony of Robby Williams).

18 Precision Drilling raises the same admissible evidence objection to these documents as well.

Doc. 406 at 9–11.

19 Doc. 405-4.

20 Doc. 403-3 (Deposition Testimony of Caleb White in suit brought by David Dunn); Doc. 403-

6 (Deposition Testimony of Dale Quigley in suit brought by David Dunn).

21 Doc. 393 at 5.

explosion.”23 The Company further clarifies “that there is not burning risk from

drilling fluid in a blowout,” the risk, rather, comes only “from the gas that follows

it.”24 Second, Precision Drilling adds that the Employees’ descriptions lack context

and stresses that the cited testimony states that blowouts are “rare.”25 Indeed, neither

party has drawn the Court’s attention to evidence of this sort of event happening on

a Precision Drilling rig.

The Employees also note the potential fire and burn risks from diesel fuel, a

flash fire causing “combustible” added to oil-based drilling muds, which Precision

Drilling uses to lubricate drill bits, remove drilling tailings (rocks and dirt) from the

well bore, and prevent well collapses during drilling.26 To support their assertion,

the Employees tie together Precision Drilling’s Vice President of Operations’

declaration that a common type of drilling mud is an oil-based mud (with the base

23 Doc. 242-9 at 82:3-14 (Deposition Testimony of Rig Manager Shayne Klepper).

Q. What is a blow-out?

A. A blow-out is an uncontrolled release of the oil or the drilling fluid out of

the well.

Q. Okay. And have you ever been on a rig where that’s happened?

A. No. Blow-out is bad.

Q. Sure. Is it pretty rare?

A. In Precision Drilling, yes.

Q. Okay.

Id.

24 Doc. 401 ¶ 17. As I’ll explore later, Precision Drilling further contends that “none of the basic

PPE protects against exposure to vapors. Only a respirator which is donned on the clock

provides such protection.” Id.

25 Id. (noting that in Shayne Klepper’s Deposition testimony, Doc. 242-9 at 82, he confirmed

that blowouts are rare).

26 Doc. 393 ¶ 19 (alleging that the drilling mud is a combustible that can cause flash fires); Doc.

242-1 ¶ 9 (Declaration of Michael Skuce, Precision Drilling Vice President of Operations)

often being diesel fuel), and a Company Material Safety Data Sheet that states:

“WARNING! Combustible liquid and vapor. – Can cause flash fire.”27 But Precision

Drilling has qualms with theory as well. It counters that the Employees cite nothing

showing that diesel is still combustible in drilling mud or that anyone has ever been

exposed to a flash fire from it.28

Finally, in this section the Employees return to the risk caused by cementing

(also mentioned as a mechanical risk), emphasizing that working “with hot liquids

such as cement” may cause burns.29 But once again, the testimony they cite does not

shed any light on how likely workers are to touch hot cement during the process.30

Besides these risks, which the Employees highlight in their own statement of

facts, they also contend in their response to Precision Drilling’s statement of facts

that Precision Drilling rig hands “have been badly burned by fires.”31 In making this

27 See Doc. 242-1 ¶ 10 (“Precision Drilling rigs can use several different types of drilling mud.

The two most common types of drilling mud are referred to generally as Oil-Based Mud, and

Water-Based Mud. Oil-Based Mud . . . is a generic term used to refer to drilling mud that

contains some type of chemical compound, often oil-based, and most frequently diesel fuel.

Water-Based Mud does not contain such compounds. There are many different types of [Oil-

Based Mud], containing different chemical compounds. The type of drilling mud used is

determined by the Operator. Not all Precision rigs use [Oil-Based Mud], and even those that

do will not necessarily use it every day of drilling. The type of drilling mud selected for use

in a particular well on a particular day is determined by the Operator.”); Doc. 394-4 at 17

(CITGO No. 1 Diesel Fuel, All Grades, Material Safety Data Sheet).

28 Doc. 401 ¶ 19.

29 Doc. 393 ¶ 20.

30 See 284-3 at 59–61 (Deposition Testimony of Precision Drilling Healthy, Safety, and

Environmental Manager, Lawson Threeton). Threeton’s cited testimony instead centers on

the role that fire retardant coveralls play in reducing this risk. Id.

claim, they cite the deposition testimony of Glenn Hoganson, a rig hand with over

three decades of experience across some fourteen-odd drilling companies:32

Q. Have you ever seen a fire on a rig?

A. Yes, I have.

Q. And have you ever seen a fire get close to a guy who is wearing

a coverall?

A. No. We evacuated the rig and the company men, but I have

personal knowledge of the crew that—the driller that took my

job when I left cyclone [and] went to work for Precision. Rig 18

caught on fire. The driller, the motor hand[,] and the floor hand

were burned 90 percent of their bodies. It almost killed both of

them. They spent over two years in the hospital. The rig burned

to the ground. The derrick went over in two and a half minutes.

Okay. These are—those two cats I’ve known my whole adult life

since I was in my twenties.33

3. Exposure to Drilling Fluids and Hazardous Materials

The third category of risk identified by the Employees is their exposure to

drilling fluids and hazardous materials.34 At a basic level, the Employees contend

that while drilling oil and gas wells, they are exposed to drilling muds—and that

these drilling muds are hazardous.35 Their case is built on Precision Drilling’s

32 Doc. 242-20 at 16:21–22 (Deposition Testimony of Glenn Hoganson) (“I had like 14 different

drilling companies in the 36 years I worked”).

33 Id. at 41:12–42:3.

34 Doc. 393 at 7.

35 Id. ¶¶ 23, 24, 26. The Employees make claims about each type of drilling mud. See id. ¶ 29.

They argue that “[s]o-called ‘water[-]based mud’ contains sodium hydroxide (‘caustic’)

which can cause burns to eyes, skin and respiratory tract.” Id. Though Precision Drilling

counters that “additional PPE is required when working with caustic to avoid these harms.

Doc. 401 ¶ 29. Likewise, the Employees note that “‘synthetic[-]based mud’ exposure can be

harmful to health.” Doc. 393 ¶ 29. While also contending that “[o]il-based mud contains

hydrocarbons (most often diesel fuel) as a base and readily causes skin rashes,” and that

“‘[g]el-based’ mud contains ‘bentonite, lime, and sometimes caustic.’” Id. But here too

Precision Drilling counters additional PPE is required “when a rig is required to mix chemicals

Material Safety Data Sheets, its Safety Manual, and the deposition testimony of its

workers and managers.36

The Employees begin by citing the Safety Sheets of chemicals added to the

Company’s drilling mud: Geltone V, MICA, FLR, FM WA II, barite, lime, and

diesel fuel.37 The relevant risks posed by these chemicals are pretty much the same.38

The Safety Sheets warn that the chemicals may cause skin and eye irritation; and to

address any irritation, the Sheets recommend that workers remove contaminated

clothing, wash their skin with soap, flush eyes their eyes with water, and seek

medical attention if the problem persists.39

36 See Doc. 393 ¶¶ 27–47.

37 Id. ¶ 28.

38 See Doc. 394-4 at 10–32.

39 The following, in particular, were cited in the Employees’ statement of facts. See Doc. 393 ¶

28.

 Geltone poses an “acute health hazard” and “[m]ay cause eye, skin, and respiratory

irritation.” Doc. 394-4 at 21. As a first aid measure the Material Safety Data Sheet

recommends to “[w]ash [skin] with soap and water[,] [and] [g]et medical attention if

irritation persists.” Id. Likewise, in case of eye contact, it instructs workers to

“immediately flush eyes with plenty of water for at least 15 minutes and get medical

attention if irritation persists.” Id.

 MICA also poses an “acute health hazard,” as it “[m]ay cause eye . . . irritation.” Id. at

27. Skin irritation is not listed as a hazard, But under first aid measures, it includes for

“skin,” to “[w]ash with soap and water[,] [and] [g]et medical attention if irritation

persists.” Id. At the same time, for “eyes” it states, “[i]n case of contact, immediately

flush eyes with plenty of water for at least 15 minutes and get medical attention if

irritation persists.” Id.

 FLR “[d]ust may be irritating to the eyes. [And while it] [s]hould not be an irritant to the

skin . . . . [it] [m]ay aggravate dermititis [sic].” Id. at 13. As a first aid measure, the Safety

Sheet recommends flushing eyes for 15 minutes, if they are irritated, washing skin with

soap and water, and seeking medical attention if a rash develops. Id.

 FM WA II “[m]ay cause irritation” to eyes and skin. Id. at 14. The Safety Sheet notes

that “[i]rritation may be become severe with prolonged contact.” Id. Under first aid

measures for eyes, it states, “immediately flush with plenty of water for 15 minutes[,]

[and then] [s]eek medical attention.” Id. For skin, meanwhile, it says to “[w]ash with

The Employees also point to similar warnings in the Precision Drilling Health

Safety & Environmental Field Reference Manual, though they encompass a different

array of chemicals.40 For “[c]austic, lime, soda, ash, calcium chloride, [and]

chlorine,” the Safety Manual warns, “[m]ay seriously burn the skin, eyes, and nose

membranes and the lungs.”41

According to the Employees, this risk of skin irritation has been borne out.

They highlight that various “[w]orkers and managers testified that they and others

developed reactions consistent with the warning provided on the [Material Safety

 Barite “[m]ay be irritating to the skin” and “eyes.” Id. at 10. The recommended first aid

measure for skin contamination is to “[w]ash skin thoroughly with soap and water[,]

[r]emove contaminated clothing[,] [and] [g]et medical attention if any discomfort

continues.” Id. at 11. For eye exposure, the Safety Sheet recommends to “[p]romptly

wash eyes with lots of water while lifting the eye lids[,] [c]ontinue to rinse for at least 15

minutes[,] [and] [g]et medical attention if any discomfort continues.” Id.

 The Employees include only part of the Material Safety Data Sheet is included for lime,

and thus the potential effects on the Employees’ skin and eyes are unclear. Id. at 16. On

this front, I’ll also note that elsewhere in their statement of facts they claim that “Lime

(a mud additive listed in Precision’s HSE Manual) causes ‘severe irritation’ to the skin,

and ‘extreme irritation of eyes . . . including burning and tearing. . .’” Doc. 393 ¶ 35

(citing Doc. 394-4 at 16). While those quotes may well have come from a portion of the

Material Safety Data Sheet that was cut off, they do not appear in the single page included

in the exhibit that the Employees quote.

 Diesel fuel “[l]iquid contact can cause eye or skin irritation.” Doc. 394-4 at 17. The Sheet

instructs to “[a]void skin contact,” but “[i]f [the] product comes in contact with clothing,

[workers should] immediately remove soaked clothing and shower.” Id. at 18. See also

Doc. 393 ¶¶ 36–37 (highlighting the risks that this Sheet identifies).

40 See Doc. 393 ¶ 33. The Employees cite to Doc. 282; however, the page the material appears

on is actually found in Doc. 283 at page 7. For gel and barite, Precision Drilling’s Manual

warns of the potential hazard of “[b]reathing a large amount over a long period[, which] could

cause silicosis or other respiratory problems.” Doc. 283 at 7. As none of the PPE being battled

over in this case protects against this risk, I find this risk irrelevant.

41 Doc. 283 at 7. The chart also includes that “[c]hromate and chrome thinners (bichromate,

dichromate, and thinners such as Spersene, Unical, or Q-Broxin)” pose a potential hazard:

“[c]hromate is absorbed through the skin and can cause poisoning.” Id. To my knowledge,

neither party has discussed these chemicals’ role in the drilling process or shed any light on

Data Sheets] when their skin was exposed to the drilling fluids.”42 Some workers

deposed (the Employees cite six) report experiencing skin irritation themselves.43

By and large, these individuals reported getting a red rash.44 Three emphasized that

it was itchy.45 Two noted that theirs often came with blisters, which sometimes got

42 Doc. 393 ¶ 41.

43 See id.

44 See Doc. 242-28 at 41:21–25 (Deposition Testimony of Brandon Weeden) (“Q. Did you ever

get invert or oil-based mud on your skin? A. I did, yes. Q. Did it cause—sorry. Did it cause

you any health problems? A. I had a rash, like, an itchy, red rash I used to try and—yeah, I

tried to keep it off of me as much as possible.”); Doc. 242-34 at 51:7–17 (Deposition

Testimony of Jeremy Mitchell) (“Q. We talked about the invert and oil-based mud. Did you

ever have any illness or sickness or a rash that you related to that? A. Rash. Q. What kind of

rash did you get? A. I’m not a doctor, but it was just a rash over the outer parts of my body.

Q. And—and where was the rash? A. Arms, legs, hands, neck area, places that would rub.”);

Doc. 335-4 at 61:5–61:24 (Deposition Testimony of Jeff McWilliams) (“Q. So the coveralls

doesn’t protect you as a floorhand from drilling mud, does it? A. Yes, it keeps—it keeps it off

your skin on most occasions. Q. Okay. But it can soak through the coverall and get on your

skin? A. Yeah, if you—like I said if you get doused yeah. Q. So you’ve had it on your skin?

A. Yes. Q. Have you ever gotten sick from it? A. Yes. Q. Okay. Describe your sickness that

you associate with getting oil-based mud on you. A. Rash. Q. Anything—any other

symptoms? A. Not to my recollection.”); see also Doc. 242-18 at 148:21–149:11 (Deposition

Testimony of Shaun Wadsworth); Doc. 242-19 at 44:17–24 (Deposition Testimony of Robert

Goodwyn).

45 See Doc. 242-28 at 41:23 (Deposition Testimony of Brandon Weeden) (“I had a rash, like an

itchy, red rash”); Doc. 242-18 at 149:3–11 (Deposition Testimony of Shaun Wadsworth) (“Q.

Did it give you a rash? A. I don’t know if you would call it a rash, but it would turn like red.

Q. Okay. A. It wasn’t a rash, like itchy rash. It would just turn red and be like a slight burning

or something, but only for a couple of minutes and then it would be red for like a day and then

it goes away.”); Doc. 242-19 at 44:17–24 (Deposition Testimony of Robert Goodwyn) (“Q.

And what happened when you would get oil[-]based mud on your skin? . . . . Oh, man. Bad

things. Red rashes, really itchy, and then it would dry out really bad, and then you’d get

infected.46 And one reported an outbreak of pimples.47 But none sought medical

attention; their rashes seem to have simply gone away.48

These rig workers’ experience is confirmed by their compatriots, and their

bosses.49 For instance, in Precision Drilling Rig Manager James Christensen’s

deposition testimony, he acknowledged that “some people are really susceptible to

rashes and whatnot,” so the Company supplies them with a barrier cream that acts

as “a second skin that stops any sort of chemicals from attacking your skin.”50

Meanwhile, veteran rig hand Glenn Hoganson spoke about his brother seeing a

46 Doc. 242-27 at 74:12–18, 77:8–78:20 (Deposition Testimony of George Hollabaugh) (“Q.

Mr. Hollabaugh, let me go back to ask you some questions about the invert. You said—did it

irritate your skin if you got invert on your skin? A. Yes, it did. Q. What did it do to your skin?

A. Gave me rashes and blisters. . . . Q. Other than getting rashes—and I’m not trying to

minimize that, all right, because I can imagine it could be pretty painful—any other physical

effects that you suffered as a result of being exposed to invert? A. If you had any cuts or open

wounds, they would get infected, and you usually weren’t able to get them cleared up until

you had some time off. Q. And the only thing you were able to do to treat the rash was to put

baby oil on it? A. Baby oil, you know, and when you got off, make sure you’re bathing and

scrubbing and taking care of yourself.”).

47 Doc. 242-19 at 44:17–24 (Deposition Testimony of Robert Goodwyn).

48 See Doc. 335-4 at 61:25–62:3 (Deposition Testimony of Jeff McWilliams) (“Q. How did you

treat the rash? A. I didn’t. Q. Did it go away? A. Yeah. Just deal with it.”); Doc. 242-18 at

149:7–11 (Deposition Testimony of Shaun Wadsworth) (“It wasn’t a rash, like itchy rash. It

would just turn red and be like a slight burning or something, but only for a couple of minutes

and then it would be red for like a day and then it goes away.”).

49 See Doc. 242-21 at 124:13–22. (Deposition Testimony of Michael Volkman) (“Q. Michael,

did you ever work with anybody that go skin rashes? A. Ethan and Bradley Howard, two

Louisiana boys, they broke out pretty good from the invert mud. Q. That was from the mud?

A. Yeah. We had like a specialty cream on the rig. It would them guys for the rash. I was a

fortunate one that didn’t break out from the stuff. Those guys, yeah, they were pretty rough

there a couple of days.”); Doc. 335-5 at 52:22–25 (Deposition Testimony of Precision Drilling

Rig Manager Beau Turner) (“Q. Have you seen anyone on your crews get a skin rash from

working with invert? A. I’ve seen people with a skin rash believed to be caused from invert,

yes.”).

50 See Doc. 242-11 at 30:15–32:9 (Deposition Testimony of Precision Drilling Rig Manager

doctor after a drilling fluid-caused rash gave him blisters, which were then infected;

in the end, however, he had no lasting ill-effects.51 Hoganson also claimed that invert

mud “inflamed” some rig hands’ hair follicles and caused other rig hands’ cuticles

to split, which in his view “allow[ed] a passageway for getting to [their]

bloodstream” and resulted, once, in “a guy’s hand [getting] really bad.”52

51 See Doc. 335-5 (Deposition Testimony of Glenn Hoganson). Though I’ll note that it’s not

clear that this infection occurred on a Precision Drilling rig—Hoganson reported having

worked for some 14 companies over his three-plus decade career:

Q. And in all of your times working on rigs, you got oil-based mud on your skin, right?

A. From head to toe.

Q. Have you ever gotten sick from it?

A. No. But my brother has gotten severely ill from it, which is funny because, you

know, I kept telling him, ahh, it’s all in your head, it’s all in your head. But when

he went to the doctor, the blood and skin infections and everything he had were

real, and to this day I catch little gruff from my parents over it.

Q. And you believe that—did some doctor tell you that was related to getting invert

on him?

A. It was caused by invert. It was on his wrist and on his ankles where the skin got

exposed and he got blisters and then the blisters got infected. And, of course, we’re

working 14 days and he was working motors for me and I put pressure on him to

just salve it up and throw a Band-Aid on it, it will be okay.

Q. And he got an open would and it got infected?

A. Yep.

Q. And did he recover from that?

A. Oh, yeah. And then we learned about always wearing more protective clothing

doing certain things and the importance of changing your coveralls and stuff

immediately instead of leaving them dirty on you. . . .

Id. at 23:6–24:10.

52 Id. at 130:8–24. Precision Drilling contends that in making these statements, Mr. Hoganson

was responding to a hypothetical. See Doc. 406 at 16–17. That’s true. See Doc. 242-20 at

130:8–9 (“Q. Glenn, what would invert do to your nails if you were exposed to invert and you

weren’t wearing rubber gloves underneath work gloves[?]”). My read of his testimony is that

he believed that doing so would allow mud into rig hands’ bloodstream, but that workers’

cuticles cracking and hair follicles becoming inflamed was something he had witnessed

firsthand. See id. at 130:11-17 (“A. Well, I’d like to use OMG there, because right now what

you’re doing is you’re allowing a passageway for getting to your bloodstream, because

cuticles will split and fall apart and they’ll actually start bleeding and it will get so bad that

you can’t hard—I mean, I’ve seen it where a guy’s hand got really bad. Plus it will get in your

For the most part, Precision Drilling acknowledges that the workers may

experience a rash from the chemicals added to drilling mud.53 The Company instead

takes issue with the Employees’ claims at the margin.54 For instance, it emphasizes

that exposure is not universal: not every rig uses oil-based drilling mud—and when

the rig does, not every worker is exposed.55 Precision Drilling further contends that

its workers are required to wear additional PPE when they are exposed to significant

amounts of drilling mud or hazardous quantities of concentrated chemicals, such as

when they mix the chemicals. But above all else, the Company maintains that when

a rig does use chemical-based drilling mud, the Employees’ day-to-day exposure is

not hazardous.56

The disagreement is starker on the Employees’ remaining claims, which

unlike their skin irritation claims, cite only to Material Safety Data Sheets. To start,

53 See Doc. 401 ¶ 41 (“Some rig hands have had skin rashes as a result of exposure to oil-based

drilling mud. Some workers on some rigs have reported skin irritation from exposure to oil-

based drilling mud, including rashes, from which their PPE does not provide protection.”).

54 Id.

55 Id. ¶¶ 24–25, 41.

56 See e.g., id. ¶¶ 29, 31, 33–45. The Employees do not admit to these claims. They first counter

that when Precision Drilling’s rigs use oil-based mud, they do so every day. Doc. 404 ¶ 31.

As evidence, they posit, “rig hands received oil[-]based mud pay for every day oil-based mud

was present, indicating that rig hands worked with oil[-]based mud each day it was present on

site.” Id. Beyond being a bit circular, this claim appears to be on a different track: Precision

Drilling does not claim that it doesn’t use oil-based mud consecutively when it is used, rather

the Company is claiming that it’s not always used—which is beyond dispute. The Employees

likewise contend that workers exposure does not vary, pointing to the fact that drillers (who

Precision Drilling claimed were less likely to be exposed) “received the same amount of oil[-

]based mud pay as any other rig hand when working with oil[-]based mud.” Id. ¶ 37. And

because Precision Drilling’s “purported justification for oil[-]based mud pay is a non-wage

expense reimbursement (as opposed to hazard pay). . . . [Precision Drilling’s] factually

binding justification for such oil[-]based mud pay indicates that drillers are therefore equally

the Employees assert that the Company’s “rigs regularly use chemicals in drilling

mud such as ‘EZ Mul’ and ‘Baraklean.’ [And that] [p]rolonged or repeated exposure

to Baraklean may cause testicular toxicity, embryo and fetus toxicity.”57 This claim

seizes on a statement listed under the “chronic effects” of Baraklean on its Safety

Sheet.58

Similarly, the Employees point to the Safety Sheet for FM Vert Mud/Slurry

for a few other broad declarations.59 First, they assert that “[e]xposure to drilling

fluids on Precision rig sites may present ‘eye irritation,’ ‘skin and mucous membrane

irritation,’ ‘gastrointestinal distress,’ ‘nervous system effects such as drowsiness,

dizziness, headaches, nausea or blurred vision.’”60 Then they contend that breathing

in this chemical “may cause serious lung damage.”61 And finally, the Employees

quote the following Safety Sheet claim:

[The] [c]hronic effects of exposure to oil[-]based drilling muds include

“dermatitis and/or kidney damage from prolonged exposure. Some

components of diesel have been determined to cause skin tumors and/or

cancers in laboratory mice, but the effect on humans has not been

determined. May be harmful if inhaled over long periods of time.”62

57 Doc. 393 ¶ 42 (quoting Doc. 287-1 at 71).

58 See Doc. 287-1 at 71 (listing the toxicological information for Baraklean). While the

Employees provide no citation directing the court to the Safety Sheet for the chemical EZ

Mul, it can be found in Doc. 288-1 at 12–17. Under “Chronic Effects/Carcinogenicity” it lists

that “[r]epeated overexposure may cause liver and kidney effects,” but it contains no such

claim about reproductive toxicity. Id. at 14. Still, it does note that it may cause skin irritation

and severe eye irritation upon contact. Id.

59 Doc. 393 ¶¶ 43–44 (citing Doc. 286-2 at 1).

60 Id. ¶ 43.

61   Id. (internal quotation omitted).

In response, Precision Drilling first reiterates that this exposure, given the

varied approaches rigs take, would not be universal.63 But the Company also

emphasizes that the Employees “cite to no evidence in support of the proposition

that Precision rigs regularly use the cited chemicals in drilling mud,” or that “any

plaintiff have ever been exposed to cited chemicals, [or] exposed in amounts in

amounts that would result in the recited health hazards.”64 In sum, Precision Drilling

contends that the Employees fail to show that they have even been exposed to these

chemicals—to say nothing of chronic exposure that would result in reproductive

toxicity, kidney damage, or the skin tumors observed in lab mice.65 Indeed, some of

the risks that the Employees highlight here—that FM Vert Mud/Slurry may cause

“‘gastrointestinal distress,’ ‘nervous system effects such as drowsiness, dizziness,

headaches, nausea or blurred vision,’” or that it “may cause serious lung

damage . . . if inhaled over long periods of time”—are simply not relevant when the

PPE that they are seeking compensation for donning and doffing does not protect

against the risk of ingesting or breathing in this chemical.66

B. The PPE

Given the many hazards of their workplace, the Employees wear PPE. Now,

some of that gear is not at issue here because it is specialized PPE that is donned and

63 Doc. 401 ¶¶ 43–45; Doc. 392-2 ¶ 31.

64 Id.

65 See id.

doffed on the clock. For instance, during “‘tripping pipe’ operations . . . . the

derrickhand works in an elevated monkeyboard and is harnessed with a 60 [foot] fall

protection rope.”67 Likewise, when Employees are tasked with mixing chemicals in

drilling mud, they are “normally required to wear rubber gloves and [a] rubber

apron . . . , [and] may also wear a face shield and a respirator.”68 Similarly, if the

Employees’ particular task exposes them to significant drilling fluids they don and

doff “disposable Tyvek suits or waterproof rain suits.”69

But beyond this specialized PPE, Precision Drilling policy and Occupational

Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) rules require that during day-to-day

operations workers wear basic PPE: steel-toed boots, hard hats, safety glasses, fire

retardant coveralls, gloves, and earplugs.70 Precision Drilling denies that donning

and doffing this PPE is always done off the clock. Indeed, the Company highlights

instances when the Employees may change during a safety meeting or changeover

meeting; and it further notes that rig hands must only have their gloves and ear plugs

with them when their shift begins.71

67 Tyger I, 308 F. Supp. 3d at 837.

68 Doc. 401 ¶ 29.

69 Id. ¶¶ 36, 38–39.

70 Doc. 401 ¶ 7 (“Defendants do not controvert that rig hands are required to wear a basic set of

PPE ([fire retardant coveralls], steel-toed boots, hard hat, safety glasses, and sometimes ear

plugs and gloves) when working on the drilling rig.”); Doc. 395 at 12 (“The requirement to

wear PPE flows out of OSHA’s general industry regulations”).

71 See Doc. 401 ¶ 5 (detailing how workers may sometimes change on the clock during safety

meetings); Doc. 392-2 ¶ 26 (“Rig hands are not required to don ear plugs and gloves before

their scheduled shift begins, but must have those items with them when working on the rig.”).

The Employees, however, deny that “pre-shift meetings were compensated before mid-2010.”

But two things are undisputed. First, the Employees are not always able to

change on the clock.72 And second, when the Employees cannot change on the clock,

they spend additional uncompensated time walking back and forth between where

they change and where they work.73

I previously summarized that this gear offers protection against “common

hazards of the worksite, including (1) Chemicals, (2) Electric Shock, (3) Flying

Debris, (4) Gases—pressurized and nonpressurized, (5) Dropped objects, (6)

Overhead equipment, (7) Rotating equipment, (8) Slippery surfaces, (9) Suspended

loads, and (10) Working at heights.”74 But given the scramble that has ensued over

the bounds of this ten-item list, a bit more nuance is required.

1. The Basic PPE’s Protection Against Mechanical Risks

The Employees posit that their basic PPE offers them protection against the

mechanical risks I identified earlier—that is, drop risks,75 well cementing,76

“pinches, burns, blisters, bruises, scratches, [and] abrasions,”77 and “dust, falling

objects, pieces of metal, flying debris, fire, and hearing loss.”78 To build their case,

onset of the first scheduled meeting of the day (when the pay day starts). By extension,

Plaintiffs are not paid for the time donning PPE. It is denied that work actually commences at

the beginning of the scheduled pay time; work commences beforehand because employees

are required to arrive before the meeting so they can be fit for duty.”).

72 Doc. 401 ¶¶ 5–6.

73 See id. ¶ 6.

74 Tyger I, 308 F. Supp. 3d at 837.

75 Doc. 393 ¶¶ 11–13.

76 Id. ¶ 14.

77 Id. ¶ 15.

the Employees again turn to the Precision Drilling Safety Manual and deposition

testimony.

For instance, in discussing the risk that a tool may be dropped from a height,

the Employees first point to the testimony of rig manager, who, in response to a

question about what the Employees’ PPE protects them from, stated, “[y]our hard

hat [protects you from] somebody dropping something on your head. I mean, it’s

pretty straightforward, I think.”79 The Employees attempt to reinforce this testimony

by citing the Precision Drilling Safety Manual.80 But Precision Drilling counters that

the page the Employees cite doesn’t support their claim that “PPE protects against

drop risks, which are potentially fatal.”81 As it turns out, the page the Employees cite

includes only that “[t]ools dropped from a height have caused significant injuries,

including fatalities.”82 Therefore, while this Safety Manual statements supports their

second contention, that dropped tools may cause fatalities, it does not necessarily

support their first, that PPE protects against this risk.83

The Employees also cite the Safety Manual in discussing the protection that

PPE provides against cementing risks—this time without the trouble attendant to

their claims about drop risks.84 To start, the Safety Manual states, “[b]ecause

79 Doc. 242-14 at 29:15–17 (Deposition Testimony of Dale Schulte).

80 Doc. 393 ¶ 13.

81 Id.; see Doc. 401 ¶ 13.

82 Doc. 282-1 at 170.

83 See id.

cementing is corrosive and can cause severe damage, all personnel must be properly

dressed whenever the danger of contact exists.”85 As a result, “[t]he following

protective equipment is essential: Safety Glasses[,] [g]loves that completely cover

the wrist area[,] [b]oots that are fully laced[,] [and] [p]ant cuffs extending over the

boots.”86 The Manual then instructs workers that if their “clothing becomes saturated

during the cementing process,” they should remove it, “shower or thoroughly wash

affected skin areas,” and “not wear the clothing until it has been washed.”87 On these

claims, Precision Drilling responds only, “[t]he cited section . . . on necessary PPE

states that it only applies when the danger of contact exists.”88

Precision Drilling raises similarly few hackles over the Employees’ claims

drawn from deposition testimony that “safety glasses protect from ‘pieces of metal

or dirt,’”89 and that “PPE also protects employees against other hazards in the

working environment, such as dust, falling objects, pieces of metal, flying debris,

fire, hearing loss, [and] abrasions.”90 The Company’s reply only attempts to clarify

85 Doc. 283-1 at 1. The Employees cite to Doc. 282 for this proposition, see Doc. 393 ¶ 14. But

the relevant statement is found in Doc. 283-1.

86 Doc. 283-1 at 1.

87 Id. (alteration omitted).

88 Doc. 401 ¶ 14.

89 Doc. 393 ¶ 11 (quoting Doc. 242-14 at 29:12–15 (Deposition Testimony of Dale Schulte)).

90 Id. ¶ 16 (citing to Doc. 242-14 at 29:14–17 and Doc. 242-13 at 22:1–11 (Deposition

Testimony of Michael G. Adkins)). In response to a question from counsel, Michael Adkins

replied that the basic PPE provides the following:

The hard hat is going to protect the worker from, you know, equipment that may

be overhead that could fall. The Safety glasses would protect the employee from

flying debris. The coveralls protect the worker in the event of a fire. The steel-

that “[t]he basic PPE protects against hazards and risks that exist in industrial

workplaces and construction sites generally, not hazards and risks that are an

intrinsic element of drilling oil and gas wells.”91 And the Company likewise does

not contest that it “requires gloves to ‘protect against possible pinches, burns,

blisters, bruises, scratches[,] or abrasions.’”92

Finally, there is the protection that the basic PPE provides against the

workplace accidents raised in the Employees reply brief.93 Given that the rig hand

survived the pin’s impact, though he suffered “permanent disabling injuries,” the

Employees claim that it is “self-evident” the worker’s hard hat “likely saved his

life.”94 They make no claims, however, about the protection the basic PPE may have

provided to the other two workers, one who died after being backed over by a

frontloader and the other who died while performing a process called “tripping

out.”95

2. The Basic PPE’s Protection Against Fire and Burn Risks

The Employees’ contention that their basic PPE protects them against fire and

burn risks—from blowouts, the diesel fuel added to oil-based mud, and cementing—

their feet. Earplugs protect the worker from hearing loss. The gloves protect,

obviously the fingers from the abrasion, the scratches, associated with doing

work with their hands.

Doc. 242-13 at 22:1-11.

91 Doc. 401 ¶¶ 11, 16.

92 Doc. 393 ¶ 15; see Doc. 401 ¶ 15.

93 Doc. 403 at 8–11.

94 Id. at 9.

centers on their fire retardant coveralls.96 As one basis for this claim, the Employees

look to an OSHA enforcement policy, quoting it for the proposition, “[f]lame

retardant coveralls ‘greatly improve[] the chance of a worker surviving and

regaining quality of life after a flash fire. [Fire retardant coveralls] can significantly

reduce both the extent and severity of burn injuries to the body.’”97

The other basis is, by now, familiar. The Employees’ statement of facts also

extensively cites deposition testimony, here of a Precision Drilling Safety

Manager.98 In the Employees’ view, the Safety Manager’s testimony supports their

claim that “when working with hot liquids such as cement, covering your skin with

coveralls is necessary [to] reduc[e] burn risks” and constitutes “an ‘essential’ aspect

of Precision’s safety protocol.”99 They pad their assertion about the fire retardant

96 See Doc. 393 ¶¶ 17–22.

97 Doc. 393 ¶ 18 (quoting OSHA Std. Interp. 1910.132, U.S. Dept. of Lab, Occupational Safety

& Health Administration, Enforcement Policy for Flame-Resistant Clothing in Oil and Gas

Drilling, Well Servicing, and Production Related Operations, 2010 WL 1149374, at *2 (Mar.

19, 2010). The Employees object to this OSHA statement on the grounds that it “is not an

undisputed fact, but a statement of OSHA position and so is hearsay.” Doc. 401 ¶ 18. For the

purposes of this motion, I have proceeded as if this statement would survive this hearsay

challenge. But see Provenzano v. RLS Logistics, 2021 WL 1060439, at *10 (M.D. Pa. Mar.

18, 2021) (Mannion, J.) (quoting Countryside Oil Co., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 928 F. Supp.

474, 482 (D. N.J. 1995), Shelton University of Medicine & Dentistry of N.J., 223 F.3d 220,

223, n.2 (3d Cir. 2000), and Damiano v. Scranton Sch. Dist., 2016 WL 3227254, at *3 (M.D.

Pa. June 13, 2016)) (“It is well established that ‘only evidence which is admissible at trial

may be considered in ruling on a motion for summary judgment.’ This rule is particularly

applicable to parties who attempt to rely upon hearsay statements to establish material issues

of fact in order to preclude summary judgment. Regarding such claims, ‘[i]n this circuit,

hearsay statements can be considered on a motion for summary judgment [only] if they are

capable of admission at trial.’ . . . ‘It is not the burden of the court, but the plaintiff, to identify

which hearsay exceptions apply.”) (internal citations omitted).

98 See id. ¶¶ 20–22; see generally Doc. 284-3 (Deposition Testimony of Lawson Threeton).

coveralls “essential” quality by emphasizing that the Safety Manager would not

himself “do the job without fire retardant coveralls and clothing which fully covers

the skin.”100 And they further highlight his statement that PPE is the “last line of

defense” against hazards that cannot be engineered away.101

Precision Drilling, however, contends that these statements mischaracterize

the Safety Manager’s testimony.102 The Company first notes that he did not say that

it was “necessary,” but rather that it was “safer.”103 On this front, I’ll let the

deposition speak for itself:

Q. Would you agree that [wearing fire retardant coveralls] is an

essential component of the job if you’re laying cement?

A. Are you saying that we couldn’t do it without it?

Q. I’m asking if, under current—the way that—the products that are

used to lay cement, if it’s an essential component of safety.

A. Yes.

Q. So it could—it would be unsafe to it without—to lay cement

without fire resistant clothing?

A. I would say it would be unsafer to do it with a short sleeve shirt

on rather than [fire retardant] coveralls, yeah, but you could still

do it either way. You don’t have to have the coveralls on. It

makes the job a little safer in case something spills on you, you

know, if it’s hot cement.

Q. You could potentially have—

A. No, it could prevent you getting burned as serious, something

like that.

Q. So if you were personally doing it, you would want to wear those

coveralls; right?

A. Yes, I would prefer to wear something long sleeved, definitely.

Q. Something that’s fire retardant, correct, or resistant?

100 Id.

101 Id. The Employees also highlight that “Precision imposes a work-rule that coveralls may not

be altered as alterations reduce the protection provided against fire and chemical burns.” Id.

102 Doc. 401 ¶¶ 20–22.

A. Yes.104

Precision Drilling also emphasizes that while the Safety Manger agreed that PPE

was the “last line of defense,” this was not to say the basic PPE protects against “all

risks that cannot be eliminated” or that guarding against these risks—despite any

incidental reduction in the risk of exposure the basic PPE provides—“is the reason

why [it] must be worn.”105

3. The Basic PPE’s Protection Against Exposure to Drilling

Fluids and Hazardous Materials

The Employees proceed similarly in staking out their claim that their basic

PPE protects them against drilling muds and other chemical hazards in their

104 Doc. 284-3 at 60:3–61:7 (Counsel for Precision Drilling’s form objection to the first question

is omitted here).

105 See Doc. 401 ¶¶ 20–22. The Safety Manager’s testimony—for context:

Q. And you’d agree that part of the—an important element of target zero

[accidents] would be wearing PPE, the appropriate PPE, at all times?

A. That’s part of it.

Q. An important part of it?

A. In the way we look at safety, it’s—kind of the last line of defense is PPE.

Q. It sounds—I’m sorry, it sounds important, but I just—I just want to make

sure that I understand your testimony.

A. Well, PPE is, you know—let’s say we have an incident that somebody—

the first thing we look at is how can we engineer it out and keep the hazard

from, you know, being there to an employee. Then we have our

administrative side, which is our JSAs and COPs and our manuals. And then

the last thing is our PPE. That’s the—when we investigate workplace

incidents, the first thing we do is look at engineering the issue out, or putting

administrative controls, and the last thing would be like, let’s just make

everybody wear impact gloves.

Q. So it’s the last line of defense?

A. Yes.

workplace, relying once more on Material Safety Data Sheets, the Company Safety

Manual, and deposition testimony.

To start, the Employees emphasize how the Safety Sheets “demonstrate that

[the Employees] cannot work with chemical mud additives without PPE.”106

Although there is some variation, the Safety Sheets provide similar instructions.107

To protect workers’ eyes against exposure, the Sheets recommend wearing safety

glasses (usually with the added specification that the glasses have side shields) or

safety goggles; to protect workers’ skin, the Sheets recommend clothing that will

protect against repeated or prolonged skin contact and gloves (sometimes with the

added specification that clothing be long-sleeved and chemical resistant).108

The Employees lodge a similar claim about the PPE’s protection against oil-

based mud containing diesel fuel.109 They highlight that the Safety Sheet

106 Doc. 393 ¶ 28.

107 See Doc. 394-4 at 12–32.

108 Id. More specifically, the Sheets recommend:

 For Barite, “suitable protective gloves if risk of skin contact,” “dust resistant safety

goggles where there is danger of eye contact,” and “appropriate clothing to prevent

repeated or prolonged skin contact. Id. at 12.

 For FM WA II, “[s]afety glasses with side shields or chemicals goggles” and “[c]hemical

resistant gloves and coveralls with long sleeves if potential for repeated skin contact

exists.” Id. at 15.

 For Lime, “[i]mpermeable” protective gloves, “dust resistant safety goggles where there

is danger of eye contact. . . . [and a] face shield in case of splash risk,” “appropriate

clothing to prevent repeated or prolonged skin contact,” and a “rubber apron.” Id. at 16.

 For Geltone and MICA, “[n]ormal work gloves,” “clothing appropriate for the work

environment,” and “safety glasses or goggles to protect against exposure.” Id. at 22, 29.

 For FLR, the cited material cuts off before the section that describes the recommended

PPE. Id. at 13.

recommends that people working with diesel wear “[s]afety glasses equipped with

side shields,” “[c]hemical goggles . . . during transfer operations or when there is a

likelihood of misting, splashing, or spraying,” “heavy duty gloves constructed of

chemical resistant materials,” “long-sleeved fire-retardant garments while working

with flammable and combustible liquids,” and “[a]dditional chemical-resistant

protective gear . . . if splashing or spraying conditions exist.”110

What’s more, as the Employees highlight, Precision Drilling’s Safety Manual

includes similar recommendations.111 One page that the Employees cite to reiterates

that “[c]hemical resistant gloves must be worn when handling or mixing caustic,

acid[,] or other chemicals.”112 And it further provides:

Proper clothing provides protection against, frostbite, sunburn[,] and

chemical hazards which may be present at the work site. At

PRECISION DRILLING OILFIELD SERVICES rig and shop

facilities, it is strongly recommended that employees wear coveralls. At

minimum, employees should wear long sleeve shirts and long pants or

coveralls. . . . If employees are wearing shorts or cut-offs and/or a T-

shirt, they must also wear coveralls.113

The Employees also turn to the Safety Manual to support one-half of their assertion,

“PPE covers critical areas such as [the] skin, head, and eyes, and therefore PPE

protects workers by effectively reducing the risk of skin and eye exposure to drilling

fluids”—emphasizing the Manual’s claims about eye protection.114 Without

110 Doc. 394-4 at 18.

111 Doc. 393 ¶ 31.

112 Doc. 394-3 at 10.

113 Id. (emphasis omitted).

specifying the purpose, the Safety Manual provides that workers must wear at least

their basic safety glasses while on the rigs.115 Though it’s worth noting that the

Manual also lists instances when heightened protection, such as safety goggles or a

face shield are required. These scenarios include “[w]ear[ing] splash-proof chemical

goggles when handling hazardous chemical liquids, powders, or vapors. . . . [when]

cleaning with chemical solutions, handling chemicals in the mud tanks, or any

operation that may expose the eyes to hazardous chemicals in liquid or solid

form.”116

To build out the other half of this assertion—that their PPE effectively reduces

skin exposure—the Employees cull the testimony of various Precision Drilling

workers.117 The workers’ testimony supports the Employees’ claim that they are

exposed to chemicals, which as I covered, have caused skin irritation.118 But their

claim that this testimony shows that the PPE does so effectively rests on shakier

115 Doc. 282-1 at 77.

116 Id. at 78. There is similarly a safety goggles requirement when moving chemicals. Id. at 77.

And a full face shield is required when rig workers are “doing any work that produces flying

flying particles or objects, such as chipping, scraping, buffing, grinding, hammering, and

pressure washing.” Id. (emphasis omitted).

117 Doc. 393 ¶ 47.

118 Doc. 242-9 at 48:5–49:1 (Deposition Testimony of Shayne Klepper) (Q. Okay. Does the—

does the PPE get dirty when you’re on the rig? A. Yes. Q. Okay. And what types of—when

you say dirty—I know that’s a word I just used. But how would you explain it? A. You get

covered in dirt, grease, oil, mud, rain water. I mean, we work out in the elements; snow, ice.

Q. Okay. You would agree that PPE can also get exposed to drilling fluid? A. Yes. Q. It can

also get exposed to caustic chemicals? A. Yes. Q. How often does the PPE need to be cleaned.

A. They’re cleaned every tower, every day.); Doc. 242-10 at 77:1–7 (Deposition Testimony

of Cody Neufeld) (“Q. Okay. But there’s a—there’s a—there’s a range where you’re not

gonna change your coveralls immediately. A. Exactly. Q. But you still may come into contact

with certain contaminants? A. Yes.”); see also Doc. 242-16 at 24:14–25:16, 26:3–28:20

ground. Just one cited worker’s testimony touches on the topic—and he’s far from

conclusive:

Q. Okay. You understand that the crew members on the rigs can get

exposed—when I say “exposed,” I just mean that they may come

into contact via their PPE with certain hazardous chemicals?

A. Yes.

Q. And is that one of the purposes of the PPE[,] to protect them from

chemicals?

A. Yes.

Q. Some cause burning?

A. Yes, caustic.119

Though Precision Drilling haggles over various items—particularly whether

Employees’ citations support their claim—their primary point of disagreement with

the Employees factual assertions is this: “The basic PPE . . . [is] not designed to

protect rig hands from exposure to chemicals in [oil-based mud] or from the

exposure of mixing in chemicals or additives such as caustic.”120 Rather, the PPE is

designed to reduce the risk of hazards “present in industrial workplaces.”121 That,

Precision Drilling argues, is why workers don respirators, face shields, and

additional protective gloves when they mix hazardous chemicals. And it is also why

they don additional garb when they are exposed to significant amounts of drilling

mud.122 Indeed, the same worker who affirmed that one of the purposes of PPE was

to protect against chemical exposure later emphasized that when workers are

119 Doc. 242-9 at 45:4–19 (Deposition Testimony of Shayne Klepper).

120 Doc. 401 ¶ 29.

121 Id. ¶ 30.

exposed to greater amounts of drilling mud, they often don full Tyvek suits or

additional overalls.123 This sentiment—that while the basic PPE has the incidental

effect of reducing exposure, it was not built to eliminate it—is also revealed in a line

of questioning raised by the Employees’ counsel during a worker’s deposition:

Q. So the coveralls doesn’t protect you as a floorhand from drilling

mud, does it?

A. Yes, it keeps—it keeps it off your skin on most occasions.

Q. Okay. But it can soak through the coverall and get on your skin?

A. Yeah, if you—like I said if you get doused yeah.

Q. So you’ve had it on your skin?

A. Yes.124

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case’s dense and contested factual background is perhaps only rivaled by

the peripatetic path it has traveled since its filing in 2011. Its pre-2018 wanderings,

which I detailed previously, are no longer of great import, so I will not dwell on

them here.125 But the same cannot be said of its journey since. In short, this is not

the first time that I have considered whether Precision Drilling or the Employees are

123 Doc. 242-9 at 49:3–22 (Deposition Testimony of Shayne Klepper) (“A. So the way it works

is you work your twelve hours. You might go through two pairs of coveralls. We also provide

them throw-away Tyvek suits if you’re doing a task that’s going to really get you really

covered in mud or the guys will wear them cleaning in the rig too just protect their coveralls.

Them are throw-aways. So we just throw them away when we use them so that our coveralls

don’t get real dirty. Lots of guys wear rain bibs, overalls on top of their coveralls to protect

themselves a little more from that. But, after your twelve hours is up, you would leave your

coveralls in the change shack on the floor. The crew coming on tower would take them

coveralls; wash them in a washing machine that Precision provides and dry them; fold them

up and have them sitting there for when you come back to work.”).

124 Doc. 335-4 at 61:5–62:3 (Deposition Testimony of Jeff McWilliams).

entitled to summary judgment on the donning and doffing question—and the case’s

post-2018 history and the bounds of the various rulings help determine the outcome.

My first donning and doffing decision came in April 2018, when I denied the

parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment.126 At the time, I concluded that there

was a genuine dispute of material fact about “the harmful nature of the drilling mud

and other chemicals” involved in the Employees’ “principal duties.”127 This

determination had two key components. First, I settled on a test—adopting the

approach taken by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Perez

v. City of New York to assess whether PPE is “integral and indispensable.128 That is,

PPE is “integral and indispensable” when it “guards against ‘workplace dangers’

that accompany the employee’s principal activity and ‘transcend ordinary risks.’”129

Second, I applied this test—finding that because the Employees’ expert, Dr. Ronald

Bishop, was prepared to testify about the potential health hazards posed by the

chemicals involved in the drilling process, the Employees had enough evidence to

proceed to trial.130

Yet as I noted in the decision, Dr. Bishop’s expert report was hotly

contested.131 And a Daubert motion soon followed.132

126 See id. at 840–49.

127 Id. at 847.

128 Id. at 848; see Perez, 832 F.3d 120.

129 Perez, 832 F.3d at 127.

130 Tyger I, 308 F. Supp. 3d at 848.

131 Id. at 845.

After determining that Dr. Bishop’s opinion indeed lacked a factual

foundation, I granted Precision Drilling’s motion to exclude. While Dr. Bishop had

sought to testify about how, among other things, the Employees’ PPE would become

contaminated with hazardous substances during the drilling process, his conclusions

were untethered.133 He had no data about the amount of hazardous material that the

Employees were exposed to; he had no data about how much material accumulated

on the Employees’ PPE; and he had no data about how great an Employees’ exposure

would be if they encountered this soiled PPE.134 In sum, his opinions were “nothing

more than a hunch,” as they just bootstrapped the existence of the chemicals on-site

to Employee danger.135

Now, as I have previewed, Dr. Bishop’s testimony was a key component of

my earlier finding that the Employees had raised a genuine dispute about whether

their PPE guarded against workplace dangers that accompanied their principal

activities and transcended ordinary risks. So this result raised another important

question: did removing this block send the entire tower crashing down? I therefore

ordered the Employees to show cause as to why I shouldn’t reconsider my earlier

denial of Precision Drilling’s motion for summary judgment.136

133 Id. at *2.

134 Id.

135 Id.

Ultimately, I determined that expert testimony was required to show that the

Employees’ basic PPE protected against chemicals that were in fact hazardous.137 In

reaching this finding, I likened the case to a toxic tort, where circuit precedent

requires that plaintiffs provide expert testimony about their chemical exposure, in

both type and amount, to advance past summary judgment.138 So, in my view,

because the Employees could only offer documentary evidence and lay testimony

after Dr. Bishop’s exclusion, Precision Drilling was entitled to summary

judgment.139

The Employees appealed this decision, as well as my exclusion of Dr.

Bishop’s testimony and my denial of their motion for summary judgment.140 The

United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit took the appeal, affirming my

decision to exclude Dr. Bishop’s testimony and further determining that I had not

erred in excising the Employees’ claim that Precision Drilling had willfully violated

the Fair Labor Standards Act.141 The court nonetheless vacated my decision to grant

summary judgment to Precision Drilling.142 But in doing so, the panel did not take

issue with my use of the Second Circuit’s donning and doffing approach.143 Rather,

137 Tyger v. Precision Drilling Corp. (Tyger III), 2019 WL 6875731, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 17,

2019).

138 Id. at *1.

139 Id.

140 Tyger v. Precision Drilling Corp. (Tyger IV), 832 Fed. Appx. 108, 109 (3d Cir. 2020).

141 Id. at 112–13, 115.

142 Id. at 113–15.

143 Id. at 114 (“In evaluating whether the donning and doffing of PPE in this case qualified as

they found I had erred in concluding that the Employees could not prove that their

“work was sufficiently hazardous” without expert testimony.144

As the Third Circuit explained, “[u]nlike in the toxic tort context, the [Fair

Labor Standards Act’s] integral and indispensable inquiry does not require that

Plaintiffs establish a causal link between occupational hazards and medical harm.”145

Therefore, while “expert testimony as to the levels of [the Employees’] chemical

exposure would certainly support [their] case,” it was not a necessary component of

a Fair Labor Standards Act claim such that its absence would entitle the opposing

party to summary judgment.146

But because in making this error I “never reached the issue of whether, based

on the other evidence presented by [the Employees], donning and doffing the basic

PPE was integral and indispensable to [their] work,” the Third Circuit did not

consider the question themselves. Instead, the panel remanded the case. And in doing

so, they instructed me to consider, for the first time since the exclusion of Dr.

Bishop’s testimony, whether the lay testimony and documentary evidence that the

Employees were prepared to offer would allow their claims to survive summary

judgment.147

Circuit, mainly, whether ‘the gear . . . guards against “workplace danger” that accompany the

employer’s principal activities and “transcend ordinary risk.”’”).

144 Id. at 114.

145 Id.

146 Id. at 115.

So with this background and the Third Circuit’s mandate in mind, I’ll again

consider the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment.

III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is appropriate

if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”148 That this case includes cross-

motions for summary judgment does not alter the calculus.149 Material facts are those

“that could alter the outcome” of the litigation, “and disputes are ‘genuine’ if

evidence exists from which a rational person could conclude that the position of the

person with the burden of proof on the disputed issue is correct.”150 A defendant

“meets this standard when there is an absence of evidence that rationally supports

the plaintiff’s case.”151 Conversely, to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must

“point to admissible evidence that would be sufficient to show all elements of a

prima facie case under applicable substantive law.”152

148 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

149   Lawrence v. City of Phila., 527 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Rains v. Cascade Indus.,

Inc., 402 F.2d 241, 245 (3d Cir. 1968)) (“Cross-motions are no more than a claim by each

side that it alone is entitled to summary judgment, and the making of such inherently

contradictory claims does not constitute an agreement that if one is rejected the other is

necessarily justified or that the losing party waives judicial consideration and determination

whether genuine issues of material fact exist.”).

150 EBC, Inc. v. Clark Bldg. Sys., Inc., 618 F.3d 253, 262 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Clark v. Modern

Grp. Ltd., 9 F.3d 321, 326 (3d Cir. 1993)).

151 Clark, 9 F.3d at 326.

The party requesting summary judgment bears the initial burden of supporting

its motion with evidence from the record.153 When the movant properly supports its

motion, the nonmoving party must then show the need for a trial by setting forth

“genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because

they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.”154 The nonmoving party

will not withstand summary judgment if all it has are “assertions, conclusory

allegations, or mere suspicions.”155 Instead, it must “identify those facts of record

which would contradict the facts identified by the movant.”156

In assessing “whether there is evidence upon which a jury can properly

proceed to find a verdict for the [nonmoving] party,”157 the Court “must view the

facts and evidence presented on the motion in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party.”158 Moreover, “[i]f a party fails to properly support an assertion

of fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as required by

Rule 56(c),” the Court may “consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the

153 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

154 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).

155 Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 252 (3d Cir. 2010).

156 Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 311 F.3d 226, 233 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting

Childers v. Joseph, 842 F.2d 689, 694–95 (3d Cir. 1988)).

157 Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252 (quoting Schuylkill & Dauphin Imp. Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S.

442, 448 (1871)).

motion.”159 Finally, although this Court “need consider only the cited materials, . . .

it may consider other materials in the record.”160

IV. ANALYSIS

Before analyzing whether the Employees have come forward with enough

evidence for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that their basic PPE guards against

workplace dangers that accompany their principal activities and transcend ordinary

risks, I must first address a threshold claim. This claim centers on the scope of the

Third Circuit’s decision—which the Employees assert not only prevents this Court

from entering summary judgment in Precision Drilling’s favor but requires that they

be granted summary judgment instead.

A. The Scope of the Third Circuit’s Mandate

The Employees argue that in remanding this case, the Third Circuit went

beyond merely reversing my finding that the case required “expert opinion on

workplace safety risks or the protective value of their PPE in order to meet the

integral and indispensable standard.”161 In their view, the court’s decision resolved

several factual issues, which they argue I am bound by here—even if untrue.162

159 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); see also Weitzner v. Sanofi Pasteur Inc., 909 F.3d 604, 613–14 (3d

Cir. 2018).

160 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).

161 Tyger IV, 832 Fed. Appx. at 114; see Doc. 394 at 2–4; Doc 403 at 1–3; Doc 407 at 1, 3–8.

162 Doc. 407 at 6 (“[E]ven where a lower court fundamentally disagrees with the express language

and findings made in an appellate mandate, it must dutifully comply even where compliance

leads to results which the trial court finds absurd (which is clearly not the case at bar).”); see

Rather than dive right into the teeth of this claim, it’s worth first summarizing the

four factual issues the Employees claim the Third Circuit resolved.

Three of these claims are stated simply. To start, the Employees contend that

I am bound by a statement in the background section: “basic PPE is worn to avoid

common hazards at the worksite, such as electrical shock, falling objects, flying

debris, slippery surfaces, and chemical exposure.”163 Second, they assert that I must

also accept the Third Circuit “h[o]ld[ing] . . . as a matter of law” that “[i]t is

undisputed that, in the course of rig hands’ work drilling oil and gas wells, their basic

PPE becomes covered with drilling mud, grease, lubricants, and caustic chemicals,

and that the basic PPE reduces the risk of exposure to those substances.”164 And

third, they contend that I am also bound by the Third Circuit’s statement, “‘[i]t is not

disputed that Precision failed to pay for’ donning and doffing PPE.”165

Their remaining claim is more intensive. The Employees’ seize on the Third

Circuit’s statement that under “both Precision’s Policies and the relevant [OSHA]

regulations, Plaintiffs are required to wear various forms of basic PPE while

operating oil rigs,” as well as the footnote that accompanies it.166 That footnote,

which cites 29 C.F.R. § 1010.132, includes the following explanatory parenthetical

of the regulation: “mandating PPE ‘wherever it is necessary by reason of hazards of

163 Doc. 403 at 3 (quoting Tyger IV, 832 Fed. Appx. at 110).

164 See Doc. 394 at 3 (“The Mandate held that, as a matter of law, the PPE ‘reduces the risk of

exposure to these substances’”); Doc. 403 at 3 (quoting Tyger IV, 832 Fed. Appx. at 110).

165 Doc. 403 at 3 (quoting Tyger IV, 832 Fed. Appx. at 110).

processes or environment, chemical hazards, radiological hazards, or mechanical

irritants encountered in a manner capable of causing injury or impairment in the

function of any part of the body through absorption, inhalation or physical

contact.’”167 From this set of statements, the Employees contend, “the Third Circuit

explained [that] the regulation applicable to Defendants’ worksite, 29 C.F.R.

§ 1910.132, requires employers to specifically analyze the given hazards on the

jobsites and mandates PPE only when necessary to protect employees from those

specific hazards.”168 And further, based on this finding (and the Employees’

interpretation of the regulation’s various subsections), “it is also indisputable that

Precision [Drilling] assessed its workplace for actual and potential hazards and

determined that the PPE was necessary in its workplaces because, inter alia,

‘chemical hazards, radiological hazards, or mechanical hazards.’”169

Setting aside, for the moment, whether these statements reflect this case’s

record, I do not agree that I am bound by them. Under the mandate rule, when a case

is remanded “for further proceedings after [a] decision by the appellate court, the

trial court must proceed in accordance with the mandate and the law of the case as

established on appeal.”170 In determining the mandate’s scope, “[a] trial court must

167 Tyger IV, 832 Fed. Appx. at 110, 110 n.3; see Doc. 403 at 2. See generally Doc. 394 at 3–4,

14, 16, 18; Doc. 407 at 12–13.

168 Doc. 394 at 16.

169 Id. at 18 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1910.132(a)).

170 Bankers Trust Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 761 F.2d 943, 949 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing Briggs

implement both the letter and spirit of the mandate, taking into account the appellate

court’s opinion and the circumstances it embraces.”171 At the same time, “the long-

settled corollary” to this dictate is “that upon remand, [the trial court] may consider,

as a matter of first impression, those issues not expressly or implicitly disposed of

by the appellate decision.”172 As a result, I am “free to make any order or direction

in further progress of the case, not inconsistent with the decision of the appellate

court, as to any question not settled by the decision.”173

Put simply, the Third Circuit did not settle these factual matters. The

statements, which are in the case’s background section, were neither expressly nor

implicitly decided when the court reversed my finding that expert testimony was

required for the Employees to make out their case.174 My ultimately erroneous

decision was on a pure matter of law: no expert, no case. And so was the Third

Circuit’s reversal.

At worst, the Employees attempt to speak their claim into existence by

labeling facts as holdings or dressing them up with the clause, “as a matter of law”;

needless to say, this lipstick-on-a-pig approach won’t do.175 At best, the Employees

can point to two sentences in the Third Circuit’s decision that support their claim.

171 Id.

172 Id. (citing Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 347 n.18 (1979) and Sprague v. Ticonic Nat’l Bank,

307 U.S. 161, 168 (1939)).

173 Id.

174 See Tyger IV, 832 Fed. Appx. at 113–15.

First, in a footnote to the background section, the Employees emphasize that the

court noted “[b]ecause we write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the

facts and procedural posture to date, we recite only the facts necessary to our

analysis.”176 And second, the Employees stress the following sentence from the

analysis: “We therefore conclude that a plaintiff may attempt to satisfy the integral

and indispensable requirement with lay witness testimony and documentary

evidence concerning worksite safety risks and the nature of the job and PPE at

issue—evidence which Plaintiffs have produced in this case.”177 But at bottom, the

Employees’ conclusion is tough to square with the Third Circuit’s statement that

because I “never reached the issue of whether, based on the other evidence presented

by the Plaintiffs, donning and doffing the basic PPE was integral and indispensable

to Plaintiffs’ work. . . . [it would] not address this question.”178 Indeed, reaching the

Employees’ stated end would require the Third Circuit to have decided which party

made the more convincing case on certain disputed facts when it had chosen not to

address the issue. I find that unlikely.

Yet while I disagree that I am bound by these statements, that is not to say

they are wholly inaccurate. As I see it, most are wholly accurate. And if they are not

wholly accurate, they are largely accurate, just lacking in nuance. The parties’

176 Tyger IV, 832 Fed. Appx. at 110.

177 Id. at 115.

disagreement about the facts is really rather about their degree and the conclusions

that they require.179

For instance, it is clear that OSHA regulations require that the Employees

wear PPE, and I have no doubt that the Third Circuit has accurately stated what that

regulation says.180 The real dispute here is about the secondary and tertiary “facts”

that the Employees claim are now “undisputed” as a result.181 That is, the

Employees’ claim that Precision Drilling’s admission on this front “conclusively

establishes, not merely ‘that there may be some degree of risk to employees;’

rather . . . that ‘at a minimum, [Plaintiffs] are exposed to a significant risk of harm’

and that the PPE reduces such risk.”182 In other words, because the gear is OSHA-

required, the integral and indispensable standard is satisfied and the Employees are

entitled to summary judgment.183 But I’ll note here that my views on this matter have

not changed since I rejected this argument in my first summary judgment decision,

and there is no sign that the Third Circuit believes otherwise. To restate it simply,

“the presence of an OSHA regulation requiring the instant PPE is relevant” to the

179 This disagreement is further evidence that the Third Circuit’s background section was

intended to situate readers, not drill down on factual disputes.

180 Tyger IV¸ 832 Fed. Appx. at 110, 110, n.3. Indeed, Precision Drilling acknowledges as much.

Doc. 395 at 12 (“The requirement to wear PPE flows out of OSHA’s general industry

regulations”).

181 See Doc. 401 ¶ 46.

182 Doc. 407 at 13 (alteration in the original).

transcendent risk inquiry, but “it is not wholly determinative” as the Employees

suggest.184

At the same time, the issue about the statement “‘[i]t is not disputed that

Precision failed to pay for’ donning and doffing PPE” is that, depending on meeting

scheduling, the Employees were sometimes able to don and doff on the clock.185 But

it remains clear that the Employees were not always paid. And it’s a similar story

with the Third Circuit’s statement, “[i]t is undisputed that, in the course of rig hands’

work drilling oil and gas wells, their basic PPE becomes covered with drilling mud,

grease, lubricants, and caustic chemicals, and that the basic PPE reduces the risk of

exposure to those substances.”186 Even if it is not an everyday occurrence, there is

no doubt that some employees are exposed to these substances. Still, that is not to

say, as I’ll get into momentarily, that the Employees are exposed to hazardous

amounts or that their basic PPE does much more than act as a barrier. Finally, in that

same vein is the Third Circuit’s statement that the “basic PPE is worn to avoid

common hazards at the worksite, such as electrical shock, falling objects, flying

debris, slippery surfaces, and chemical exposure.”187 The parties make differing

claims about how significant and how common the risks are, as well as the amount

184 Tyger I, 308 F. Supp. 3d at 844; see Gorman v. Consol. Edison Corp., 488 F.3d 586, 594 (2d

Cir. 2007) (“The donning and doffing of generic protective gear is not rendered integral by

being required by the employer or by government regulation.”).

185 Doc. 403 at 3 (quoting Tyger IV, 832 Fed. Appx. at 110); see Doc. 401 ¶ 5 (detailing that the

Employees may sometimes change on the clock during safety meetings).

186 Doc. 403 at 3 (quoting Tyger IV, 832 Fed. Appx. at 110).

of protection that the basic PPE provides against them. So at day’s end, this too is a

matter of degree.

At first glance, the ink spilled over this issue would suggest that this suit has

taken on a Rashomon-like quality. But on closer inspection, that is not the case. As

I see it, the facts are clear. The real dispute is about the integral and indispensable

legal standard and the results that these facts require.

And with that, I’ll proceed to the merits.

B. The Transcendent Risk Inquiry under Perez

In remanding this case to consider whether “donning and doffing the basic

PPE was integral and indispensable to [the Employees’] work,” the Third Circuit did

not reject my adoption of the Second Circuit’s transcendent risk inquiry as it was set

out in Perez.188 So I see no reason to depart from it now. To show that donning and

doffing their PPE is integral and indispensable to drilling oil and gas wells, the

Employees must therefore prove that their basic PPE “guards against ‘workplace

dangers’ that accompany [their] principal activities and ‘transcend ordinary

risks.’”189

The parties offer competing approaches to this inquiry. Precision Drilling’s

opening volley argues that this inquiry ought to begin and end with the generic nature

of the Employees’ basic PPE.190 At the same time, the Employees urge that I take a

188 832 F.3d 120.

189 Tyger I, 308 F. Supp. at 848 (quoting Perez, 832 F.3d at 127).

page out of the statutory instruction playbook and look to the dictionary definition

of each of the key words.191 But neither is satisfactory.

To start, the first approach is flatly in conflict with the case from which the

inquiry came. Let me explain: Precision Drilling claims that the workers’ safety gear

is generic, and that courts applying the recent Supreme Court case, Integrity Staffing

Solutions, v. Busk, “have concluded that donning and doffing standard safety gear is

not integral and indispensable to the principal work activity, including cases

concerning the oil and gas industry.”192 And in support of this proposition, Precision

Drilling cites Gorman,193 and two other cases out of similar litigation in Texas,

Alanis v. Tracer Industry Management Co.194 and Stanley v. Car-Ber Testing Texas,

LLC.195

But Gorman did not cite Busk—a time machine would have been required.

And while the two Texas cases did, that still does not allow the Court to conclude

that under the Perez transcendent risk inquiry generic gear can never qualify. The

191 Under their approach, a hazard would transcend ordinary risks when the “working

environment . . . exposes employees to dangers which are beyond normal, such that ‘an

employee could not dispense with [donning his PPE] without impairing his ability to perform

his principal activity safely and effectively.’” Doc. 403 at 5–6. Conveniently, this definition

aligns with the integral and indispensable standard that they argue I ought to apply instead of

Perez’s transcendent risk inquiry, that PPE is “integral and indispensable” when it “is utilized

to guard against workplace risks which are not present in ordinary life.” Doc. 394 at 3. But as

the Employees concede, dictionary definitions are more typical in the realm of statutory

construction. Doc. 403 at 5–6.

192 Doc. 395 at 12.

193 488 F.3d 586.

194 2016 WL 7551073 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 1, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL

4371535, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2016).

Texas cases relied on Von Friewalde v. Boeing Aerospace Operations,196 a United

States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit case that cited Gorman for the

proposition, “donning and doffing of generic protection gear such as safety glasses

and hearing protection, are . . . ‘noncompensable, preliminary tasks.’”197 But if

Gorman adopted a generic test, the Second Circuit walked it back in Perez.

The Employees’ approach does little better, however. Besides subtly lowering

the bar to a height which their case can clear, it adds definitions to an area of law

that’s already a word salad. Consider the long walk required to arrive at our present

destination: the Portal-to-Portal Act created an exception for activities preliminary

or postliminary to “principal activities,” which Congress left undefined.198 The

Supreme Court then filled the void. It first defined “principal activities” as activities

that “are an integral and indispensable part of the principal activities for which

covered workman are employed.”199 And it later clarified that “integral and

indispensable” is something that “is an intrinsic element of these [principal]

activities and one with which the employee cannot dispense if he is to perform his

principal activities.”200 From there, needing to focus this inquiry given the wide

contexts in which it is applied, the Second Circuit—in an approach this Court elected

to follow—determined that donning and doffing PPE is integral and indispensable

196 339 Fed. Appx. 448, 454 (5th Cir. 2009).

197 See Alanis, 2016 WL 7551073, at *6–7.

198 See 29 U.S.C. § 254(a).

199 Steiner, 350 U.S. at 256.

to workers’ principal activities when it “guards against ‘workplace dangers’ that

accompany [their] principal activities and ‘transcend ordinary risks.’”201

If, as the Employees wish, this Court were to add yet another set of definitions

to arrive at “dangers which are beyond normal,” (and to further tack on language

from Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence: “such that ‘an employee could not . . .

perform his principal activity safely and effectively’”) would this Court not then

need to define “dangers,” “normal,” “safely,” and “effectively” as well? That way

lies madness.

Given these shortcomings, to divine the inquiry’s bounds, I will instead look

to Perez and the line of three cases that Second Circuit drew it from:202 Steiner v.

Mitchell,203 Alvarez v. IBP, Inc.,204 and Gorman v. Consolidated Energy Corp.205

The seminal case in the integral and indispensable PPE jurisprudence is

Steiner, a 1956 Supreme Court case that dealt with the compensability of post-work

showers and the donning and doffing of company-provided clothing.206 There, the

change-and-shower program was necessitated by the circumstances.207 Though the

Court also noted that employees’ work at a battery plant included “extensive use of

dangerously caustic and toxic materials,” its decision centered on the workers’

201 Perez, 832 F.3d at 127 (quoting Gorman, 488 F.3d at 593).

202 Id. at 124–25.

203 350 U.S. 247.

204 339 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2003).

205 488 F.3d 586.

206 Steiner, 350 U.S. at 249–51.

endemic daily lead exposure.208 Despite its best efforts, the plant could not keep

employees’ lead exposure below 1.5 milligrams per 10 cubic meters, the level

scientists then regarded as hazardous because of the risk of lead poisoning.209 But in

detailing lead’s hazards and the benefits of changing and showering, the Court hit

on several facts beyond the recorded lead levels.

For instance, the decision noted that medical exams revealed that some

workers had “[a]bnormal concentrations of lead” in their bodies; and it further

highlighted evidence that by merely bringing particles home workers exposed their

families to danger.210 Likewise the Court noted factors beyond this physical

evidence—describing how state law required the company to provide shower

facilities and pointing out how insurers would not provide the employer required

coverage without these facilities.211 Finally, the Court stressed testimony from a

company employee stating, “[i]n the afternoon the men are required by the company

to take a bath because lead oxide might be absorbed into the blood stream. It protects

the company and the employee both.”212 In combination, the Court found that these

facts rendered the changing of clothes and showering “an integral and indispensable

part of principal activities for which [they were] employed . . . .”213

208 Id. at 249–50.

209 Id. at 249.

210 Id. at 250.

211 Id. at 250–51.

212 Id. at 251 (internal quotation omitted).

Next in the chronology is Alvarez.214 There, the United States Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether meat plant workers should have

been paid to don and doff their protective gear.215 At the outset, the court noted the

danger faced by meat plant workers, writing, “[a]ccording to the United States

Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics, employment at a packing plant is

still one of the most dangerous jobs in America, with multiple thousands of workers

injured on the job every year.”216 Indeed, the trial court had found that workers could

be injured if their knife slipped on built up fat and blood while butchering.217 As a

result, workers wore protective gear, which spanned the spectrum from “non-

214 339 F.3d 894. Ultimately, Alvarez was appealed to the Supreme Court; however, neither the

Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that the unique and non-unique gear was integral and

indispensable, nor its finding that only the unique gear was compensable because the time

spent donning and doffing the non-unique gear was de minimis were challenged. Alvarez, 546

U.S. at 32 (“IBP does not challenge the holding below that, in light of Steiner, the donning

and doffing of unique protective gear are ‘principal activities’ under § 4 of the Portal-to-Portal

Act. Moreover, IBP has not asked us to overrule Steiner. . . . Thus, the only question for us to

decide is whether the Court of Appeals correctly rejected IBP's contention that the walking

between the locker rooms and the production areas is excluded from FLSA coverage by §

4(a)(1) of the Portal-to-Portal Act.”).

215 Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 902–03.

216 Id. at 898 (citing U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Industry Injury and Illness

Data (2002), http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshum.htm).

217 See Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 2001 WL 34897841, at *13 (E.D. Wa. Sept. 14, 2001) (“The workers

testified that they could not hold the knives safely without the clean gloves because of the

blood and fat that made them slip. Many workers changed their gloves multiple times a day

in order to keep them clean. Some had as many as six to eight pairs that they changed

throughout the day. In addition to safety concerns, the employees testified that the gloves were

necessary as insulation from the cold of the refrigerated carcasses and the cold temperature of

the processing floor. Cold hands made it more dangerous to use knives, saws, and other types

of cutting equipment.”). Given, however, that the Ninth Circuit’s integral and indispensable

test then focused on whether the company or OSHA rules required the gear—which, as I’ll

get into momentarily, the Supreme Court has since rejected—the hazards in this case did not

unique” items, like hairnets and hard hats, to “unique” gear, like Kevlar gloves and

metal-mesh leggings.218

Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit rejected the workers’ non-unique gear claims.

The court wrote, “neither the [Fair Labor Standards Act] policy nor ‘the actualities

of plaintiffs’ working conditions justif[ied] compensation for the time spent

performing these tasks.”219 So it determined that putting on hard hats and hair nets

was noncompensable under the de minimis doctrine—a dagger that still dangles over

this case.220 But in the process, the Ninth Circuit also determined that the donning

and doffing of unique and non-unique gear alike was “integral and indispensable.”221

It reached this finding after determining first that OSHA and company rules required

this gear to be worn and then finding “that donning, doffing, washing, and retrieving

protective gear [was], at both broad and basic levels, done for the benefit of [the

employer].”222

218 Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 904.

219 Id. at 903.

220 Id. The de minimis doctrine stems from Anderson, 328 U.S. at 692 (“When the matter in issue

concerns only a few seconds or minutes of work beyond the scheduled working hours, such

trifles may be disregarded. Split-second absurdities are not justified by the actualities of

working conditions or by the policy of the Fair Labor Standards Act. It is only when an

employee is required to give up a substantial measure of his time and effort that compensable

working time is involved.”). The basic PPE at issue in this case would seem to be a candidate

for dismissal under this doctrine. But this issue has not been extensively briefed. See Doc. 400

at 33–34; Doc. 407 at 14–17. And the Employees have also highlighted deposition testimony

claiming that it took up to 45 minutes to don and doff the gear. See Doc. 242-17 at 102

(Deposition Testimony of Rodney Tyger).

221 Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 904.

But there is good reason to divorce this required-by and for-the-benefit-of-

the-employer analysis from any assessment under the Perez inquiry. Over a decade

later, in Busk,223 the Supreme Court explicitly rejected both prongs of this Ninth

Circuit test when it considered the compensability of post-shift security

screenings.224 The Court wrote, “[t]he Court of Appeals erred by focusing on

whether an employer required a particular activity,” and it later added, “[a] test that

turns on whether the activity is for the benefit of the employer is similarly

overbroad.”225

The lessons that can be drawn from Perez’s nodding approval of Alvarez are

accordingly limited. As I see it, Perez can be read only to endorse the end-result.

That is, in the Second Circuit’s view, the donning of non-unique garb, like the Kevlar

gloves and metal-mesh leggings that survived the Ninth Circuit’s de minimis

assessment, guarded against workplace dangers that accompanied the butcher’s

principal activity and transcended ordinary risks. And indeed, this sort of gear is the

only type mentioned in the Second Circuit’s decision. In support of its initial

proposition—that “[c]ourts have . . . concluded that an employee’s pre- and post-

shift efforts to protect against heightened workplace dangers can qualify as integral

and indispensable”—the court wrote just that “in Alvarez, the Ninth Circuit

concluded that slaughterhouse employees’ donning and doffing of protective

223 574 U.S. 27.

224 See id. at 36.

equipment, including ‘metal-mesh gear,’ qualified as integral and indispensable to

their butchering work.”226

Next in the sequence is Gorman, a 2007 case in which the Second Circuit

considered compensability claims brought by Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant

workers.227 Part of the workers’ case centered on unpaid time spent donning and

doffing helmets, safety glasses, and steel-toed boots.228 After highlighting the

dangerous work conditions faced by the workers in Steiner, the lower court had

concluded, without exploring any dangers intrinsic to work at Indian Point, that the

gear was “not specialized” because “[a]nyone could purchase them at an ordinary

hardware store.”229 In the court’s view, this made the PPE unlike the clothes worn

in Steiner or the meat-processing plant equipment in Alvarez.230 And in any event,

the trial court further added that the time spent donning and doffing the gear was de

minimis, rendering it otherwise noncompensable.231

The Second Circuit affirmed the motion to dismiss on appeal. In the appellate

court’s view, “[t]he donning and doffing of such generic protective gear [was] not

different in kind from ‘changing clothes and showering under normal conditions,’

226 Perez, 832 F.3d at 124–25.

227 Gorman, 488 F.3d at 589.

228 Id. at 594.

229   Id.

230 Gorman v. Energy Nuclear Operations, Inc., 2006 WL 477619, at *5, *5 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.

14, 2006).

which, under Steiner, [were] not covered by the [Fair Labor Standards Act].”232 At

the same time, the court also emphasized, “[t]he donning and doffing of generic

protective gear [was] not rendered integral by being required by the employer or by

regulation.”233

But it would be a mistake to read Gorman without Perez’s gloss.234 In Perez,

the Second Circuit reversed a trial court that found the donning and doffing of

bulletproof vests by urban park rangers noncompensable based solely on its generic

nature. This error, according to the court, stemmed from the trial court’s

misapplication of Gorman, which it took to mean “the donning and doffing of

generic protective gear is not covered by the [Fair Labor Standards Act].”235 But the

Second Circuit emphasized that Gorman did not establish a categorical genericity

rule.236 Rather, in its view Gorman had “held that nuclear power plant employees’

donning and doffing of helmets, safety glasses, and steel-toed boots did not qualify

as integral and indispensable because the items at issue guarded against only routine

workplace risks.” What’s more, the Second Circuit emphasized, while “[t]he generic

nature of the items may have pointed toward that ultimate conclusion, because

232 Gorman, 488 F.3d at 594.

233 Id. (citing Reich v. IBP, Inc., 38 F.3d 1123, 1126 (10th Cir. 1994)).

234 See Tyger I, 308 F. Supp. 3d at 846–47 (“I must recognize first that Gorman presents a rather

narrow view of the compensability of generic PPE. Indeed, beyond the treatment rendered by

the Second Circuit when it revisited the issue in Perez, I note that other courts have cautioned

against its broad application.”).

235 Perez v. City of New York, 2015 WL 424394, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2015) (quoting Gorman,

488 F.3d at 594) (internal alterations omitted).

generic equipment is more likely than specialized equipment to address workplace

conditions that are commonplace. . . . [,] the items’ generic nature did not establish,

as a matter of law, that they guarded against only routine risks.”237 The Second

Circuit drew on Steiner for this point, which it emphasized held, “items as generic

as a shower and a change of clothes can, in certain circumstances, neutralize extreme

threats to worker safety.”238 As a result, “[t]o decide whether the use of protective

gear qualifies as integral and indispensable, therefore, courts always must determine

whether the gear—however generic or specialized—guards against ‘workplace

dangers’ that accompany the employee’s principal activities and ‘transcend ordinary

risks.’”239 And “[t]his inquiry,” the court further noted, “requires a fact-intensive

examination of the gear at issue, the employee’s principal activities, and the

relationship between them.”240

With this clarified standard in mind, the Second Circuit determined that “[t]he

risk of sustaining gunfire while enforcing municipal laws [was] not, in [their] view,

an ordinary risk of employment,”241 and remanded the case to the district court to

determine whether the donning and doffing of “the bulletproof vest also may qualify

as integral and indispensable.”242

237 Id.

238 Id.

239 Id.

240 Id.

241 Id. at 125.

So where does that leave us? Ultimately, the Perez inquiry “is markedly ‘fact-

dependent,’” but as I see it, these four cases bear on the three components baked into

phrase “guards against ‘workplace dangers’ that accompany the employee’s

principal activities and ‘transcend ordinary risks.’”243

First, the Employees must identify a workplace danger that transcends

ordinary risks. The cases make plain that courts should not concern themselves with

trifles. Perez and Steiner centered on deadly harms. But by acknowledging Alvarez,

where the workers’ PPE guarded against the risk of slicing themselves while

butchering meat, Perez appears to have left the door open to serious, though not

necessarily lethal, harms.244

Second, the Employees must show that this transcendent risk accompanies

their principal activities. If the inquiry’s first step centers on the magnitude of the

risk, the second centers on its frequency. In Steiner, the risk was pervasive; each day

the workers entered the plant they were exposed to dangerous levels of lead.245 But

this appears to represent just one end of the spectrum, as Perez recognized that the

less common risk of line-of-duty shootings may suffice.246

243 Tyger I, 308 F. Supp. at 848 (quoting Perez, 832 F.3d at 127).

244 See Perez, 832 F.3d at 125.

245 See Steiner, 350 U.S. at 249–51.

246 See Perez, 832 F.3d at 125, 127 (noting that “[t]he risk of sustaining gunfire while enforcing

municipal laws [was] not, in [its] view, an ordinary risk of employment,” and later

determining that “[b]ecause the success of . . . [this] argument[] is fact-dependent, [the circuit

Third, the Employees must show that their basic PPE “guards against” this

transcendent risk. Here, the Employees have a tough row to hoe. One case, Gorman,

more-or-less states outright that basic PPE is not up to the task when the risk is

sufficiently great.247 And while I have noted that the blind application of Gorman is

unwarranted, two of the other cases, Alvarez and Perez, hint at that same

conclusion.248 Regardless, Perez rejects a categorical approach, and instructs that “a

fact-intensive examination of the gear at issue” be undertaken. As I view it, the gear

must provide meaningful protection. Though Perez spoke of gear “neutraliz[ing]

extreme threats to worker safety,” it did not seem to think absolute protection was

required; a bulletproof vest may well prevent an officer from being shot in the mid-

section, but that’s about it.249 As a result, even when there is no other evidence of a

particular item’s effectiveness, it may suffice that it was intended to protect against

a particular harm.

So how then does this inquiry apply to the risks and PPE that the Employees

identify here?

1. Mechanical Risks

For the most part, the mechanical risks that the Employees describe are

quintessentially ordinary. Having your hand pinched, burned, or blistered is

undoubtedly uncomfortable; and the same could be said about having your eyes

247 Gorman, 488 F.3d at 594.

248 See Perez, 832 F.3d at 127; Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 904.

exposed to debris and dust or even having your toes crushed.250 Although risks need

not be fatal, the Employees have not shown that these are persistent or severe enough

to be said to transcend ordinary risks. To hold otherwise would require lowering the

bar further than any other court has to date. And this Court will not be breaking that

new ground.

Some of these same faults are present in the Employees’ claims that other

aspects of their day-to-day operations have had harmful, and at times deadly, or near

deadly, consequences. Let’s start with the Employees claims that they may suffer

hearing loss from workplace noise and that “cementing . . . ‘can cause severe

damage.’”251 As best I can gather from their various filings, to support the first of

these assertions, the Employees cite the Company Safety Manual, which they claim

says, “[n]oise induced hearing loss is irreversible . . . [and] PREVENTABLE,”252

and deposition testimony where a rig worker stated, “I’m deaf because I didn’t wear

[ear protection] because it wasn’t a rule.”253

250 Doc. 393 ¶¶ 11, 15–16.

251 See Doc. 393 ¶¶ 14, 16; see also Doc. 403 at 7 (pointing to the Precision Drilling Safety

Manual in support of their hearing loss claim).

252 See Doc. 403 at 7. And I say they claim because the citation they provide does not actually

direct the Court to a page. The Employees cite Doc. 282, but the Bates number they provide,

“8475,” isn’t included in that document or Doc. 283, which contains the second half of the

safety manual.

253 Doc. 242-14 at 29:21–22; see Doc. 404 ¶ 43. The Employees also cite to deposition testimony

emphasizing that earplugs protect against the risk of hearing loss. See Doc. 393 ¶ 16; Doc.

242 at 22:8–9 (Deposition Testimony of Michael Adkins) (“Earplugs protect workers from

But a reasonable juror could not conclude that the Employees faced a

transcendent risk. Quite simply, the Employees have not shown that the risk of

hearing loss is hazardous enough. Indeed, what evidence they do have comes from

one individual who made an off-hand remark about being deaf—though given that

he sat for a deposition, this appears not to have been total. At the same, nothing

suggests that this experience was commonplace.254 Now, had the Employees

uncovered evidence that workers across-the-board experienced deafness, that may

well have catapulted this non-deadly risk to Steiner-, Alvarez-, and Perez-like levels.

As is, however, the evidence falls well short.

The second of these assertions, about the risk of cementing, suffers similar

evidentiary flaws. The sole basis for the Employees’ claim is the Company Safety

Manual. It instructs rig workers, “cementing is corrosive and can cause severe

damage,” and thus “all personnel must be properly dressed whenever the danger of

contact exists”—with proper dress meaning “safety glasses, gloves that completely

cover the wrist area, boots that are fully laced, [and] pant cuffs extending over the

boots.”255 What’s more, the Safety Manual provides that if the rig workers’ clothing

becomes saturated, they are to remove it and wash their skin.”256 But none of the

Employees’ briefs, nor their answer to Precision Drilling’s statement of facts, shed

254 See Doc. 242-14 at 29:21–22.

255 Doc. 393 ¶ 14 (quoting Doc. 283-1 at 1).

any more light on this risk, or what “cementing” even entails.257 “Severe damage,”

if supported and explicated, may well be a transcendent risk. But based on the

evidence that the Employees have put forward here, there’s no way of knowing. As

it stands, a jury would not even have enough evidence to begin weighing the

magnitude or frequency of risk posed by the cementing process—to say nothing of

concluding that it was a transcendent risk.

Finally, there are the three workplace accidents that the Employees raised in

their reply brief.258 Precision Drilling contends that these reply brief attachments

cannot be considered at summary judgment; that may well be, but even if they were,

it wouldn’t move the needle.259 To start, the three workplace accidents are unrelated

and infrequent.260 In one, a pin fell 80 feet, embedding itself in a rig worker’s

257 See Doc. 394; Doc. 403; Doc. 407; Doc. 404.

258 Doc. 393 ¶ 13; see Doc. 403 at 11.

259 That I am setting aside this objection in no way means that I reject Precision Drilling’s claim,

which is based on the Employees’ counsel, the affiant, not being a proper source to introduce

these documents through at trial. Doc. 406 at 8–9. At a glance, this objection appears well-

founded. See Travelers Ins. Co., 928 F. Supp. at 482 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) and Williams

v. Borough of West Chester, Pa., 891 F.2d 458, 471 (3d Cir. 1989)) (quoting Fed. R. Evid.

(901(a) and 10A Charles A. Wright et. al, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2722 at 58–60

(2d ed. 1983)) (“It is well settled that only evidence which is admissible at trial may be

considered in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. A decision on admissibility under

Rule 56 is governed by the same standards at trial. Federal Rule of Evidence 901(a) requires

‘authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility.’. . . In order for a

document to be considered by a court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, . . . ‘the

affiant must be a person through who the exhibits could be admitted into evidence.’”) (internal

citations omitted).

260 Precision Drilling has emphasized, “[t]he basic PPE protects against hazards and risks that

exist in industrial workplaces and construction sites generally, not hazards and risks that are

an intrinsic element of drilling oil and gas wells.” Doc. 401 ¶¶ 11, 16. As I see it, it’s not about

whether the risk is a direct result of oil- or gas-drilling operations, but rather about how

helmet—backing the Safety Manual’s assertion that “tools dropped from a height

have caused significant injuries.”261 In another, a rig worker was killed when he was

backed over by a frontloader.262 And in the final example, a rig worker was killed

while “tripping out.”263 But while the magnitude of harm in each instance is great,

causing death or near-death, these accidents appear to happen once a decade—if that.

And that frequency is a far cry from the daily exposure in Steiner or the not

uncommon line-of-duty shooting that the Second Circuit dealt with in Perez.264 If

these isolated incidents did qualify, it would make the requirement that the hazard

“accompany the employee’s principal activities” meaningless.

Furthermore, for two of these instances, there’s no evidence suggesting that

the basic PPE did anything to guard against the risk. I disagree with Precision

Drilling’s claim that it would be improper to assume that the rig worker whose

helmet was impaled by a pin would have suffered greater injury had he not been

wearing the hard hat.265 If that doesn’t suffice, I don’t know what would. But that’s

could not be discounted as extrinsic to drilling operations merely because it happens

elsewhere.

261 Doc. 403 at 9–10; Doc. 282-1 at 170.

262 Doc. 403 at 11.

263 Id.

264 As the issue was remanded for consideration in the first instance in Perez, neither the district

or circuit court delved into how often these law enforcement officers were shot; however,

according to FBI data, 22,088 officers were injured in assaults with firearms between 2010

and 2019. FBI, Uniform Crime Reporting: Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assault,

Table 85 (2019), https://ucr.fbi.gov/leoka/2019/topic-pages/tables/table-85.xls. There are

undoubtedly more law enforcement officers in the country than oil rig workers, and urban

park rangers may well face a lesser risk, but in the Court’s view, these appear to be quite

different likelihoods of harm.

not necessarily the case for the other two. Indeed, the Employees never even make

the case that their basic PPE provided any protection against these risks. That’s

telling. As I see it, a reasonable jury could not conclude based on the evidence before

the Court that any gear, whether basic or specialized, would have protected the now-

deceased rig workers.

2. Fire and Burn Risks

The fire and burn risks pose a closer call, but some of the same problems

persist. The Employees compile a strong case that their fire retardant coveralls guard

against the risk of fires and burns. Between an OSHA enforcement policy statement

that emphasizes this gear’s protection, deposition testimony highlighting that it

reduces burn risk, and—perhaps most importantly—the fact that fire retardant

coveralls were meant to do just that, a reasonable jury could easily find that this gear

guards against fire and burn risks.266 The Employees fail, however, to offer evidence

on the severity and frequency of these supposed risks.

The crux of their claim, which is based on the Company’s Safety Sheets and

Safety Manual, is that their worksite poses a risk of flash fires and blowouts. At first

blush, these risks appear serious, even deadly. But the Employees fail to show that

these risks are more than hypothetical—a problem that may well be inherent in cases

built on safety manuals. At best, they can point to Glenn Hoganson’s statement that

he knew of a rig catching fire.267 But this isolated incident, which does not appear to

have even taken place on a Precision Drilling rig, is not enough to drag their claim

over the finish line.268 Put simply, without evidence showing the likelihood of this

harm, these risks are far too different from Steiner and Perez for a reasonable juror

to find that they accompany the Employees’ principal activities and transcend

ordinary risks.

The same goes for the Employees’ ancillary claim centering, once again, on

the cementing process. They contend that rig hands may experience burns during

this process; yet nothing they cite clarifies the likelihood or magnitude of this harm.

Indeed, in the words of the Safety Manager, whose deposition the Employees rely

on, the evidence they’ve put forward merely shows that cementing without fire

retardant coveralls would be “unsafer.”269 That is not enough to survive summary

judgment.

267 See Doc. 242-20 at 41–42.

268 See id. at 41:12–42:3 (Deposition Testimony of Glenn Hoganson) (“Q. Have you ever seen a

fire on a rig? A. Yes, I have. Q. And have you ever seen a fire get close to a guy who is

wearing a coverall? A. No. We evacuated the rig and the company men, but I have personal

knowledge of the crew that—the drilling that took my job when I left cyclone [and] went to

work for Precision. Rig 18 caught on fire. The driller, the motor hand[,] and the floor hand

were burned 90 percent of their bodies. It almost killed both of them. They spent over two

years in the hospital. The rig burned to the ground. The derrick went over in two and a half

minutes. Okay. These are—those two cats I’ve known my whole adult life since I was in my

twenties.”).

3. Chemical Risks

Finally, the chemicals risks that the Employees have identified fare similarly.

As I see it, the evidence more than adequately shows that they were exposed drilling

fluid on a frequent enough basis, contrary to Precision Drilling’s claim that the lack

of uniformity in drilling mud type and exposure rendered it too unlike Steiner.270

Indeed, everyday exposure is not required: Perez permitted a claim to move forward

even though line-of-duty shootings do not happen daily.271 The problem, however,

is that the Employees’ evidence fails to show that the drilling mud endangered them.

In Steiner, the record was clear. The workers were regularly exposed to lead

concentrations exceeding 1.5 milligrams per 10 cubic meters; medical professionals

had determined that this level of exposure caused lead poisoning; and in medical

exams, workers had in fact registered excessive lead levels.272 At the same time, in

Perez, the risk that police officer may be shot was considered more-or-less self-

evident—though the Second Circuit ultimately remanded the case to the trial court

for consideration of these dangers in the first instance.273 But here, the Employees’

evidence consists of a Company Safety Manual and Material Safety Data Sheets

270 See Doc. 395 at 20 (“Exposure to oil-based mud is not a uniform condition of employment. It

is undisputed that not all rigs drill using oil-based mud. Those that do use it do not use it

exclusively, and the percentage of the time they do use it varies. . . . As a result, it cannot be

said that exposure to oil-based mud is a consistent hazard similar to the uniformly present

hazard of lead poising in Steiner.”).

271 See Perez, 832 F.3d at 125, 127.

272 Steiner, 350 U.S. at 249–50.

suggesting that these chemicals “may” or “can” cause various health effects and

deposition testimony showing that drilling mud caused some workers rashes and

infections.274

In its reversal, the Third Circuit made plain that expert testimony is not

required to make out these claims because the “integral and indispensable inquiry

does not require that Plaintiffs establish a causal link between occupational hazards

and medical.”275 But that does not alleviate the Employees of their burden entirely.

Their lay and documentary testimony must still show that the hazard transcended

ordinary risks. And at bottom, it is not enough for the Employees to flail at cancer

risks that are only evident in lab mice, or which only come through ingesting or

breathing in the chemicals.276 So based on this evidence, I do not believe that a

reasonable jury member could conclude that exposure to drilling mud in their day-

to-day operations posed a transcendent risk. The Employees have not shown that any

of the prerequisites to the “may” or “can” have been met—at most, they have

highlighted few instances of irritated hands.

Still that is not the only problem with their evidence. Even if the Employees

could show that they were exposed to dangerous amount of drilling fluid, I remain

unconvinced that the basic PPE, and in particular their fire retardant coveralls,

adequately guard against this risk. It is undeniable that by being a barrier, the basic

274 See Doc. 401 ¶¶ 43–45.

275 Tyger IV, 832 Fed. Appx. at 114.

PPE “reduces” exposure.277 But this incidental effect does not settle the matter. By

the same token, if Precision Drilling had a mask mandate, a surgical mask would

also reduce exposure. Now in fairness, this is a closer call; the fire retardant coveralls

hold up much better than a cloth mask. But as one might expect from coveralls

designed to resist fire, when Employees are inundated with drilling fluid, the

coveralls have soaked through.278 Indeed, because of this incomplete protection,

Precision Drilling requires that its employees don additional PPE when mixing

drilling chemicals, a time when their exposure could be dangerous.279

IV. CONCLUSION

This Court has spent significant time sifting through the record, which is the

product of some 20-odd depositions and multiple years of discovery. Today’s

conclusion is inescapable: 11 years on—with various other parts of the case having

been settled or dismissed—there’s even less that remains than meets the eye. To find

that the Employees’ basic PPE guards against workplace hazards that accompany

277 Tyger IV. 832 Fed. Appx. at 110.

278 Doc. 335-4 at 61:5–62:3 (Deposition Testimony of Jeff McWilliams) (“Q. So the coveralls

doesn’t protect you as a floorhand from drilling mud, does it? A. Yes, it keeps—it keeps it off

your skin on most occasions. Q. Okay. But it can soak through the coverall and get on your

skin? A. Yeah, if you—like I said if you get doused yeah. Q. So you’ve had it on your skin?

A. Yes.”); Doc. 242-9 at 49:3–11 (Deposition Testimony of Shayne Klepper) (“So the way it

works is you work your twelve hours. You might go through two pairs of coveralls. We also

provide them throw-away Tyvek suits if you’re doing a task that’s going to really get you

covered in mud . . . .”). This exposure is further evidenced by the rig hands who reported

rashes. See Doc. 242-28 at 41:21–25 (Deposition Testimony of Brandon Weeden); Doc. 242-

19 at 44:17–24 (Deposition Testimony of Robert Goodwyn); Doc. 242-18 at 149:3–11

(Deposition Testimony of Shaun Wadsworth); Doc. 242-27 at 74:12–18 (Deposition

Testimony of George Hollabaugh).

their principal activities and transcends ordinary risks would be out of step with

courts across the country. The hazards that the Employees have described are either

ordinary, hypothetical, or isolated. And the protection that the Employees’ steel-toed

boots, hard hats, safety glasses, fire retardant coveralls, gloves, and earplugs provide

against them can at best be described as so-so. This dooms their donning and doffing

and walking and waiting time claims alike.280

Precision Drilling’s motion for summary judgment is therefore granted. An

appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

Chief United States District Judge

280 See Tyger IV, 832 Fed. Appx. at 113, n.9 (“the parties agree that, pursuant to the Department

of Labor’s ‘continuous workday rule,’ the post-donning and pre-doffing walking and waiting