The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
GLENN CAPMAN, :
Plaintiff : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:21-362
v. : (JUDGE MANNION)
LACKAWANNA COUNTY, et al., :
Defendants :
MEMORANDUM
Pending before the court is the defendants’ motion to dismiss the
plaintiff’s complaint or, in the alternative, to enforce settlement agreement
and general release. (Doc. 9). Based upon the court’s review of the record,
the defendants’ motion will be GRANTED.
By way of relevant procedural background, the plaintiff filed the instant
action on February 26, 2021, in which he sets forth four claims: a First
Amendment free speech violation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 (Count I); a
violation of the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law pursuant to
43 P.S. §260.1 (Count II); a First Amendment freedom of association
violation pursuant to §1983 (Count III); and a municipal liability claim
pursuant to §1983 (Count IV). (Doc. 1). On April 30, 2021, the defendants1
1 The named defendants are Lackawanna County, the Lackawanna
County Sheriff’s Office, and Mark McAndrew.
filed the instant motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint or, in the
alternative, to enforce a settlement agreement. (Doc. 9). A brief in support of
the motion was filed on May 14, 2021. (Doc 13). The plaintiff filed a brief in
opposition to the defendants’ motion on June 18, 2021. (Doc. 20). On July 2,
2021, the defendants filed a reply brief. (Doc. 21).
The factual allegations of the plaintiff’s complaint, which the court must
accept as true for purposes of the instant motion have been summarized as
follows by the plaintiff:
Officer Capman has been employed as a full-time
correctional officer at the Lackawanna County Prison (“LCP”)
since September 25, 2019. (See Doc. 1 at ¶ 56). Officer Capman
previously served as a Deputy Sheriff in the Sheriff’s Office for
more than twenty-one (21) years, where he held the rank of
Corporal from 2010 through 2019 and also served as Acting
Sergeant from March 2017 to June 2017. (See Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 17,
18, 22, 25). Sheriff McAndrew served as the Sheriff of the County
at all times relevant hereto. (See id. at ¶ 5).
Officer Capman was assigned to work in the Family Court
building beginning in June 2017. (See id. at ¶ 25). In June 2018
Sheriff McAndrew asked Officer Capman’s father-in-law at a
funeral home if Officer Capman was going to run for Sheriff in
2021, to which his father-in-law responded in the affirmative.
(See id. at ¶ 29). On or about January 24, 2019, Sheriff
McAndrew notified Officer Capman that he would not be moving
from the Family Court building into the newly-purchased
government building on Wyoming Avenue in Scranton,
Pennsylvania (the “new government building”) with the other
County employees, but would remain in the Family Court
building-as the only Sheriff’s Office employee. (See id. at ¶¶ 28,
30). Instead of staffing the Family Court building with less senior
employees or rotating staff members for this duty, Sheriff
McAndrew chose to single out Officer Capman, a 21-year
veteran of the Sheriff’s Office. (See id. at ¶31). Sheriff McAndrew
took such action because he recognized Officer Capman as a
political threat and isolating Officer Capman from the public,
County employees and public officials would minimize the
political threat posed to him. (See id. at ¶32). Officer Capman
remained isolated for approximately two (2) months in the Family
Court building with limited lighting and heat. (See id. at ¶ 33).
On or about March 8, 2019, Sheriff McAndrew removed
Officer Capman from the empty Family Court building and re-
assigned Officer Capman to the midnight shift at the Lackawanna
County Courthouse (the “Courthouse”)-not the new government
building where the majority of other County employees now
worked. (See id. at ¶ 34). In so doing, Sheriff McAndrew kept
Officer Capman isolated from the public and the vast majority of
County employees and public officials, and did not let Officer
Capman join County employees in the new government building.
(See id. at ¶ 35). Additionally, when Officer Capman sought
overtime work, he was told that he could only work overtime at
the Courthouse, and not the new government building, despite
Officer Capman’s seniority rights. (See id. at ¶ 36).
Also on or about March 8, 2019, Sheriff McAndrew and the
County’s Deputy Director of Human Resources, Justin
MacGregor (“Deputy Director MacGregor”), received a complaint
regarding a possible “toxic work environment” (the “March 8,
2019 complaint”) arising out of the purported misconduct of
Officer Capman. (See id. at ¶ 37). In May or June 2019, Officer
Capman received a Weingarten hearing regarding the March 8,
2019 complaint wherein Officer Capman informed Deputy
Director MacGregor of his intent to run for Sheriff in 2021. (See
id. at ¶¶ 40, 43). On June 14, 2019, Officer Capman was placed
on paid administrative leave pending investigation of the March
8, 2019 complaint. (See id. at ¶ 45). Officer Capman ultimately
transferred to the LCP as a full-time correctional officer pursuant
to the Agreement entered into specifically to address the
purposed “toxic work environment” allegedly created by Officer
Capman. (See id. at ¶¶ 50, 52).
On February 26, 2021, Officer Capman commenced this
action against Defendants by way of a Complaint alleging
violations of his First Amendment rights to freedom of speech
[alleging]2 Sheriff McAndrew, acting under color of state law,
retaliated against Officer Capman after Sheriff McAndrew
learned that Officer Capman intended to run against him in 2021
and posed a political threat, as well as freedom of association
after the Lackawanna County Deputy Sheriff’s Association (the
“Association”) filed and litigated an unfair labor practice (“ULP”)
charge on Officer Capman’s behalf with the Pennsylvania Labor
Relations Board (“PLRB”) throughout 2018 and 2019. (See Doc.
1, generally).
Specifically, the ULP charge alleged that Sheriff McAndrew
refused to promote Officer Capman to a vacant Sergeant position
in 2018, disciplined Officer Capman and denied him further
opportunities to serve as Acting Sergeant in retaliation for Officer
Capman filing a grievance in June 2017. (See id. at ¶¶ 13, 26).
On September 30, 2019, the Hearing Examiner issued a
Proposed Decision and Order finding that Sheriff McAndrew
retaliated against Officer Capman for filing a grievance. (Id. at ¶¶
66-68; see also September 30, 2019 Proposed Decision and
Order attached as Exhibit “B” to Doc. 1, generally). On April 24,
2020, the Hearing Examiner’s decision became final. (See Doc.
1 at ¶ 69; see also April 24, 2020 PLRB Final Order attached as
Exhibit “G” to Doc. 1, generally).
(Doc. 20, pp. 1-5).
The defendants have responded to the plaintiff’s complaint by filing the
pending motion in which they argue that the plaintiff’s claims are barred by a
Settlement Agreement and General Release, the “Agreement” referenced
above, which was entered into by the parties in this action on September 24,
2019. Defendants argue that the Agreement contained a general release of
all claims which “specifically and unconditionally released any and all
2 As worded, plaintiff’s statement is a conclusion of law which the court
need not accept on a motion to dismiss.
complaints of any nature whatsoever which [plaintiff] ever had against
Defendants, including without limitation, any claims arising out of the
circumstances that specifically led to the Agreement, expressly identifying
and including claims under §1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which are
the claims asserted in this action.” The plaintiff argues, on the other hand,
that the Agreement only releases claims related to the March 8, 2019 “toxic
work environment” complaint and does not release the claims raised in this
action.
When construing the terms of a settlement and general release, it is
well-settled that federal courts in Pennsylvania are guided by Pennsylvania
law. York v. U.S., 2013 WL 1953535, *1 (M.D.Pa. May 10, 2013) (citing
Three Rivers Motor Co. v. Ford Motors Co., 522 F.2d 885, 892 (3d Cir.
1975)). Moreover, “in Pennsylvania, the general rule for construction of
releases is that the intention of the parties must govern, but this intention
must be gathered from the language of the release. Evans v. Marks, 218
A.2d 802 (Pa. 1966)). A signed settlement and release is binding upon the
parties unless executed and procured by fraud, duress, accident or mutual
mistake. Kent v. Fair, 140 A.2d 445 (Pa. 1958).” Id. This general rule applies
equally to releases executed in the settlement of civil rights claims.
A contract that releases potential . . . federal civil rights
claims, is valid if it was knowingly and voluntarily executed. See
Coventry v. U.S. Steel Corp., 856 F.2d 514, 522 (3d Cir. 1988),
superseded by statute on other grounds. To consider whether a
release is valid, the Third Circuit directs courts to consider the
totality of the circumstances surrounding its execution, and to do
so district courts should consider the following non-exhaustive
factors: (1) the clarity and specificity of the release language; (2)
the plaintiff's education and business experience; (3) the amount
of time the plaintiff had for deliberation about the release before
signing it; (4) whether plaintiff knew or should have known his
rights upon execution of the release; (5) whether plaintiff was
encouraged to seek, or in fact received benefit of counsel; (6)
whether there was an opportunity for negotiation of the terms of
the agreement; and (7) whether the consideration given in
exchange for the waiver and accepted by the employee exceeds
the benefits to which the employee was already entitled by
contract or law. Cirillo v. Arco Chem. Co., 862 F.2d 448, 451 (3d
Cir. 1988) (citing Coventry, 856 F.2d at 523). Courts should also
consider “whether there is evidence [that the employer procured
the release through] fraud or undue influence, or whether
enforcement of the release would be against the public interest.”
Cuchara v. GaiTronics Corp., 129 F. App'x 728, 731 (3d Cir.
2005).
Id. at *2 (citing Gregory v. Derry Twp. School Dist., 2010 WL 146332, *5
(M.D.Pa. Jan. 11, 2010)).
When construing the effect of a settlement and general
release: “First, a court must look to the language of the release.
In examining the language of a release, the terms of the release
will be given their ordinary meaning unless a different meaning
was clearly intended. In addition, the language of the release
must be viewed in the context of the entire document. See, e.g.,
Harrity v. Medical College of Pennsylvania Hosp., 653 A.2d 5
(Pa.Super. 1994). Each part of the release must be given effect.”
Bickings v. Bethlehem Lukens Plate, 82 F.Supp.2d 402, 405
(E.D.Pa. 2000) (some citations omitted). Thus, a party may not
pick and choose only those portions of a settlement that are
convenient and seek selective enforcement of a settlement and
release.
Id.
Here, while the defendants argue the applicability of each of the factors
above, the plaintiff argues that only one of the factors is at issue - whether
the language of the Agreement clearly and specifically waives his First
Amendment claims in this action. Plaintiff argues that it does not. In doing
so, plaintiff cites to Paragraph 4 of the Agreement, which he argues shows
that the Agreement applies “only to the specific facts involving the charges
of misconduct made against [him].”
Upon review of the Agreement, there is a “Recitals” section, which
provides the procedural background of the “toxic work environment”
complaint received by the Sheriff’s Office regarding the plaintiff. It further
reflects the parties intention to resolve the matter through the Agreement.
The Agreement then sets forth the “Terms and Conditions.” Those terms
provide that in lieu of possible discipline against plaintiff, the County offered
him a lateral transfer of employment to the Lackawanna County Prison as a
full-time correctional officer, which plaintiff accepted. (Doc. 1, Ex. D, ¶1).
Plaintiff agreed to abide by all terms and conditions of employment as a
newly hired correctional officer. (Id., ¶2). Plaintiff agreed to voluntarily resign
his employment with the Sheriff’s Department to accept his employment as
a correctional officer. (Id., ¶3). Paragraph 4 then states in its entirety:
4. The parties agree and acknowledge that the resolution
of this matter applies only to the specific facts involving the
charges of misconduct made against Mr. Capman and may not
be used by the Parties as precedent in any disciplinary matter,
grievance, grievance arbitration, bargaining session, interest
arbitration or any other type of legal proceeding.
(Id., ¶4).
Paragraph 4 relates not at all to the plaintiff’s release of claims, but
simply provides that the terms given plaintiff for the resolution of this
particular claim are non-precedential in any other proceedings. The plaintiff’s
release of claims follows the non-precedential provision in Paragraph 5.
Paragraph 5 reads as follows:
Mr. Capman agrees that in consideration of the promises
contained herein, and for other good and valuable consideration,
Mr. Capman, intending to be legally bound hereby, for himself,
and all of his dependents, heirs, executors, administrators, legal
and/or personal representatives, successors, assigns and
agents does hereby unconditionally and irrevocably remise,
release and forever discharge for the County and each and every
of its commissioners, elected officials, including but not limited to
Sheriff Mark McAndrew in his individual and/or official capacity,
directors, officers, employees, attorneys, representatives,
administrators, assigns insurers and/or agents, both current and
former, of and from any and all complaints including but not
limited to unfair labor practice complaints with the Pennsylvania
Labor Relations Board, grievances, actions, liabilities,
obligations, promises, agreements, controversies, damages,
claims, causes of action, lawsuits, debts, demands, costs,
losses, rights, charges and/or expenses (including attorneys’
fees and costs), of any nature whatsoever, asserted or
unasserted, known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected,
which he ever had, now has, or hereafter may have against the
County, Office and/or Sheriff McAndrew, arising at any time up
to the date of this Agreement, including without limitation of the
foregoing general terms, any claims arising out of the
circumstances that specifically led to this agreement. This
Settlement Agreement expressly includes but is not limited to
claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, §1983 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Fair Labor Standards
Act, the Pennsylvania Employee Relations Act, the National
Labor Relations Act, Family and Medical Leave Act, the
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, the Pennsylvania Workers’
Compensation Act, federal and Pennsylvania statutes, and
common law.
(Doc. 1, Ex. D, ¶5).
The language of the release is clear and unambiguous. The plaintiff
agreed “unconditionally” to release “any and all complaints” “of any nature
whatsoever, asserted or unasserted, known or unknown, suspected or
unsuspected, which he ever had, now has, or hereafter may have against
the County, Office and/or Sheriff McAndrew, arising at any time up to the
date of this Agreement, including without limitation of the foregoing general
terms, any claims arising out of the circumstances that specifically led to this
agreement.” The settlement agreement expressly included claims under
§1983 and Pennsylvania statutes. The Agreement does not contain any
exclusions or exceptions. Although the Agreement may have been the result
of the “toxic work environment” complaint brought against the plaintiff, the
general release of claims is all-encompassing and is not limited only to
claims arising out of that matter.3
In light of the foregoing, the court finds that the plaintiff released any
and all claims that he could have made against the defendants in this action
by way of the September 24, 2019 Agreement. As a result, the claims which
he now attempts to raise in the instant action are precluded and the
defendants’ motion to dismiss will be granted. Although the Third Circuit has
instructed that a district court must permit a curative amendment if a claim is
vulnerable to a 12(b)(6) dismissal, a court need not grant leave to amend if
amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny,
515 F.3d 224, 236 (3d Cir. 2008). Because the court finds that the Settlement
Agreement and General Release here precludes plaintiff’s claims,
3 The plaintiff offers no substantive opposition to the defendant’s
discussion of the remaining factors. Although they are not discussed at
length herein, the court has reviewed defendants’ argument as to the
remaining factors and finds that they also weigh in favor of dismissal.
amendment of these claims would be futile. Thus, plaintiff’s claims will be
dismissed with prejudice. An appropriate order shall issue.
s/ Malachy E. Mannion
MALACHY E. MANNION
United States District Judge
DATE: March 24, 2022
21-362-01