Ansley v. Wetzel

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAWRENCE O. ANSLEY, : CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:21-CV-528

:

Plaintiff : (Judge Conner)

:

v. :

:

SECRETARY JOHN E. WETZEL, et al., :

:

Defendants :

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Lawrence Ansley (“Ansley”), a state inmate in the custody of the

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, commenced this action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 setting forth various causes of action. (Doc. 1). Named as defendants

are, inter alia, Secretary John Wetzel, Superintendent Robert Marsh,

Superintendent Thomas McGinley, Grievance Coordinator J. Burd, Unit Manager

Urbanick, Psychologist Ms. Brocca, Psychologist Mr. Snedden, Psychologist Ms.

Shultz, Psychologist Ms. Learn, Major Foulds, Captain Burns, Grievance

Coordinator Ms. Kelley, Officer Beesley, Officer Long, and Sergeant Weeks

(collectively, “defendants”). Before the court is defendants’ Rule 12(b) motion (Doc.

23) to partially dismiss the complaint. For the reasons set forth below, the motion

will be granted in part and denied in part.

I. Factual Background & Procedural History

On January 18, 2020, Ansley was transferred from the State Correctional

Institution at Camp-Hill (“SCI-Camp Hill”) to the State Correctional Institution at

Benner (“SCI-Benner”) and was immediately placed in the Restricted Housing Unit

(“RHU”). (Doc. 1 ¶ 1). On January 25, 2020 Ansley saw the Program Review

Committee (“PRC”) where they elected not to transfer Ansley to general population

and refused to allow him access to his electronics. (Id. ¶ 2).

On February 11, 2020, Deputy Booher allegedly kicked Ansley’s door and told

him he would not be leaving the RHU and that he planned to prevent him from

being released on parole. (Id. ¶ 3). In March 2020, Ansley’s family deposited

approximately $350.00 into his inmate account. (Id. ¶ 4). Lieutenant Stavola

allegedly told Ansley he was “watching his account” and accused Ansley of being a

drug dealer and gang leader. (Id. ¶¶ 4-5). Lieutenant Stavola also allegedly claimed

that he planned to prevent Ansley from obtaining parole. (Id. ¶ 6).

Thereafter, Ansley was transferred to general population where he was

purportedly forced to share a cell with another inmate who was dealing and doing

drugs. (Id. ¶ 7). Ansley requested a cell change to defendant Urbanick and later to

defendant Marsh; both refused to transfer him. (Id. ¶¶ 7-8).

In June 2020, Ansley wrote an email to his sister and expressed suicidal

thoughts due to the erratic behavior of his cellmate. (Id. ¶ 9). His email was

flagged, and he was treated by defendants Snedden and Brocca, the prison

psychologists. (Id. ¶ 10). Ansley alleges that defendants Snedden and Brocca

refused to recommend a cell change to defendant Urbanick, despite his suicidal

ideations. (Id. ¶¶ 9-11).

During the second week of June, 2020, Lieutenant Stavola searched Ansley’s

cell and found a stolen television and a bag of wine. (Id. ¶ 12). Ansley alleges that

Lieutenant Stavola “pretended” not to recognize his cellmate’s drugs. (Id.) Ansley

contends that his cellmate did not receive a misconduct. (Id.) Instead, two weeks

later, Lieutenant Stavola showed Ansley’s cellmate the letters Ansley had written

requesting a cell change, placing him in “extreme danger.” (Id. ¶ 13). Ansley also

alleges that his cellmate and Lieutenant Stavola created a “rape plot” to place in

Ansley’s file to keep him from obtaining parole. (Id. ¶ 14). On June 25, 2020, Ansley

was placed in the RHU and Lieutenant Stavola allegedly reiterated his intent to

prevent Ansley from obtaining parole. (Id. ¶¶ 15-16).

On July 14, 2020, Ansley again saw the PRC and Deputy Booher denied his

request for the return of his electronics. (Id. ¶ 17). He saw Psychologist Specialist,

Ms. Learn, who allegedly did not provide him with adequate help for his suicidal

thoughts. (Id. ¶ 18). Ansley went on a hunger strike for two weeks until he was

given his electronics. (Id.) On July 31, 2020, Ansley was interviewed by a parole

board member and was ultimately denied parole on August 4, 2020. (Id. ¶¶ 19-20).

Ansley believes he was denied parole because of the “rape plot” that Stavola,

Booher, and his former cellmate allegedly placed in his file. (Id.)

On September 16, 2020, Ansley was transferred from SCI-Benner to the State

Correctional Institution at Coal Township (“SCI-Coal Township”). (Id. ¶ 21).

Ansley alleges that individuals at SCI-Benner stole his tablet and that Unit Manager

Dunn refused to give him an identification, clothes, and a cable cord. (Id. ¶¶ 22, 24).

On September 23, 2020, Ansley was placed in a psychiatric observation cell for

twelve hours, and then returned to Dunn’s housing unit. (Id. ¶ 23).

On October 2, 2020, Ansley again reported thoughts of suicide and met with

Psychologist Specialists. (Id. ¶ 24). While speaking with the Psychologist

Specialists, Unit Manager Dunn allegedly interrupted the meeting and stated that

Stavola had included the “rape plot” in Ansley’s file and that he had 26 other sexual

assault misconducts, so he would always be on Dunn’s block. (Id. ¶¶ 24-27). Ansley

reportedly wrote to defendant Wetzel and informed him that he was not safe with

Dunn. (Id. ¶ 28). Defendant McGinley was also “made aware,” but Ansley alleges

that defendant McGinley is Dunn’s “best friend” and would not intervene. (Id. ¶

29). In late October, 2020, defendant Foulds allegedly told Ansley to withdraw the

grievance against Dunn. (Id. ¶ 30).

On January 9, 2021, Ansley was overheard making inappropriate comments

about a staff member, and defendant Long issued a misconduct against him and

placed him in the RHU. (Id. ¶ 31). On January 10, 2021, defendant Weeks, who was

allegedly having an “affair” with defendant Long, inventoried Ansley’s property.

(Id. ¶¶ 31-32). Ansley claims that his property went missing and was damaged. (Id.

¶ 32). On January 20, 2021, Ansley’s property arrived in the RHU, but certain items

were still missing. (Id. ¶ 33). He notified defendant McGinley and filed a grievance

about the missing property. (Id. ¶¶ 34, 36). The grievance was upheld in part. (Id. ¶

36).

On January 30, 2021, Ansley asked defendant Beesley for a second book from

the RHU library cart. (Id. ¶ 35). Defendant Beesley denied his request and

allegedly stated that he “didn’t know rapists knew how to read.” (Id.) Ansley filed a

grievance and wrote to defendant Wetzel about this comment. (Id.)

On March 4, 2021, Ansley was released from the RHU. (Id. ¶ 37). However,

on March 6, 2021, he returned to the RHU. (Id.) On March 7, 2021, security officers

searched his cell and confiscated his legal complaint and exhibits related to this

lawsuit. (Id.) The following day, Ansley was released from the RHU. (Id.)

Ansley alleges that, on March 16, 2021, staff at SCI-Coal Township stole from

him. (Id. ¶ 38). He asserts that he ordered items from the commissary on January 8

and money was deducted from his account, but he never received the commissary

items because he was in the RHU. (Id.) Defendant Kelley, the grievance

coordinator, dismissed the issue. (Id.)

Defendants move to partially dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. 23). The motion is fully briefed and ripe for

resolution.

II. Legal Standard

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the

dismissal of complaints that fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the

court must “accept as true all [factual] allegations in the complaint and all

reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and view them in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff.” Kanter v. Barella, 489 F.3d 170, 177 (3d Cir. 2007)

(quoting Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 350 (3d Cir. 2005)). Although the court is

generally limited in its review to the facts contained in the complaint, it “may also

consider matters of public record, orders, exhibits attached to the complaint and

items appearing in the record of the case.” Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran &

Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1384 n. 2 (3d Cir. 1994); see also In re Burlington Coat

Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997).

Federal notice and pleading rules require the complaint to provide “the

defendant notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”

Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To test the sufficiency of the complaint in the

face of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must conduct a three-step inquiry. See

Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130-31 (3d Cir. 2010). In the first step,

“the court must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.’”

Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)). Next, the factual and legal

elements of a claim should be separated; well-pleaded facts must be accepted as

true, while mere legal conclusions may be disregarded. Id.; see also Fowler v.

UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). Once the well-pleaded factual

allegations have been isolated, the court must determine whether they are sufficient

to show a “plausible claim for relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Twombly, 550

U.S. at 556); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (requiring plaintiffs to allege facts sufficient

to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level”). A claim “has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

III. Discussion

A. Claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985, and 1986 and the Equal

Protection Clause, and claims against defendants Schultz, Learn,

and Foulds

Ansley concedes that his claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985,

and 1986 and his equal protection theory should be dismissed. (Doc. 38 at 2-3, 8, 10,

15). He also moves to voluntarily dismiss the claims against defendants Schultz,

Learn, and Foulds. (Id. at 18). Therefore, defendants’ motion will be granted with

respect to the §§ 1981, 1985, and 1986 claims, the equal protection claim, and the

claims against defendants Schultz, Learn, and Foulds.

B. Official Capacity Claims

Defendants argue that any claims seeking monetary damages against them in

their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. (Doc. 25 at 16).

Personal capacity suits under section 1983 seek to recover money from a

government official, as an individual, for acts performed under color of state law.

Gregory v. Chehi, 843 F.2d 111, 120 (3d Cir. 1988). Official capacity suits, in contrast,

generally represent an action against an entity of which the government official is

an agent. Id.; see also Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55 (1978).

When suits are brought against state officials in their official capacities, those

lawsuits are treated as suits against the state. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991).

However, the doctrine of sovereign immunity, established by the Eleventh

Amendment, protects states, such as the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, from

suits by citizens. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100-

01, 117 (1984); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996); Lavia v.

Pennsylvania, 224 F.3d 190, 195-96 (3d Cir. 2000). That immunity runs to state

officials if they are sued in their official capacity and the state is the real party upon

which liability is sought. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237-38 (1974). Congress

has not abrogated the immunity regarding Ansley’s claims, nor has Pennsylvania

waived this grant of immunity. See 42 PA. C.S.A. § 8521(b). Consequently, Ansley’s

claim for money damages against the defendants in their official capacities is barred

by sovereign immunity. See Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 254

(3d Cir. 2010).

C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim

Next, defendants move to dismiss all claims against Wetzel, Marsh,

McGinley, Burns, Kelley, Brocca, Snedden, Urbanick, Beesley, Long, Weeks, and

Burd based on their lack of personal involvement in the alleged constitutional

violations. (Doc. 25 at 17-21). Individual liability can be imposed under section 1983

only if the state actor played an “affirmative part” in the alleged misconduct and

“cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.” Evancho v.

Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195,

1207 (3d Cir. 1998)). “A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal

involvement in the alleged wrongs. . . . Personal involvement can be shown through

allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.” Rode,

845 F.2d at 1207-08; see also Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); Atkinson v. Taylor,

316 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2003). Such allegations, however, must be made with

appropriate particularity in that a complaint must allege the particulars of conduct,

time, place, and person responsible. Evancho, 423 F.3d at 354; Rode, 845 F.2d at

1207-08. Alleging a mere hypothesis that an individual defendant had personal

knowledge or involvement in depriving the plaintiff of his rights is insufficient to

establish personal involvement. Rode, 845 F.2d at 1208.

1. Defendants Wetzel, Marsh, McGinley, Burns, Urbanick, and

Kelley

It appears that Ansley seeks to hold defendants Wetzel, Marsh, McGinley,

Burns, and Urbanick liable based solely upon their failure to respond to his letters.

(Doc. 1 ¶¶ 2, 8, 11, 28, 29, 34, 35; Doc. 38 at 14). Ansley also seeks to hold defendant

Kelley liable based on her role as grievance coordinator. (Doc. 1 ¶ 38). It has long

been recognized that a state prisoner’s allegation that prison officials and

administrators responded inappropriately, or failed to respond, to a prisoner’s

complaint or grievance, is insufficient to establish personal involvement in the

underlying unconstitutional conduct. See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207-1208 (concluding

that after-the-fact review of a grievance is insufficient to demonstrate the actual

knowledge necessary to establish personal involvement); Simonton v. Tennis, 437 F.

App’x 60, 62 (3d Cir. 2011) (nonprecedential) (“[A] prison official’s secondary review

of an inmate’s grievance or appeal is not sufficient to demonstrate the personal

involvement required to establish the deprivation of a constitutional right”); Brooks

v. Beard, 167 F. App’x 923, 925 (3d Cir. 2006) (nonprecedential) (holding that

allegations that prison officials and administrators responded inappropriately, or

failed to respond to a prison grievance, did not establish that the officials and

administrators were involved in the underlying allegedly unconstitutional

conduct).1 In accordance with the foregoing, any attempt by Ansley to establish

liability against defendants Wetzel, Marsh, McGinley, Burns, Urbanick, and Kelley

based upon their handling of Ansley’s complaints or administrative grievances does

not support a constitutional claim. Accordingly, these defendants will be dismissed

from this action.

Additionally, to the extent that Ansley attempts to hold defendants Marsh

and McGinley liable based on their respective supervisory roles of Superintendent,

this claim also fails. It is well-established that officials may not be held liable for

unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat

superior. See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207. Accordingly, insofar as Ansley’s claims

against defendants Marsh and McGinley rely on a respondeat superior theory of

liability, they are entitled to dismissal on this ground.

2. Defendants Brocca and Snedden

With respect to defendants Brocca and Snedden, Psychologist Specialists,

Ansley alleges that they refused to talk to the unit manager about effectuating a cell

move. (Doc. 1 ¶ 10). By failing to request a cell move, Ansley alleges that

defendants Brocca and Snedden failed to protect him from harm. (Doc. 38 at 14).

1 The court acknowledges that nonprecedential decisions are not binding

upon federal district courts. Citations to nonprecedential decisions reflect that the

court has carefully considered and is persuaded by the panel’s ratio decidendi.

Construing the complaint liberally, these allegations are sufficient to establish the

personal involvement of defendants Brocca and Snedden. The motion to dismiss

will be denied with respect to these defendants.

3. Defendants Beesley, Long, and Weeks

In the complaint, Ansley alleges that he asked defendant Beesley for a second

book from the RHU library cart, but Beesely denied his request, and made a rude

comment. (Id. at ¶ 35). Defendant Beesley’s denial of a book and his comment to

Ansley, without any accompanying physical injury, does not amount to malicious

behavior violative of the Eighth Amendment. See Dunbar v. Barone, 487 F. App’x

721, 723 (3d Cir. 2012) (nonprecedential) (“[V]erbal threats or taunts, without more,

are not sufficient to constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment.”). Therefore,

defendant Beesley is entitled to dismissal from this action based on lack of personal

involvement in the violation of Ansley’s constitutional rights.

As to the claims against defendants Weeks and Long, Ansley asserts that he

made an inappropriate comment about defendant Weeks and that defendant Long

overheard the comment. (Doc. 1 ¶ 31). Defendant Long then issued a fabricated

misconduct against Ansley. (Id.; Doc. 38 at 14-15). Ansley further alleges that

defendant Weeks inventoried his property, his property was subsequently

damaged, and Weeks is responsible for the missing property. (Doc. 1 ¶ 32; Doc. 38

at 14-15). Accepting these allegations as true, the court concludes that Ansley has

adequately asserted personal involvement sufficient to withstand scrutiny on a Rule

12(b) motion. The motion to dismiss the claims against Weeks and Long will be

denied.

4. Defendant Burd

A review of the complaint confirms that there are no allegations against

defendant Burd. (See Doc. 1). Ansley does not allege, in any way, that defendant

Burd was involved in the violation of his constitutional rights. In his brief in

opposition to defendants’ motion to dismiss, Ansley alleges that defendant Burd is

the “primary grievance holder” at SCI-Benner. (Doc. 38 at 15). As stated supra,

Ansley cannot impose liability on defendant Burd based upon her role in reviewing

and responding to grievances. Ansley has thus failed to allege sufficient facts to

establish that defendant Burd had any personal involvement in the violation of his

rights, and she will be dismissed from this action.

D. State Law Defamation Claim

Ansley also alleges a claim of defamation against defendants Dunn, Stavola,

Booher, and Beesely in connection with references they made to Ansley’s purported

history of sexual misconduct. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 19, 25-27, 35). Under Pennsylvania law,

Ansley must plead seven elements to state a claim for defamation: (1) the

defamatory character of the communication; (2) its publication by the defendant; (3)

its application to the plaintiff; (4) the understanding by the recipient of its

defamatory meaning; (5) the understanding by the recipient of it as intended to be

applied to the plaintiff; (6) special harm resulting to the plaintiff from its

publication; and (7) abuse of a conditionally privileged occasion. 42 PA. CONS.

STAT. ANN. § 8343(a).

“Defamation is a communication which tends to harm an individual’s

reputation so as to lower him or her in the estimation of the community or deter

third persons from associating or dealing with him or her.” Elia v. Erie Ins.

Exchange, 634 A.2d 657, 660 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (citing Zartman v. Lehigh Cnty.

Humane Soc., 482 A.2d 266 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984)). Under Pennsylvania law, “only

statements of fact can support an action for libel or slander, not merely expressions

of opinion.” Id. (citations omitted). “Whether a particular statement or writing

constitutes fact or opinion is a question of law for the court”, id. (citation omitted),

and whether a challenged statement is capable of defamatory meaning is a question

of law for the court to determine in the first instance. Feldman v. Lafayette Green

Condominium Ass’n, 806 A.2d 497, 500 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002) (citing Kryeski v.

Schott Glass Tech., 626 A.2d 595 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)). “In making this

determination, we view the statement in its factual context, because the key in

determining defamatory meaning is the effect the statement would produce on its

intended audience.” Id. (citation omitted).

Ansley alleges that defendants Dunn, Stavola, and Booher made references

to his history of sexual assault, harassment, and attempted rapes, and that

defendant Beesley stated that he “didn’t know rapists knew how to read.” (Doc. 1

¶¶ 19, 25-27, 35). Defendants assert, as a defense, the truth of the references and

state that Ansley’s history of sexual assault, harassment, and attempted rapes are in

his misconduct file. (Doc. 25 at 23). In response, Ansley denies that he has a “rape

history.” (Doc. 38 at 15). It is well-established that truth is an absolute and

complete defense to a defamation claim and a defendant need only show

substantial, rather than complete, truth. See Pacitti v. Durr, 310 F. App’x 526, 528

(3d Cir. 2009) (nonprecedential) (citing Bobb v. Kraybill, 354 Pa. Super. 361, 511

A.2d 1379, 1380 (1986)). While defendants’ argument is compelling, the resolution of

the substantial truth of these references is not appropriate on a Rule 12(b) motion to

dismiss because it takes the court beyond the pleadings. The court will deny

defendants’ motion to dismiss the defamation claim against defendants Dunn,

Stavola, and Booher.

With respect to defendant Beesley’s statement that he “didn’t know rapists

knew how to read,” we find that this statement is not capable of defamatory

meaning. Even if this is a statement of fact, and not mere opinion, there are no

allegations that defendant Beesley published the statement, a recipient understood

its defamatory meaning, special harm resulted to Ansley, or there was abuse of a

conditional privilege. The court will dismiss the defamation claim against

defendant Beesley.

IV. Leave to Amend

When a complaint fails to present a prima facie case of liability, district courts

must generally grant leave to amend before dismissing the complaint. See Grayson

v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002); Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d

113, 116-17 (3d Cir. 2000). Specifically, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has

admonished that when a complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim,

courts should liberally grant leave to amend “unless such an amendment would be

inequitable or futile.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 245 (citing Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229,

235 (3d Cir. 2004)). The official capacity claims and the claims against defendants

Wetzel, Marsh, McGinley, Burns, Urbanick, Kelley, Beesley, and Burd are legally

and factually flawed. Therefore, the court concludes that curative amendment with

respect to these claims would be futile.

V. Conclusion

Defendants’ partial motion (Doc. 23) to dismiss will be granted in part and

denied in part. An appropriate order shall issue.

/S/ CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER

Christopher C. Conner

United States District Judge

Middle District of Pennsylvania

Dated: March 7, 2022