Liptok v. Mason

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOHN LIPTOK, : Civil No. 1:21-CV-1475

:

Plaintiff, :

:

v. :

:

SUPERINTENDENT MASON, et al., :

:

Defendants. : Judge Jennifer P. Wilson

MEMORANDUM

Presently before the court is the complaint and motion to proceed in forma

pauperis of self-represented Plaintiff John Liptok (“Liptok”), a state inmate

incarcerated at the Mahanoy State Correctional Institution (“SCI-Mahanoy”), in

Frackville, Pennsylvania. (Docs. 1, 4.) For the following reasons the court will

grant Liptok’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis but dismiss his complaint

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b) with leave to file an amended complaint.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

John Liptok filed the above-captioned action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

on August 23, 2021 after he failed to receive mail sent from his family. (Doc. 1.)

According to the complaint, in April 2021, Liptok’s family sent him mail via the

Smart Communications1 but he never received it. (Id., p. 7.) 2

Liptok names the following individuals as Defendants: John Wetzel, former

DOC Secretary; Superintendent Mason; and Mailroom Supervisor Faith Walter.

(Id.) Liptok “blames” Secretary Wetzel for modifying the way prisoners received

incoming mail after it was discovered drugs were being introduced into the prisons

via inmate mail sent directly to the prison. Consequently, non-privileged incoming

mail is sent to Smart Communications in Florida for processing. Inmates then

receive copies of the scanned mail. (Id., pp. 7–8.) Although Faith Walter told

Liptok “nothing came in, [he] believes it did.” (Id.) Liptok names Superintendent

Mason as a Defendant because she is “not doing her job” as evidenced by the fact

his mail is missing. (Id.) As relief, Liptok the return of his mail and compensation

for his mental health injuries. (Id., p. 5.)

JURISDICTION

The court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 which allows a district court to exercise subject matter

1 According to the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections’ (“DOC”) website, “[a]ll general

incoming correspondence needs to be sent to the DOC’s third party mail vendor” Smart

Communications. General incoming correspondence is defined as “nearly all correspondence

which is NOT legal or privileged correspondence.” See https://www.cor.pa.gov/Pages/Mail.aspx

(last visited: Jan. 20, 2022).

2 For ease of reference, the court utilizes the page numbers from the CM/ECF header.

jurisdiction in civil cases arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the

United States.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the court must conduct an initial review of a

“complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental

entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” See also 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2) (requiring court, in a case where plaintiff is proceeding in forma

pauperis, to dismiss the case if, for example, it is frivolous or fails to state a claim

for which relief may be granted). The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for

failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 is identical to the legal

standard used when ruling on Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motions. See Dooley v.

Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523,

530 (3d Cir. 2003)).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief….” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1). In order “[t]o

survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

570 (2007)). A claim is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

“Conclusory allegations of liability are insufficient” to survive a motion to dismiss.

Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 92 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678–79). To determine whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, a

court identifies “the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim for relief,”

disregards the allegations “that are no more than conclusions and thus not entitled

to the assumption of truth,” and determines whether the remaining factual

allegations “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Bistrian v. Levi, 696

F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012).

The pleadings of self-represented plaintiffs are held to a less stringent

standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys and are to be liberally

construed by the court. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Higgs v.

Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d. Cir. 2011). Yet, a self-represented party must

still “abide by the same rules that apply to all other litigants,” and must still “allege

sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182,

185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244–45

(3d Cir. 2013)). Thus, to survive screening, a prisoner-plaintiff’s claims must be

facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the court to

reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable to the misconduct. Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678–79. Self-represented litigants are to be granted leave to file a curative

amended complaint even when a plaintiff does not seek leave to amend, unless

such an amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Phillips v. Cnty. of

Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008). However, a complaint that sets forth

facts which affirmatively demonstrate that the plaintiff has no right to recover is

properly dismissed without leave to amend. Dooley, 957 F.3d at 376 (citing

Grayson v. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 106 (3d Cir. 2002)).

DISCUSSION

Liberally construing Liptok’s complaint, the court believes Plaintiff to be

asserting a First Amendment and Due Process claim related to the one-time loss or

destruction of his personal property, i.e. incoming non-privileged mail from his

family in April 2021. (Doc. 1.) For the following reasons, Liptok’s complaint will

be dismissed as it does not state a plausible basis for a claim. However, Plaintiff

will be given leave to file an amended complaint so he can provide more

information about the basis for his claims.

A. First Amendment

Prisoners have a First Amendment right to communicate with the outside

world by sending and receiving mail. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989);

Jones v. Brown, 461 F.3d 353, 358 (3d Cir. 2006) (explaining state prisoners do

not forego their First Amendment right to use the mail simply due to their

incarceration). Prison regulations or practices that affect a prisoner’s legal mail

have the potential to interfere with a prisoner’s right of access to the courts. See

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996). Prison regulations or practices affecting a

prisoner’s receipt of non-legal mail may also implicate First Amendment rights if

not “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner v. Safley, 482

U.S. 78, 89 (1987). It is well-established that “preventing the introduction of

contraband into the prison is … a legitimate penological interest.” Guyer v. Beard,

907 F.2d 1424, 1428–29 (3d Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).

In the present case, although Liptok blames the alleged mismanagement of

his personal mail on the requirement that it must go to Smart Communications

first, he does not allege the prison mail regulation is unconstitutional, rather he

expresses his preference for the older and faster method of handling incoming mail

where it was sent directly to the prisoner at the prison. Additionally, he

acknowledges the change in mail policy was prompted by the improper use of

prisoner mail by some to introduce drugs into the facilities. In the complaint,

Liptok alleges it is the conduct of individuals that interfered with the timely receipt

or destruction of incoming mail from his family in April 2021. Accepting these

allegations as true, Liptok fails to state a First Amendment claim as a “single,

isolated interference with [plaintiff’s] personal mail was insufficient to constitute a

First Amendment violation.” Nixon v. Sec’y Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., 501 F.

App’x 176, 178 (3d Cir. 2012).

B. Fourteenth Amendment Claim

To the extent Liptok alleges that Defendants have intentionally destroyed his

incoming nonlegal mail from his family, the court construes his claim as a

Fourteenth Amendment violation for the deprivation of property without due

process of law. Accepting as true Liptok’s allegations that Defendants lost or

destroyed his incoming personal mail, he nonetheless fails to state a due process

claim. Neither the negligent nor the unauthorized deprivation of property by a

state employee rises to a due process violation if state law provides an adequate

post-deprivation remedy. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986)

(negligent acts of officials causing unintentional loss of property does not violate

due process); see also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984 (intentional

deprivation of property does not violate due process if meaningful post-deprivation

remedy for loss is available). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the

DOC’s prison grievance system provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy to

satisfy due process. See Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 210 (3d Cir. 2008); see

also Tillman v. Lebanon Cnty. Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 422 (3d Cir. 2000)

(holding that the prison’s grievance program and internal review provides an

adequate post-deprivation remedy to satisfy due process); Shareef v. Moore, 844 F.

App’x 487 (3d Cir. 2021) (no due process violation where inmate had access to

adequate post-deprivation remedy to address confiscation and destruction of

property and legal papers). Pennsylvania tort law also provides an adequate

remedy for prison officials’ unlawful deprivation of inmate property. See Pa.

Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8522(b)(3); see also Shakur v. Coelho, 421 F. App’x 132, 135

(3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (Pennsylvania Tort Claims Act provides adequate

remedy for willful destruction of property). Based on this caselaw, Liptok fails to

state a due process claim. See Spencer v. Bush, 543 F. App’x 209, 213 (3d Cir.

2013) (“‘[A]n unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state employee

does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful post deprivation remedy for

the loss is available.’” (quoting Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533). Accordingly, Liptok has

not stated a basis for a due process claim because state law provides him with a

remedy for his lost or destroyed property, i.e. his nonlegal mail.

LEAVE TO AMEND

As stated, Liptok’s entire complaint is subject to dismissal pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim. Nonetheless, the court will

grant Liptok twenty-one days (21) to file an amended complaint as to the alleged

loss or destruction of his April 2021 non-legal mail. If Liptok decides to file an

amended complaint in this action, he must clearly label it “Amended Complaint”

on the face of the document. It must bear the docket number assigned to this case

and must be retyped (double spaced) or legibly rewritten (double spaced) in its

entirety, on the court-approved form. In addition, any amended complaint filed by

Liptok supersedes (replaces) the original complaint already filed. It must be

“retyped or reprinted so that it will be complete in itself including exhibits.” M.D.

Pa. LR 15.1; see also W. Run Student Hous. Assocs. v. Huntingdon Nat’l Bank, 712

F.3d 165, 171 (3d Cir. 2013).

The court cautions Liptok that the amended complaint must be concise and

direct. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d). Each allegation must be set forth in individually

numbered paragraphs in short, concise, and simple statements. Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P.

10(b). The factual allegations of the amended complaint may not be conclusory.

Instead, the facts alleged should be specific enough as to time and place of the

violations and must identify the specific person or persons responsible for the

deprivation of his constitutional rights and what each defendant did to harm him.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.

If Liptok fails to file an amended complaint on the court’s form within

twenty-one days, the court will dismiss his action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B).

An appropriate order follows.

s/Jennifer P. Wilson

JENNIFER P. WILSON

United States District Court Judge

Dated: January 24, 2022 Middle District of Pennsylvania