Harding v. Ransom

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RYAN HARDING, : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:19-CV-1882

:

Petitioner : (Judge Conner)

:

v. :

:

KEVIN J. RANSOM, :

:

Respondent :

MEMORANDUM

This is a habeas corpus case under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in which petitioner Ryan

Harding challenges his 2014 conviction and sentence for third-degree murder and

possession of a firearm without a license in the Lackawanna County Court of

Common Pleas. We will deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus with prejudice.

I. Factual Background & Procedural History

The state courts of Pennsylvania have succinctly summarized much of the

relevant background. In May 2014, Harding was charged in a seven-count

indictment with first-degree murder, third degree murder, two counts of conspiracy

to commit murder, aggravated assault, illegal possession of a firearm, and

possession of a firearm without a license arising from the shooting death of Rashan

Crowder. Commonwealth v. Harding, No. 13 CR 1885, 2015 WL 13779112, at *2

(Lackawanna Cty. Ct. of Common Pleas, Apr. 13, 2015). On July 28, 2014, Harding

pleaded guilty to third-degree murder and possession of a firearm without a license

pursuant to a plea agreement in which he agreed to an open plea on those two

counts and dismissal of the remaining counts. Commonwealth v. Harding, No. 1593

MDA 2018, 2019 WL 2267267, at *1 (Pa. Super. Ct. May 28, 2019); see also Doc. 6-2 at

2-3. He was sentenced to 20-40 years of imprisonment on the murder charge and 3

½-7 years of imprisonment on the firearm charge, resulting in an aggregate

sentence of 23 ½-47 years of imprisonment. Id. Harding appealed to the Superior

Court, arguing that his sentence was manifestly excessive. Commonwealth v.

Harding, No. 4 MDA 2015, 2016 WL 417385, at *3 (Pa. Super. Ct. Feb. 1, 2016). The

court affirmed the sentence on February 1, 2016. Id. at *5. Harding filed a petition

for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which was denied on

July 6, 2016. Commonwealth v. Harding, 141 A.3d 478 (Pa. 2016).

Harding filed a petition for state collateral relief under Pennsylvania’s Post-

Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) on July 19, 2018. Harding, 2019 WL 2267267, at *1.

Harding argued, inter alia, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel

because counsel purportedly told him that he would receive a sentence of 15-30

years imprisonment if he agreed to plead guilty. Id. The Court of Common Pleas

dismissed the PCRA petition and Harding appealed. Id.

The Superior Court affirmed. Id. at *4. The court reasoned in relevant part

that contrary to Harding’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Harding had

expressly stated during his plea hearing that he was entering an open plea and that

no promises had been made to him in exchange for pleading guilty. Id. at *3.

Harding filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus on October 16,

2019, and the court received and docketed the petition on October 30, 2019. (Doc.

1). Harding raises the same ineffective assistance of counsel claim that he raised

before the Court of Common Pleas and the Superior Court in his PCRA

proceedings. (Id.)

Harding’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is predicated on a letter,

dated July 14, 2014, he received from his defense counsel—apparently after one of

their initial meetings (Doc. 6-2 at 3). (See Doc. 1 at 16-18). Generally speaking, the

letter purports to summarize this meeting between Harding and defense counsel

and to update Harding on the status of plea negotiations in Harding’s criminal case.

(Id.) The letter indicates that defense counsel sought a sentencing range of 5-10

years, but that counsel for the Commonwealth had offered a much higher

sentencing range of 20-40 years. The letter suggests that plea negotiations were

shared with the trial judge, who allegedly expressed his willingness to impose a

sentence of 15-30 years provided, however, that the parties could agree on such a

range. (Id.) It is an understatement to note that defense counsel’s July 14, 2014,

letter does not conform to reasonable standards of professional conduct. The letter

is rife with syntactical errors and contains numerous ambiguities as to what plea

offers had been formally extended and whether the court had agreed to impose any

particular sentence. The only possible reaction to this letter is confusion.

Two weeks after counsel’s letter, the Court of Common Pleas conducted a

change of plea hearing on July 28, 2014. During the colloquy, the court questioned

Harding as to whether any promises had been made to him regarding the sentence

he would receive:

THE COURT: Okay. Now, I heard your lawyer say that essentially this is

an open plea, no promises have been made to you with regard to any sentences, do

you understand that to be true.

MR. HARDING: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. What do you understand your exposure to

be?

MR. HARDING: Excuse me?

THE COURT: How much time are you looking at in a worst-case

scenario here?

MR. HARDING: Twenty to forty for the third degree and --

THE COURT: You’re right.

MR. HARDING: -- I’m not sure about the firearm offense. Three to

seven for the firearm.

(Doc. 6-2 at 9-10). Harding additionally confirmed that other than the open plea

agreement, no promises had been made to him to induce his guilty plea. (Id. at 41).

Harding asserts that counsel’s communication two weeks prior to his plea

hearing constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel because it interfered with his

ability to enter a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent guilty plea. (Doc. 1 at 5).

Respondents responded to the petition on April 1, 2020, arguing that the petition

should be dismissed as untimely, or alternatively denied on its merits. (Doc. 6). We

ruled that the petition was timely on May 6, 2021 and ordered respondents to re-

serve Harding with a copy of their response. (Doc. 12). Counsel subsequently

entered an appearance on Harding’s behalf and Harding filed a reply brief through

counsel on July 20, 2021, arguing that the court should conduct an evidentiary

hearing to fully address his claim. (Id.) Respondents filed a sur reply on July 21,

2021.1 (Doc. 23).

II. Standard of Review

Harding’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim was decided on the merits in

state court and is accordingly governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which states in relevant part:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted

with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State

court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

The standard for obtaining habeas corpus relief under AEDPA is “difficult to

meet.” Mays v. Hines, 592 U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 1145, 1149 (2021) (quoting Harrington

v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011)). Federal habeas corpus relief is meant to guard

against “extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems” and is not

meant to substitute for “ordinary error correction through appeal.” Harrington,

562 U.S. at 102-03 (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5 (1979) (Stevens, J.

1 We will not consider the substance of the sur reply because respondents did

not obtain leave of the court before filing it. See M.D. Pa. L.R. 7.7 (stating that sur

replies may not be filed “without leave of the court”).

concurring in judgment)). “Federal habeas courts must defer to reasonable state-

court decisions,” Dunn v. Reeves, 594 U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 2405, 2407 (2021), and may

only grant habeas corpus relief when the state court’s decision “was so lacking in

justification” that its error was “beyond any possibility for fairminded

disagreement.” Mays, 141 S. Ct. at 1149 (quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102).

III. Discussion

At the outset, we will reject Harding’s request for an evidentiary hearing.

Federal habeas courts “cannot conduct evidentiary hearings to supplement the

existing state court record” when the petitioner’s claim was adjudicated on the

merits in state court. Brown v. Wenerowicz, 663 F.3d 619, 629 (3d Cir. 2011). The

court’s review “is limited to the record that was before the state court that

adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011).

We turn our attention to the merits of Harding’s ineffectiveness claim.

To obtain habeas corpus relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel,

petitioners must show (1) that counsel’s representation fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness and (2) that counsel’s deficient performance caused

prejudice to the petitioner. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The

court’s analysis as to whether counsel’s performance was deficient must be “highly

deferential” to counsel, and the court “must indulge a strong presumption that

counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”

Id. at 689.

The court’s analysis is “doubly deferential” when a state court has already

decided that counsel’s performance was adequate. Dunn, 141 S. Ct. at 2410. The

court must apply a high level of deference both to counsel’s actions and to the state

court’s determination that counsel’s actions were constitutionally adequate. Id.;

Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (citing Yarborough v. Gentry, 540

U.S. 1, 5-6 (2003)). The federal court may only grant habeas corpus relief if “every

‘fairminded jurist’ would agree that every reasonable lawyer would have made a

different decision.” Dunn, 141 S. Ct. at 2411 (emphasis in original) (quoting

Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101).

Habeas corpus relief may be granted for the ineffective assistance of counsel

during plea proceedings. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 162 (2012). To provide

effective assistance, counsel must “give a defendant enough information ‘to make a

reasonably informed decision whether to accept a plea offer.’” United States v. Bui,

795 F.3d 363, 367 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Shotts v. Wetzel, 724 F.3d 364, 376 (3d Cir.

2013)). In determining whether counsel’s allegedly deficient performance caused

prejudice to the petitioner, the court should consider “whether there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the petitioner would have foregone a guilty

plea and insisted on trial.” Velazquez v. Superintendent SCI Fayette, 937 F.3d 151,

162 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)).

Harding claims that his counsel’s July 14, 2014 letter interfered with his

ability to enter a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent guilty plea. (Id. at 5). In the

relevant portions of the letter, which we quote verbatim ac litteratim, counsel

provides this largely unintelligible summary of his meeting with Harding:

Thus, during our meeting, it was discussed the status if any, of your

plea negotiations and offer. It was communicated that we were

seeking a 5-10 years and the offer extended by the District Attorney’s

Office of 3RD degree murder: 20-40 years. In communicating the

current positions of the parties to the Court, there were discussed of

the middle ground which would in turn put you at a 15-30-year

sentence followed by 10-years of special probation supervision. The

Court indicated that if this offer were put on the table and accepted by

us than the Court would be willing to impose the above-mentioned

sentence, accordingly. Further, in our discussion, you and I talked

about the range of sentencing if we were to go to trial presenting our

defense strategy and if we were successful the potential standard

range sentences that could be imposed under the sentencing

guidelines. This, if you review the paper I left with you, is outlined on

that sheet according to the sentence if successful. So, and again, as we

said, the sentence the Court is willing to accept for the plea is

significantly less than the sentence it could impose if we were

successful. Plus, we did the alternative and reviewed the sentence you

would receive if we were unsuccessful and the Court imposed a

sentence for the 3RD Murder (the charge a part of the plea), and the

remaining charges underlying the offense was obviously, much greater

almost double the time previously stated above as it relates to the

charges, if we were successful at trial. Finally, if you were to take the

plea in this case, you would receive a sentence in the low-end of the

standard range of the sentencing guidelines, which would be legally

and practicably impossible otherwise.

. . .

In closing, you asked me to before making an final decision attempt to

see if there is another alternative arrangement that could be made, a

change in the numbers lets say; this attempt and discussion did occur

and it has been indicated that this is the best the offer and

consequently the deal is going to get, and I have no reason to expect

any changes.

So, let me tell you, Ryan, the goal is always to put you in a better

position during a plea and discussion than would be if you were to go

to trial, and in this case, I feel I was successful in accomplishing this

goal for you. Therefore, when taken all the information included in

this letter in conjunction with the defense strategy discussion we had

regarding certain legal arguments we could advance at trial and their

faults, it is my opinion at this time that we offer the District Attorney’s

Office a plea as discussed above in this letter.

(Id. at 17-18 (errors in original throughout).)

Defense counsel’s letter is incomprehensible. In three paragraphs of poorly

written, dense, and vexing prose, defense counsel’s letter veers unpredictably

between statements suggesting that a plea deal had already been reached and

statements indicating that no formal plea offers had yet been extended by the

Commonwealth. With respect to the critical issues of defense strategy and counsel’s

advice regarding a plea agreement, this letter is completely unintelligible. Were our

analysis confined to the issue of whether counsel provided adequate representation

via the subject correspondence, the conclusion would be clear: counsel’s letter

unmistakably falls below an objective standard of reasonableness.

Our analysis, however, is not so confined, as we must also consider whether

Harding suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s incompetence. The Superior

Court considered and rejected Harding’s claims on the merits, concluding that

Harding suffered no prejudice because there was “ample evidence to show

[Harding] understood that there was no agreement as to the particular sentence

that he would receive, his open plea left his sentence to the discretion of the trial

court, and that he had not been promised any particular sentence in exchange for

entering an open plea.” Harding, 2019 WL 2267267, at *3.

Based on Harding’s testimony during the plea colloquy, we cannot conclude

that the Superior Court’s conclusion was unreasonable. Any confusion Harding

had after reading counsel’s letter is erased by the trial court’s extensive plea

colloquy. See United States v. Fazio, 795 F.3d 421, 427 (3d Cir. 2015) (noting that

defendant’s confusion caused by erroneous advice from counsel is remedied by

court’s sufficiently extensive plea colloquy); accord United States v. Shedrick, 493

F.3d 292, 299 (3d Cir. 2007). Harding acknowledged several times during the

colloquy that he was entering an open plea, that no promises had been made to him

regarding the sentence he would receive, and that he was facing a potential

sentence of 20-40 years of imprisonment for the murder charge as well as an

additional 3 ½ to 7 years on the gun charge.2 We must presume that Harding’s

2 The relevant portions of the plea colloquy are reproduced below. We also

note that defense counsel confirmed on the record that, immediately prior to the

hearing, he and Harding “fully went over not only certain sentencing guidelines and

ranges, but also the charges, the maximum charges, and made an offer . . . [to] an

open plea to two counts” of the seven counts pending against Harding. (Doc. 6-2 at

2).

THE COURT: Okay. Now, I heard your lawyer say that essentially this

is an open plea, no promises have been to you with regard to any sentences, do you

understand that to be true?

MR. HARDING: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. What you do you understand your exposure to be?

MR. HARDING: Excuse me?

THE COURT: How much time are you looking at in a worst-case

scenario here?

MR. HARDING: Twenty to forty for the third degree and - -

THE COURT: You’re right.

MR. HARDING: - - I’m not sure about the firearm offense. Three to seven

for the firearm.

THE COURT: All right. So, you know, you’re 19 years old, so you’re

looking at sentences that could add up to twice as long as you’ve been on this earth,

right?

MR. HARDING: Yes.

(Id. at 9-10).

THE COURT: . . . Here’s basically what you’re pleading guilty to, okay?

. . . Count two is murder of the third degree. . . . It’s a Felony one, and theoretically

there’s a $15,000 fine and a 40 years maximum. We already talked about the

maximum. . . .

(Id. at 25-26).

THE COURT: Okay. The other one is that on the 5th of May 2013 in

Lackawanna County, you’re accused of committing the crime of count seven of

carrying a firearm without a proper license, 18th volume of the Pennsylvania

Crimes Code Consolidated Pennsylvania Statutes Annotated, Section 6106(a)(1).

That is a Felony three, subject to a $15,000 fine and a seven year maximum.

(Id. at 27).

THE COURT: Okay. So now we’ve got the basics down. I want to ask

you that has anybody today promised you anything, other than the open plea that

we’ve talked about, or used any force or threatened you or coerced you in any way

to enter this plea of guilty?

MR. HARDING: No.

(Id. at 27-28).

THE COURT: . . . This is an open count, I have a big range there.

There’s obviously guidelines that are gonna come to me based upon what

your prior record might be and based upon the offense gravity scores that are

involved for the two offenses you’re pleading guilty to, but I’ll get - - this sentence

might happen in two months from now.

In the meantime they’ll put together a little dossier or a booklet about Ryan

Harding and I’ll get to read all about you and your good points and your bad points,

do you understand that?

MR. HARDING: Yes.

THE COURT: And that’s the kind of information I need in order to

impose a sentence intelligently. So I don’t know what I’m gonna do so it is an open

plea, do you understand that?

MR. HARDING: Yes.

(Id. at 37-38).

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Other than the open plea, any other

promises made to you?

MR. HARDING: No.

(Id. at 41).

THE COURT: Okay. Do you understand that I’m not bound by any

agreement? I mean, I could decide that I want to go in the aggravating range or I

could decide I want to go in the mitigating range. I don’t know yet. I’ll know you

when I sentence you but I don’t know you yet, do you understand that?

MR. HARDING: Yes.

(Id. at 41-42).

statements were truthful. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (1977) (noting that

statements made during a plea hearing “carry a strong presumption of verity”);

accord United States v. James, 928 F.3d 247, 256 (3d Cir. 2019). And Harding has

not pointed to sufficient evidence in the record to rebut that presumption.

To the contrary, the record reflects that Harding and his counsel engaged in

extensive discussions after Harding received defense counsel’s July 14, 2014 letter.

(See Doc. 6-2 at 2 (Atty. Brown: “And, Your Honor, I’ve had a chance to speak with

Ryan both today and Saturday, after discussions with the District Attorney’s Office

it’s our intention to enter a plea today.”); see also id. at 28 (confirming “long

session” between Harding and his attorney prior to plea hearing).) Hence, Harding

had ample opportunity to discuss the contents of the July 14, 2014, letter with his

attorney and to clear up any residual confusion. Moreover, Harding’s decision to

agree to an open plea is entirely logical given that the plea agreement resulted in

the dismissal of five other charges—including the first-degree murder charge—

thereby eliminating more severe penalties. We will accordingly deny the petition

THE COURT: I want to make sure we’re on the same page. Okay, so I

have, 15 says, (Reading) Do you understand that the maximum penalty of the

charge you’re pleading guilty to, murder in the third degree, the maximum is 40

years, do you understand that?

MR. HARDING: Yes.

THE COURT: And the maximum on possession of a firearm is seven

years, okay?

MR. HARDING: Yes.

THE COURT: So if I were to do consecutive it would be 47 years.

MR HARDING: Yes.

(Id. at 45-46).

because Harding has not shown a reasonable probability that he “would have

foregone a guilty plea and insisted on trial” if not for the actions of counsel. See

Velazquez, 937 F.3d at 162.

IV. Conclusion

We will deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus with prejudice. A

certificate of appealability will not issue because no reasonable jurist would

disagree with this ruling or conclude that the issues presented are adequate to

deserve encouragement to proceed further. Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct.

759, 773 (2017) (citing Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003)). An appropriate

order shall issue.

/S/ CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER

Christopher C. Conner

United States District Judge

Middle District of Pennsylvania

Dated: February 4, 2022