Medina v. Snowberger

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MARIO MEDINA, :

Plaintiff :

: No. 1:20-cv-00866

v. :

: (Judge Kane)

C.O. SNOWBERGER, et al., :

Defendants :

MEMORANDUM

This is a prisoner civil rights case arising out of an incident in which pro se Plaintiff

Mario Medina (“Medina”) was pepper sprayed in his cell in the State Correctional Institution-

Benner Township (“SCI-Benner Township”). Presently before the Court is Defendants’ motion

for partial summary judgment (Doc. No. 29), which seeks summary judgment as to all claims

other than Medina’s excessive force claim against Defendant Snowberger (“Snowberger”). For

the following reasons, the motion will be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

On May 29, 2020, Medina initiated this case through the filing of a complaint pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. No. 1.) Defendants answered the complaint on September 9, 2020.

(Doc. No. 14.) Medina subsequently moved for leave to amend, and the Court granted the

request on January 26, 2021. (Doc. Nos. 17-18.) Medina’s amended complaint was docketed

later that day, naming as defendants Snowberger and three other SCI-Benner Township

employees: Hammer, Shilling, and a John Doe Defendant. (Doc. No. 19.) In the amended

complaint, Medina alleges generally that defendant Snowberger used excessive force when he

pepper sprayed Medina on June 13, 2018, that the other defendants failed to protect Medina from

the excessive force and failed to promptly provide him medical attention, and that the defendants

retaliated against Medina for filing grievances relating to the incident. (Id.) Medina also alleges

that he has been denied parole in retaliation for filing grievances. (Id.) Defendants answered the

amended complaint on February 3, 2021. (Doc. No. 20.)

On June 23, 2021, following the close of fact discovery, Defendants filed the instant

motion for summary judgment, seeking summary judgment as to all claims other than Medina’s

excessive force claim against Defendant Snowberger.1 (Doc. No. 29.) Defendants filed a

statement of material facts and a brief in support of the motion on the same day. (Doc. Nos. 30-

31.) Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment as to the relevant claims both

because Medina failed to exhaust administrative remedies and because the claims fail on their

merits. (Doc. No. 31.) Medina filed a brief in opposition to the motion on August 2, 2021, but

did not file a response to the statement of material facts. (Doc. No. 32.) Defendants filed a reply

brief on August 3, 2021, and Medina then filed a sur reply on October 20, 2021. (Doc. Nos. 33,

36.) Medina did not obtain leave of the Court before filing the sur reply.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) requires the Court to render summary judgment “if

the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “[T]his standard provides

that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an

otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no

genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).

A disputed fact is “material” if proof of its existence would affect the outcome of the case under

applicable substantive law. See id. at 248; Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1078

1 Defendants do not seek summary judgment as to the excessive force claim because they

acknowledge that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Snowberger’s discharge

of the pepper spray was intentional or accidental. (Doc. No. 31 at 2 n.1.)

(3d Cir. 1992). An dispute of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257; Brenner v.

Local 514, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 927 F.2d 1283, 1287-88 (3d Cir. 1991).

When determining whether there is a genuine dispute of material fact, the Court must

view the facts and all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See Moore v.

Tartler, 986 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1993); Clement v. Consol. Rail Corp., 963 F.2d 599, 600 (3d Cir.

1992); White v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 862 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1988). To avoid summary

judgment, however, the nonmoving party may not rest on the unsubstantiated allegations of his

or her pleadings. When the party seeking summary judgment satisfies its burden under Rule 56

of identifying evidence that demonstrates the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact, the

nonmoving party is required to go beyond his pleadings with affidavits, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, or the like in order to demonstrate specific material facts that give rise to a

genuine dispute. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). The party opposing

the motion “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the

material facts.” See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

When Rule 56 shifts the burden of production to the nonmoving party, that party must produce

evidence to show the existence of every element essential to its case that it bears the burden of

proving at trial, for “a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the

nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” See Celotex, 477 U.S. at

323; see also Harter v. G.A.F. Corp., 967 F.2d 846, 851 (3d Cir. 1992).

In determining whether a dispute of material fact exists, the Court must consider the

evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See White, 862 F.2d at 59. In

doing so, the Court must accept the nonmovant’s allegations as true and resolve any conflicts in

his favor. See id. (citations omitted). However, a party opposing a summary judgment motion

must comply with Local Rule 56.1, which specifically directs the oppositional party to submit a

“statement of the material facts, responding to the numbered paragraphs set forth in the statement

required [to be filed by the movant], as to which it is contended that there exists a genuine issue

to be tried”; if the nonmovant fails to do so, “[a]ll material facts set forth in the statement

required to be served by the moving party will be deemed to be admitted.” See L.R. 56.1. A

party cannot evade these litigation responsibilities in this regard simply by citing the fact that he

is a pro se litigant. These rules apply with equal force to all parties. See Sanders v. Beard, No.

09-cv-01384, 2010 WL 2853261, at *5 (M.D. Pa. July 20, 2010) (stating that pro se parties “are

not excused from complying with court orders and the local rules of court”); Thomas v. Norris,

No. 02-cv-01854, 2006 WL 2590488, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2006) (explaining that pro se

parties must follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).

III. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS2

On June 13, 2018, while collecting lunch trays, Defendant Snowberger discharged his

pepper spray in the vicinity of Medina’s cell. (Doc. No. 30 ¶ 12.) The pepper spray struck both

2 The Local Rules provide that in addition to the requirement that a party file a brief in

opposition to the moving party’s brief in support of its motion, “[t]he papers opposing a motion

for summary judgment shall include a separate, short and concise statement of material facts

responding to the numbered paragraphs set forth in the statement [of material facts filed by the

moving party] . . . as to which it is contended that there exists a genuine issue to be tried.” See

M.D. Pa. L.R. 56. 1. The Rule further requires the inclusion of references to the parts of the

record that support the statements. See id. Finally, the Rule states that the statement of material

facts required to be served by the moving party will be deemed to be admitted unless

controverted by the statement required to be served by the opposing party. See id. Unless

otherwise noted, the background herein is derived from Defendants’ Rule 56.1 statement of facts.

(Doc. No. 30.) Plaintiff has not filed a response to Defendants’ statement of material facts in

compliance with Local Rule 56.1. Accordingly, the Court deems the facts set forth by

Defendants to be undisputed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); M.D. Pa. L.R. 56.1; United States v.

Alberto, No. 3:18-cv-01014, 2020 WL 730316, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 2020).

Snowberger and Medina. (Id. ¶ 13.) Medina pressed the emergency button in his cell, alerting

prison staff that he had been sprayed and requesting immediate medical care. (Id. ¶ 14.) Medina

was seen in the prison’s medical department approximately ten minutes after the incident

occurred. (Id. ¶¶ 17-18.) At the time, his eyes were red, irritated, and watering. (Id. ¶ 19.)

Prison staff treated him by applying a solution to his eyes. (Id. ¶ 20.) The June 13, 2018

incident was the only time that Snowberger had used physical force with Medina and the only

time he used pepper spray on Medina. (Id. ¶¶ 22-23.) Medina also had never reported to

Defendants Hammer or Shilling that he was afraid of Snowberger. (Id. ¶ 24.)

Medina filed two grievances with the prison alleging that Defendant Snowberger

intentionally used pepper spray against him, the second of which Medina appealed through all

stages of review. (Id. ¶¶ 30-33.) Medina filed an additional grievance on July 11, 2018, alleging

that Defendant Hammer had intentionally lost Medina’s boots. (Id. ¶ 35.) That grievance was

dismissed, and Medina did not appeal. (Id. ¶¶ 36-37.) Medina was also denied parole at some

point in time, although he was not sure whether this occurred before or after the incident

involving Snowberger. (Id. ¶ 38.)

IV. DISCUSSION

Defendants assert that they are entitled to summary judgment as to all claims other than

the excessive force claim against Snowberger because Medina failed to exhaust administrative

remedies as to those claims and because the claims fail on their merits. (Doc. No. 31.) The

Court considers Defendants’ arguments below.

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a prisoner must pursue all

available avenues of relief through the applicable grievance system before initiating a federal

civil rights action. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 n.6 (2001)

(“[A]n inmate must exhaust irrespective of the forms of relief sought and offered through

administrative avenues”). Section 1997e provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o action shall be

brought with respect to prison conditions under [S]ection 1983 of this title, or any other [f]ederal

law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such

administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The

exhaustion requirement is mandatory. See Williams v. Beard, 482 F.3d 637, 639 (3d Cir. 2007);

see also Booth, 532 U.S. at 742 (holding that the exhaustion requirement of the PLRA applies to

grievance procedures “regardless of the relief offered through administrative procedures”).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has further provided that there is

no futility exception to Section 1997e’s exhaustion requirement. See Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d

65, 75-76 (3d Cir. 2000). Courts have typically required across-the-board exhaustion by inmates

seeking to pursue claims in federal court. See id. Additionally, courts have interpreted this

exhaustion requirement as including a procedural default component, holding that inmates must

fully satisfy the administrative requirements of the inmate grievance process before proceeding

with a claim in federal court. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Oriakhi

v. United States, 165 F. App’x 991, 993 (3d Cir. 2006) (providing that “there appears to be

unanimous circuit court consensus that a prisoner may not fulfill the PLRA’s exhaustion

requirement by exhausting administrative remedies after the filing of the complaint in federal

court”). Courts have also concluded that inmates who fail to complete the prison grievance

process in a full and timely manner are barred from subsequently litigating claims in federal

court. See, e.g., Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289 (3d Cir. 2000); Bolla v. Strickland, 304 F.

App’x 22 (3d Cir. 2008).

A prisoner’s failure to exhaust may be excused if administrative remedies are

unavailable to the inmate, as an inmate is only required to exhaust those administrative remedies

that are “‘capable of use’ to obtain ‘some relief for the action complained of.’” See Ross v.

Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 642 (2016). A grievance process is unavailable and may be deemed

exhausted in three circumstances: “(1) when the remedy ‘operates as a simple dead end—with

officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates’; (2) when it

is ‘so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use’; and (3) ‘when prison

administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through

machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.’” See Hardy v. Shaikh, 959 F.3d 578, 584 (3d

Cir. 2020) (quoting Ross, 578 U.S. at 643-44). Although the burden to establish a plaintiff’s

failure to exhaust administrative remedies ordinarily lies with the defendants, it is the plaintiff’s

burden to establish that a grievance process was unavailable See Rinaldi v. United States, 904

F.3d 257, 268 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing Tuckel v. Grover, 660 F. . 3d 1249, 1253-54 (10th Cir. 2011)).

The prison grievance policy relevant to this case is the Pennsylvania DOC’s Rule 804

(“DC-ADM 804”). See DCM-ADM 804, Department of Corrections, available at:

https://www.cor.pa.gov/About%20Us/Documents/DOC%20Policies/804%20Inmate%20Grievan

ces.pdf. Under DC-ADM 804, a prisoner must first submit a timely written grievance for review

by the Superintendent or regional grievance coordinator within fifteen days from the date of the

incident. See id. DC-ADM 804 provides that the grievance must include “a statement of the

facts relevant to the claim,” “shall identify individuals directly involved in the events,” and “shall

specifically state any claims [the inmate] wishes to make concerning violations of Department

directives, regulations, court orders, or other law.” See id. If the inmate wishes to receive

compensation or “other legal relief normally available from a court” as a remedy for his

grievance, he “must request the specific relief sought in his/her initial grievance.” See id. A

response should be received within ten business days. See id. Next, the prisoner must submit a

timely written appeal to an intermediate review level within ten working days. See id. Again, a

response should be received within ten working days. See id. Finally, the inmate must submit a

timely appeal to the Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals (“SOIGA”) within

fifteen working days, and the inmate should receive a final determination within thirty days. See

id. To fully exhaust an issue or incident in accordance with DC-ADM 804, “[a]n inmate must

exhaust all three levels of review and comply with all procedural requirements of the grievance

review process.” See id.

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because Medina failed to

exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to all of his claims other than his excessive

force claim. (Doc. No. 31 at 5-7.) Medina argues in response that Defendants are “using tactics

out of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections ‘Grievance Officer Training Manual,’ to

defraud the DC-ADM 804 Grievance System.” (Doc. No. 32 at 6.) Medina asserts that this

manual teaches DOC employees to “avoid core topics in the initial grievance, to play upon

words, to procrastinate, to manipulate, and [to] lie.” (Id. at 7.) Medina argues that the manual

violates the purpose of DC-ADM 804, which is to facilitate inmate grievances. (Id.) Medina

does not dispute Defendants’ contention that he failed to exhaust administrative remedies. (Id.)

Given Medina’s failure to offer evidence to establish that he exhausted administrative

remedies with respect to the relevant claims, Defendants reiterate in their reply brief that they are

entitled to summary judgment. (Doc. No. 33 at 2-3.) Medina then argues in his sur reply that he

attempted to file an initial grievance relating to the claims but that the grievance was never filed

due to the actions of the John Doe Defendant and other DOC officials. (Doc. No. 36 at 3-5.)

Medina further asserts that he attempted to appeal this grievance but that he did not receive

responses to his appeals. (Id. at 6-7.) Medina does not attach a copy of this grievance or any

other documentation to support his account.

The record before the Court reflects that Medina filed a grievance complaining that

Snowberger used excessive force during the pepper spraying incident and that Medina appealed

this grievance through all stages of the prison grievance system. (See Doc. No. 30.) The record

does not indicate that Medina exhausted administrative remedies with respect to any other claims

raised in this case.

Although Medina’s position regarding the issue of exhaustion is somewhat unclear, the

Court liberally construes Medina’s argument regarding the grievance officer training manual as

an argument that the grievance policy under DC-ADM 804 was unavailable to him. The Court

will reject this argument. It is the plaintiff’s burden to establish that a prison grievance policy is

unavailable, see Rinaldi, 904 F.3d at 268, and Medina has not offered any evidence to show that

the administrative remedies at issue here were not “‘capable of use’ to obtain ‘some relief for the

action complained of.’” See Ross, 578 U.S. at 642. Medina appealed his excessive force claim

against defendant Snowberger through all stages of appellate review under DC-ADM 804, and

he has not explained why he was unable to do the same with respect to his other claims.

The Court will also disregard Medina’s assertions in his sur reply brief that he attempted

to file an initial grievance for two reasons. First, Medina did not raise this argument in his

opposition brief, and arguments cannot be raised for the first time in a reply brief. See Epsilon

Energy USA, Inc. v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, No. 1:21-cv-00658, 2021 WL 1740582, at

*4 (M.D. Pa. May 3, 2021) (citing Interbusiness Bank, N.A. v. First Nat’l Bank of Mifflintown,

328 F. Supp. 2d 522, 529 (M.D. Pa. 2004)). Second, Medina did not seek leave of the Court

before filing his sur reply as required by the Local Rules. See M.D. Pa. L.R. 7.7 (stating that no

briefs may be filed after the moving party’s reply brief “without leave of court”). Even if the

Court accepted the argument made in Medina’s sur reply as procedurally proper, however, the

Court would still reject the argument on its merits, as Medina has not produced any documentary

evidence to support his contention that he attempted to file an initial grievance and, in addition,

he has not described the subject matter of the grievance.

Accordingly, because the record of this case reflects that Medina failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies with respect to all claims other than his excessive force claim against

Defendant Snowberger, the Court will grant Defendants summary judgment as to these claims.

Having reached this conclusion, the Court will not address Defendants’ alternative argument that

the claims fail on their merits.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion for partial summary

judgment (Doc. No. 29). An appropriate Order follows.