Ojo v. Brew Vino LLC

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MYNECA Y. OJO et al., : Civil No. 1:20-CV-661

:

Plaintiffs, :

:

v. :

:

BREW VINO LLC, et al., :

:

Defendants. : Judge Sylvia H. Rambo

M E M O R A N D U M

Before the court is Defendants’ Amended Motion for Joinder (Doc. 35), which

requests that this action be consolidated with Sandra Harrison et al. v. Brew Vino

LLC, et al., Civil No. 1:20-CV-666 (hereinafter Harrison).1 For the following

reasons, the court will grant the motion.

I. BACKGROUND

According to Plaintiffs’ complaint, this case arose from an incident on April

21, 2018, in York, Pennsylvania at Grandview Golf Course, a public facility

operated by Defendant Brew Vino LLC. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 1, 14.) Having purchased a

three-year membership to the golf course, Plaintiffs Myneca Y. Ojo and Karen Ann

1 The motion requests consolidation but cites Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 governing joinder

of parties instead of the controlling Rule 42(a). (See Doc. 35 at ¶¶ 1–2.) Because the Rule 42(a)

test for consolidation is included as part of Rule 20 analysis and since Defendants argue the

applicable standard in their motion, the court will consider it as a motion to consolidate.

Additionally, the court notes that Defendants failed to file a separate brief in support of their

motion in accordance with Local Rule 7.5 and advises that they must do so in connection with any

future motion.

Crosby were exercising their membership for the first time. (Id. at ¶ 1.) They were

joined by three other friends, Sandra Thompson, Sandra Harrison, and Carolyn Dow.

(Id. at ¶ 14.) Plaintiffs and the other members of their group are African American

women. (Id.) Plaintiffs allege that Brew Vino LLC, through its employees, the

named individual Defendants, discriminated against their group while they golfed

by undeservedly reprimanding them for playing too slow and cutting people off, by

asking them to leave and trying to refund their membership fees, and by calling the

police on them several times. (Id. at ¶¶ 22–25, 30–37.) After completing nine holes,

the group took a lunch break, and only Plaintiff Ojo and Ms. Thompson stayed at

the golf course to finish the remaining nine holes. (Id. at ¶ 29.) Some of the alleged

actions occurred before the group’s lunch break, and others after.

On April 20, 2020, Plaintiffs initiated this action against Defendants alleging

unlawful discrimination on the basis of race and sex under the Civil Rights Act, 42

U.S.C. §§ 1982, 1985, 1986 et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq., and the Pennsylvania

Human Relations Act (“PHRA”), as well as common law claims for breach of

contract, constructive fraud of contract, tortious interference of contract, defamation,

and infliction of emotional distress. Defendants answered the complaint on May 18,

2021, and a case management conference was held on August 9, 2021. (Doc. 27.)

The next day, Sandra Harrison and Carolyn Dow, two other members in

Plaintiffs’ golf group, filed a lawsuit against the same named defendants and based

on the same incident, alleging unlawful discrimination on the basis of race and sex

under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the PHRA. (See

Harrison, Doc. 1.) The Harrison Defendants, who are represented by the same

counsel representing them in this action, answered the complaint on May 18, 2021,

and a case management conference was held on August 9, 2021. (Harrison, Doc.

29.)

On September 3, 2021, Defendants moved for joinder or consolidation of the

two cases. (Doc. 35; see also Harrison, Doc. 36.) Plaintiffs filed a brief in

opposition. (Doc. 40.) The matter is ripe for review.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When separate actions pending before a court “involve a common question of

law or fact,” the court has broad discretion to consolidate them to facilitate the

administration of justice. FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a)(2); Hall v. Hall, 138 S. Ct. 1118, 1130

(2018). Consolidated cases “do not lose their separate identities,” and consolidation

must not “deprive any party of any substantial rights which he may have possessed

had the actions proceeded separately.” Hall, 136 S. Ct. at 1130–31 (internal citations

omitted). In exercising its discretion, the court should “weigh the benefits of judicial

economy against the potential for new delays, expense, confusion or prejudice.”

Farahmand v. Rumsfeld, No. 02-CV-1236, 2002 WL 31630709, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov.

20, 2002) (cleaned up). The moving party bears the burden of proof. See id.;

Borough of Olyphant v. PPL Corp., 153 F. App’x 80, 82 (3d Cir. 2005).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants’ motion contends that this case should be consolidated with

Harrison because the actions share common facts and law. Common facts include

that plaintiffs from both cases were on a golf outing together at the Grandview Golf

Course on April 21, 2018; that all plaintiffs are African American women who were

members of the golf course; and that both cases name the same Defendants.

Common issues of law include that both actions allege, based on the same or similar

conduct, race- and sex-based discrimination in violation of various federal and state

laws, including Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Section 1981 of the Civil

Rights Act of 1966, and the PHRA.

Plaintiffs’ arguments against consolidation are unavailing. They contend that

their interests conflict with those of the Harrison Plaintiffs because they allege

distinct operative facts, make different demands for damages, and assert additional

common law claims. But the specific factual differences between the cases that

Plaintiffs point to are relatively minor, and to the extent Ojo alleges facts as to

liability that do not apply to the Harrison Plaintiffs, there is no serious dispute that

these same facts also do not apply to Crosby. Similarly, Plaintiffs’ arguments

exaggerate the added complexity of adjudicating different damages demands,

particularly considering that some of their injuries are alleged to have arisen from

the very same conduct alleged in Harrison, and given that they themselves already

make dissimilar demands. Plaintiffs’ assertion of unique common law claims

likewise does not defeat Defendants’ motion, as the claims are based on the same

set of circumstances, and complete identity of law or facts is not required for

consolidation. See e.g., Brown v. Mercadante, 687 F. App’x 220, 221–22 n.3 (3d

Cir. 2017) (affirming district court’s consolidation of two actions involving one or

more unique facts, claims, and parties).

Plaintiffs make no substantive argument that consolidation would cause delay,

unnecessary expense, confusion, or prejudice. The progression of both cases in

tandem to date means there is little risk of delay, and consolidation will ostensibly

reduce the parties’ litigation expenses by permitting them to coordinate discovery

and requiring that identical witnesses listed in both actions’ case management plans

be deposed only once.2 (See Docs. 30, 32; Harrison, Docs. 32, 34.) There is also

minimal risk of confusion or prejudice to Plaintiffs. Both actions concern relatively

straightforward and largely identical issues of fact and questions of law, and courts

regularly and competently manage cases with multiple plaintiffs, dissimilar claims,

2 The cases’ complaints were filed one day apart; respective answers were filed on the same date;

and the court issued the same post-conference order in both cases on the same date. (See Docs. 1,

27, 32; Harrison, Docs. 1, 29, 34.)

and varying demands for damages. Therefore, the court will exercise its discretion

to consolidate the cases to facilitate the administration of justice.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the court will grant Defendants’ Amended

Motion for Joinder. (Doc. 35.) An appropriate order shall follow.

s/ Sylvia H. Rambo

SYLVIA H. RAMBO

United States District Judge

Dated: January 28, 2022