The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JOHN WARD, JR. :
Petitioner : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:21-0897
v. : (JUDGE MANNION)
WARDEN, SCI-HOUTZDALE, :
Respondent :
MEMORANDUM
Petitioner, John Ward, Jr., an inmate confined in the State Correctional
Institution, Houtzdale, Pennsylvania, filed the instant petition for writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254. (Doc. 1). He attacks a
conviction imposed by the Court of Common Pleas for Lackawanna County,
Pennsylvania. Id. Presently before the Court is Respondent’s motion to
dismiss the petition for writ of habeas corpus as barred by the statute of
limitations and for Petitioner’s failure to exhaust state court remedies prior to
filing his federal habeas corpus petition. (Doc. 13). Although provided an
opportunity to file a traverse, Petitioner did not file a traverse. The motion is
ripe for disposition and, for the reasons set forth below, the petition be
dismissed as untimely under the statute of limitations, see 28 U.S.C.
§2244(d).
I. Background
On April 25, 2014, Petitioner, John Ward, Jr., entered a guilty plea in
the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas to one count of Involuntary
Deviate Sexual Intercourse with a Child. (Doc. 1, petition at 1). On August
20, 2014, Petitioner was sentenced to ten to twenty-five years. Id. Petitioner
acknowledges that he did not file a direct appeal from his conviction and
sentence; nor did he file a collateral challenge for relief under the Post
Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§9541-9546. Id.
On May 18, 2021, Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas
corpus. Id. He challenges his guilty plea, claiming that he was “bullied into
taking a guilty plea deal by [his] Public Defender and the Judge.” Id.
On November 30, 2021, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the
petition as untimely and for Petitioner’s failure to exhaust state court
remedies prior to filing his federal action. (Doc. 13). Although provided an
opportunity to file a brief in opposition, Petitioner has not responded to the
motion. Respondent’s motion is ripe for disposition and for the reasons set
forth below, the motion will be granted, and Petitioner’s action will be
dismissed as untimely.
II. Discussion
The court shall “entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on
behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only
on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §2254(a). A petition filed under
§2254 must be timely filed under the stringent standards set forth in the Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub.L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (Apr. 24, 1996). See 28 U.S.C. §2244(d) (1).
Specifically, a state prisoner requesting habeas corpus relief pursuant to
§2254 must adhere to a statute of limitations that provides, in relevant part,
as follows:
(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a
writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the
latest of–
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for
seeking such review;
. . .
(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State
post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the
pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted
toward any period of limitation under this subsection.
28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(1)-(2); see Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d 153, 157 (3d Cir.
1999). Thus, under the plain terms of §2244(d)(1)(A), a state court criminal
judgment does not become final until appeals have been exhausted or the
time for appeal has expired. See Nara v. Frank, 264 F.3d 310, 314 (3d Cir.
2001).
On August 20, 2014, Petitioner was sentenced to ten to twenty-five
years. (Doc. 1, petition). Petitioner’s judgment became final on September
19, 2014, when the time expired for him to file a direct appeal from his
judgment of sentence. The one-year AEDPA statute of limitations period
commenced running as of that date and expired one year later, on
September 15, 2015. Therefore, the present petition, filed on May 18, 2021,
is patently untimely by six years.
However, the limitation period is not “an inflexible rule requiring
dismissal whenever AEDPA’s one-year clock has run.” Day v. McDonough,
547 U.S. 198, 208 (2006). “Instead, the limitation period is subject to both
statutory and equitable tolling.” Jenkins v. Superintendent of Laurel
Highlands, 705 F.3d 80, 85 (3d Cir. 2013).
A. Statutory Tolling
Section 2244(d)(2) tolls the one-year statute of limitations with respect
to the “time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction
or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is
pending.” 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(2). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has
defined “pending” as the time during which a petitioner may seek
discretionary state court review, whether or not such review is sought.
Swartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 417 (3d Cir. 2000). Because Petitioner failed to
collaterally challenge his guilty plea through the filing of a PCRA petition,
there is no basis for statutory tolling.
B. Equitable Tolling
Equitable tolling stops the clock when extraordinary circumstances
prevent a petitioner from timely filing, thereby rendering strict enforcement of
the one-year limitations period unfair. Wood v. Milyard, 566 U.S. 463, 469
n.3 (2012); see also Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010). “Equitable
tolling of the limitations period is to be used sparingly and only in
“extraordinary” and “rare” circumstances. See Satterfield v. Johnson, 434
F.3d 185, 195 (3d Cir. 2006); LaCava v. Kyler, 398 F.3d 271, 274-75 (3d Cir.
2005). Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling must establish two
elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently; and (2) that
some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. Diguglielmo, 544
U.S. 408, 418 (2005).
With respect to the diligent pursuit of rights, he must demonstrate that
he exercised reasonable diligence in investigating and bringing the claims.
See Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 142 (3d Cir. 2002). Mere excusable
neglect is not sufficient. See LaCava, 398 F.3d at 276. Moreover, “the party
seeking equitable tolling must have acted with reasonable diligence
throughout the period he seeks to toll.” Warren v. Garvin, 219 F.3d 111, 113
(2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Smith v. McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13, 17 (2d Cir. 2000)).
Extraordinary circumstances have been found where (1) the
respondent has actively misled the petitioner, (2) the petitioner has in some
extraordinary way been prevented from asserting his rights, (3) the petitioner
has timely asserted his rights mistakenly in the wrong forum, see Jones, 195
F.3d at 159, or (4) the court has misled a party regarding the steps that the
party needs to take to preserve a claim, see Brinson v. Vaughn, 398 F.3d
225, 230 (3d Cir. 2005). Significantly, even where extraordinary
circumstances exist, “[i]f the person seeking equitable tolling has not
exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to file after the extraordinary
circumstances began, the link of causation between the extraordinary
circumstances and the failure to file is broken, and the extraordinary
circumstances therefore did not prevent timely filing.” Brown v. Shannon, 322
F.3d 768, 773 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Valverde v. Stinson, 224 F.3d 129, 134
(2d Cir. 2000)).
Ward presents no evidence to account for the delay in seeking relief in
federal court. (See Doc. 1). Nor does he indicate that extraordinary
circumstances obstructed his pursuit of post-conviction relief. The fact that a
petitioner is proceeding pro se does not insulate him from the “reasonable
diligence” inquiry and his lack of legal knowledge or legal training does not
alone justify equitable tolling. Ross v. Varano, 712 F.3d 784, 799-800 (3d
Cir. 2013) (citing Brown v. Shannon, 322 F.3d 768, 774 (3d Cir. 2003)).
Therefore, equitable tolling of the AEDPA statute of limitations is not
warranted in this case.
C. Actual Innocence
We now turn to the fundamental miscarriage of justice tolling
exception. Although the fundamental miscarriage of justice or “actual
innocence” exception was previously used to excuse procedural default, the
United States Supreme Court has held that a convincing showing of actual
innocence may excuse the federal limitations period. McQuiggin v. Perkins,
569 U.S. 383 (2013). McQuiggin made it clear that such an exception is very
rare, noting that the petitioner “must show that it is more likely than not that
no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new
evidence.” Id. at 399 (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). “To
be credible a claim of actual innocence must be based on reliable evidence
not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324; Calderon v. Thompson, 523
U.S. 558, 559 (1998). “Proving actual innocence based on new evidence
requires the petitioner to demonstrate (1) new evidence (2) that is reliable
and (3) so probative of innocence that no reasonable juror would have
convicted the petitioner.” Sistrunk v. Rozum, 674 F.3d 181, 191 (3d Cir.
2012) (citing Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327). “‘[A] petitioner does not meet the
threshold requirement unless he persuades the district court that, in light of
the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ Schlup, 513 U.S., at 329, 115 S.Ct. 851;
see House, 547 U.S., at 538, 126 S.Ct. 2064 (emphasizing that the Schlup
standard is “demanding” and seldom met).” McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 386.
“The gateway actual innocence standard is ‘demanding’ and satisfied
only in the ‘rare’ and ‘extraordinary’ case where ‘a petition presents evidence
of innocence so strong that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome
of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was free of
nonharmless constitutional error.’ ” Reeves v. Fayette SCI, 897 F.3d 154 (3d
Cir. 2018) (quoting McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 392).
Here, without citing what his new evidence is, Petitioner makes the
conclusory statement that he has “new evidence of [his] crime” in that “[his]
victim gets peopled locked up for a crime they never even committed.” (Doc.
1 at 9). Petitioner, however, fails to supplement his claim with any reliable
showing of factual innocence. Thus, the Court does not find that “it is more
likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. As such, Ward cannot
overcome the time-bar based on the actual innocence exception.
III. Certificate of Appealability
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2253(c), unless a circuit justice or judge issues
a certificate of appealability (“COA”), an appeal may not be taken from a final
order in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. §2254. A COA may issue only if the
applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right. 28 U.S.C. §2253(c)(2). “A petitioner satisfies this standard by
demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s
resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues
presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.”
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003). “When the district court denies a
habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s
underlying constitutional claim, a COA should issue when the prisoner
shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the
petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that
jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct
in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Here,
jurists of reason would not find the procedural disposition of this case
debatable. Accordingly, no COA will issue.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court will grant the Respondent’s
motion to dismiss and the petition for writ of habeas corpus will be dismissed
as untimely.
A separate Order will issue.
s/ Malachy E. Mannion
MALACHY E. MANNION
United States District Judge
DATE: December 30, 2021
21-0897-01