“An offer by an owner to sell his property as a specified price, as well as the purchase price of the land, is admissible if not too remote in time.”
How later courts described this case
- “An offer by an owner to sell his property as a specified price, as well as the purchase price of the land, is admissible if not too remote in time.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
UGI SUNBURY LLC, No. 3:16-CV-0794
Plaintiff, (Chief Judge Brann)
v.
A PERMANENT EASEMENT FOR
0.438 ACRES, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
DECEMBER 13, 2021
More than five years ago, energy company UGI Sunbury LLC obtained the
easements it needed to construct a natural gas pipeline that cut through the property
owned by Donald Pontius and his wife. But because the parties were unable to
reach agreement on the amount UGI owed Pontius for the easements, they decided
to settle the matter in court. This litigation ensued, resulting in two separate bench
trials involving four different appraisal experts and an appeal to the Court of
Appeals. Now, having reviewed the evidence and considered the parties’
respective positions, the Court is prepared to resolve the matter—hopefully, this
time, for good.
I. BACKGROUND
On May 6, 2016, UGI filed its initial Complaint in Condemnation, seeking
to acquire by eminent domain easements for use in constructing a natural gas
transmission pipeline across the Pontius property in the Borough of Shamokin
Dam, Snyder County, Pennsylvania.1 The initial Complaint sought, among other
things, a “permanent right of way and easement . . . for the purpose of
constructing, operating, maintaining, altering, repairing, changing the size of,
replacing and removing a pipeline and all related equipment and appurtenances
thereto (including but not limited to meters, fittings, tie-overs, valves, cathodic
protection equipment and launchers and receivers)” as well as a restriction on
Pontius’s ability to “use said permanent right of way or any part thereof for a road
. . . without first having obtained [UGI’s] approval in writing.”2
On August 2, 2016, the Court granted UGI’s Motion for Preliminary
Injunction and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (the “August 2016 Order”),3
“thereby allowing [UGI] access and possession of a portion of the [Pontius]
property for construction of the underground natural gas transmission pipeline and
the use of temporary work space needed during construction activity.”4 Put another
1 Doc. 1.
2 Id. at ¶ 1.i.(i).
3 Doc. 24.
4 Doc. 143 at 2.
way, the Court granted UGI the easement rights requested in its initial
Complaint—including the right to install aboveground appurtenances and prevent
certain vehicle traffic above the pipeline.5
After the Court’s August 2016 Order, “UGI installed the pipeline on
[Pontius’s] property and restored the surface of the property.”6 Both parties then
hired expert witnesses to conduct appraisals of the property.7 On May 17, 2018, the
action proceeded to a bench trial and the parties presented testimony by their
respective expert witnesses.8 After the trial, the Court issued its ruling and directed
the Clerk to enter judgment in favor of the Defendants in the amount of
$254,228.39.9
On September 24, 2018, UGI filed a Notice of Appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.10 The Third Circuit issued its decision on
February 11, 2020, holding that the Court improperly admitted and relied on the
testimony of Pontius’s appraisal expert.11 Accordingly, the Third Circuit vacated
this Court’s judgment and remanded the case for a new valuation hearing.12
5 Doc. 23; Doc. 24.
6 Doc. 143 at 2–3.
7 See Doc. 63, Ex. A (Aug. 2, 2016 Appraisal Report by Don Paul Shearer); Doc. 66, Ex. A (Oct.
19, 2015 Appraisal Report by John Gillooly and Matthew S. Krauser).
8 See Doc. 109.
9 Doc. 114.
10 Doc. 116.
11 UGI Sunbury LLC v. A Permanent Easement for 1.7575 Acres, 949 F.3d 825 (2020).
12 Id. at 837.
The Court held a status conference with the parties on April 22, 2020, and
then instructed the parties to produce new valuation evidence from their respective
appraisal experts by October 23, 2020.13 The parties did so: Pontius produced a
report by William F. Rothman of RSR Appraisers & Analysts, dated September 28,
2020,14 and UGI produced a report by Matthew Krauser of Newmark Knight
Frank, dated October 22, 2020.15 In their appraisal reports, Rothman and Krauser
analyzed the pre-taking market value of the Pontius property (i.e., the value of the
property before UGI obtained the easements and constructed the pipeline) as well
as the property’s post-taking value (i.e., the value of the property as encumbered
by UGI’s easements).16 Although both experts used the same “sales comparison
approach”17 to calculate the pre- and post-taking value of the Pontius property,
13 Doc. 127.
14 Ex. D-1 (Sept. 28, 2020 Appraisal Report by William F. Rothman).
15 Ex. P-5 (Oct. 22, 2020 Appraisal Report by Matthew Krauser).
16 Ex. D-1 (Sept. 28, 2020 Appraisal Report by William F. Rothman) at 7 (valuations are “as of
the date of taking August 2, 2016”).
17 The “sales comparison approach” to value involves comparing the Pontius property to similar
properties with publicly available sale information. See id. at 51; see also Ex. P-5 (Oct. 22,
2020 Appraisal Report by Matthew Krauser) at 38. This methodology unfolds in two steps:
first, the appraiser must determine the “highest and best use” of the subject property; and
second, the appraiser must identify similar properties (based on the “property rights conveyed,
financing terms, conditions of sale, date of sale, location, and physical characteristics”) that
can be used to estimate the price of the subject property. See Ex. D-1 (Sept. 28, 2020 Appraisal
Report by William F. Rothman) at 38–41, 51–52; see also Ex. P-5 (Oct. 22, 2020 Appraisal
Report by Matthew Krauser) at 36–37, 39–50. The appraiser conducts this analysis for the
subject property both pre- and post-taking and then determines the damage attributable to the
taking by subtracting the post-taking value from the pre-taking value. See Ex. D-1 (Sept. 28,
2020 Appraisal Report by William F. Rothman) at 74–75; see also Ex. P-5 (Oct. 22, 2020
Appraisal Report by Matthew Krauser) at 51.
they reached dramatically different conclusions about the value of the property and
the cost of the taking. Specifically, Rothman found that the damage the taking
caused to the value of the property amounted to $642,500,18 while Krauser
concluded the damage was only $163,800.19
Prior to trial, on July 22, 2021, UGI filed a motion in limine to exclude
Rothman’s testimony pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702.20 The following
day, July 23, 2021, Pontius responded in kind, filing a motion in limine to exclude
Krauser’s expert testimony and report.21 On September 20, 2021, after a pre-trial
conference with counsel for both parties, the Court issued a Scheduling Order
explaining that it would conditionally admit Rothman’s and Krauser’s expert
testimony and reports, subject to a later Rule 702 determination to be made
following trial.22 Both parties were therefore permitted to present their appraisal
experts at trial.23
The trial on this matter was held on October 12, 2021.24 Pontius presented
two witnesses: his appraisal expert, Rothman, and Arthur Bowen, a real estate
18 Ex. D-1 (Sept. 28, 2020 Appraisal Report by William F. Rothman) at 75 (calculated as the pre-
taking value minus the post-taking value as reduced by the rental value of the temporary
construction easement area—that is, $950,000 – ($335,000 – $27,000) = $642,5000).
19 Ex. P-5 (Oct. 22, 2020 Appraisal Report by Matthew Krauser) at 51.
20 Doc. 142.
21 Doc. 144.
22 Doc. 157 ¶ 4.
23 Id.
24 See Doc. 172.
broker familiar with the Pontius property’s listing history as well as the
commercial real estate market in the surrounding area.25 UGI likewise called two
witnesses26 in its case in chief: its appraisal expert, Krauser, and Casey Monagan,
the UGI project manager who oversaw the construction of the pipeline underneath
the Pontius property.27
Following the trial, on November 4, 2021, the Court denied the Plaintiff’s
and Defendants’ competing motions in limine to exclude the expert testimony and
reports put forward by the other side.28 As such, the testimony and exhibits of
Rothman and Krauser were admitted into evidence.
On November 24, 2021, UGI submitted its post-trial brief and proposed
findings of fact.29 Pontius did the same.30 As such, this case is now ripe for
disposition.
II. DISCUSSION
Following the one-day bench trial, the sole remaining issue before the Court
is the amount of money Pontius deserves as just compensation and damages for the
easements UGI obtained to construct its pipeline under the Pontius property. As the
25 Id. at 8:14–134:9.
26 UGI also called the Plaintiff, Donald Pontius, as a hostile witness subject to examination as if
on cross; however, Mr. Pontius was unable to recall the facts at issue or otherwise offer
substantive testimony. Id. at 105:1–110:3.
27 Id. at 138:17–279:19.
28 Doc. 173; Doc. 174.
29 Doc. 175; Doc. 176.
30 Doc. 177; Doc. 178.
Third Circuit held in Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., LLC v. Permanent Easement for
7.053 Acres,31 federal courts must follow the provisions of Chapter 7 of the
Pennsylvania Eminent Domain Code32 in determining just compensation in an
eminent domain action under the Natural Gas Act. Accordingly, to calculate just
compensation, the Court must proceed in four steps: (1) determine the property’s
pre-taking value; (2) assess the effect of the easements on the property and decide
the property’s post-taking value; (3) determine the value of the temporary
construction easement; and (4) reconcile the three preceding valuations to reach a
conclusion on the amount UGI owes Pontius.33 Under Pennsylvania law, this
amount may be supplemented with an award for “professional fees”34 and “delay
compensation.”35
A. Pre-Taking Value
To determine the Pontius property’s pre-taking value—that is, the market
value of the property as of August 2, 2016, before UGI obtained the easements
needed to construct the pipeline—the Court must assess the valuations offered by
the parties’ experts, William F. Rothman (Pontius) and Matthew S. Krauser (UGI).
Although Rothman and Krauser employed the same valuation methodology (the
31 931 F.3d 237, 255 (3d Cir. 2019).
32 26 Pa. C.S. § 701 et seq.
33 26 Pa. C.S. §§ 702(a), 703.
34 26 Pa. C.S. § 710.
35 20 Pa. C.S. § 713.
sales comparison approach), they reached substantially different conclusions about
the property’s pre-taking value: Rothman valued the property at $950,000,36 and
Krauser valued it at $750,000.37 After hearing the experts’ testimony and
reviewing their reports, the Court concludes that Krauser’s valuation more
accurately reflects the pre-taking value of the Pontius property.
For their analyses of the property’s pre-taking value, both Rothman and
Krauser concluded that the highest and best use would be achieved by demolishing
the current buildings on the property and then developing the land for commercial
use.38 Rothman and Krauser diverge, however, in the comparable properties they
select. Rothman selected three properties for comparison and, based on the sales
data, calculated the adjusted price per acre for the Pontius property as $600,000;
the pre-taking value of the property, which is 1.6 acres, was therefore $950,000.39
Krauser critiqued Rothman’s selections, arguing that Rothman’s “comparable land
site three appears to be most relevant to the market value after the acquisition” and
that his selected price unit (“price per acre”) differed from the “typical analysis.”40
36 Ex. D-1 (Sept. 28, 2020 Appraisal Report by William F. Rothman) at 60.
37 Ex. P-5 (Oct. 22, 2020 Appraisal Report by Matthew Krauser) at 45.
38 See Ex. D-1 (Sept. 28, 2020 Appraisal Report by William F. Rothman) at 41; Ex. P-5 (Oct. 22,
2020 Appraisal Report by Matthew Krauser) at 36–37.
39 Ex. D-1 (Sept. 28, 2020 Appraisal Report by William F. Rothman) at 53–60.
40 Ex. P-6 (Apr. 15, 2021 Appraisal Review Report by Matthew Krauser) at 16–17.
In contrast, Krauser selected four comparable properties with an adjusted
sales range of “$646,875 – $878,750” per site, which he averaged to $750,000.41
Rothman criticized Krauser’s analysis, arguing that Krauser failed to accurately
account for differences in the property sizes and the market conditions at the time
of the sales, and also made incorrect assumptions based on site location and
improvements.42 As expected, both experts defended their property selections,
adjustment calculations, and units of comparison when testifying at trial.43
Although these disagreements are undoubtedly relevant, the Court finds
most persuasive Krauser’s analysis of the list price of the Pontius property between
May 2011 and August 2016.44 As UGI notes, the Uniform Standards of Appraisal
Practice Rule 1-5 requires appraisers to analyze “the listing history where no other
price information is available to them so as to avoid overvaluing the property.”45
Moreover, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held that an offer by an owner
to sell his property at a specified price is admissible evidence that reflects his or
her beliefs regarding the value of the property.46
41 Ex. P-5 (Oct. 22, 2020 Appraisal Report by Matthew Krauser) at 45.
42 Ex. D-19 (Jan. 18, 2021 Appraisal Review Report by William F. Rothman) at 5–6.
43 Doc. 172 (Oct. 12, 2021 Trial Tr. (W. Rothman Testimony)) at 59:9–67:22; see also id.
(M. Krauser Testimony)) at 191:17–192:18, 209:1–211:16.
44 See P-6 (Apr. 15, 2021 Appraisal Review Report by Matthew Krauser) at 9.
45 Doc. 176 at 6.
46 See Durika v. School District of Derry Township, 203 A.2d 474, 484 (Pa. 1964) (“An offer by
an owner to sell his property as a specified price, as well as the purchase price of the land, is
admissible if not too remote in time.”); see also Pennsylvania Dept. of Transportation v.
Bellas, 321 A.2d 418, 420 (Pa. Cmmwlth. 1974) (“Of course it is the law in Pennsylvania that
Here, Pontius listed the property at $950,000 in February 2013—three years
before the relevant date at issue.47 In May 2014, the final listing date available
before the pipeline was announced, the property was listed at $790,000.48 Although
these price listings are not definitive statements of market value, they serve as
helpful barometers for assessing the validity of the experts’ proposed pre-taking
valuations. As such, the Court finds it difficult to credit Rothman’s pre-taking
valuation of $950,000. Although Pontius listed the property at this price in 2013,
the list price “had been reduced multiple times before the date of acquisition.”49
Indeed, in the ensuing three years, Pontius lowered the list price by $160,000—and
that was still fifteen months prior to the relevant appraisal date at issue here.
In his appraisal report, Krauser stated that “[i]t is unreasonable to assume
that the market value (in the before scenario) is equal to, or greater than, the asking
price for the property.”50 Krauser reiterated that position when testifying at trial:
A listing is a benchmark typically of the most the
property would sell for. . . . Typically, a property does
not sell for more than the listing price because a willing
buyer and a willing seller are going to come to a meeting
of the minds. And a competent purchaser is going to
know that typically, if there is a listing price, there’s a
gap that’s typically found between the actual sale price
an offer by a property owner to sell, if not too remote in time, may be admitted into evidence
as an admission of what he considers the value of his property to be at the time he made the
offer.”).
47 Ex. P-6 (Apr. 15, 2021 Appraisal Review Report by Matthew Krauser) at 9.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
and a listing price. And that’s because the negotiations
occur.51
Art Bowen, the real estate broker who testified on behalf of Pontius, agreed, stating
that a willing buyer would not pay $950,000 for a property that was listed for
$650,000.52 The Court finds this testimony credible and persuasive.53
Given the decline in the list price for the property prior to the announcement
of the pipeline, the Court concludes that Krauser’s valuation of the Pontius
property pre-taking accurately reflects the property’s market value as of August 2,
2016. Therefore, the Court finds that the pre-taking value of the Pontius property is
$750,000.
B. Post-Taking Value
Having determined the appropriate pre-taking value for the Pontius property,
the Court must now turn to the post-taking value—that is, the market value of the
property as encumbered by the easements UGI obtained. As with the pre-taking
51 Doc. 172 (Oct. 12, 2021 Trial Tr. (M. Krauser Testimony)) at 182:24–183:15.
52 Id. (A. Bowen Testimony) at 127:16–19 (“Q. Yes. With your experience in the marketplace
and the relevant area we’re talking about, would a willing buyer pay 950,000 for a property
that’s listed for 650,000? A. Not if it’s listed for 650, they wouldn’t pay 950.”).
53 At trial, Rothman testified that he did not review the available price listings for the Pontius
property. Id. (W. Rothman Testimony) at 88:9–12. When asked whether “the listing prices
[are] relevant to your analysis,” Rothman responded, “No, not really.” Id. at 88:13–14.
Although Rothman is an experienced real estate appraiser who is eminently qualified to offer
an expert opinion on property valuation, this testimony is altogether unconvincing. Given that
the Uniform Standards of Appraisal Practice explicitly require appraisers to analyze price
listings of the subject property current as of the appraisal date, and the logical relationship
between a property’s list price and prospective buyers’ assessments of the property’s value, it
seems inconceivable that a real estate appraiser wouldn’t consider the listing history relevant
to a market value determination.
value, the parties’ respective appraisal experts offer dramatically different
valuations for the property post-taking. But the reason for this divergence is
distinct. The difference in the post-taking valuations stems from the experts’
assumptions about the proper interpretation and effect of two provisions of the
easement rights taken: (1) “Defendants shall not . . . use said permanent right of
way or any part thereof for a road”; and (2) “without first having obtained
Plaintiff’s approval in writing.”54
1. Restriction on the Use of the Right of Way “For a Road”
To calculate the Pontius property’s post-taking value, the Court must first
assess what type of activity is prohibited by the easement right restricting Pontius’s
“use [of the] permanent right of way or any part thereof for a road.”55 In essence,
the Court must determine what constitutes a “road” within the context of UGI’s
easements.
Pontius interprets this specific easement right as prohibiting the landowner
from permitting vehicle traffic or parking above the pipeline.56 Pontius’s appraisal
expert, Rothman, concurred, explaining that “[a]ny paved road is obviously
prohibited by [this] language,” and “[a] driveway would [likewise] be prohibited
. . . if it is considered a road, a permanent structure, interference with access or an
54 Doc. 1 ¶ 1(i).
55 Id.
56 Doc. 145 at 11–15.
interference with UGI[’s] lawful use of rights.”57 UGI disagrees, arguing that the
“Defendants are not precluded by the terms of use of the permanent pipeline
easement from utilizing the surface of the easement for a paved parking area and
for vehicle access to and from such a parking area.”58 At trial, the UGI project
manager responsible for overseeing the pipeline project, Casey Monagan, testified
that parking is permitted over the top of the easement on the Pontius property and
the amount of groundcover over the pipeline is sufficient to protect the pipeline
from vehicle passage on the asphalt above the pipeline.59 As such, UGI’s appraisal
expert, Krauser, explained that “it is [his] understanding that the owner may cross
the easement with a paved road or driveway and can construct potential parking
spaces within the easement area.”60
In support of his proffered interpretation, Pontius directs the Court to
Section 102 of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code,61 which details the
definitions of certain “words and phrases when used in this title.”62 Pontius argues
that Section 102 of the Motor Vehicle Code contains two definitions relevant to the
instant issue:
57 Ex. D-1 (Sept. 28, 2020 Appraisal Report by William F. Rothman) at 45.
58 Doc. 153 ¶ 26; see also Doc. 146 at 11 (“[T]he reference in the descriptive language of the
original complaint to a ‘road’ was not intended to prohibit vehicle passage or parking above
the underground pipeline.”).
59 Doc. 172 (Oct. 12, 2021 Trial Tr. (C. Monagan Testimony)) at 148:13–23, 150:6–21.
60 Ex. P-5 (Oct. 22, 2020 Appraisal Report by Matthew Krauser) at 34.
61 See Doc. 172 (Oct. 12, 2021 Trial Tr.) at 99:11–100:4.
62 75 Pa. C.S. § 102.
“Highway”: “The entire width between the boundary lines of every
way publicly maintained when any part thereof is open to the use of
the public for purposes of vehicular travel.”63
“Private road or driveway”: “A way or place in private ownership and
used for vehicular travel by the owner and those having express or
implied permission from the owner, but not by other persons.”64
In contrast, UGI asks the Court to accept the “ordinary, commonsense meaning” of
the word “road,” pointing to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary definition: “[A]n
open way for vehicles, persons, and animals: HIGHWAY.”65 UGI argues that this
definition “does not include a parking lot,” and “[o]f course, no one ever intended
to use the subject property as a highway.”66
Pontius does not cite, and the Court is not aware of, any legal authority
applying the Motor Vehicle Code definition of “[p]rivate road or driveway” to
road-use prohibitions included in easements in the eminent domain context.
Conversely, UGI’s argument that words in an easement should be given their
“ordinary, commonsense meaning” comports with the approach endorsed by the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which has held that words “take their plain
meaning in establishing the intent of the parties and the nature and extent of the
easement.”67 In Moody v. Allegheny Valley Land Trust, the Pennsylvania Supreme
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Doc. 146 at 11 (citing Merriam-Webster Dictionary (11th ed. 2004)).
66 Id.
67 Baptist Church in Great Valley v. Urquhart, 178 A.2d 583, 586 (Pa. 1962); see also Naylor v.
Board of Supervisors of Charlestown Township, 253 A.3d 786, 816 (Pa. Cmmwlth. 2021)
Court applied the plain meaning maxim when analyzing an easement concerning
“the use and purposes of [a] Road.”68 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted
the following American Heritage Dictionary definition for “road”: “[A]n open,
generally public way for the passage of vehicles, people, and animals,” “the
surface of a road; a roadbed,” “a course or path,” or “a railroad.”69
The dictionary definition of “road” accepted by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in Moody aligns with that offered by UGI—both recognize that “road,” as
commonly understood, refers to an “open” and “generally public” way designed
for vehicle passage. Neither a parking lot nor a property ingress/egress point (i.e.,
the current paved space sitting atop the easement area) falls within these
definitions.
The Court accepts UGI’s proposed definition for “road” as used in the
Complaint, and, therefore, rejects Pontius’s proffered interpretation of the
easement language at issue. In so doing, the Court finds that Rothman’s post-
taking value of the Pontius property is without factual support. This definition of
“road”—that is, a throughway that is “open” and “generally public”—renders
inaccurate the following two assumptions underlying Rothman’s post-taking
(Ceisler, J., concurring in part) (“[W]hen considering . . . conservation easements, the plain
meaning of the words used therein remains our touchstone in determining the purpose
animating such easements.”).
68 976 A.2d 484, 491 (Pa. 2009).
69 Id. (citing The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed. 2000)).
valuation: (1) the “use of the existing ingress/egress at the southwest end of the
property is prohibited by the easement”; and (2) the “sharply sloped land southwest
of the permanent easement . . . is completely unusable for development” because
“such road use could not legally connect with the remainder of the land east of the
pipeline easement.”70 Rothman’s conclusions about the highest and best use of the
Pontius property post-taking are therefore incorrect and the comparable properties
based thereon are inapplicable.71
That leaves the Court with only Krauser’s post-taking valuation. Because the
easement language prohibiting “the use of said permanent right of way or any part
thereof for a road”72 does not preclude the landowner from “utilizing the surface of
70 Ex. D-1 (Sept. 28, 2020 Appraisal Report by William F. Rothman) at 45.
71 Separately, Pontius and Rothman assert that “the highest and best use after the condemnation
is significantly different than before the taking due to the inability to develop a working site
plan that would not intrude upon UGI’s easement rights.” Doc. 154 at 8. At trial, Pontius
introduced as evidence a 2009 site plan for the construction of a Sonic Drive-In fast-food
restaurant location, which included drainage basins and stormwater pipes that sat on or ran
through what is now the easement area. See Def. Ex. 17. Rothman testified that the Sonic
Drive-In depicted in the site plan is “what [he] had in mind for [the] maximally productive”
use of the property, but that due to UGI’s easement, construction consistent with the Sonic site
plan was no longer “physically possible.” Doc. 172 (Oct. 12, 2021 Trial Tr. (W. Rothman
Testimony)) at 36:23–37:3, 38:10–50:25. However, the issue here is not whether this specific
site plan can be implemented, but, rather, whether any commercial site plan can be developed
such that the Pontius property post-taking can still be used for commercial development.
Addressing this issue for UGI, Monagan testified that the Sonic site plan could be “redesigned”
to accommodate the pipeline and UGI would be willing to “work with the owner to reconfigure,
redesign, or make accommodations to help the development out.” Id. (C. Monagan Testimony)
at 151:21–155:9. The Court found Monagan’s testimony credible and persuasive. Pontius, on
the other hand, failed to offer any meaningful rebuttal evidence: Rothman acknowledged that
as an appraiser and not a civil engineer, testifying about whether “the Sonic plan conceivably
could be reconfigured to actually work on [the Pontius] property” was “beyond [his]
expertise.” Id. (W. Rothman Testimony) at 85:9–86:25.
72 Doc. 1 ¶ 1.i.(i).
the easement for a paved parking area and for vehicle access to and from such a
parking area,”73 Krauser is correct in finding that “the description of the [Pontius]
property is essentially the same before and after the acquisition of the new
easement.”74 Therefore, the Court accepts Krauser’s approach to determining the
property’s post-taking value—that is, subtracting the easement valuation from the
pre-taking value of the property—as well as his ultimate conclusion about the
property’s post-taking value.75
2. With UGI’s Written Approval
Even if the Court accepted Pontius’s proposed definition of “road” within
this context, that would not necessarily obligate the Court to accept Rothman’s
proposed post-taking value for the Pontius property. Instead, the Court would need
to assess the effect of the easement language permitting the landowner to construct
a “road” over the pipeline if it first obtains UGI’s “approval in writing.”76
As noted, Rothman opined that “the easement language effectively
eliminates any practical or useful road use of the sloped land southwest of the
permanent easement” as well as “the existing ingress/egress at the southwest end
of the property.”77 Because Rothman found that the “road” use restrictions prevent
73 Doc. 153 ¶ 26.
74 Ex. P-5 (Oct. 22, 2020 Appraisal Report by Matthew Krauser) at 46.
75 See id. at 47–50.
76 Doc. 1 ¶ 1.i.(i).
77 Ex. D-1 (Sept. 28, 2020 Appraisal Report by William F. Rothman) at 45.
all meaningful vehicle traffic over the pipeline, he concluded that any future
landowner is categorically prohibited from demolishing the existing buildings and
developing the property for commercial use.78 That isn’t quite right.
At trial, Rothman admitted that he did not review the easement language that
allows UGI to exempt the owner from any of the various property restrictions
contained in the easement79—that is, the provision establishing that “Defendants
shall not . . . use said permanent right of way or any part thereof for a road . . .
without first having obtained [UGI’s] approval in writing.”80 But this provision
significantly alters the effect of the discussed “road” use prohibition. As Monagan
explained, consistent with this “standard language” in its easement documentation,
UGI “work[s] with the landowners all the time on a case-by-case basis to make
sure [it’s] accommodating what they want to do.”81 Indeed, Monagan stated that
UGI would be willing to work with Pontius or any future owner of the Pontius
property to “accommodate a [commercial] development,” such as by granting the
owner the ability to cross the pipeline with vehicle traffic or, if necessary,
“put[ting] a concrete apron above the pipeline to help disburse the load.”82 This is
supported by the actions UGI took after constructing the pipeline—that is, UGI re-
78 Id. at 47.
79 Doc. 172 (Oct. 12, 2021 Trial Tr. (W. Rothman Testimony)) at 75:2–15.
80 Doc. 1 ¶ 1.i.(i) (emphasis added).
81 Doc. 172 (Oct. 12, 2021 Trial Tr. (C. Monagan Testimony)) at 150:22–151:16.
82 Id. at 151:21–153:21.
paved the existing parking lot and ingress/regress at the southwest end of the
property.83
Because the easement language, by its very terms, permits the construction
of a road above the pipeline so long as the landowner obtains UGI’s written
approval, Rothman’s opinion that the landowner is categorically prohibited from
doing so is incorrect. As such, Rothman’s conclusions about the highest and best
use of the Pontius property post-taking, as well as the comparable properties
selected based on that highest and best use analysis, are likewise incorrect. Again,
this leaves the Court with only Krauser’s post-taking valuation of the Pontius
property, as Krauser’s highest and best use analysis for the property post-taking is
predicated on an accurate understanding of this easement language.
Because the Court adopts UGI’s proffered definition of “road” within the
context of the Complaint and likewise agrees with UGI that Rothman incorrectly
concluded that the easement language categorically prohibits vehicle traffic above
the pipeline, the Court accepts Krauser’s post-taking valuation of the Pontius
property. Therefore, the Court finds that the post-taking value of the property is
$599,000.84
83 Id. at 157:18 –159:3.
84 Ex. P-5 (Oct. 22, 2020 Appraisal Report by Matthew Krauser) at 50 (calculated by subtracting
the “Permanent Easement Valuation” ($151,000) from the “Retrospective Market Value
(Underlying Land) – Before Acquisition” ($750,000)).
C. Value of the Temporary Construction Easement
The final valuation relevant to the just compensation owed to Pontius
concerns the temporary construction and access easements—that is, the value of
the land encumbered temporarily for the construction of the pipeline. As with the
pre- and post-taking valuations, Rothman and Krauser reach different conclusions
on the value of this temporary taking.85 And, as with the pre- and post-taking
valuations, the Court agrees with Krauser.
Rothman calculated the value of the temporary construction easement by
looking at the duration of the construction period (one year), the total size of the
affected area (0.4577 acres or 19,937 sq. ft.), the price per acre of the Pontius
property pre-taking (which he valued at $600,000), and the estimated rental rate
(which he placed at 10%).86 By multiplying these figures together (that is, “1 year
x $600,000 x 0.4577 x 10%”), Rothman estimated the rental value at $27,462,
which he rounded to $27,500.87
Krauser employed a similar methodology, but he used separate figures for
the unit value (he valued the easement area at $10.73 per sq. ft.) and estimated
rental rate (which he placed at 6%).88 At trial, Krauser explained that although
85 Compare Ex. D-1 (Sept. 28, 2020 Appraisal Report by William F. Rothman) at 74, with Ex. P-
5 (Oct. 22, 2020 Appraisal Report by Matthew Krauser) at 48.
86 Ex. D-1 (Sept. 28, 2020 Appraisal Report by William F. Rothman) at 74.
87 Id.
88 Ex. P-5 (Oct. 22, 2020 Appraisal Report by Matthew Krauser) at 48.
appraisers historically “always used a 10 percent return rate,” due to the reduction
in interest rates over the past decade, he no longer considers this “realistic.”89 As
such, his firm “tempered what historically a lot of appraisers use as a 10 percent
return down to a 6 percent return.”90 By multiplying the duration of the
construction period, price per square foot of the easement area, the size of the
affected area, and the estimated rental rate (that is, one year x $10.73 x 19,937 x
6%), Krauser estimated the rental value at $12,800.91
For the unit value, the Court accepts the figure Krauser applied ($10.73 per
sq. ft.) because the figure Rothman used has already been rejected—as explained,
Rothman’s proposed price-per acre of the Pontius property pre-taking does not
comport with the property’s list price before the valuation date. Additionally, for
the estimated rental rate, the Court accepts Krauser’s stated rationale for applying
the 6% rate.
For these reasons, the Court finds that the value of the temporary
construction easement is $12,800.
D. Reconciling the Valuations
To determine the total amount UGI owes Pontius for the temporary and
permanent easements it obtained to construct and maintain the pipeline, the Court
89 Doc. 172 (Oct. 12, 2021 Trial Tr. (M. Krauser Testimony)) at 218:3–13.
90 Id. at 218:14–16.
91 Ex. P-5 (Oct. 22, 2020 Appraisal Report by Matthew Krauser) at 48.
must reconcile the preceding three valuations: (a) the pre-taking value of the
Pontius property, (b) the post-taking value of the Pontius property, and (c) the
value of the temporary construction easement. This requires subtracting the post-
taking value from the pre-taking value to reach a final determination on the
permanent easement valuation and then adding to that the cost of the temporary
construction easement.92
As explained, the Court made the following valuation determinations: (a) the
pre-taking value of the Pontius property is $750,000; (b) the post-taking value of
the property is $599,000; and (c) the value of the temporary construction easement
is $12,800. Therefore, the damage to the value of the property is $163,800.
E. Professional Fees and Delay Compensation
Both parties acknowledge that under Pennsylvania law, the Court may award
Pontius an allowance of “professional fees” and “delay compensation.”93
Specifically, 26 Pa. C.S. § 710 provides that “[t]he owner of any right, title or
interest in real property acquired or injured by an acquiring agency . . . shall be
reimbursed in an amount not to exceed $4,000, regardless of right, title or interest,
as payment toward reasonable expenses actually incurred for appraisal, attorney
and engineering fees.” Additionally, 25 Pa. C.S. § 713 provides that
92 See Ex. D-1 (Sept. 28, 2020 Appraisal Report by William F. Rothman) at 74–75; Ex. P-5 (Oct.
22, 2020 Appraisal Report by Matthew Krauser) at 49.
93 See Doc. 151 at 13; Doc. 154 at 7.
“[c]ompensation for delay in payment shall be paid at an annual rate equal to the
prime rate as listed in the first edition of The Wall Street Journal published in the
year, plus 1%, not compounded from: (1) the date of relinquishment of possession
of the condemned property by the condemnee; or (2) if possession is not required
to effectual condemnation, the date of the condemnation.”
Here, Pontius argues that under 26 Pa. C.S. § 710, he is entitled to
professional fees. UGI does not seriously contest this issue.94 The Court agrees
with Pontius and awards him $4,000 in professional fees as provided by 26 Pa.
C.S. § 710.
However, the parties dispute the amount Pontius deserves in delay
compensation. Pontius asserts that he should receive the full amount, which he
values at $183,797.13.95 UGI disagrees, arguing that “as a matter of equity, the
Court should exclude from such award the period of time that the U.S. District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania was effectively closed to civil trials
due to the national COVID-19 public health emergency, from March 13, 2020 until
June 28, 2021.”96 Given that this Court remained active through the COVID-19
pandemic and there is no indication that the trial date in this matter was delayed as
a result of COVID-19, the Court finds UGI’s appeal “as a matter of equity”
94 Doc. 151 at 13; see also Doc. 153 ¶ 20.
95 Doc. 155 ¶ 107; see also Doc. 155, Ex. A.
96 Doc. 151 at 13.
unpersuasive. As such, the Court awards Pontius the full amount of delay
compensation, which, based on the pre- and post-taking valuations detailed above,
comes to $46,449.75.97
III. CONCLUSION
Unlike his counterpart testifying on behalf of Pontius, UGI’s appraisal
expert appropriately accounted for the Pontius property’s listing history prior to the
easement and accurately interpreted the pertinent easement language. As such, the
Court accepts the pre- and post-taking valuations, as well as the value of the
temporary construction easement, offered by UGI’s expert. The damage to the
value of the Pontius property caused by UGI’s easement is therefore $163,800. As
Pontius is entitled to $4,000 in professional fees and $46,449.75 in delay
compensation, the total amount UGI owes Pontius is $214,249.75.
An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Matthew W. Brann
Matthew W. Brann
Chief United States District Judge
97 See Appendix.
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