The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
KEITH D. NEFF, et al.,
Plaintiffs, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:21-CV-00993
v.
COMMISSIONERS OF SCHUYLKILL (MEHALCHICK, M.J.)
COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM
Presently before the Court are two amended complaints seeking damages and
injunctive relief filed by pro se prisoner-Plaintiff Keith D. Neff (“Neff”) on November 17, 2021,
and December 13, 2021.1 (Doc. 74; Doc. 75). Additionally, there is a pending motion for
injunctive relief filed by Neff on June 21, 2021. (Doc. 10). Neff is currently incarcerated in the
Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution at Frackville (“SCI-Frackville”). (Doc. 75, at 4).
In the amended complaints, Neff does not identify which damages are sought against
Defendants “Warden Schell and Centre County Corrections” and Defendants “Halcovage,
Bender, [and] Hess.” (Doc. 74, at 1; Doc. 75, at 1). Liberally construing Neff’s pro se status,
the Court will consider both two amended complaints in conducting its statutorily mandated
screening in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). (Doc. 74; Doc.
75). For the reasons provided herein, the Court finds that the amended complaints fail to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted and grants Neff leave to file a second amended
complaint.
1 Neff filed an “amended complaint” on June 22, 2021, that lists additional Plaintiffs
Laura Johnson, Angelica Maready, Nicole Savage, Mariah Lewis, Jill Datchko, Monica
Mike, and Kathy Tonkin. (Doc. 14, at 1). These additional Plaintiffs are not mentioned again
in subsequent pleadings.
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Neff, proceeding pro se, initiated the instant action by filing the complaint on June 3,
2021.2 (Doc. 1). Neff filed the motion for injunctive relief on June 21, 2021, and a brief in
support on August 2, 2021. (Doc. 10; Doc. 24). On October 21, 2021, the Court granted Neff’s
motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 32; Doc. 57). After conducting its statutorily-
mandated screening of the complaint in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e), the Court found that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted and granted Neff leave to file an amended complaint. (Doc. 58; Doc. 59).
On November 17, 2021, Neff filed the first amended complaint, asserting claims
against “Warden Schell and Centre County Corrections” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242,
249, 1961, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985. (Doc. 74, at 1). From what can be gleaned from the
instant pleading, Neff asserts that Centre County Corrections “trespass[ed] on Schuylkill
County Prison premises with the intent to engage in human trafficking to gain an illegal,” as
well as racketeering and kidnapping. (Doc. 74, at 1). Additionally, Neff asserts procedural
due process deprivation and requests a modification of the Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections policy that limits free envelope distribution. (Doc. 74, at 3). Neff does not identify
what relief he seeks. (Doc. 74, at 1).
2 Also before the Court are a series of complaints, supplements, and memoranda filed
by Neff beginning on June 3, 2021. (Doc. 1; Doc. 8; Doc. 9; Doc. 11; Doc. 13; Doc. 14;
Doc. 16; Doc. 17; Doc. 19; Doc. 20; Doc. 21; Doc. 22; Doc. 23; Doc. 25; Doc. 26; Doc. 27;
Doc. 30; Doc. 31; Doc. 33; Doc. 34; Doc. 36; Doc. 37; Doc. 38; Doc. 39; Doc. 41; Doc. 42;
Doc. 43; Doc. 44; Doc. 45; Doc. 46; Doc. 47; Doc. 48; Doc. 49; Doc. 50; Doc. 51; Doc. 52;
Doc. 53; Doc. 54; Doc. 55; Doc. 56; Doc. 60; Doc. 61; Doc. 62; Doc. 63; Doc. 64; Doc. 65;
Doc. 66; Doc. 67; Doc. 68; Doc. 69; Doc. 70; Doc. 72; Doc. 73).
2
On December 13, 2021, Neff filed another amended complaint, asserting claims
against additional Defendants Halcovage, Bender, and Hess for “an unconstitutional parole
policy in regards to the parole application.” (Doc. 745, at 1). Neff asserts that the Schuylkill
County Parole and Probation Board violate his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.
(Doc. 75, at 1). Neff does not allege facts that describe how the Defendants allegedly violated
his constitutional rights or identify what relief he seeks to recover. (Doc. 75, at 1).
The matter is now before the Court pursuant to its statutory obligation under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) to screen the amended complaint and dismiss it if it fails to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Preliminary injunctive relief is extraordinary in nature and should be issued in only
limited circumstances. See Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d
1421, 1426-27 (3d Cir. 1994). Moreover, the issuance of such relief is within the sound
discretion of the district judge. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Chamberlain, 145 F.
Supp. 2d 621, 625 (M.D. Pa. 2001). In order to obtain injunctive relief, the moving party must
demonstrate: “(1) likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm resulting from a
denial of the relief; (3) the harm to the non-moving party if relief is granted; and (4) the public
interest.” United States v. Bell, 238 F. Supp. 2d 696, 699 (M.D. Pa. 2003). “Only if the movant
produces evidence sufficient to convince the trial judge that all four factors favor preliminary
relief should the injunction issue.” Opticians Ass’n of Am. v. Indep. Opticians of Am., 920 F.2d
187, 192 (3d Cir. 1990).
“[A]n essential prerequisite to the grant of a preliminary injunction is a showing by the
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movant of irreparable injury pendente lite of the relief is not granted.”3 United States v.
Pennsylvania, 533 F.2d 107, 110 (3d Cir. 1976). Indeed, a preliminary injunction “may not be
used simply to eliminate a possibility of a remote future injury.” Holiday Inns of Am., Inc. v.
B&B Corp., 409 F.2d 614, 618 (3d Cir. 1969). “[T]he irreparable harm must be actual and
imminent, not merely speculative.” Angstadt ex rel. Angstadt v. Midd-West Sch., 182 F. Supp. 2d
435, 437 (M.D. Pa. 2002). “[M]ore than a risk of irreparable harm must be demonstrated. The
requisite for injunctive relief has been characterized as a ‘clear showing of immediate
irreparable injury,’ or a ‘presently existing actual threat . . .’” Continental Grp., Inc. v. Amoco
Chems. Corp., 614 F.2d 351, 359 (3d Cir. 1980) (citations omitted). “A preliminary injunction
cannot be issued based on past harm. The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to prevent
future irreparable harm.” Fisher v. Goord, 981 F. Supp. 140, 168 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (emphasis
in original).
Moreover, “[t]he ‘requisite feared injury or harm must be irreparable – nor merely
serious or substantial,’ and it ‘must be of a peculiar nature, so that compensation in money
cannot atone for it.’” ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting
Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir. 1977)). “In order to demonstrate irreparable harm
the plaintiff must demonstrate potential harm which cannot be redressed by a legal or an
equitable remedy following a trial. The preliminary injunction must be the only way of
protecting the plaintiff from harm.” Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797,
801 (3d Cir. 1989) (emphasis added). “The key word in this consideration is irreparable. . . The
possibility that adequate compensatory or other corrective relief will be available at a later
3 Pendente lite is a Latin term meaning “while the action is pending” or “[d]uring the
proceeding or litigation.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1154 (7th ed. 1999).
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date, in the ordinary course of litigation, weighs heavily against a claim of irreparable harm.”
Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90 (1974) (emphasis in original).
B. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A AND 28 U.S.C. § 1915(E)(2)
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court is obligated, prior to service of process, to screen
a civil amended complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or
officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a); James v. Pa. Dep't of Corr.,
230 Fed. App’x 195, 197 (3d Cir. 2007) (not precedential). The Court must dismiss the
amended complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b)(1); Mitchell v. Dodrill, 696 F. Supp. 2d 454, 471 (M.D. Pa. 2010). The Court has a
similar obligation with respect to actions brought in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
In this case, because Neff is a prisoner suing a governmental employee and brings his suit in
forma pauperis, both provisions apply. In performing this mandatory screening function, a
district court applies the same standard applied to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Mitchell, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 471; Banks v. Cty. of
Allegheny, 568 F. Supp. 2d 579, 588 (W.D. Pa. 2008).
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a defendant to move
to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). To assess the sufficiency of a complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must first
take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim, then identify mere conclusions
which are not entitled to the assumption of truth, and finally determine whether the
complaint’s factual allegations, taken as true, could plausibly satisfy the elements of the legal
claim. Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011). In deciding a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, the court may consider the facts alleged on the face of the amended
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complaint, as well as “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters
of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S.
308, 322 (2007).
After recognizing the required elements which make up the legal claim, a court should
“begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not
entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The plaintiff
must provide some factual ground for relief, which “requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of
a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678. Thus, courts “need not credit a complaint’s ‘bald assertions’ or ‘legal
conclusions’ . . . .” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting
In re Burlington Coat Factory Securities Litigation, 114 F.3d 1410, 1429-30 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor
need the court assume that a plaintiff can prove facts that the plaintiff has not
alleged. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519,
526 (1983).
A court must then determine whether the well-pleaded factual allegations give rise to
a plausible claim for relief. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 219-20 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sheridan v. NGK Metals
Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 262 n.27 (3d Cir. 2010). The court must accept as true all allegations in
the amended complaint, and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be
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construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1261. This
“presumption of truth attaches only to those allegations for which there is sufficient factual
matter to render them plausible on their face.” Schuchardt v. President of the United States, 839
F.3d 336, 347 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation and citation omitted). The plausibility
determination is context-specific and does not impose a heightened pleading requirement.
Schuchardt, 839 F.3d at 347.
Additionally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Thus, a well-pleaded
complaint must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief
beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a “short and plain” statement of a cause of
action. There is no requirement that the pleading be specific or probable. Schuchardt, 839 F.3d
at 347 (citing Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d at 224, 233-234 (3d Cir. 2008). Rule 8(a)
requires a “showing that ‘the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair
notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233 (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545).
With the aforementioned standards in mind, a document filed pro se is “to be liberally
construed.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A pro se complaint, “however inartfully
pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”
and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to
relief. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972). Further, the Third Circuit has instructed
that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the district court must
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permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson
v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).
III. DISCUSSION
A. THE MOTION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IS IMPROPER
Reviewing the amended complaint, other pleadings, and the motion, it is clear that no
immediate irreparable injury is alleged. In the motion for injunctive relief, Neff seeks
injunctive relief and punitive damages against Correctional Officer “Bermel” for observing
his medical records, which Neff argues is a violation of HIPPA. (Doc. 10, at 1). Neff asserts
that his medical information “may now be passed to lawyers represented by defendants in an
ongoing civil lawsuit or my ex-corrupt lawyer William Burke.” (Doc. 10, at 1). In the brief in
support to the motion, Neff asserts a myriad of different allegations and claims that are
unrelated to the instance that is the subject of the motion for injunctive relief, including lack
of meaningful access to the law library, illegal transfer of other inmates, and slander. (Doc.
24, at 1-4).
When construed in the light most favorable to Neff, the motion does not demonstrate
that any future harm in connection with his claims for injunctive relief is imminent, as
opposed to speculative. See Angstadt, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 437. The facts averred therein are
concerned solely with an alleged instance where Correctional Officer “Bermel” may have
viewed Neff’s medical records. (Doc. 10, at 1). The pleadings fail to articulate a presently
existing actual threat of irreparable injury, outlining nothing more than a speculative
possibility of future harm, based upon a single past interaction with a correctional officer.
Such allegation is insufficient to establish a “clear showing of immediate irreparable injury.”
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See Continental Grp., 614 F.2d at 359. Thus, the Court finds that Neff’s request for injunctive
relief is improper. Accordingly, the motion for injunctive relief is DENIED. (Doc. 10).
B. THE AMENDED COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF
MAY BE GRANTED.
At the outset, the amended complaint fails to comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. As discussed supra, Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(a)(2). Here, even when liberally construed as is necessary for pro se complaints, Neff fails
to simply, concisely, and directly allege what his claims are and does not provide fair notice
of the grounds on which his intended claims rest. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007).
He simply alleges that Defendant Centre County Corrections “trespass[ed] on Schuylkill
County Prison premises with the intent to engage in human trafficking to gain an illegal,” in
addition to claims of racketeering and kidnapping. (Doc. 74, at 1). Additionally, Neff alleges
that Defendants Halcovage, Bender, and Hess “have an unconstitutional parole policy in
regards to the parole application.” (Doc. 75, at 1). Neff alleges no facts relating to a particular
occurrence in which his Constitutional rights were deprived, which rights Neff was deprived
of, or what recovery Neff seeks, apart from changing the internal envelope policy of the
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections. (Doc. 74, at 1-3; Doc. 75, at 1). Moreover, Neff
does not identify how each Defendant is personally involved in the alleged wrongdoings.
(Doc. 74, at 1; Doc. 75, at 1).
Furthermore, Neff has filed numerous documents, including supplements,
amendments, “memorandums,” and “writs of habeas corpus.” See supra note 1. The Court
has reviewed these documents, construing them liberally. Notably, it appears that several of
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these filings, which are largely rambling and incomprehensible, overlap with other actions
involving Neff. See Neff v. Wapinski, et al., No. 4:21-CV-01334 (M.D. Pa. July 30, 2021);
Schuylkill Cty. Inmates, et al. v. Comm’rs of Centre Cty. et al., No. 3:21-CV-01342 (M.D. Pa. July
30, 2021). Despite the various cross-references, “[n]either Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, which governs
pleadings, nor Fed. R. Civ. P. 15, which governs amended and supplemental pleadings,
permits [Neff] to submit numerous addenda to his Complaint in this piecemeal fashion.” See
Lewis v. Sessions, No. 17-CV-5475, 2017 WL 7313822, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov. 3, 2017); see also
Walthour v. Child & Youth Servs., No. 09-CV-03660, 2009 WL 5184465, at *1-2 (E.D. Pa. Dec.
21, 2009) (“Plaintiffs’ pleadings, amendments, and supplemental filings are disjointed and
incomplete . . . Defendants cannot be on notice of the claims against them if they are not
named in the caption, nor can they adequately respond to claims scattered throughout various
pleadings and supplemental fillings.”). Neff’s vague and fragmented filings fail to overcome
the pleading deficiencies contained in his amended complaint. (Doc. 74; Doc. 75).
Neff runs afoul of Rule 8(a)(2)’s basic tenant that the “‘plain statement’ [must] possess
enough heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545; see
also Cooper v. Link, No. 18-CV-4481, 2018 WL 6528170, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 12, 2018)
(“[Plaintiff] cannot move forward on his complaint as pled because it is not clear what each
Defendant did to violate his rights.”). Thus, in its current form, the amended complaint would
not provide any meaningful opportunity for the Defendants to decipher or answer the vague
allegations levied against them. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. As such, Neff’s amended
complaint is subject to dismissal in its entirety for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted. (Doc. 74; Doc. 75).
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C. LEAVE TO AMEND
The Court recognizes that pro se plaintiffs often should be afforded an opportunity to
amend a complaint before the complaint is dismissed with prejudice, unless granting further
leave to amend would be futile or result in undue delay. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235-
36 (3d Cir. 2004); see Fletcher–Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 253
(3d Cir. 2007). As the amended complaint in its current form does not clearly set forth any
claims against the Defendants, dismissal is warranted. However, so as to preserve Neff’s rights
as a pro se litigant, the Court will allow him to file a final, unified, legible second amended
complaint setting forth his factual allegations and legal claims in a manner that can be
reviewed by the Court and, if necessary, answered by the Defendants.
Neff is advised that the second amended complaint must be a pleading that stands by
itself without reference to the original or amended complaints. Young v. Keohane, 809 F.
Supp. 1185, 1198 (M.D. Pa. 1992) (emphasis added). The second amended complaint must
also establish the existence of specific actions taken by the Defendants which have resulted in
identifiable constitutional violations, to the extent Neff intends to bring a civil rights action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Further, Neff is cautioned that he must comply with Rule 8 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and establish at least a modicum of factual specificity
regarding the claims he intends to assert and the factual grounds upon which they rest. The
second amended complaint should also be limited to those claims that arise out of the same
transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences as averred in the original
complaint. Failure to file a second amended complaint in accordance with the
aforementioned requirements may result in the dismissal of this action in its entirety.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff Keith D. Neff’s amended
complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1). (Doc. 74; Doc. 75). Neff shall be granted thirty (30) days
in which to file a second amended complaint. Additionally, Neff’s motion for injunctive relief
fails to establish an existing actual threat of irreparable injury, but Neff is granted leave to file
an amended motion in consideration of the leave to file a second amended complaint. (Doc.
10).
An appropriate Order follows.
Dated: December 15, 2021 s/ Karoline Mehalchick
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
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