BALAS v. STANISH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOHN BALAS, :

a/k/a MICHAEL JOHN BALAS, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:21-0466

Plaintiff

: (JUDGE MANNION)

Vv.

DR. STANISH, et al.,

Defendants )

. MEMORANDUM

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, John Balas, an inmate confined at the State Correctional

Institution, Mercer (“SCi-Mercer’), Pennsylvania, originally filed the above

caption civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 in the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. (Doc. 2). On March 10,

2021 Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. (Doc. 11). The named Defendants

are Dr. Stanish, SCl-Retreat physician, Pam Smith, SCl-Retreat’s

Corrections Health Care Administrator (CHCA), Melinda Adams, SCli-Mercer

Superintendent and Karen Feather, SCl-Mercer CHCA. (Doc. 11). Plaintiff

claims that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical

needs. Id. For relief, he seeks compensatory and punitive damages. Id. By

Order dated March 15, 2021, the action was transferred to the Middle District

where it was filed on March 16, 2021. (Doc. 13).

Presently before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss. (Doc. 23).

The motion is fully briefed and is ripe for disposition. For the reasons set forth

below, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

ll, FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiff states that in 2019, he “reported to Defendants Stanish and

Smith for excessive abdominal pains.” (Doc. 11). He claims that Defendants

Stanish and Smith “performed medical evaluations and reveal Plaintiff was

suffering from a ‘hernia’.” Id. Defendants “provided Plaintiff with a hernia belt

and medications,” and “informed Plaintiff [he] was in need of a hernia

operation to make it correct.” Id. Plaintiff claims that he “reported to

Defendants of daily pain, insufficient medications and request for the

operation but Defendants refused Plaintiff.” Id. Plaintiff believes that he was

“at risk of irreparable harm [because] his hernia extend[ed] into his groin.” Id.

Thus, he claims that “Defendants actions were deliberate indifferent in

delaying and denying Plaintiff serious medical and adequate medical care.”

Id.

Plaintiff further claims that on December 28, 2020, while housed at

SCl-Mercer, Plaintiff “was exposed to COVID-19” and that “Defendants were

informed that COVID-19 CDC precautions were not being followed or

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enforced but took no actions.” Id. He claims that “Defendants permitted

individuals who were expose, positive, and with COVID-19 symptoms in

direct contact with Plaintiff.” Id. As a result of Plaintiff's exposure, “Plaintiff

was placed on enhance quarantine due to Defendants.” Id. Plaintiff believes

that “Defendants’ enhance quarantine procedure conflict with other DOC

procedures making them unavailable.” Id. Plaintiff claims that “Defendants

Adams and Feather were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's poor and

unsafe living conditions and exposure to COVID-19.” Id. Thus, he concludes

that “Defendants’ exposure of COVID-19 upon Plaintiff put his future health

in substantial risk.” Id.

Thus, Plaintiff filed the instant action in which he claims that

Defendants Stanish and Smith “were deliberately indifferent where they

delayed and denied serious medical care to Plaintiff’ and Defendants Adams

and Feather were “deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's poor and unsafe living

conditions”, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id.

ill. MOTION To Dismiss

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal of a complaint for “failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Under Rule 12(b)(6), we

must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light

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most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable

reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Fowler v.

UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009)(quoting Phillips v.

County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008)). While a complaint

need only contain “a short and plain statement of the claim,” Fed.R.Civ.P.

8(a)(2), and detailed factual allegations are not required, Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), a complaint must plead “enough facts

to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “The

plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for

more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[L]abels

and conclusions” are not enough, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, and a court “is

not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual

allegation.” Id. (quoted case omitted). Thus, “a judicial conspiracy claim must

include at least a discernible factual basis to survive a Rule

12(b)(6) dismissal.” Capogrosso v. The Supreme Court of New Jersey, 588

F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).

in resolving the motion to dismiss, we thus “conduct a two-part

analysis.” Fowler, supra, 578 F.3d at 210. First, we separate the factual

elements from the legal elements and disregard the legal conclusions. Id. at

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210-11. Second, we “determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint

are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief’.” Id. at

211 (quoted case omitted).

iV. DISCUSSION

In their motion to dismiss, Defendants contend that Plaintiff has failed

to allege facts in support of his allegation that they were deliberately

indifferent to his serious medical needs. (Doc. 24). To demonstrate a prima

facie case of Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment based on

the denial of medical care, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant acted

with “deliberate indifference to [his] serious medical needs.” Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); Durmer v. O’Carroli, 991 F.2d 64, 67 (3d

Cir. 1993). There are two components to this standard: Initially, a plaintiff

must make an “objective” showing that the deprivation was “sufficiently

serious,” or that the result of the defendant's denial was sufficiently serious.

Additionally, the plaintiff must make a “subjective” showing that the

defendant acted with “a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Wilson v. Seiter,

501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991); see also Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492,

499 (3d Cir. 2002).

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The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has found deliberate indifference

when a prison official knows of a prisoner's need for medical treatment but

intentionally refuses to provide it, delays necessary treatment for a non-

medical reason, or prevents a prisoner from receiving needed medical

treatment. Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir.1999).

This approach “affords considerable latitude to prison medical

authorities in the diagnosis and treatment of the medical problems of inmate

patients. Courts will ‘disavow any attempt to second guess the propriety or

adequacy of a particular course of treatment ... which remains a question of

sound professional judgment.” Little v. Lycoming Cnty., 912 F.Supp. 809,

815 (M.D.Pa. 1996) (citing Inmates of Allegheny Cnty. Jail v. Pierce, 612

F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979)).

When an inmate is provided with medical care and the dispute is over

the adequacy of that care, an Eighth Amendment claim does not exist.

Nottingham v. Peoria, 709 F.Supp. 542, 547 (M.D.Pa. 1988). Mere

disagreement as to the proper medical treatment does not support an Eighth

Amendment claim. Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst’l Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d

326, 346 (3d Cir. 1987). Only flagrantly egregious acts or omissions can

violate the standard. Medical negligence alone cannot result in an Eighth

Amendment violation, nor can any disagreements over the professional

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judgment of a health care provider. White v. Napolean, 897 F.2d 103, 108-

10 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06 (medical malpractice

is insufficient basis upon which to establish an Eighth Amendment violation),

Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197 (‘It is well-settled that claims of negligence and

medical malpractice, without some more culpable state of mind, do not

constitute ‘deliberate indifference.’ ”); Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 346 (concluding

that mere allegations of malpractice do not raise issues of constitutional

import).

Further, a prison administrator cannot be found deliberately indifferent

under the Eighth Amendment because he or she fails to respond to the

medical complaints of an inmate being treated by a prison physician, or

because, as non-physicians, they defer to the medical judgment of the

inmate's treating physicians. Durmer, 991 F.2d at 69. However, if non-

medical prison personnel had “a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that

prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner,”

liability may be imposed. Spruill, 372 F.3d at 236.

In the instant case, the allegations in Plaintiff's amended complaint

clearly demonstrate that he had received medical attention for his hernia, as

well as prescriptions to ease his discomfort. The attention Plaintiff received

lacks the requisite deliberate indifference to support an Eighth Amendment

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claim. See Brown v. Beard, 453 F. Appx 453, 455 (3d Cir. 2011)

(disagreements regarding how to treat reducible hernia does not establish

an Eighth Amendment violation); Rodriguez v. Sec’y of the Commonwealth,

441 F. App’x 919, 923-24 (3d Cir. 2011) (no finding of deliberate indifference

where plaintiff was treated for his hernia by medical staff, but not in the

manner the prisoner would have preferred); Winslow v. Prison Health Servs.,

406 F. App’x 671, 675 (3d Cir. 2011) (same). Plaintiff alleges in his amended

complaint that he was seen by medical personnel and treated with

medication. Unfortunately, despite the medical attention, Plaintiff continued

to suffer from discomfort. This is clearly a case where Plaintiff had been given

medical attention but was dissatisfied with the course of treatment and

subsequent results. As stated above, an inmate’s disagreement with medical

treatment is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference. Durmer, 991

F.2d at 69; Spruill, 372 F.3d at 235. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to establish an

Eighth Amendment violation with respect to the medical treatment he

received from Dr. Stanish and Dr. Smith for his hernia.

As to remaining Defendants, Adams and Feather, the Defendants

argue that Balas’ amended complaint must be dismissed because he has

failed to allege the requisite injury. (Doc. 24). The Court agrees.

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For a plaintiff to establish Article Ili standing, he must suffer an injury

that is “concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to

the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling.” Clapper □□

Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (quoting Monsanto Co. v.

Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010)). These requirements

originate from separation-of-powers principles and “serve[ ] to prevent the

judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the political

branches.” Id. at 408 (citation omitted). The standing doctrine also serves

several other “implicit policies embodied in Article Ill,” including the

assurance that “the legal questions presented to the court will be resolved,

not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete factual

context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial

action.”

Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392

U.S. 83, 96 (1968)). In sum, the Court must ensure that Balas has a

“personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.

490, 498 (1975) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Supreme Court has been clear that an injury, to be cognizable,

must not be “too speculative.” Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409. Rather, the injury

must be “certainly impending.” Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,

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504 U.S. 555, 565 n.2 (1992)). “[A]llegations of possible future injury” are not

sufficient. Id. (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)).

Plaintiff alleges that he was exposed to COVID-19 because

precautions were not being followed and as a result people who had

symptoms and were positive with COVID-19 were allowed to come into

contact with Plaintiff. (Doc. 11). As a result, he claims his future health is at

risk. Id.

Missing here is any allegation of actual injury attributed to Defendants’

alleged placing of Balas in proximity with infected inmates. These allegations

do not support a plausible inference that Plaintiff sustained an injury sufficient

to support constitutional standing. See, eg., Purdy v. Community

Corrections, 2021 WL 2778565, at *3 (D. Neb. July 2, 2021) (holding that

prison inmate failed to plead injury with respect to the allege risk of COVID-

19 infection); Cage v. Nwozo, 2017 WL 6815023, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 26,

2017) (inmate lacked standing to assert claims based on prison officials’

release of another inmate into the prison population despite the inmate

having tested positive for shingles where the plaintiff did not claim to have

been infected with the shingles virus himself or that he never experienced

chickenpox before, making him susceptible to the shingles virus); Shoffner

v. Wenerowicz, 2015 WL 4199075 (E.D. Pa. July 13, 2015)(Plaintiffs lack

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standing to bring a claim for harm they may or may not suffer in the future).

Thus, Plaintiff alleges none of the predicate facts upon which to plausibly

infer that his proximity to allegedly infected inmates caused him to suffer any

injury. Article ill’s injury-in-fact requirement for standing requires that the

complaint support causation between the alleged wrong and the claimed

injury. See Finkelman v. NFL, 810 F.3d 187, 193 (3d Cir. 2076).

It is possible that Balas is claiming an injury-in-fact based on the fear

of contracting COVID-19 he experienced when he was exposed to others

who were positive. However, fear of future harm constitutes an injury

sufficient to support standing only if it arises from a threatened injury that is

imminent and “ ‘certainly impending.’ ” Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38,

42 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155, 158

(1990) (explaining that the imminence requirement “ensures that courts do

not entertain suits based on speculative or hypothetical harms”)). The “injury

in fact” must have been “concrete and particularized” as well as “actual or

imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (quotation

marks and citations omitted). Balas has alleged nothing akin to an impending

injury. Based on the allegations of his Amended Complaint, the injury he

feared was speculative and hypothetical. Nothing about the situation or risk

Balas faced can be considered imminent for purposes of Article Ill standing.

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See, e.g., Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. v. Way, 2020 WL 6204477, at

*7 (D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2020).

Plaintiffs purported injury is somewhat analogous to the injuries

claimed by inmates in cases involving exposure to second-hand smoke,

hepatitis, and asbestos. In Robinson v. Vaugh, for example, an inmate

alleged constitutional standing based on his exposure to asbestos and his

“constant fear of contracting an asbestos-related disease.” 1992 WL 368467,

at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 2, 1992). The Court determined the inmate lacked

standing because mere exposure, “absent some manifestation of an

asbestos-related disease,” rendered his purported injury “too speculative.”

Id.

Nor does the allegation that he had to endure his own period of

quarantine, standing alone, satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of

constitutional standing. This is principally because he has failed to allege any

particularized concrete injury resultant of his quarantine. Doing so is certainly

a tail order given that prisoners—by virtue of their incarceration—are already

severely restricted in their associations and activities—i.e., essentially

quarantined from society. This pleading difficulty is further compounded by

the broad application of restrictions such as quarantines that the general

public has endured during the continuing national health emergency. Such

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restrictions have been burdens faced by most citizens. See, e.g., Parker v.

Wolf, 506 F. Supp.3d 271, 282-83 (M.D. Pa. 2020). This generality

distinguishes Plaintiff's case from those where the imposition of a COVID

quarantine was found to have satisfied the injury-in-fact requirement. For

example, in Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Walz, 492 F. Supp. 3d 822, 830 (D.

Minn. 2020), the court found the plaintiffs allegation that a state-wide

quarantine prevented them from engaging in political activity in indoor public

settings to be an injury sufficient to establish standing. And in W.O. v.

Beshear, 459 F. Supp. 3d, 833 (E.D. Ky. 2020), the Court found plaintiffs’

allegation that a state-wide quarantine that prevented them from interstate

travel stated a sufficient injury for purposes of constitutional standing. Id. at

840. But here, Balas has not alleged any material burden or restriction

imposed on him because of his quarantine that was outside those normally

associated with incarceration. Thus, his general reference to having been

placed in quarantine does not support the type of particularized concrete

injury necessary to support Article III standing.

V. LEAVE TO AMEND

The Third Circuit has instructed that if a civil rights complaint is

vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the district court must

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permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitabie

or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir, 2002).

Here, it is clear from the facts alleged in the pro se complaint that any

attempt to amend the plaintiffs §1983 claims against the named Defendants

would be futile. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004). Thus,

the Court will dismiss the Plaintiff's §1983 claims without leave to amend.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court will grant the Defendants’

motion to dismiss. (Doc. 23). A separate Order shall issue.

5] Malachy €. Mannion

MALACHY E. MANNION

United States District Judge

Dated: November 23, 2021

21-0466-01

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