noting that “a section 2255 motion filed in the sentencing court is the presumptive means for a federal prisoner to challenge the validity of a conviction or sentence”
How later courts described this case
- noting that “a section 2255 motion filed in the sentencing court is the presumptive means for a federal prisoner to challenge the validity of a conviction or sentence”
- “It is firmly established that the remedy available to a federal prisoner under 2255 is exclusive in the absence of a showing that such remedy ‘is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [the prisoner’s] detention.’ ”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RAKIEN FIGUEROA, :
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:21-0571
Petitioner :
(JUDGE MANNION)
V. :
WARDEN ERIC BRADLEY :
Respondent :
MEMORANDUM
Petitioner, Rakien Figueroa, an inmate confined in the Canaan United
States Penitentiary, Waymart, Pennsylvania, filed the instant petition for a
writ of habeas corpus pursuantto 28 U.S.C. §2241. (Doc. 1). He challenges
his 2015 federal sentence imposed by the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York. Id. For the reasons set forth below, the Court
will dismiss Petitioner's §2241 petition without prejudice for lack of
jurisdiction.
|. Background
In October 2015, Figueroa was charged with one count of knowingly
and intentionally possessing in and affecting commerce a firearm in violation
of 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) and 3351. United States v. Figueroa, No.
15-CR-495 (E.D. N.Y.), Doc. 14, Indictment. In February 2018, after being
found guilty by jury, of count one of the indictment, Figueroa was sentenced
to 72-months of imprisonment, to run consecutively with the sentence
imposed in 08-cr-749. United States v. Figueroa, No. 15-CR-495(E.D. N.Y.),
Doc. 128, Judgment.
Figueroa filed a timely Notice of Appeal. United States v. Figueroa, No.
15-CR-495 (E.D. N.Y.), Doc. 132, Notice of Appeal. In October 2019, he
supplemented his briefing and raised a Rehaif' claim. United States v.
Figueroa, No. 18-589 (2d Cir.), Doc. 97. On August 7, 2020, the Second
Circuit affirmed the judgments of the district court, denying the Rehaif claim.
United States v. Figueroa, No. 15-CR-495 (E.D.N.Y.), Doc. 143, Order.
On March 29, 2021, Figueroa filed the instant petition for habeas relief
claiming that his “conviction under 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1) is invalid in light of
Rehaifv. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2191 (2019).” (Doc. 1).
ll. Discussion
lt is well settled that to challenge the validity of a sentence, a federal
prisoner must file a motion to vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2255 in the
sentencing court, which is “already familiar with the facts of the case.” See
‘ Rehaifv. United States, —- U.S. —-, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019).
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Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 774-75 (2008); see also Russell v.
Martinez, 325 F. App’x 45, 47 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting that “a section 2255
motion filed in the sentencing court is the presumptive means for a federal
prisoner to challenge the validity of a conviction or sentence”). Conversely,
a federal prisoner may challenge the execution of his sentence, such as the
denial or revocation of parole or the loss of good-time credits, by filing a
petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2241 in the district court for the federal
judicial district where he is in custody. See 28 U.S.C.§2241(a); Rumsfeld v.
Padilla, 542 U.S. 443-44 (2004); Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 485 (3d
Cir. 2001). However, if a petitioner shows “that a §2255 motion ‘is inadequate
or ineffective to test the legality of his detention,’ ... [he may] resort to §2241
to challenge the validity of the conviction or sentence.” See Brown v.
Mendez, 167 F. Supp. 2d 723, 726 (M.D. Pa. 2001); see also 28 U.S.C.
§2255(e); Litterio v. Parker, 369 F.2d 395, 395 (3d Cir. 1966) (“It is firmly
established that the remedy available to a federal prisoner under 2255 is
exclusive in the absence of a showing that such remedy ‘is inadequate or
ineffective to test the legality of [the prisoner’s] detention.’ ”).
A motion under §2255 is not “inadequate or ineffective” if the
sentencing court has previously denied relief. See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d
245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997). Nor is a §2255 motion “inadequate or ineffective”
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merely because the inmate “is unable to meet the requirements of [28
U.S.C.] §2244 and §2255(h), which require a federal prisoner to obtain
preauthorization from the appropriate United States Court of Appeals before
filing a second or subsequent §2255 motion in the sentencing court.” See
Miller v. United States, No. 3:19-cv-2159, 2020 WL 820334, at *2 (M.D. Pa.
Jan. 9, 2020), report □□□ recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 815777 (M.D.
Pa. Feb. 18, 2020). Moreover, “§2255 is not inadequate or ineffective merely
because the petitioner cannot satisfy §2255’s timeliness or other
gatekeeping requirements.” See Long v. Fairton, 611 F. App'x 53, 55 (3d Cir.
2015) (citing Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251). The Third Circuit:
permits access to §2241 when two conditions are satisfied: First,
a prisoner must assert a “claim of ‘actual innocence’ on the
theory that ‘he is being detained for conduct that has
subsequently been rendered non-criminal by an intervening
Supreme Court decision’ and [Third Circuit] precedent construing
an intervening Supreme Court decision’—in other words, when
there is a change in statutory caselaw that applies retroactively
in cases on collateral review. And second, the prisoner must be
“otherwise barred from challenging the legality of the conviction
under § 2255.” Stated differently, the prisonerhas “had no earlier
opportunity to challenge his conviction for a crime that an
intervening change in substantive law may negate.”
Bruce v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 868 F.3d 170, 180 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting
Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251). Ifa petitioner improperly challenges a federal
conviction or sentence under §2241, the §2241 petition must be dismissed
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for lack of jurisdiction. See Cradle v. United States, 290 F.3d 536, 539 (3d
Cir. 2002).
In the instant case, Petitioner's only challenge to his conviction is
pursuant to Rehaif. The record is clear, however, that Figueroa raised his
Rehaif claim as part of his appeal before the Second Circuit. Thus, Figueroa
fails to demonstrate that he falls within the exception initially recognized in
Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245 and reaffirmed in Bruce, 868 F.3d 170 (2017).
Moreover, there is no indication that Petitioner has filed a §2255 motion
challenging his conviction and sentence. While Petitioner has not filed a
§2255 motion challenging his conviction and sentence, this Court has noted
that “[t]he remedy afforded under §2247 is not an additional, alternative, or
supplemental remedy to that prescribed under §2255.” See Dusenberry v.
Oddo, No. 17-cv-2402, 2018 WL 372164, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2018).
Likewise, as noted above, “§2255 is not inadequate or ineffective merely
because the petitioner cannot satisfy §2255’s timeliness or other
gatekeeping requirements.” See Long, 611 F. App’x at 55. Therefore,
Petitioner may not rely upon §2241 to raise his claims, and the Court will
dismiss his §2241 petition for lack of jurisdiction.
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ili. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, Figueroa’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2241 will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction without
prejudice to Petitioner's right to file a §2255 motion in the sentencing court,
subject to the pre-authorization requirements set forth in 28 U.S.C. §§2244
and 2255(h), as they may apply. Because Petitioner is not detained because
of a process issued by a state court and the petition is not brought pursuant
to §2255, no action by this Court with respect to a certificate of appealability
is necessary.
An appropriate Order follows.
5| Malachy E. Mannion
MALACHY E. MANNION
United States District Judge
Dated: September 23, 2021
21-0571-01
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