Hammonds v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania State Police

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CHANTE HAMMONDS, :

:

Plaintiff CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:20-657

:

v. (JUDGE MANNION)

:

ROBERT AIGELDINGER,

:

Defendant

M E M O R A N D U M

In her Amended Complaint, filed September 23, 2020, Plaintiff Chante

Hammonds asserted three claims against Defendants, the Commonwealth

of Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”), hereinafter

“Commonwealth Defendants”, and Robert Aigeldinger, a PSP Motor Carrier

Enforcement Officer during the relevant times of this case. (Doc. 15). Plaintiff

alleged that Aigeldinger forced her to perform a sexual act on him in order to

pass her tractor trailer for inspection and she raised claims for civil rights

violations under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against all Defendants. Specifically, in

Count I, Plaintiff alleged that Commonwealth Defendants violated her rights

under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and “also her rights to

personal security, freedom from assault and battery, sexual assault, sexual

abuse, false imprisonment, the application of excessive force and to due

process of law.” Plaintiff alleged that Aigeldinger, acting within the scope of

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his employment with the PSP, violated her rights “to be secure in her person

and free from unreasonable force, sexual assault, sexual abuse and false

imprisonment.” In Count II, Plaintiff raised claims against the Commonwealth

Defendants under the 14th Amendment for failing to implement policies and

procedures, and for failing to properly train and supervise all PSP personnel,

particularly members of the Commercial Vehicle Safety Division. In the two

federal law claims, Counts I and II, Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages

as relief as well as punitive damages and attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C.

§1988. In Count III, Plaintiff raised state law claims against all three

Defendants for official oppression, threat of an official act, and false

imprisonment. As relief for her state law claims, Plaintiff seeks compensatory

and punitive damages as well as attorney’s fees. (Doc. 15, ¶¶ 47, 57, 63-65).

In addition to monetary relief, Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment

for the court to “declare that the [past] actions of the Defendants were in

violation of the [stated] laws.”1 (Doc. 15, ¶ 66).

1The court notes that Plaintiff’s claim for declaratory relief must be

dismissed, as she does not allege that she will be subjected to the alleged

conduct by the remaining Defendant in the future. The Third Circuit has held

that “[d]eclaratory judgment is inappropriate solely to adjudicate past

conduct,” and is not “meant simply to proclaim that one party is liable to

another.” Corliss v. O’Brien, 200 Fed.Appx. 80, 84 (3d Cir. 2006); see also,

Brown v. Fauver, 819 F.2d 395, 400 (3d. Cir. 1987) (holding plaintiff in a

1983 action lacks standing to pursue declaratory relief where plaintiff “has

done nothing more than allege past exposure to unconstitutional state

action.”); Blakeney v. Marsico, 340 Fed.Appx. 778, 780 (3d Cir. 2009)

(holding that “even if defendants violated [plaintiff’s] rights in the past as he

alleges, he is not entitled to a declaration to that effect.”); O’Callaghan v.

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On October 7, 2020, Commonwealth Defendants filed a motion to

dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). (Doc. 18). These Defendants submitted a brief in

support thereof on October 21, 2020. (Doc. 21).

On December 28, 2020, Defendant Aigeldinger filed a motion to

dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

under Rule 12(b)(1), and for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), and

submitted a brief in support thereof on January 10, 2021. (Docs. 28 & 29).

On January 13, 2021, Plaintiff filed a stipulation, pursuant to

Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1)(A), voluntarily dismissing, with prejudice, her claims

against Defendants Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and PSP. (Doc. 30).

Defendants Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and PSP were then terminated

as parties in this action. No doubt that “the Eleventh Amendment bars claims

for damages against the PSP, a state agency that did not waive its sovereign

immunity.” Atkin v. Johnson, 432 Fed.Appx. 47, 48 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing 71

P.S. §§61, 732–102; Capogrosso v. Supreme Court of N.J., 588 F.3d 180,

185 (3d Cir. 2009)). Thus, Plaintiff’s remaining claims are contained in

Counts I and III of her amended complaint against Defendant Aigeldinger.

Hon. X, 661 Fed.Appx. 179, 182 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding that request for

declaration that defendant judge previously violated plaintiff’s rights is “not a

proper use of a declaratory judgment, which is meant to define the legal

rights and obligations of the named parties in anticipation of future conduct,

not to proclaim their liability for past actions.”).

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Plaintiff submitted a brief in opposition to Defendant Aigeldinger’s

motion to dismiss her amended complaint on March 23, 2021. (Doc. 33).

Defendant Aigeldinger did not file a reply brief in support of his motion to

dismiss and the time within which it was due has expired. Defendant

Aigeldinger’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s amended complaint for failure to

state a claim is now ripe for the court’s disposition.

Accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, the court will GRANT IN PART

and DENY IN PART the motion. Specifically, the court will GRANT

Defendant’s motion to dismiss as to Count I to the extent that Defendant is

sued in his official capacity, and the court will DENY Defendant’s motion as

to Count I to the extent that Defendant is sued in his individual capacity. Also,

the court will GRANT Defendant’s motion to dismiss as to the official

oppression and threat of official act claims included in Count III, and DENY

Defendant’s motion to dismiss as to the false imprisonment claim in Count

III, to the extent that Defendant is sued in his individual capacity. Further, the

court will GRANT Defendant’s motion to dismiss the false imprisonment

claim in Count III, to the extent that Defendant is sued in his official capacity.

I. BACKGROUND

According to the amended complaint, Plaintiff is an adult African

American female from Antioch, Tennessee, who on August 23, 2018 was

employed as a truck driver for Schneider Trucking and was operating a

tractor trailer on Interstate 81 North in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania. (Doc.

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15, ¶¶ 3, 14-15). On that day, Plaintiff was stopped at a rest area in Dorrance

Township, PA, to undergo a motor carrier inspection by the Commonwealth

of Pennsylvania. (Id., ¶ 16). At the rest stop, Defendant Aigeldinger, a

uniformed PSP Motor Carrier Enforcement Officer, approached Plaintiff and

asked her if she was ready for a truck inspection. (Id., ¶ 18). Defendant then

made sexually explicit remarks to Plaintiff and implied that he would provide

a good inspection report if Plaintiff performed oral sex on him. (Id., ¶¶ 19-

22). After completing the report, Defendant entered the cab of Plaintiff’s

truck, unzipped his pants, and forced Plaintiff to climb into the cab and

perform oral sex on him. (Id., ¶ 24).

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant’s actions were motivated by her

race and gender, and that the acts constituted official oppression, threat of

an official act, and false arrest. (Doc. 15, ¶’s 27-28, 31-33).

After the incident, Plaintiff reported Defendant’s conduct to law

enforcement officials, and Defendant was arrested and charged with, and

plead guilty to, threat of an official act, (18 Pa. C.S.A. §2906(a)(4)), and

official oppression, (18 Pa. C.S.A. 5301(1)). (Id., ¶¶ 24-25). Defendant was

sentenced to 24 months in the Luzerne County Accelerated Rehabilitation

Program and ordered to perform 60 hours of community service. (Id., ¶ 25).

Plaintiff asserts that during the relevant time period, Defendant was acting in

his official capacity as a PSP Officer. (Id., ¶ 60).

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II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Defendant’s motion to dismiss with respect to Count I is brought

pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). The court can dismiss claims brought

under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against the PSP and a PSP trooper, “to the extent

he was acting in his official capacity—for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), on the ground that they

were immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.” Atkin v. Johnson,

432 Fed.Appx. 47, 48 (3d Cir. 2011). The Eleventh Amendment bars claims

for damages against a PSP Trooper “[t]o the extent [he] [is] sued in his official

capacity, [and] he too [is] immune from suit [under the Eleventh

Amendment].” (citing Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71,

109 S.Ct. 2304 (1989). “Although Congress can abrogate a state’s sovereign

immunity, it did not do so through the enactment of 42 U.S.C. §1983, the

federal law under which [plaintiff] proceeds.” Id. (citing Quern v. Jordan, 440

U.S. 332, 345, 99 S.Ct. 1139 (1979)).

Defendant’s motion to dismiss is also brought pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.

12(b)(6), which provides for the dismissal of a claim, in whole or in part, if the

plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A defendant

moving to dismiss bears the burden of showing the plaintiff’s failure to state

a claim. Lesher v. Zimmerman, 822 Fed.Appx.116, 119 (3d. Cir. 2020) (citing

Hedges v. U.S., 303 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005)). Dismissal is appropriate

only if, accepting all of the facts alleged in the complaint as true, the plaintiff

has failed to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on

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its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (abrogating

“no set of facts” language from Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).

Legal conclusions, unlike factual allegations, are disregarded. Bruni v. City

of Pittsburgh, 824 F.3d 353, 360 (3d Cir. 2016).

The facts alleged must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the

speculative level,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, a requirement that “calls for

enough facts[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal

evidence of” the necessary elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action. Id. at

556. Furthermore, in order to satisfy federal pleading requirements, the

plaintiff must “provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief,” which “requires

more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements

of a cause of action will not do.” Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224,

231 (3d Cir. 2008) (brackets and quotations marks omitted) (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Finally, at this stage, courts “accept all factual

allegations as true,” and “determine whether, under any reasonable reading

of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Id. at 233.

In considering a motion to dismiss, the court generally relies on the

complaint, attached exhibits, and matters of public record, in addition

“undisputedly authentic documents” if they form part of the claims’ basis.

Hartig Drug Co. v. Senju Pharm. Co., 836 F.3d 261, 268 (3d Cir. 2016). Other

parts of the record are generally not considered. See Jordan v. Fox,

Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3rd Cir. 1994).

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III. DISCUSSION

Initially, the court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s constitutional claims

under §1983 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1331 and 1342. The court can exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims under 28 U.S.C.

§1367. Venue is proper in this district since the alleged unlawful conduct

occurred here and Defendant is located here. 28 U.S.C. §1391.

1. Count I, §1983 Claims

Under Section 1983, one who deprives others within U.S. jurisdiction

of federal constitutional or statutory rights “under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage” of a state is subject to liability. 42

U.S.C. §1983; Leshko v. Servis, 423 F.3d 337, 339 (3d Cir. 2005). For

purposes of Section 1983, the term “under color of [law]” is construed to also

mean “state actor.” Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009). A plaintiff

thus seeking to “hold an individual liable under §1983 must establish that she

was deprived of a federal constitutional or statutory right by a state actor.” Id.

(citing Benn v. Universal Health Sys., 371 F.3d 165, 169-70 (3d Cir. 2004)).

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s §1983 claims in Count I are barred by

Eleventh Amendment immunity since Plaintiff only sues him in is official

capacity. He thus seeks dismissal of Count I under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1)

arguing that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the federal claims

against him since they are barred by sovereign immunity under the Eleventh

Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment shields state governments and their

subsidiaries from suit in federal court. U.S. CONST. amend. XI; Lombardo v.

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Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 540 F.3d 190, 194 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Hans v.

Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (“[T]he Supreme Court extended the Eleventh

Amendment’s reach to suits by in-state plaintiffs, thus barring all suits against

non-consenting States in federal court.”). “Individual state employees sued

in their official capacity are also entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.”

Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 254 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing

Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991)). See also Kentucky v. Graham, 473

U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) (“Official-capacity suits ... ‘generally represent only

another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an

agent.’”).

In determining whether a defendant was sued in their official or

individual capacity, courts first look to the complaint and the “course of

proceedings.” Melo v. Hafer, 912 F.2d 628, 635 (3d Cir. 1990), aff’d 502 U.S.

21 (1991). The fact that a public official acted under the color of law does not

automatically yield the conclusion that he was sued in his official capacity.

Id. at 636. Indeed, the distinction between an official-capacity suit and a

personal-capacity suit turns not on the capacity in which the state officer

acted, but on the capacity in which the officer was sued. Hafer v. Melo, 502

U.S. 21, 27 (1991).

For a suit to be brought against a state officer in his official capacity, a

state “policy or custom must have played a part in the violation of federal

law.” Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25 (1991). Therefore, a “plaintiff’s failure to allege

that the defendant acted in accordance with a governmental policy or

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custom” suggests that the defendant is sued in their individual capacity. Stief

v. Robeson Twp., 2021 WL2137588, at *5 (E.D. Pa. 2021) (quoting Jones v.

Culinary Manager II, 30 F.Supp.2d 491, 496 (E.D. Pa. 1998)). In addition, a

request for punitive damages is indicative of an individual capacity suit, see

Ellis v. Horn, 37 Fed.Appx. 38, 39 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Gregory v. Chechi,

843 F.2d 111, 119-20 (3d Cir. 1988)), because state officials may not be

sued for punitive damages in their official capacities. Keller v. Crawford, 465

F.Supp.3d 472, 485 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (citing City of Newport v. Fact Concerts,

Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 263 (1981)). A defendant’s assertion of a personal

immunity defense, too, tends to demonstrate that the suit was an individual

capacity one. Stief, 2021 WL2137588 at *5; see also Melo, 912 F.2d at 636

(“It appears that [the defendant] understood that plaintiffs sought to sue her

in her personal capacity because she raised a defense of qualified immunity

throughout the course of these proceedings, a defense available only for

governmental officials when they are sued in their personal, and not in their

official, capacity.”).

To support his Eleventh Amendment defense, Defendant relies on the

amended complaint’s assertions that “[a]t all times material and relevant,” he

acted “within the course and scope of his employment” and “in his official

capacity.” (Doc. 15, ¶¶ 7-8, 37, 49, 60, 61). In response, Plaintiff argues that

those assertions serve only to satisfy the prerequisite for a §1983 claim—

that Defendant was acting under the color of law—and do not prove that

Defendant was acting within the scope of his employment as necessary to

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qualify for immunity. Acting within the scope of one’s employment, however,

is a requirement for Pennsylvania sovereign immunity, 1 Pa.C.S.A. §2310,

which “applies to Commonwealth employees in both their official and

individual capacities,” Larsen v. State Emp.’s Ret. Sys., 553 F.Supp.2d 403,

420 (M.D. Pa. 2008), not Eleventh Amendment Immunity. See Id. at 411,

420. By arguing this issue, Plaintiff begs the question of whether Defendant

was sued in his official or individual capacity.

As previously noted, the amended complaint states that Defendant

acted in his “official capacity” during the relevant period. (Doc. 15, ¶ 60-61).

It also describes Defendant as one of the “workmen, agents, and/or

employees” of the Commonwealth and the Pennsylvania State Police. (Doc.

15 ¶ 9). On the other hand, the amended complaint asserts that Defendant

acted “individually and in concert with others”, first identifies him as an “adult

and competent individual” and provides his home address, suggesting an

individual-capacity suit. (Doc. 15, ¶¶ 5, 47-48). Another factor indicating that

Defendant is sued in his individual capacity is Plaintiff’s request for punitive

damages. (Doc. ¶ 2).

Weighing in favor of an official-capacity suit are the facts that the

amended complaint alleges Defendant Aigeldinger acted “in furtherance” of

Pennsylvania’s and the PSP’s “customs, policies, and interests,” (Doc. 15 ¶

49), and names Pennsylvania and the PSP as co-defendants. Moreover,

Plaintiff’s Count III state law claims seek to assign liability to the

Commonwealth Defendants for the conduct of Defendant Aigeldinger;

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imputing Aigeldinger’s conduct to his employers suggests that he is sued in

his official capacity. Finally, Defendant’s only immunity defense is an

Eleventh Amendment one, which is not available to a state official sued in

his individual capacity.

The relevant factors here do not yield a clear result: both an individual-

capacity suit and an official capacity suit are reasonably read from the

amended complaint and the course of proceedings. In similar circumstances,

where plaintiffs sought punitive damages and other facts supported either

side of the distinction, courts in this circuit have held at the motion to dismiss

stage that defendants were sued in both capacities. See, e.g., Thorpe v.

Upper Makefield Twp., 2015 WL6810837, at *5 (E.D. Pa. 2015); Moore v.

Cuttre, 2010 WL2557682, at *3 (D. N.J. 2010). Likewise, accepting the

allegations in the amended complaint as true, the court concludes that

Defendant is sued in both his individual and official capacity. The court finds

that Defendant is not sued only in his official capacity as he argues. As such,

Plaintiff’s federal claims against Defendant Aigeldinger in his official capacity

will be dismissed, see Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. at 166 (“an official-

capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against

the entity”), but the claims in Count I against this Defendant in his individual

capacity are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment and will proceed.2

2The court notes that Defendant Aigeldinger does not move to dismiss

Count I of plaintiff’s amended complaint against him, to the extent it is

deemed as suing him in is individual capacity, under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure

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2. Count III, State Law Claims

In Count III of her amended complaint, Plaintiff asserts state law claims

of official oppression, threat of an official act, and false imprisonment. (Doc.

15, ¶’s 63-65). These first two claims mirror the Pennsylvania criminal

statutes, 18 Pa.C.S.A. §5301(1) (official oppression) (M2) and §2906(a)(4)

(coercion/threat of official act) (M2), which Defendant was charged with

violating for his actions taken against Plaintiff.3 Plaintiff also alleges that on

March 11, 2019, Defendant Aigeldinger “plead (sic) guilty to both charges”

and, as a result, was sentenced to 24 months in the Luzerne County

Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (“ARD”) Program and was ordered to

perform 60 hours of community service. (Doc. 15, ¶’s 25-26).

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s state law claims of official oppression

and threat of an official act must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure

to state a claim since they are not civil causes of action. Defendant states

that the criminal charges against him were “resolved without any admission

to state a claim. In any event, Plaintiff plausibly states federal claims against

Defendant Aigeldinger in Count I and they shall proceed.

3The court takes judicial notice of the state court Criminal Dockets in

Defendant Aigeldinger’s case, Numbers: MJ-11306 -CR-0000136-2018 and

MJ-11304 -CR-0000251-2018. https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/CaseSearch.

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of guilt” since he entered the ARD program, (Doc. 29 at 10), despite Plaintiff’s

allegation that he pled guilty to the charges.

Plaintiff misstates the ARD program and Defendant did not plead guilty

to the criminal charges. As the PA Commonwealth Court in Reading Area

Water Auth. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 137 A.3d 658, n. 5

(Pa. Comwlth. 2016), noted:

Acceptance into an ARD program requires neither an admission nor a

denial of guilt. Rather, in accordance with Pa.R.Crim.P. 315, when a

defendant is accepted into an ARD program, all proceedings on the

charges are deferred until the program has been completed. Moreover,

Pa.R.Crim.P. 319 and 320 provide that upon successful completion of

an ARD program, the charges against the defendant are dismissed and

the defendant’s arrest record is expunged.

Thus, since it appears from the Criminal Dockets that Defendant

successfully completed the 24 months of probation, the criminal charges

against him were expunged.

Although Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to raise common law

claims against Defendant for his conduct that gave rise to the criminal

charges, official oppression and criminal coercion (threat of an official act) 4

4 18 Pa. C.S.A. §2906(a)(4) subjects to criminal liability any person

who “with intent unlawfully to restrict freedom of action of another to the

detriment of the other… threatens to… take or withhold action as an official,

or cause an official to take or withhold action.” The court finds that Plaintiff’s

“threat of an official act” claim is equivalent to the criminal coercion statute.

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have been rejected as bases for civil liability. Wilson v. Marrow, 917 A.2d

357, 365 n. 9 (Pa. Comwlth. Ct. 2007) (““[O]fficial oppression is a state

criminal offense. Pennsylvania’s official oppression statute does not give rise

to a private cause of action.”); Filby v. Colebrookdale Twp. 2018 WL

5533989, *3 (Pa. Comwlth. 2018); Simpson v. City of Coatesville, 2015

WL7251546, at *5-6 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (holding that the Pennsylvania criminal

coercion statute does not provide for a private cause of action); Booze v.

Wetzel, 2017 WL 2991801, *11 (M.D. Pa. May 25, 2017) (holding that

“[plaintiff’s] claims for criminal coercion and official oppression fail as a matter

of law since criminal statutes do not generally give rise to civil liability.”).

Therefore, the court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state cognizable

claims of official oppression and criminal coercion (threat of an official act)

against Defendant.

False imprisonment, by contrast, is recognized as a common law tort.

Gagilardi v. Lynn, 285 A.2d 109, 111 (Pa. 1971).5 Defendant contends that

Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim should be dismissed since he is entitled

to Eleventh Amendment immunity.

5 A prima facie claim of false imprisonment under state law requires

showing “(1) the detention of another person (2) that is unlawful.” Braswell

v. Wollard, 243 A.3d 973, 979-80 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2020) (citing Renk v. City

of Pittsburgh, 641 A.2d 289, 293 (Pa. 1994)).

15

The court in Justice v. Lombardo, 239 A.3d 1142, 2020 WL 4590537,

*5 (Pa. Comwlth. 2020), explained:

Pennsylvania law affords sovereign immunity to “[t]he Commonwealth,

and its officials and employees acting within the scope of their duties.”

1 Pa. C.S. § 2310. Pursuant to Section 8521 of the Judicial Code, 42

Pa. C.S. §8521, “[a]n employee of the Commonwealth (such as [a PSP

trooper]), acting within the scope of his employment or duties, is

protected from the imposition of liability for intentional tort claims by

sovereign immunity.” Holt v. Nw. Pa. Training P’ship Consortium, Inc.,

694 A.2d 1134, 1140 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997) (emphasis added). Further,

“willful misconduct does not vitiate a Commonwealth employee’s

immunity because sovereign immunity protects a Commonwealth

employee acting within the scope of his or her employment from

liability, even for intentional acts which cause emotional distress.” Holt,

694 A.2d at 1140 (emphasis added). Whether a person acted within

the scope of employment is ordinarily a question for the jury. Orr v.

William J. Burns Int’l Detective Agency, 12 A.2d 25, 27 (Pa. 1940).

The court has found that Defendant is only entitled to Eleventh

Amendment immunity for claims against him in his official capacity. Thus, to

the extent that Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim is raised against

Defendant in his official capacity, it will be dismissed. However, as discussed

above, insofar as Defendant is sued in his individual capacity, at this stage

of the case, he is not protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity with

respect to Plaintiff’s state law false imprisonment claim since Plaintiff has

sufficiently alleged that Defendant was not acting within the scope of his

employment or duties. As Plaintiff points out, (Doc. 33 at 10), her amended

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complaint alleges that “the Defendant unlawfully detained her in the cab of

her truck when he forced her into the cab and sexually assaulted her.”

Defendant also notes that he was not criminally charged with the false

imprisonment of Plaintiff, leaving the court to infer that he intends this lack of

a corresponding criminal charge to serve as a defense to Plaintiff’s tort claim.

However, because the court knows of no rule that a false imprisonment tort

claim be coupled with a criminal charge, and because Defendant does not

offer one, this defense fails. As Defendant presents no other arguments for

dismissing Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim, the court will allow this claim

to proceed against him in his individual capacity.

Therefore, Plaintiff’s official oppression and threat of official act claims

in Count III will be dismissed, while her state law false imprisonment claim

will be allowed to proceed to the extent that she sues Defendant in his

individual capacity.

IV. CONCLUSION

Defendant Aigeldinger’s motion to dismiss, (Doc. 28), Plaintiff’s

amended complaint, (Doc. 15), will be GRANTED IN PART and, DENIED IN

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PART, as specified above. Plaintiff’s claim for declaratory relief will be

DISMISSED. An appropriate Order will issue.

s/ Malachy E. Mannion

MALACHY E. MANNION

United States District Judge

Date: July 16, 2021

20-657-01

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