Benanti v. Citizens Financial Group, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MICHAEL BENANTI,

Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:19-CV-02162

v.

(MEHALCHICK, M.J.)

CITIZENS FINANCIAL GROUP, INC.,

et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

This is a civil rights action initiated upon the filing of the Complaint by pro se Plaintiff

Michael Benanti (“Benanti”) on December 17, 2019. (Doc. 1). In his six-count Amended

Complaint, Benanti asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law against the following

Defendants: Citizens Financial Group and Citizens Bank of Pennsylvania (“Citizens”); John

Scott, a member of the litigation group employed by Citizens; Lorissa Harris, a member of

the Office of the Chairman at Citizens; Nicole Ferrante, a member of the Office of the

Chairman at Citizens; Jennifer Cotes, an employee of Citizens; John Doe employees of

Citizens; David Lewen, a federal prosecutor in the Eastern District of Tennessee; Mick

Nocera, an FBI Special Agent in Knoxville, Tennessee, and John Doe law enforcement

personnel. (Doc. 34, ¶¶ 5-13). Now pending before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss the

Amended Complaint filed by Citizens, Cote, Ferrante, Harris, and Scott (collectively, the

“Citizens Defendants”). (Doc. 37). For the reasons stated herein, it is recommended that the

Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

The following recitation of facts are taken from those alleged in Benanti’s Amended

Complaint, which was filed on October 15, 2020. (Doc. 34). From 2008 to 2015, Benanti

owned and operated two prisoner service companies which provided rehabilitation and re-

entry services. (Doc. 34, ¶ 15). These companies were called Prisoner Assistant (PA) and

Lifetime Liberty Group (LLG). (Doc. 34, ¶ 15). In January 2015, Benanti founded LLG.

(Doc. 34, ¶ 16). Citizens Bank subsequently agreed to open dozens of accounts under

Benanti’s name. (Doc. 34, ¶ 16).

On November 25, 2015, Benanti was arrested and indicted in the Eastern District of

Tennessee for bank robbery and related offenses. (Doc. 34, ¶ 16). In May 2016, Defendants

Lewen, Nocera, and John Doe law enforcement members released extra-judicial statements

to the public on a government website prior to Benanti’s trial. (Doc. 34, ¶ 17). The statements

contained opinions about Benanti’s guilt, observations of his character, and allegations of

uncharged conduct. (Doc. 34, ¶ 17). Because of these statements, articles were written alleging

that Benanti’s companies were fraudulent, that Benanti stole from these companies, that

Benanti robbed banks to replace funds he took from the companies’ accounts, and that

Benanti murdered his partner to cover up his crimes. (Doc. 34, ¶ 18). These statements were

provided to Citizens and unknown Citizens employees by Defendants Lewen, Nocera, and

John Doe law enforcement personnel between February 2016 and February 2017. (Doc. 34,

¶ 23).

In July and August 2016, two LLG clients attempted to have their payments returned.

(Doc. 34, ¶¶ 24-26). One of the clients contacted Benanti, who directed Travelers to perform

the refund. (Doc. 34, ¶¶ 24-25). The other client, Kenneth Doolin, informed Benanti that he

had asked for the refund directly from Travelers. (Doc. 34, ¶ 26). Travelers did not update

Benanti on the status of either of these requests. (Doc. 34, ¶¶ 25-26). On August 29, 2016,

Doolin corresponded with Defendant Ferrante who agreed to pay Doolin $6,399.56 from

Benanti’s accounts. (Doc. 34, ¶ 31). Ferrante did not attempt to contact Benanti to seek

permission to withdraw funds from his accounts. (Doc. 34, ¶ 31).

In July and August 2016, Defendants Lewen, Nocera, and John Doe law enforcement

personnel intercepted mail sent from Benanti to his attorney, his aunt, and a friend. (Doc. 34,

¶ 28). The mail was then copied and distributed to Citizens. (Doc. 34, ¶ 28). In so doing,

Lewen, Nocera, and John Doe law enforcement personnel spread “the unsupported

allegations” regarding Benanti’s fraudulent business and the murder of his partner. (Doc. 34,

¶ 28).

On August 8, 2016, Citizens and unknown Citizens employees withdrew a total of

$10,277.70 from Benanti’s accounts with a debit memo to close via email. (Doc. 34, ¶ 30).

Later that month, Benanti’s attorney presented a power of attorney to Citizens Bank, but its

employees refused to provide him any information. (Doc. 34, ¶ 33). On September 6, 2016,

Benanti’s aunt and friend were “visited” by Defendants John Doe law enforcement personnel.

(Doc. 34, ¶ 34). The law enforcement personnel informed Benanti’s aunt that “the funds were

‘illegally obtained’ and threatened her that she could be in trouble if she attempted to access

them.” (Doc. 34, ¶ 34). Defendants Lewen, Nocera, and John Doe law enforcement personnel

had no evidence of illegally obtained funds being deposited in the accounts, nor were Citizens

and John Does Citizens employees able to identify the same. (Doc. 34, ¶ 35).

There was no legal process or claim of forfeiture of funds served on Citizens and

Citizens employees by the government related to Benanti’s criminal case. (Doc. 34, ¶ 36). On

October 5, 2016, Citizens and John Doe Citizens employees withdrew $6,662.77 without

obtaining authorization or notifying Benanti. (Doc. 34, ¶ 37). On November 25, 2016,

Citizens and John Doe Citizens employees withdrew $2,875.19 without obtaining

authorization or notifying Benanti. (Doc. 34, ¶ 38). On December 16, 2016, Citizens and John

Doe Citizens employees withdrew $42,566.10 without obtaining authorization or notifying

Benanti. (Doc. 34, ¶ 39).

On January 3, 2017, Benanti submitted a second power of attorney, assigning Chelsea

Moore authority to communicate with Citizens and John Doe Citizens employees on

Benanti’s behalf. (Doc. 34, ¶ 40). Moore was denied access to the account information

necessary for Benanti to prepare for trial. (Doc. 34, ¶ 40). Defendants Lewen, Nocera, and

John Doe law enforcement conspired with Defendants Citizens and John Doe Citizens

employees to block Benanti from accessing his account information. (Doc. 34, ¶ 41).

Defendants Lewen, Nocera, and John Doe law enforcement conspired with Defendants

Citizens and John Doe Citizens employees about allowing power of attorney access to

Benanti’s accounts between February 1, 2016, and February 14, 2017. (Doc. 34, ¶ 42).

Between February 2016 and February 2017, Defendants Citizens, Ferrante, and John Doe

Citizens employees confiscated, transferred, distributed, or otherwise deprived Benanti of the

funds held in accounts under his authority without notice. (Doc. 34, ¶ 44). Defendants

Citizens, Scott, Harris, Ferranti, Cotes, and John Doe Citizens employees failed to notify

Benanti of a dispute or investigation, claim, or process of any kind between February 2016

and February 2017. (Doc. 34, ¶ 45).

Between February 2016 and February 2017, Defendants Lewen, Nocera, and John

Doe law enforcement told Citizens and John Doe Citizens employees that Benanti deposited

bank robbery money into his accounts held at Citizens, that he stole money from his clients

and/or accounts, and that he murdered Natasha Bogoev. (Doc. 34, ¶¶ 46-48). This was a

conspiracy to create, reveal, or otherwise find motive for Benanti to rob banks. (Doc. 34, ¶

49).

On January 6, 2017, Defendant Lewen served a subpoena on Citizens concerning

Benanti’s accounts with direction to respond to Defendant Nocera. (Doc. 34, ¶ 50). On

January 10, 2017, Defendant Cotes responded to the subpoena on behalf of Citizens without

notifying Benanti. (Doc. 34, ¶ 51). On February 14, 2017, Benanti was convicted in criminal

case number 3:15-CR-177. (Doc. 34, ¶ 52). In July 2017, Benanti was sentenced and

transported to Atwater, California, for the service of his sentence. (Doc. 34, ¶ 53).

Between October and December 2017, Benanti corresponded with Defendant Harris,

requesting account statements and inquiring about accounts. (Doc. 34, ¶ 54). Harris

responded on November 14, 2017. (Doc. 34, ¶ 54). On December 21, 2017, Harris informed

Benanti of portions of the account agreement related to fraudulent or illegal activity, their

right to make payment to third parties involved in disputes, and their right to set off and close

an account. (Doc. 34, ¶ 55). Harris refused to provide details, but informed Benanti that the

accounts were closed with a negative balance, otherwise ignoring Benanti’s questions and

concerns. (Doc. 34, ¶ 55).

On January 2, 2018, Benanti disputed the account activity from November 25, 2015,

until January 2, 2018 as fraudulent, and requested an investigation, account statements, and

a record of the transactions, specifically who was paid what. (Doc. 34, ¶ 56). On February 21,

2018, John Scott of Citizens Litigation Group responded with final statements from when the

accounts were closed. (Doc. 34, ¶ 57). Scott refused to answer questions or provide

information on the notification of dispute or alleged fraud enclosed in those statements. (Doc.

34, ¶ 57). No PA or LLG client had a balance of $42,566.10. (Doc. 34, ¶ 58).

On June 19, 2018, Benanti asked Scott a series of questions regarding his account

activity, as well as for supporting documents. (Doc. 34, ¶ 59). On July 16, 2018, Harris

responded for Citizens with the remainder of Benanti’s requested account statements. (Doc.

34, ¶ 60). Between July 16 and September 17, 2018, Benanti contacted the Office of the

Chairman at Citizens via phone call. (Doc. 34, ¶ 61). A John Doe Citizens employee refused

to provide specific information on the transactions and told Benanti to contact the United

States Attorneys office or the FBI for more information and that actions on the account were

within Citizens legal rights and made in conjunction with a law enforcement investigation.

(Doc. 34, ¶ 61). On September 17, 2018, Benanti requested written results of an investigation

from Harris and Scott. (Doc. 34, ¶ 62). Benanti informed them that he was not charged or

convicted of any crime related to Citizens Bank accounts held by Benanti and that the federal

and state authorities did not confiscate or initiate forfeiture procedures. (Doc. 34, ¶ 62).

Benanti requested emails, reports, and reasons for unauthorized actions on his accounts and

that the issue be resolved. (Doc. 34, ¶ 62). On October 11, 2018, Harris refused to provide

Benanti with any information except for the requested statements. (Doc. 34, ¶ 63).

On December 18, 2018, Benanti wrote Scott a letter which was received on December

21, 2018. (Doc. 34, ¶ 64). Benanti requested his entire case file, disputed all actions taken on

the accounts after November 25, 2015, and advised Scott that he had received information

about Citizens Bank working with the FBI and prosecutor’s office in an effort to conceal

evidence and obstruct justice. (Doc. 34, ¶ 64). Benanti requested a letter admitting the funds

in the account exceeded any legitimate claims against it, along with records of communication

between Citizens and the government. (Doc. 34, ¶ 64). Benanti placed Citizens and Scott on

notice of impending suit should they not attempt to resolve the issues. (Doc. 34, ¶ 64).

Defendants know that no unaccounted funds were deposited into any of Benanti’s

accounts, thus they conspired to support a motive for bank robbery. (Doc. 34, ¶ 65).

Defendants know that the amount of money left in Benanti’s bank accounts exceeded his

clients’ claims or any legitimate claim made on the accounts, demonstrating no theft. (Doc.

34, ¶ 66). Defendants Citizens and John Doe Citizens employees deprived Benanti of

approximately $100,000.00 that was on deposit in Citizens Bank. (Doc. 34, ¶ 69).

Benanti brings claims of breach of contract; conspiracy to deprive him of his Fourth,

Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights; fraud; unjust enrichment; “bad faith”; violation of

privacy; and violation of the Right to Financial Privacy Act (RFPA). (Doc. 34, ¶¶ 70-119).

Citizens Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss on December 7, 2020. (Doc. 37). This

motion is fully briefed and is ripe for disposition. (Doc. 38; Doc. 44; Doc. 48).

II. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD

Defendants seek to dismiss the Complaint under Rules 12(b)(1) – for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction – and 12(b)(6) – for failure to state a claim – of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. (Doc. 38). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion may be treated as either a facial or factual

challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction. Gould Electronics Inc. v. United States, 220

F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000). In a factual attack under Rule 12(b)(1), the court may consider

and weigh evidence outside the pleadings to determine if it has jurisdiction. Gould Electronics

Inc., 220 F.3d at 178. This 12(b)(1) factual evaluation may occur at any stage of the

proceedings, from the time the answer has been served until after the trial has been

completed. Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & LoanAss'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891–92 (3d Cir. 1977).

“When a motion under Rule 12 is based on more than one ground, the court should consider

the 12(b)(1) challenge first because if it must dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction, all other defenses and objections become moot.” In re Corestates Trust Fee

Litig., 837 F.Supp. 104, 105 (E.D. Pa. 1993), aff'd 39 F.3d 61 (3d Cir. 1994).

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a defendant to move

to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). To assess the sufficiency of a complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must first

take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim, then identify mere conclusions

which are not entitled to the assumption of truth, and finally determine whether the

complaint’s factual allegations, taken as true, could plausibly satisfy the elements of the legal

claim. Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011). In deciding a Rule

12(b)(6) motion, the court may consider the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, as well

as “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court

may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).

After recognizing the required elements which make up the legal claim, a court should

“begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not

entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The plaintiff

must provide some factual ground for relief, which “requires more than labels and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of

a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678. Thus, courts “need not credit a complaint’s ‘bald assertions’ or ‘legal

conclusions…’” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting

re Burlington Coat Factory Securities Litigation, 114 F.3d 1410, 1429-30 (3d Cir. 1997)). The court

also need not assume that a plaintiff can prove facts that the plaintiff has not alleged. Associated

Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

A court must then determine whether the well-pleaded factual allegations give rise to

a plausible claim for relief. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the misconduct alleged.” Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 219-20 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sheridan v. NGK Metals

Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 262 n.27 (3d Cir. 2010). The court must accept as true all allegations in

the complaint, and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1261. This “presumption of truth

attaches only to those allegations for which there is sufficient factual matter to render them

plausible on their face.” Schuchardt v. President of the United States, 839 F.3d 336, 347 (3d Cir.

2016) (internal quotation and citation omitted). The plausibility determination is context-

specific and does not impose a heightened pleading requirement. Schuchardt, 839 F.3d at 347.

Additionally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Thus, a well-pleaded

complaint must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief

beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a “short and plain” statement of a cause of

action. There is no requirement that the pleading be specific or probable. Schuchardt, 839 F.3d

at 347 (citing Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d at 224, 233-234 (3d Cir. 2008). Rule 8(a)

requires a “showing that ‘the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair

notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551

U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233 (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545).

With the aforementioned standards in mind, a document filed pro se is “to be liberally

construed.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A pro se complaint, “however inartfully

pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”

and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond doubt that the

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to

relief. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972). Nonetheless, pro se plaintiffs are still

subject to the basis pleading requirements of Rule 8. Rhett v. New Jersey State Superior Court,

260 F. App’x 513 (3d Cir. 2008). The Third Circuit has further instructed that if a complaint

is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative

amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State

Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).

III. DISCUSSION

Citizens Defendants submit that Benanti lacks standing so his Complaint should be

dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. 38, at 10). Citizens Defendants state

that the damages alleged in the Complaint arise from loss of funds from a bank account which

belonged to LLG, not Benanti. (Doc. 38, at 12). Benanti’s “claims fail because he cannot

prove that he has personally or individually suffered an injury in fact that is separate or distinct

from his businesses.” (Doc. 38, at 12) (emphasis in original). The only bank account identified

in the Complaint is opened in the name of LLG and Benanti does not have standing to assert

direct claims on behalf of his companies, according to Citizens Defendants. (Doc. 38, at 11-

12).

Benanti responds that Defendants erroneously confine his claims to one account.

(Doc. 44, at 4). Benanti submits that he does not identify a specific account to which his claims

are limited and does not limit his claims to one account. (Doc. 44, at 4). Quoting his

Complaint, Benanti asserts that he “clearly states ‘dozens of accounts’ were opened ‘under

the plaintiff’s name.’” (Doc. 44, at 4). 1

The standing doctrine is a threshold inquiry to adjudication, which defines and limits

the role of the judiciary. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343

(1975). It is well settled that unless a plaintiff has standing, a federal district court lacks

subject-matter jurisdiction with respect to the merits of the case. A plaintiff bears the burden

of establishing three elements in order to invoke federal jurisdiction: injury, causation, and

redressability. Specifically:

[ (1) ]The plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact, which is an invasion of

a legally protected interest that is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual

or imminent [;(2) ]the plaintiff must establish a causal connection between the

injury and the conduct complained of[; and (3) ] the plaintiff must establish that

it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be “redressed

by a favorable decision.”

In re McNeil Consumer Healthcare, 877 F. Supp. 2d 254, 269 (E.D. Pa. 2012)

(citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119

L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (citations omitted).

“[T]he Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently held that a district court must apply a

“plausibility” standard when analyzing whether the factual allegations of a complaint, taken

as true, show that the plaintiff possesses Article III standing.” In re Schering Plough Corp.

Intron/Temodar Consumer Class Action, 678 F.3d 235, 244 (3d Cir. 2012).

1 Any injury relating to Benanti’s conviction shall not be considered here because

claims which would implicitly invalidate the legitimacy of a conviction must be brought in a

petition for habeas corpus. (Doc. 44, at 3); see Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994).

A plaintiff “cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.

Warth v. Sedin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). The “derivative injury rule” “holds that a

shareholder (even a shareholder in a closely-held corporation) may not sue for personal

injuries that result directly from injuries to the corporation.” In re Kaplin, 143 F.3d 807, 811-

12 (3d Cir. 1998). The corporate veil cannot be pierced by the shareholder seeking to sue for

the company’s losses. KBT Corp. v. Ceridian Corp., 966 F.Supp. 369, 373 (E.D. Pa. 1997). Only

injuries suffered by the shareholder personally, rather than in the corporation’s name, can be

remedied in a lawsuit brought by the shareholder. In re Kaplan, 143 F.3d at 812; Scanlin v. TD

Waterhouse Inc., No. 4:05-CV-02458, 2006 WL 3484353, at *1-2 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2006)

(holding that a plaintiff lacked standing when he was the founder and sole “funder” of a non-

profit corporation and brought claims arising from a transaction between the defendants and

the corporation).

After examining the Complaint’s allegations and attached exhibits, the Court finds

that Benanti does not have standing. See In re Schering Plough Corp. Intron/Temodar Consumer

Class Action, 678 F.3d 235, 244 (3d Cir.2012). The plausibility standard, as articulated in Iqbal,

requires the “reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 679. For relief, Benanti seeks “actual damages of approximately $100,000,” as

well as putative damages. (Doc. 34, at 22). The $100,000 in actual damages comes from the

amount of money “on deposit in Citizens Bank” of which Benanti was “deprived.” (Doc. 34,

at 13). The material provided by Benanti establishes that the accounts at issue in this lawsuit

were in the names of Benanti’s corporations and not Benanti personally. (Doc. 34).

First, in response to Benanti’s inquiry “about accounts and why was access to my

accounts blocked,” Defendant Harris responded that “your recent correspondence regarding

Lifetime Liberty Group was forwarded to the Office of the Chairman for review and response.”

(Doc. 34, at 10, 64) (emphases added). This begins a long string of correspondence and

evidence in which Benanti: (i) does not inquire into “some” or a portion of his accounts, but

rather inquires into “my accounts” signifying that all of his accounts are at issue; (ii) receives

responses regarding only bank accounts under LLG or PA, not under his name personally;

and (iii) does not inquire further into any additional accounts. (Doc. 34). On December 21,

2017, Benanti received another letter from Defendant Harris in response to Benanti’s initial

inquiry as to “my accounts” in which Harris stated that “the Bank has closed all account(s)

relating to Lifetime Liberty Group.” (Doc. 34, at 10, 65) (emphases added). Benanti

characterizes this correspondence as informing him that “the accounts were closed with a

negative balance.” (Doc. 34, at 10). If there were additional accounts at issue which were

under Benanti’s name personally and not one of his companies, he would have likely used a

qualifier when describing the accounts that were closed with a negative balance. (See Doc. 34,

at 10).

The only mention of accounts belonging to Benanti in his personal capacity in any

correspondence came in a letter from Defendant Scott to Benanti on February 21, 2018. (Doc.

34, at 66). In this letter, Scott stated that he was writing in response to Benanti’s letter

“concerning the status of the Lifetime Liberty Group accounts, Prisoner Assist Inc. accounts,

and your personal accounts with the Bank (collectively, the ‘Accounts’).” (Doc. 34, at 66).

However, Scott proceeded to state that “enclosed herewith are the final statements for all of

the Accounts.” (Doc. 34, at 66) (emphasis added). According to Benanti, these statements

“reflected a total of $62,000,” and involved a bank account ending in 7842. (Doc. 34, at 11,

50, 60-62). This bank account was under Lifetime Liberty Group – Main Account. (Doc. 34,

at 50, 60-62).

Not satisfied with this response, Benanti wrote back to Scott on June 19, 2018, in

which he explained that the statements sent by Scott

tell me little to nothing in actuality. I request all statements for the months of

and between November 2015 till [sic] each account closed for the following

accounts.

623424-790-7 Prisoner Assistant Main Account Payable

623424-784-2 Lifetime Liberty Group – Main Account

630218-780-3 Lifetime Liberty Group – Receivable Pay

I gave no permission to withdraw any funds from any account after December

2, 2015. I think that from those statements I can see the records of all

transactions which will help me to better understand what happened here.

(Doc. 34, at 68).

The only accounts sought by Benanti were those belonging to LLG and PA. (Doc. 34, at 68).

Benanti said that acquiring these statements would allow him to see the records of all

transactions and clarify what occurred. (Doc. 34, at 68). If there were personal accounts at

issue, common sense says that Benanti would have requested account statements from those

under his name. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (explaining that the plausibility standard requires

the “reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense”). The fact that all

transactions would be illuminated by Benanti’s receipt of only PA and LLG account

statements demonstrates that there is no personal Benanti account at issue. Furthermore, in

the letter sent on June 19, 2018, Benanti stated that “[a]ll accounts held at Citizens were held in

corporations under my name and legally my property.” (Doc. 34, at 67) (emphases added).

This is a direct factual allegation which, taken as true, precludes Benanti from filing suit in

his personal capacity for any claim arising from any account held at Citizens. See In re Kaplan,

143 F.3d at 812.

Finally, on July 16, 2018, Harris responded to Benanti’s letter of June 19, 2018. (Doc.

34, at 76). According to Benanti, Harris’s letter provided “the remainder of the requested

account statements.” (Doc. 34, at 11-12). The “remaining” accounts at issue ended in 7803,

7907, and 7842. (Doc. 34, at 76). Per Benanti’s letter of June 19, 2018, each one of these

accounts belonged to one of his corporations. (Doc. 34, at 68).

The correspondence between Benanti and Citizens Defendants establishes that the

only interests at issue belong to third-party corporations. (Doc. 34). Benanti’s references to

“my accounts” address only LLG and PA accounts. (Doc. 34). Benanti makes no inquiry and

expresses no concern for any account beyond those belonging to LLG and PA. (Doc. 34). As

such, it is clear that Benanti “rest[s] his claim[s] to relief on the legal rights or interests of third

parties.” See Warth, 422 U.S. at 498. Benanti does not have standing to bring suit because he

seeks to remedy injuries to LLG and PA rather than to himself. See In re Kaplan, 143 F.3d at

812. For this reason, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear Benanti’s claims. See

Warth, 422 U.S. at 498; In re McNeil Consumer Healthcare, 877 F. Supp. 2d at 269.

IV. LEAVE TO AMEND

The Third Circuit has instructed district courts to permit a curative amendment if a

complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, unless an amendment would

be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). Here,

such amendment would be futile. Benanti has established through the correspondence that he

has put on the record that only LLG and PA bank accounts are at issue. (Doc. 34).

Throughout the lengthy correspondence between Travelers representatives and Benanti, there

is virtually no mention or reference to any personal account. (Doc. 34, at 50-73). It would be

futile to prolong this case when such evidence shows that Benanti was disputing only LLG

and PA bank accounts. (Doc. 34). As such, leave to amend shall not be granted.2

V. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Travelers Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.

(Doc. 37). Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction.3 Plaintiff’s Motion to Order Clerk to Serve New Defendants and Motion

to Appoint Counsel are DISMISSED AS MOOT. (Doc. 40; Doc. 45). The Clerk of Court is

directed to CLOSE THIS MATTER.

An appropriate Order shall follow.

BY THE COURT:

Dated: June 28, 2021 s/ Karoline Mehalchick

KAROLINE MEHALCHICK

United States Magistrate Judge

2 Benanti cannot amend the caption and proceed on behalf of his corporations because

he is not an attorney and so cannot represent his corporations. Simbraw, Inc. v. United States,

367 F.2d 373, 373-74 (3d Cir. 1966) (an attorney must appear for a corporation in litigation).

3 “Dismissal for lack of standing reflects a lack of jurisdiction, so dismissal … should

[be] without prejudice.” Thorne v. Pep Boys Manny Moe & Jack Inc., 980 F.3d 879, 896 (3d Cir.

2020).