The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ALFRED ASHFORD, JR., : CIVIL NO: 1:20-CV-1215
:
Plaintiff, :
:
: (Magistrate Judge Schwab)
v. :
:
DAUPHIN COUNTY PROBATION :
DEPARTMENT, et al., :
:
Defendants. :
ORDER
July 1, 2021
I. Introduction.
This action comes before us for a screening review of the complaint in
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The plaintiff, Alfred Ashford, Jr.
(“Ashford”), is a pretrial detainee at Dauphin County Prison who commenced this
pro se Section 1983 action claiming the defendants illegally detained him. After
screening the complaint, we conclude that the complaint fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, and we will grant Ashford leave to file an amended
complaint.
II. Background and Procedural History.
Ashford filed this complaint on July 15, 2020. Doc. 1. He names as the
defendants the Dauphin County Probation Department, an unnamed Dauphin
County Probation Department Supervisor, an unnamed Dauphin County Probation
Department Probation Officer; Dauphin County, Pennsylvania; Jeff Haste and
Mike Prize, chairmen of Dauphin County local government; and George Hartwick,
III, vice chairman of Dauphin County local government. Id. at 2-3. Ashford claims
the defendants violated his constitutional rights by holding him against his will in
Dauphin County Prison. Id. at 4. Ashford also alleges that an unidentified
individual slammed him into a cement floor, injuring his shoulder and knocking
him unconscious on July 7, 2020. Id. at 5. How these allegations are related is a
mystery. Ashford seeks as relief the dismissal of a probation officer for giving
misleading reports to a judge to acquire signatures and monetary relief. Id.
III. Screening of In Forma Pauperis Complaints–Standard of Review.
The court has a statutory obligation to conduct a preliminary review of pro
se complaints brought by prisoners given leave to proceed in forma pauperis in
cases that seek redress against government officials. Specifically, the court must
review the complaint in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides, in
pertinent part:
(a) Screening. The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible
or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in
a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental
entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for dismissal. On review, the court shall identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the
complaint, if the complaint
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief.
Under § 1915A, the court must assess whether a pro se complaint “fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” This statutory text mirrors the
language of Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides
that a complaint should be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
“Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a
‘short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). The statement required by
Rule 8(a)(2) must give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and
of the grounds upon which it rests. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007).
Detailed factual allegations are not required, but more is required than labels,
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action. Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “In other words, a complaint
must do more than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). “A complaint has to ‘show’ such an
entitlement with its facts.” Id.
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in
the complaint, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the complaint
must be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox
Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). But a
court “need not credit a complaint’s bald assertions or legal conclusions when
deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902,
906 (3d Cir. 1997). A court also need not “assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove
facts that the . . . plaintiff has not alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v.
Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
Following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more
than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, it must recite factual allegations
sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere
speculation. In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint
entails a three-step analysis:
First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead
to state a claim.” Second, the court should identify allegations that,
“because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the
assumption of truth.” Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine
whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.”
Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 675 & 679).
A complaint filed by a pro se litigant is to be liberally construed and
“however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (quoting Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Nevertheless, “pro se litigants still must allege
sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina,
Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013). Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must
contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, a pro se complaint
must recite factual allegations that are sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed
right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a “short and plain”
statement of a cause of action.
IV. The complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Ashford claims the defendants violated his First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Ashford’s complaint, however, is entirely devoid of factual allegations to support
his Section 1983 claims. See generally doc. 1. While his constitutional claims are
properly brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Ashford fails to satisfy the pleading
requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), Ashford fails to satisfy the requirement that
his complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashford fails to provide the requisite factual
background for any of his constitutional claims. Instead, he asserts a single legal
conclusion related to his alleged illegal detention and alleges that he was slammed
to the floor without any explanation whatsoever regarding how this violated his
constitutional rights. Doc. 1 at 4-5. Apart from this, Ashford’s complaint is
entirely devoid of any factual pleading. See generally id. Thus, Ashford fails to
state a claim because he fails to satisfy the pleading requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2).
For Ashford’s benefit, we briefly inform him of the standard regarding
pleading Section 1983 claims against municipalities and individuals. “Section
1983 imposes civil liability upon any person who, acting under the color of state
law, deprives another individual of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Shuman v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist.,
422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005). Section 1983 “does not create any new
substantive rights but instead provides a remedy for the violation of a federal
constitutional or statutory right.” Id. To establish a claim under Section 1983, the
plaintiff must establish a deprivation of a federally protected right and that this
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Woloszyn v.
Cnty. of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 319 (3d Cir. 2005).
A municipality, such as Dauphin County, cannot be held liable for the
unconstitutional acts of its employees on a theory of respondeat superior. Monell
v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Rather, “under § 1983, local
governments are responsible only for ‘their own illegal acts.’” Connick v.
Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475
U.S. 469, 479 (1986) (emphasis in original)). To state a claim against a
municipality, the plaintiff must allege that the violation of his rights was caused
either by a policy or by a custom of the municipality. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694;
Berg v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 275 (3d Cir. 2000). Municipal policies
include the decisions of a government’s lawmakers and the acts of its
policymaking officials as well as municipal customs, which are acts or practices
that, even though not formally approved by an appropriate decision maker, are so
persistent and widespread as to have the force of law. Berg, 291 F.3d at 275;
Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 583 (3d Cir. 2003). In other
words, a municipality “can be held responsible as an entity when the injury
inflicted is permitted under its adopted policy or custom.” Mulholland v. Gov’t
Cnty. of Berks, 706 F.3d 227, 237 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Beck v. City of
Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 1996)).
“To satisfy the pleading standard, [a plaintiff] must identify a custom or
policy, and specify what exactly that custom or policy was.” McTernan v. City of
York, 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009). Additionally, there must be a direct causal
link between the policy or custom and the alleged constitutional violation. City of
Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989).
Additionally, as to individual defendants, liability in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983
action is personal in nature, and to be liable, a defendant must have been
personally involved in the wrongful conduct. In other words, defendants are
“liable only for their own unconstitutional conduct.” Barkes v. First Corr. Med.,
Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir. 2014), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Taylor v.
Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042 (2015). “[A] plaintiff must aver facts to show the
defendants’ personal involvement in the alleged misconduct.” Dooley v. Wetzel,
957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020). “Personal involvement requires particular
‘allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.’” Id.
(quoting Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)). And so
respondeat superior cannot form the basis of liability. Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d
347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005). Thus, a constitutional deprivation cannot be premised
merely on the fact that the defendant was a prison supervisor when the incidents
set forth in the complaint occurred. See Alexander v. Forr, 297 F. App’x 102,
104-05 (3d Cir. 2008). “Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and
§ 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant,
through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009).
The Third Circuit has “recognized that ‘there are two theories of supervisory
liability, one under which supervisors can be liable if they established and
maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused the constitutional
harm, and another under which they can be liable if they participated in violating
plaintiff’s rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the persons in charge, had
knowledge of and acquiesced in their subordinates’ violations.’” Parkell v.
Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 330 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Santiago v. Warminster Twp.,
629 F.3d 121, 129 n.5 (3d Cir. 2010)).
“Where a supervisor with authority over a subordinate knows that the
subordinate is violating someone’s rights but fails to act to stop the subordinate
from doing so, the factfinder may usually infer that the supervisor ‘acquiesced’ in
(i.e., tacitly assented to or accepted) the subordinate’s conduct.” Robinson v. City
of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1294 (3d Cir. 1997) (footnote omitted), abrogated on
other grounds, Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006).
“A plaintiff makes sufficient allegations of a defendant’s personal involvement by
describing the defendant’s participation in or actual knowledge of and
acquiescence in the wrongful conduct.” Chavarriaga v. New Jersey Dep’t of Corr.,
806 F.3d 210, 222 (3d Cir. 2015).
To set forth a claim for supervisory liability under the policy-and-practice
strand of supervisory liability, a plaintiff must:
(1) identify the specific supervisory practice or procedure that the
supervisor failed to employ, and show that (2) the existing custom and
practice without the identified, absent custom or procedure created an
unreasonable risk of the ultimate injury, (3) the supervisor was aware
that this unreasonable risk existed, (4) the supervisor was indifferent
to the risk; and (5) the underling’s violation resulted from the
supervisor’s failure to employ that supervisory practice or procedure.
Id. at 227 (quoting Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2001)).
“Put another way, the inmate must identify the supervisor’s specific acts or
omissions demonstrating the supervisor’s deliberate indifference to the inmate’s
risk of injury and must establish a link between the supervisor, the act, and the
injury.” Id.
V. Leave to Amend.
Before dismissing a complaint under the screening provision of
28 U.S.C.§ 1915A, the court must grant the plaintiff leave to amend his complaint
unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State
Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). Here, in light of the liberal-amendment
standard, although this screening analysis calls for dismissal of the complaint, we
will grant Ashford another opportunity to comply with the requirements of Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8 and attempt to state a claim upon which relief can granted. Thus, we will
grant Ashford leave to file an amended complaint.
VI. Order.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Ashford is GRANTED leave to file an
amended complaint, and any such amended complaint shall be filed on or before
July 29, 2021.1 If Ashford fails to file an amended complaint, we will recommend
that the complaint be dismissed.
S/Susan E. Schwab
Susan E. Schwab
United States Magistrate Judge
1 Any amended complaint must be titled as an amended complaint and must
contain the docket number of this case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). “The plaintiff is
advised that any amended complaint must be complete in all respects.” Young v.
Keohane, 809 F. Supp. 1185, 1198 (M.D. Pa. 1992). “It must be a new pleading
which stands by itself as an adequate complaint without reference to the complaint
already filed.” Id. “Also in general, an amended pleading—like [any] amended
complaint here—supersedes the earlier pleading and renders the original pleading a
nullity.” Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 220 (3d Cir. 2017). In other words, if
an amended complaint is filed, the previous complaints will have no role in the
future litigation of this case. Any amended complaint must also comply with the
pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including the
requirements that the complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the grounds
for the court’s jurisdiction,” “a short and plain statement of the claim,” and “a
demand for the relief sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)-(3). Further, “[e]ach
allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). “A party
must state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as
practicable to a single set of circumstances.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). And to the
extent it would promote clarity to do so, “each claim founded on a separate
transaction or occurrence . . . must be stated in a separate count.” Id.