The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RUTH EATON, : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:20-CV-1596
:
Plaintiff : (Judge Conner)
:
v. :
:
COMMONWEALTH HEALTH :
SYSTEMS, INC., d/b/a :
COMMONWEALTH HEALTH :
SYSTEMS, d/b/a WILKES-BARRE :
GENERAL HOSPITAL, LLC, d/b/a :
WILKES-BARRE GENERAL :
HOSPITAL, :
:
Defendant :
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Ruth Eaton brings a claim of retaliation against her former employer
under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et. seq. Defendant
Wilkes-Barre Hospital Company, LLC (“Wilkes-Barre Hospital” or “the Hospital”),1
moves to dismiss Eaton’s claim pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). We will deny Wilkes-Barre Hospital’s motion.
I. Factual Background & Procedural History
Eaton began working as a case manager for Wilkes-Barre Hospital in 2006.
(See Doc. 2 ¶ 1). Around March 30, 2020, Eaton “filed a grievance reporting a
1 The complaint names the following entity as Eaton’s employer:
Commonwealth Health Systems, Inc. d/b/a Commonwealth Health Systems d/b/a
Wilkes-Barre General Hospital, LLC d/b/a Wilkes-Barre General Hospital. (See
Doc. 2 ¶ 2). Defendant’s notice of removal avers that it was incorrectly named in the
complaint and refers to itself as “Wilkes-Barre Hospital Company, LLC.” (See Doc.
1 at 1).
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.” (See id. ¶ 9). The grievance alleges a
violation of “Article 15/FLSA” and states
Due to low census, salaried case managers are being
mandated to take time off using their vacation and/or
personal days for same. This is in violation of the law
under the Fair Labor Standards Act, which requires: “An
exempt employee must be paid a salary which is a fixed
amount that can’t be changed because of variations in the
amount or quality of the work performed[.]” There is
work available in other areas which is being assigned to
hourly employees.2
(See id., Ex. A).
According to the complaint, Eaton “was informed” on April 14, 2020, that her
FLSA grievance “was substantiated” and she would receive the benefits due to her.
(See id. ¶ 10).3 That same day, Wilkes-Barre Hospital informed Eaton she would be
permanently laid off on April 28, 2020. (See id. ¶ 11). The Hospital further informed
Eaton she would not be recalled, even though it was required to recall her under
2 Eaton attached her grievance as an exhibit to the complaint. (See Doc. 2,
Ex. A). Eaton’s grievance appears to paraphrase an FLSA regulation on salaried
employees:
An employee will be considered to be paid on a “salary
basis” within the meaning of this part if the employee
regularly receives each pay period on a weekly, or less
frequent basis, a predetermined amount constituting all
or part of the employee’s compensation, which amount is
not subject to reduction because of variations in the
quality or quantity of the work performed.
See 29 C.F.R. § 541.602(a). The following section describes instances when an
employer may “lose the exemption” if it makes “improper deductions” from
employees’ salaries. See id. § 541.603(a).
3 The complaint does not specify the source of this information.
the terms of her collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”). (See id. ¶¶ 12-14). Eaton
alleges that she suffered “lost wages of approximately $65,000 per year and medical,
dental, and vision benefits.” (See id. ¶ 15).
Eaton filed the instant complaint in August 2020 in the Court of Common
Pleas of Luzerne County, and Wilkes-Barre Hospital timely removed the action.
Eaton’s complaint alleges one count of retaliation under the FLSA. Wilkes-Barre
Hospital filed a motion to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). This motion is
fully briefed and ripe for disposition.
II. Legal Standard
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the
dismissal of complaints that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the
court must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable
reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Phillips v. County
of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings,
Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)). In addition to reviewing the facts
contained in the complaint, the court may also consider “exhibits attached to the
complaint, matters of public record, [and] undisputedly authentic documents if the
complainant’s claims are based upon these documents.” Mayer v. Belichick, 605
F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol.
Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)).
Federal notice and pleading rules require the complaint to provide “the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
Phillips, 515 F.3d at 232 (alteration in original) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To test the sufficiency of the complaint, the court conducts
a three-step inquiry. See Santiago v. Warminster Township, 629 F.3d 121, 130-31
(3d Cir. 2010). In the first step, “the court must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a
plaintiff must plead to state a claim.’” Id. at 130 (alteration in original) (quoting
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)). Next, the factual and legal elements of a
claim must be separated; well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, while mere legal
conclusions may be disregarded. Id. at 131-32; see Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578
F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). Once the court isolates the well-pleaded factual
allegations, it must determine whether they are sufficient to show a “plausible claim
for relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556. A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads facts “that allow[]
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
III. Discussion
The FLSA prohibits “labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of
the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general
well-being of workers.” 29 U.S.C. § 202(a). The statute contains an
antiretaliation provision making it unlawful “to discharge or in any other
manner discriminate against any employee” because the employee has filed a
FLSA complaint. See 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). This provision seeks to prevent
employer retribution against workers who report FLSA violations. See Kasten
v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. 1, 12 (2011).
Wilkes-Barre Hospital raises three arguments in support of dismissal. It
raises two threshold arguments, contending that Eaton’s FLSA retaliation
claim is not properly exhausted and is subject to Garmon preemption, in
addition to challenging the claim on its merits. We address these arguments
seriatim.
A. Exhaustion and Preemption4
The FLSA does not require administrative exhaustion and instead allows
employees to file suit “‘in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction.’”
Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 740 (1981) (quoting 29 U.S.C.
§ 216(b)). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals recognizes a “narrow” exception to
this rule, see Jones v. Does 1-10, 857 F.3d 508, 512 (3d Cir. 2017), for FLSA claims
which “depend[] on the disputed interpretation of a CBA provision,” see Bell v.
SEPTA, 733 F.3d 490, 494 (3d Cir. 2013). For such claims, an employee must
exhaust her administrative remedies through arbitration under the National Labor
4 Wilkes-Barre Hospital mischaracterizes part of its motion under Rule
12(b)(1), which is the proper vehicle for raising challenges to our subject matter
jurisdiction for, inter alia, lack of Article III standing. See Zimmermann v. U.S.
NLRB, 749 F. App’x 148, 149 (3d Cir. 2019) (nonprecedential). Defenses based on
failure to exhaust administrative remedies are “‘in the nature of statutes of
limitation’ and ‘do[] not affect the District Court’s subject matter jurisdiction.’”
Anjelino v. N.Y. Times Co., 200 F.3d 73, 87 (3d Cir. 1999). Our court of appeals has
cautioned against conflating merits issues with jurisdictional ones. See Davis v.
Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 348 (3d Cir. 2016); Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018, 1021
(3d Cir. 1997). Accordingly, we find that Wilkes-Barre Hospital’s arguments are
appropriately treated under Rule 12(b)(6) and not Rule 12(b)(1).
Relations Act (“NLRA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169, as amended by the Labor
Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197, before filing suit in
federal court. See Bell, 733 F.3d at 494. However, if the employee’s FLSA claim
does not require CBA interpretation, arbitration is not required. See Jones, 857
F.3d at 512 (citing Bell, 733 F.3d at 491).
Wilkes-Barre Hospital contends that the court lacks jurisdiction because
Eaton has not arbitrated her claim, and is required to do so by the LMRA.
(See Doc. 6 at 5-9). This argument overreads Eaton’s complaint. Eaton does
not seek to litigate a contractual right under the CBA or pursue the merits of
her underlying FLSA grievance—she alleges only that she was permanently
laid off in retaliation for filing that grievance. (See Doc. 2 ¶¶ 9-11). The CBA’s
existence, and Eaton’s passing reference to it in her complaint, do not ipso
facto convert Eaton’s claim into a dispute that must be arbitrated under the
LMRA. As our court of appeals recently noted, the arbitration requirement on
which the Hospital bases much of its argument is a “narrow” one, and has
been applied to dismiss an FLSA claim “in only one case.” See Jones, 857 F.3d
at 512 (citing Vadino v. A. Valey Eng’rs, 903 F.2d 253, 266 (3d Cir. 1990)). The
Hospital fails to explain exactly how Eaton’s FLSA retaliation claim—which is
based solely on her participation in statutorily protected activity—is dependent
upon a disputed interpretation of the CBA.
Furthermore, dismissing Eaton’s claim on this ground would also
contravene the United States Supreme Court’s pronouncement on the
different policies underlying the FLSA and the LMRA:
In contrast to the Labor Management Relations Act,
which was designed to minimize industrial strife and to
improve working conditions by encouraging employees to
promote their interests collectively, the FLSA was
designed to give specific minimum protections to
individual workers . . . [the FLSA] grants individual
employees broad access to the courts.
Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 739-40. Eaton seeks to vindicate her individual right to
alert her employer of potential FLSA violations without fear of retaliation. She
is therefore relying “solely on [her] statutory, rather than [her] contractual,
rights to recovery.” See Bell, 733 F.3d at 496. Eaton’s FLSA retaliation claim
does not depend on a disputed provision of the CBA and does not require
arbitration.
The Hospital alternatively maintains that Eaton’s claim is subject to
Garmon preemption. (See Doc. 6 at 10 (citing San Diego Bldg. Trades Council
v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959))). This line of precedent preempts “state
regulations and causes of action . . . if they concern conduct that is actually or
arguably either prohibited or protected by the [NLRA].” See Belknap, Inc. v.
Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 498 (1983). The doctrine confers exclusive jurisdiction on
the National Labor Relations Board “over unfair labor practice proceedings.”
See Voilas v. GMC, 170 F.3d 367, 378 (3d Cir. 1999). The party asserting
Garmon preemption “bears the burden of demonstrating that the challenged
activity is arguably prohibited by the NLRA.” See id. at 379.
Wilkes-Barre Hospital claims “Eaton alleges interference with her
NLRA-protected rights” without further explanation. (See Doc. 6 at 10). The
problem with the Hospital’s argument is that Eaton’s complaint is devoid of
any reference to the NLRA—most likely because she is not suing under this
statute. Nor is she alleging any state-law claim that would warrant a Garmon
preemption analysis. See Voilas, 170 F.3d at 373 (if state-law claim “is
substantially dependent upon” CBA, it must be analyzed under LMRA or
dismissed as preempted under Garmon (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v.
Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985))). The Hospital has failed to meet its burden,
and we readily conclude that Eaton’s FLSA retaliation claim is not subject to
Garmon preemption.
B. Merits
Courts in this circuit analyze FLSA retaliation claims under the burden-
shifting framework for Title VII claims. See Cononie v. Allegheny Gen. Hosp., 29 F.
App’x 94, 95 (3d Cir. 2002) (nonprecedential); see also Preobrazhenskaya v. Mercy
Hall Infirmary, 71 F. App’x 936, 939 (3d Cir. 2003) (nonprecedential) (citing
Kachmar v. SunGard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 1997)). A plaintiff
claiming retaliation under the FLSA “must show that (1) the plaintiff engaged in
protected activity, (2) the employer took an adverse employment action against her,
and (3) there was a causal link between the plaintiff’s protected action and the
employer’s adverse action.” See Preobrazhenskaya, 71 F. App’x at 939 (citing
Kachmar, 109 F.3d at 177). The Hospital challenges only the first element of
Eaton’s prima facie case.
The filing of an internal complaint may constitute protected activity if it is
“sufficiently clear and detailed for a reasonable employer to understand it, in light
of both content and context, as an assertion of rights protected by the statute and a
call for their protection.” Kasten, 563 U.S. at 14. Our court of appeals also permits
recovery when retaliation “is based on the employer’s mistaken belief” that the
plaintiff engaged in such activity, even if she did not. See Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp.,
Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 571 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Fogarty v. Boles, 121 F.3d 886, 891 (3d
Cir. 1997); Brock v. Richardson, 812 F.2d 121, 125 (3d Cir. 1987)).
In the matter sub judice, Eaton alleges a single count against Wilkes-Barre
Hospital, claiming it violated the FLSA’s antiretaliation provision. (See Doc. 2 ¶¶ 8-
15). Eaton straightforwardly alleges the following: (1) she formally filed a grievance
with the Hospital regarding a purported FLSA violation; (2) two weeks later, the
Hospital informed Eaton her complaint was “substantiated”; and (3) the Hospital
simultaneously informed her that she would be permanently laid off. (See Doc. 2 ¶¶
9-11). Eaton quite plainly accused her employer of violating the FLSA by stating
her belief that its staffing policy was “in violation of the law under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.” (See Doc. 2, Ex. A). Her grievance is “sufficiently clear and
detailed”—it references the FLSA twice and paraphrases a corresponding
regulation. See Kasten, 563 U.S. at 14. Wilkes-Barre Hospital’s argument that
“Eaton’s grievance does not allege a FLSA violation” is simply incorrect. (See Doc.
6 at 11).
By its briefing, Wilkes-Barre Hospital also seeks to litigate Eaton’s
underlying grievance, claiming the practice Eaton disputed is permitted by the
FLSA. (See Doc. 6 at 11-12; Doc. 11 at 2-3). The Hospital’s contention that it did not
actually violate the FLSA has little bearing on Eaton’s prima facie case. Our court
of appeals admonishes us to interpret the FLSA “liberally,” rather than “in a
narrow, grudging manner.” See Brock, 812 F.2d at 124 (internal citation omitted).
So long as the employer has “fair notice” of the employee’s assertion of FLSA
rights, no more is required. See Kasten, 563 U.S. at 14. At the pleading stage, we
accept as true Eaton’s well-pled allegations that she reported an FLSA violation
and that Wilkes-Barre Hospital “substantiated” her complaint. (See Doc. 2 ¶¶ 9-11).
Eaton’s complaint need not prove that the Hospital in fact violated the FLSA under
the first prong of her prima facie claim. We conclude that Eaton has stated a claim
for retaliation under the FLSA.
IV. Conclusion
We will deny Wilkes-Barre Hospital’s motion (Doc. 5) to dismiss. An
appropriate order shall issue.
/S/ CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER
Christopher C. Conner
United States District Judge
Middle District of Pennsylvania
Dated: May 11, 2021