Bonilla v. Saul

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EMILY JESSICA BONILLA,

Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:20-CV-00161

v.

(MEHALCHICK, M.J.)

ANDREW M. SAUL,

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Emily Jessica Bonilla (“Bonilla”) brings this action under section 1631(c) of

the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c) for judicial review of the final decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security (the “Commissioner”) denying her application for

supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. For the following

reasons, the undersigned shall order the Commissioner’s decision be REVERSED and this

matter REMANDED.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In September 2015, Bonilla filed an application under Title XVI for supplemental

security income benefits, claiming disability beginning August 20, 2015, due to a mild stroke

and left side issues. (Doc. 5-6, at 2). The Social Security Administration initially denied the

application in March 2016, prompting Bonilla’s request for a hearing, which Administrative

Law Judge (ALJ) Theodore Burock held on November 8, 2017, as well as on August 23,

2018. (Doc. 5-6, at 16; Doc. 5-5, at 29, 60). In a December 2018 written decision, the ALJ

determined that Bonilla is not disabled and therefore not entitled to benefits or income under

Title XVI. (Doc. 5-2, at 22). The Appeals Council subsequently denied Bonilla’s request for

review. (Doc. 5-2, at 2).

On January 30, 2020, Bonilla commenced the instant action. (Doc. 1). The

Commissioner responded on April 6, 2020, providing the requisite transcripts from Bonilla’s

disability proceedings. (Doc. 4; Doc. 5). The parties then filed their respective briefs, with

Bonilla raising three principal bases for reversal or remand. (Doc. 14; Doc. 15).

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

To receive benefits under XVI of the Social Security Act, a claimant must demonstrate

an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or

which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12

months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 416.909. To satisfy this requirement, a

claimant must have a severe physical or mental impairment that makes it impossible to do his

or her previous work or any other substantial gainful activity that exists in significant numbers

in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B); 20 C.F.R. § 416.905(a).1

A. ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW

The “Social Security Administration, working through ALJs, decides whether a

claimant is disabled by following a now familiar five-step analysis.” Hess v. Comm’r Soc. Sec.,

931 F.3d 198, 200–01 (3d Cir. 2019). The “burden of proof is on the claimant at all steps

except step five, where the burden is on the Commissioner of Social Security.” Hess, 931 F.3d

at 201; see 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(a)(1). Thus, if the claimant establishes an inability to do past

1 A “physical or mental impairment” is defined as an impairment resulting from

“anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by

medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §

1382c(a)(3)(D).

relevant work at step four, the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five to show that jobs

exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant could perform

consistent with his or her residual functional capacity, age, education, and past work

experience. 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(a)(1).

B. JUDICIAL REVIEW

The Court’s review of a determination denying an application for Title XVI benefits is

limited “to considering whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence.”

Katz v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., No. 19-1268, 2019 WL 6998150, at *1 (3d Cir. Dec. 20, 2019).

Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather

such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The quantum of proof is less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere

scintilla. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). A single piece of evidence is not

substantial if the ALJ ignores countervailing evidence or fails to resolve a conflict created by

such evidence. Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993). In an adequately

developed factual record, substantial evidence may be “something less than the weight of the

evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does

not prevent [the ALJ’s decision] from being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v.

Fed. Maritime Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966).

The question before the Court, therefore, is not whether Bonilla is disabled, but

whether the Commissioner’s determination that Bonilla is not disabled is supported by

substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct application of the relevant

law. See Arnold v. Colvin, No. 3:12-CV-02417, 2014 WL 940205, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 11,

2014) (“[I]t has been held that an ALJ’s errors of law denote a lack of substantial

evidence.”); Burton v. Schweiker, 512 F. Supp. 913, 914 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (“The

[Commissioner]’s determination as to the status of a claim requires the correct application of

the law to the facts.”); see also Wright v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 675, 678 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that

the scope of review on legal matters is plenary). “In determining if the Commissioner’s

decision is supported by substantial evidence the court must scrutinize the record as a

whole.” Leslie v. Barnhart, 304 F. Supp. 2d 623, 627 (M.D. Pa. 2003). If “the ALJ’s findings

of fact . . . are supported by substantial evidence in the record,” the Court is bound by those

findings. Knepp v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2000).

III. THE ALJ’S DECISION

In his written decision, the ALJ determined that Bonilla “has not been under a

disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, since September 15, 2015, the date the

application was filed.” (Doc. 5-2, at 22). The ALJ reached this conclusion after proceeding

through the five-step sequential analysis provided in 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a).

A. STEP ONE

At step one of the five-step analysis, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is

engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i). If a claimant is engaging

in substantial gainful activity, the claimant is not disabled, regardless of age, education, or

work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b). Substantial gainful activity is defined as work

activity requiring significant physical or mental activity and resulting in pay or profit. 20

C.F.R. § 416.972. The ALJ must consider only the earnings of the claimant. 20 C.F.R. §

416.974. Here, the ALJ determined that Bonilla “has not continuously engaged in substantial

gainful activity since September 15, 2015, the application date,” and therefore proceeded to

step two of the analysis. (Doc. 5-2, at 13-14).

B. STEP TWO

At step two, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a medically

determinable impairment – or a combination of impairments – that is severe and meets the

12-month duration requirement. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If the ALJ determines that a

claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that significantly limits

the claimant’s “physical or mental ability to do basic work activities,” the ALJ will find that

the claimant does not have a severe impairment and is therefore not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §

416.920(c). If, however, a claimant establishes a severe impairment or combination of

impairments, the ALJ proceeds to consider step three. Here, the ALJ found that Bonilla had

seven severe impairments: migraine headaches, status post cerebrovascular accident,

depression, anxiety, recurrent lymphadenopathy, locked right knee, and seizure disorder.

(Doc. 5-2, at 14).

C. STEP THREE

At step three, the ALJ must determine whether the severe impairment or combination

of impairments meets or equals the medical equivalent of an impairment listed in the version

of 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. I, App. 1 that was in effect on the date of the ALJ’s decision.

20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii), 416.925, 416.926. The sections in this appendix are commonly

referred to as “listings.” If the ALJ determines that the claimant’s impairment or impairments

meet a listing, then the claimant is considered disabled, otherwise the ALJ must proceed to

and analyze the fourth step of the sequential analysis. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d). Here, the ALJ

determined that none of Bonilla’s impairments, considered individually or in combination,

meets or equals the severity of a listed impairment. (Doc. 5-2, at 14-16).

D. RESIDUAL FUNCTIONAL CAPACITY

Between steps three and four, the ALJ evaluates the claimant’s residual functional

capacity (RFC), crafted upon consideration of all the evidence presented. At this intermediate

step, the ALJ considers all claimant’s symptoms and “the extent to which [they] can

reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence.”

20 C.F.R. § 416.929(a). This involves a two-step inquiry according to which the ALJ must (1)

determine whether an underlying medically determinable mental impairment or impairments

could reasonably be expected to produce the claimant’s symptoms; and, if so, (2) evaluate the

intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the claimant’s symptoms to determine the extent

to which they limit the claimant’s functional limitations. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(b)–(c).

Here, Bonilla alleged that her medical impairments affected her sleep, memory,

concentration, understanding, and her abilities to lift, squat, bend, stand, walk, hear, climb

stairs, see, complete tasks, follow instructions, use her hands, and get along with others. (Doc.

5-2, at 17). The ALJ found that while Bonilla’s medically determinable impairments could

reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms, her statements concerning the

intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of these symptoms were not entirely consistent with

the medical evidence and other evidence in the record. (Doc. 5-2, at 17). The ALJ concluded

that Bonilla had the RFC “to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(a)

except she is limited to occasional climbing of ramps and stairs.” (Doc. 5-2, at 16). The ALJ

also limited Bonilla to balancing, stooping, kneeling, and crouching only occasionally; never

crawling; never having concentrated exposure to extreme temperatures, wetness, fumes,

odors, dust, gases, and poor ventilation; never being exposed to unprotected heights or

dangerous machinery; performing only routine, repetitive tasks; and only occasional changes

in the work setting. (Doc. 5-2, at 16).

E. STEP FOUR

Step four requires the ALJ to determine whether the claimant had, during the relevant

period, the RFC to perform the requirements of his or her past relevant work regardless of the

claimant’s age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv). Past relevant

work is work that the claimant has done within the past 15 years, that was substantial gainful

activity, and that lasted long enough for the claimant to learn how to do it. 20 C.F.R. §

416.920(a)(4)(iv). The ALJ considers whether the claimant retains the capacity to perform the

particular functional demands and job duties of the past relevant work, either as the claimant

actually performed it or as ordinarily required by employers throughout the national

economy. Garibay v. Comm’r Of Soc. Sec., 336 F. App’x 152, 158 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting SSR

82–6). “If the claimant can perform [her] past relevant work despite [her] limitations, [she] is

not disabled.” Hess, 931 F.3d at 202 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv)); see also 20 C.F.R.

§ 416.920(a)(4)(iv). Here, the ALJ determined that Bonilla had no past relevant work and thus

proceeded to step five of the sequential analysis. (Doc. 5-2, at 21).

F. STEP FIVE

At step five of the sequential analysis, the ALJ considers the claimant’s age, education,

and work experience to determine whether the claimant can make the adjustment to other

work. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(v). A claimant who can adjust to other work is not disabled.

20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(v). Here, considering Bonilla’s age, education, work experience,

and RFC, the ALJ determined that there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the

national economy that Bonilla could perform. (Doc. 5-2, at 21). In making this determination,

the ALJ relied on the vocational expert’s testimony that Bonilla was able to perform the

requirements of occupations such as a final assembler, order clerk for food and beverage, and

carding machine operator, all sedentary occupations with open positions ranging from 20,000

to 83,000 nationally. (Doc. 5-2, at 22). Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Bonilla was not

disabled and denied her application for benefits. (Doc. 5-2, at 22).

IV. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Bonilla submits that the ALJ committed the following errors, each of

which warrant remand: (1) he failed to consider how particular mental health issues limit

Bonilla’s functional capacity; (2) he was obligated, but failed, to include various conditions in

Bonilla’s collection of severe impairments; and (3) he assigned too much weight to some non-

examining physicians. (Doc. 14, at 13-14, 20, 21). The Commissioner responds that the ALJ

appropriately evaluated all of the evidence and that substantial evidence supports the decision.

(Doc. 15, at 1-2). Additionally, the Commissioner avers that the non-examining physicians’

opinions were entitled to the weight they were given. (Doc. 15, at 1-2).

A. IMPAIRMENTS NOT CONSIDERED SEVERE

Bonilla asserts that she is limited from various impairments which the ALJ did not

consider to be severe or were not mentioned in the decision. (Doc. 14, at 19). She avers that

her medical records reflect that she suffers from left-sided weakness with left-food drop, right

leg issues, vertigo, and asthma. (Doc. 14, at 20). “Claimant’s medical records clearly reflect

these conditions as having a more than minimal impact upon Claimant’s activities of daily

living, and as such each of these conditions would have some impact upon Claimant’s RFC.”

(Doc. 14, at 20). It should follow, according to Bonilla, that the ALJ should have classified

these conditions as severe and factored them into her RFC. (Doc. 14, at 21). The

Commissioner responds that the medical record does not support Bonilla’s complaints and

alleged limitations. (Doc. 15, at 21). He contends that the evidence cited by Bonilla is

contradicted by other evidence in the record, and that her credibility is in doubt. (Doc. 15, at

22-23).

As mentioned supra, at step two the ALJ is required to consider whether a claimant's

impairments are (1) medically determinable and (2) severe. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (a)(4)(ii). This

severity inquiry is a de minimis screening device used to discard meritless claims. See Newell v.

Commissioner of Social Security, 347 F.3d 541, 546 (3d Cir. 2003); McCrea v. Commissioner of

Social Security, 370 F.3d 357, 360 (3d Cir. 2004). If an ALJ determines that a claimant has a

severe condition at step two, then the sequential analysis proceeds to step three. 20 C.F.R. §

416.920 (a)(4)(ii).

Under the regulations, a medically determinable impairment is evaluated as follows:

Your [medically determinable] impairment(s) must result from anatomical,

physiological, or psychological abnormalities that can be shown by medically

acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. Therefore, a physical

or mental impairment must be established by objective medical evidence from

an acceptable medical source. We will not use your statement of symptoms, a

diagnosis, or a medical opinion to establish the existence of an impairment(s).

20 C.F.R. § 416.921.

Further, to qualify as “severe,” the impairment, or combination of impairments, must

“significantly limit[ ] [a claimant's] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20

C.F.R. § 416.921(c). According to SSR 85-28, examples of basic work activities include:

[W]alking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying or

handling; seeing, hearing, and speaking; understanding, carrying out, and

remembering simple instructions; use of judgement, responding appropriately

to supervision, coworkers, and usual work situations; and dealing with changes

in a routine work setting.

SSR 85-28, 1985 WL 56856 (Jan. 1, 1985).

An impairment is not considered severe, however, if it only presents a

“slight abnormality” that has “no more than a minimal effect on [a claimant’s] ability to

work.” Newell, 347 F.3d at 546.

The burden of showing the severity of an impairment at step two rests with a

claimant. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987). This burden is “not an exacting one,”

and “[a]ny doubt as to whether a showing has been made is to be resolved in favor of the

applicant.” McCrea, 370 F.3d at 360. Accordingly, the Third Circuit has held that “[t]his step

should be ‘rarely utilized’ to deny benefits.” Kinney v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 244 F. App'x 467,

469 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing McCrea, 370 F.3d at 361). “Due to this limited function, the

Commissioner's determination to deny an applicant's request for benefits at step two should

be reviewed with close scrutiny.” McCrea, 370 F.3d at 360.

First, Bonilla claims that her left-sided weakness with left-foot drop has been ongoing

since 2015 and is confirmed by her medical records. In support of this claim, Bonilla cites not

to a medical record, but to the transcript of her oral hearing. (Doc. 14, at 20) (citing Doc. 5-

5, at 53). The law is clear that “a physical or mental impairment must be established by

objective medical evidence from an acceptable medical source. We will not use your

statement of symptoms, a diagnosis, or a medical opinion to establish the existence of an

impairment(s).” 20 C.F.R. § 416.921. Therefore, Bonilla’s testimony is insufficient, by itself,

to establish a physical or mental impairment. As for the remaining conditions which Bonilla

argues should be considered severe, Bonilla identifies no medical documentation in support

of her averments. (Doc. 14, at 19-21). Plaintiff’s failure to identify support in the medical

record results in a failure to carry her burden. See Gonzalez v. Saul, 2020 WL 5074326, at *12

(M.D. Pa. 2020). The ALJ’s decision shall not be reversed on this issue.

B. LIMITATIONS NOT IN THE RFC

Bonilla next asserts that the ALJ failed to include in the RFC particular limitations

caused by her severe impairments. (Doc. 14, at 11-18).

1. Mental Health Limitations

First, Bonilla identifies panic attacks, depression, and neurological issues, all of which

give rise to particular work challenges. (Doc. 14, at 13-14). The panic attacks worsen with the

stress of work and can force her to leave work early or not be able to work at all. (Doc. 14, at

13-14). Bonilla’s “neurological issues” affect her concentration and focus, her ability to

remain on task, give her insomnia, and cause nervous and anxious behavior. (Doc. 14, at 13-

14). These issues’ effects on Bonilla’s “ability to remain on task, need for unscheduled breaks,

and absenteeism,” were not addressed by the ALJ, and the RFC is insufficient to handle these

limitations. (Doc. 14, at 14-15). The Commissioner responds that the ALJ “properly

discredited [the] dubious allegations” regarding these perceived limitations. (Doc. 15, at 19).

He submits that Bonilla does not present evidence that these limitations exist and that they

satisfy the 12-month durational requirement. (Doc. 15, at 20-21).

The ALJ’s failure to address substantial evidence that Bonilla is limited by the effects

of her depression and anxiety, particularly the symptoms of fatigue and insomnia, is cause for

remand. Bonilla identifies substantial evidence in the medical record corroborating her

allegations of sleep disturbance, nervousness, anxiety, insomnia, panic attacks, and

depression. (Doc. 5-5, at 13, 18; Doc. 5-13, at 64; Doc. 5-19, at 56-61). On October 12, 2015,

the Medication Management Assessment provided by Cindy Wolf, CRNP, reflected that

Bonilla had been diagnosed with major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and

primary insomnia. (Doc. 5-13, at 64). Symptoms included changes in mood and loss of

interest in activities. (Doc. 5-13, at 64). The mental status exam revealed depression, anxiety,

and insomnia. (Doc. 5-13, at 65). Nearly four months later, on February 5, 2016, Bonilla

reported her depression and anxiety as 10 out of 10. (Doc. 5-19, at 58). She also stated that

she was having panic attacks daily. (Doc. 5-19, at 58). Her therapist at this time reported that

Bonilla suffered from, inter alia, sleep disturbance, fatigue, loss of interest, issues

concentrating, and panic attacks. (Doc. 5-19, at 60). Her social environment and

“occupational problem” are described as psychosocial stressors. (Doc. 5-19, at 60).

Approximately two years later, on December 3, 2018, Bonilla reported to Dr. Robert Knipe

that she experienced dysphoric mood, sleep disturbance, nervousness, and anxiousness. (Doc.

5-5, at 18). She reported the same on December 13, 2018. (Doc. 5-5, at 13).

Throughout his decision, the ALJ recognizes the presence of these issues but fails to

adequately address them. He opines that “the claimant has depression and anxiety based on

records from Philhaven Lebanon, a treating mental health provider,” and that “Ms. Miller

noted that the claimant has frequent crying, sleep disturbance, decrease in appetite, fatigue,

loss of interest, concentration issues, and panic attacks.” (Doc. 5-2, at 18). The ALJ also

acknowledges Bonilla’s oral testimony that she stopped working at Boscov’s due to fatigue.

(Doc. 5-2, at 19). Despite the ALJ’s acknowledgment that Bonilla’s mental health provider

had described her struggle with depression and anxiety leading to insomnia and fatigue, 2 he

goes on to state that “the treatment record does not support or provide a basis for [her inability

to work due to fatigue],” and “the record does not provide a medical or psychological basis

for missing work.”3 (Doc. 5-2, at 18-19). This conclusion is clearly belied by the Philhaven

2 Fatigue and sleep problems are frequent symptoms of depression. Rachel Nall, MSN,

CRNA, Fatigue and Depression: Are They Connected?, Healthline (last updated Mar. 29, 2020)

https://www.healthline.com/health/depression/fatigue.

3 The ALJ’s conclusion that “the claimant’s ability to care for her four children is

inconsistent with her testimony of migraines, seizures, fatigue, etc.” is flawed. (Doc. 5-2, at

19). Individuals frequently care for children while experiencing such ailments.

Furthermore, insofar as the ALJ uses Bonilla’s boyfriend’s testimony “that the

claimant was terminated by Boscov’s because she missed too much work and had to care for

Lebanon records and Ms. Miller’s notes, which the ALJ had previously mentioned. (Doc. 5-

2, at 18).

The ALJ identifies substantial evidence that Bonilla has normal memory,

comprehension, mood, affect, and behavior despite her depression and anxiety, however he

does not address how the depression and anxiety affect her ability to remain on task and work

without unscheduled breaks or absenteeism. (Doc. 5-2, at 17, 19-20). The only instance in

which the ALJ touches upon Bonilla’s fatigue and its effect on her ability to work a regular

schedule is when he assigns significant weight to the assessment of Alex Siegel, Ph.D., a non-

examining DDS psychologist. (Doc. 5-2, at 20). That assessment includes the opinion that

Bonilla is “not significantly limited” in her “ability to perform activities within a schedule,

maintain regular attendance, and be punctual within customary tolerances.” (Doc. 5-6, at 12).

However, Siegal does not say how he came to this opinion and the ALJ does not justify his

reliance on this portion of Siegel’s assessment with medical evidence. (Doc. 5-2, at 20; Doc.

5-6, at 12-13).

In sum, the ALJ found that Bonilla suffers from depression and anxiety and wrote that

her treating mental health provider noted that she has sleep disturbance, fatigue,

concentration issues, and panic attacks. (Doc. 5-2, at 18). Bonilla testified to frequently

suffering from fatigue and that her chronic night sweats frequently wake her up at night. (Doc.

5-5, at 50-51). The ALJ acknowledged that Bonilla was unable to work full time at Boscov’s

due to fatigue but did not account for the effects of fatigue in the RFC. (Doc. 5-2, at 16, 19).

her four young children,” to contradict Bonilla’s testimony that she stopped work due to

fatigue, the ALJ errs. (Doc. 5-2, at 19). It stands to reason that an individual who suffers from

fatigue would miss too much work and would be unable to balance work with raising children.

See Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 612-13 (3d Cir. 2014) (“An ALJ cannot reject evidence for

an incorrect or unsupported reason.”).

In light of the above, his statement that “the record does not provide a medical or

psychological basis for missing work,” is severely flawed. (Doc. 5-2, at 19). No valid reason

is provided for discounting the effect of fatigue and sleep disturbances on Bonilla’s ability to

work or for concluding that Bonilla can work a full and uninterrupted schedule despite

suffering from fatigue and insomnia. (Doc. 5-2, at 19; Doc. 5-5, at 50-51). The ALJ may not

reject evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason, thus remand is necessary to resolve this

issue. Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999).

Because the Court recommends vacatur of the ALJ’s decision based on the failure to

account for limitations to Bonilla’s work schedule, it declines to address Bonilla’s remaining

allegations of error, as “[a] remand may produce different results on these claims, making

discussion of them moot.” Burns v. Colvin, 156 F. Supp. 3d 579, 598 (M.D. Pa. 2016).

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that the Commissioner’s decision to deny

Plaintiff’s application for benefits be VACATED and the case be REMANDED for further

proceedings consistent with this order. Final judgment be issued in favor of Plaintiff, and the

Clerk of Court close this case.

An appropriate Order follows.

Dated: February 25, 2021 s/ Karoline Mehalchick

KAROLINE MEHALCHICK

United States Magistrate Judge