Opinion

Bird v. Borough of Moosic

Court
District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
Filed
Feb 19, 2021
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 29.1%

“There must be at least some definitive administrative determination resulting in a denial or deprivation of due process before [a plaintiff] can raise such a claim. Until there is a final decision which has practical impact on a litigant, it is not ripe for adjudication.”

How later courts described this case

  • “There must be at least some definitive administrative determination resulting in a denial or deprivation of due process before [a plaintiff] can raise such a claim. Until there is a final decision which has practical impact on a litigant, it is not ripe for adjudication.”
  • dismissing due process claims as unripe where terminated city employee failed to appeal CBA- mandated arbitration decision and “raise these matters in available and constitutionally adequate” state court proceedings

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

HEATHER BIRD,

Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:20-cv-00337

V. (SAPORITO, M.J.)

Wit Bp

BOROUGH OF MOOSIC, et al., ko 8, ‘Poe,

Defendants. PER “8 ig 224 “

MEMORANDUM OV ee

This is a civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The plaintiff, Heather Bird, is a part-time police officer for one of the two

named defendants, the Borough of Moosic. Bird was injured on the job

and applied for temporary disability benefits under the Pennsylvania

Heart and Lung Act, 53 P.S. § 637. On September 10, 2019, the second of

two named defendants, James Segilia, mayor of the Borough, summarily

denied her application for Heart and Lung benefits.

On February 25, 2020, appearing through counsel, the plaintiff

commenced this civil rights action by filing a complaint. (Doc. 1.) In her

complaint, the plaintiff claims that this summary denial of her Heart and

Lung Act benefits application violated her Fourteenth Amendment

procedural due process rights because she was deprived of a property

interest without the requisite pre- or post-deprivation due process—that

is, she was denied her Heart and Lung benefits without being provided

with adequate notice, an explanation of the evidence upon which the

Borough based its denial, or an opportunity to present her side of the

story.

On December 29, 2020, we entered an order that, among other

things, directed the parties to show cause why this case should or should

not be dismissed for lack of ripeness for adjudication. (Doc. 52.) See

generally Suburban Trails, Inc. v. N.J. Transit Corp., 800 F. 2d 361, 365

(3d Cir. 1986) (“[R]ipeness of issues for adjudication is a matter we must

raise and examine independently of the parties’ wishes.”). Both sides

have responded. (Doc. 54; Doc. 55; Doc. 56.)

Based on the record before us, it appears that on February 19, 2020,

a hearing officer was designated by the Borough to conduct an

administrative hearing on the plaintiffs claim for Heart and Lung Act

benefits, pursuant to the Pennsylvania Local Agency Law, 2 Pa. Cons.

Stat. Ann. § 553. (Doc. 54-1, at 27 n.1.) On February 27, 2020, the hearing

officer provided the plaintiff with written notice of the hearing, originally

scheduled to take place on March 27, 2020. (Doc. 39-1, at 19.) The hearing

~_9. □

was twice postponed—once due to the COVID-19 pandemic and once at

the request of plaintiff's counsel. (Id., at 26, 28.) Ultimately, the hearing

was held on August 27, 2020. On December 4, 2020, the hearing officer

issued a decision finding that the plaintiff was ineligible to receive Heart

and Lung benefits because she was a part-time, non-salaried police

officer. (Doc. 54-1, at 26-82.)

In a December 20, 2020, letter to the court regarding the hearing

officer’s decision, plaintiffs counsel noted that the hearing officer’s

adjudication report had not yet been offered to the Borough Council for

consideration, and it had not yet been accepted or adopted by the Borough

Council as a local agency decision. (Doc. 49, at 2.) See generally Lewis v.

Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 28 PPER § 28084, 1997 WL 34821379 (Pa.

Commw. Ct. Mar. 5, 1997) (holding that, under Local Agency Law, a

municipality complies with due process requirements “by: (1) appointing

a hearing officer to hold a hearing at which [the employee] was

represented by counsel and had the opportunity to cross-examine

witnesses; (2) reviewing the [hearing] officer's findings of facts,

conclusions of law and recommendation; and (3) making an independent |

ruling based on the entire record”): Romanick v. Rush Twp., 44 PPER

99, 2013 WL 1683691 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Apr. 4, 2013) (noting that

township supervisors adopted a hearing officer’s decision regarding a

police officer’s removal as police chief and demotion to patrol officer).1

Based on the posture of the plaintiff's administrative appeal, we

find her due process claims are not ripe for adjudication by this federal

district court because administrative proceedings before the Borough are

not final, and she has not yet availed herself of state court forums for

judicial review of a final administrative adjudication. See Amanio v.

Witlin, 544 F. Supp. 140, 142 (M.D. Pa. 1982) (“There must be at least

some definitive administrative determination resulting in a denial or

deprivation of due process before [a plaintiff] can raise such a claim. Until

there is a final decision which has practical impact on a litigant, it is not

ripe for adjudication.”); see also Bonilla v. City of Allentown, 359 F. Supp.

3d 281, 299 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (dismissing due process claims as premature

where former police officer’s disability pension application remained

pending after a state court reversed and remanded it to a municipal

1 The Borough Council’s minutes and agendas, which are available

to the public on the Borough’s web site, and of which we may take judicial

notice, see Perano v. Twp. of Tilden, Civil Action No. 09-00754, 2010 WL

1462367, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 12, 2010), do not reflect consideration

of any resolution adopting the hearing officer’s adjudication either.

A.

pension board for further proceedings); Isajewicz v. Bucks Cty. Dept of

Commcins, 851 F. Supp. 161, 166 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (dismissing due process

claims as unripe where terminated city employee failed to appeal CBA-

mandated arbitration decision and “raise these matters in available and

constitutionally adequate” state court proceedings); Gniotek v. City of

Philadelphia, 630 F. Supp. 827, 831-82 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (citing Amanto,

544 F. Supp. at 142, and dismissing due process claims as unripe where

underlying claims remained under review by municipal pension board).?

Accordingly, this case shall be dismissed for lack of ripeness for

adjudication.

An appropriate order follows.

Dated: February 14 , 2021 F. ,

Yoenpn F.

United States Magistrate Judge

2 The plaintiff has argued that, notwithstanding these ongoing

administrative proceedings, she has a ripe claim based for pre-

deprivation denial of due process because the Borough mayor summarily

denied her initial claim for Heart. and Lung benefits. But, as we

previously noted (see Doc. 53, at 3-4), “a procedural due process violation

is not complete unless and until the [s]tate fails to provide due process

because the state may cure a procedural deprivation by providing a later

procedural remedy.” Bonilla, 359 F. Supp. 3d at 297 (internal quotation

marks omitted). Here, that later procedural remedy is still unfolding.

EF!

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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