The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ROSE PALMER, AS : Civ. No. 1:20-CV-00539
ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE :
ESTATE OF EVERETT :
PALMER, JR., :
:
Plaintiff, :
:
vs.
:
YORK COUNTY, et al., :
:
Defendants. : Judge Sylvia H. Rambo
MEMORANDUM
Before the court is the motion for judgment on the pleadings (Doc. 52) filed
by Defendants Eric Emig, Nicholas Cessna, Donald Kopp, Timothy Irizarry,
Greggory Clark, William Lybrand, Tyler Larkin, Max Fink, Wayne Smith, Ted
Konasol, Brandon Schneider, Nathan Fitzkee, Steven Bolding, and Ronald Belt
(collectively “the Guard Defendants”). For the reasons set forth below, the motion
will be denied.
I. BACKGROUND
This action arises from the death of Everett Palmer, Jr., which occurred on
April 9, 2018, while Mr. Palmer was in custody at York County Prison. Plaintiff
Rose Palmer is the mother of Mr. Palmer and the duly appointed administratrix of
his estate. (Doc. 26, ¶ 3.) The Guard Defendants, as alleged, are individuals that were
employed as prison guards at the York County Prison during the relevant period. (Id.
¶ 4.)
According to the amended complaint, on April 7, 2018, Mr. Palmer travelled
from his home in Delaware to York County, Pennsylvania to voluntarily address an
open warrant related to an old DUI charge. (Id. ¶ 16.) After speaking with authorities
in York County, Mr. Palmer was arrested and taken into custody. (Id. ¶ 20.) He was
brought before a Magisterial District Judge later that evening, and bail was set at
$5,000. (Id. ¶¶ 20-21.) Mr. Palmer did not have the funds immediately available to
him, so he was remanded to the custody of the York County Prison. (Id. ¶ 22.)
Sometime after Mr. Palmer arrived at the prison, prison officials determined
that he was a suicide risk and he was therefore placed in an isolated cell under 24-
hour watch. (Id. ¶¶ 25, 27.) Later that evening, Mr. Palmer informed two John Doe
guards that he was hallucinating, but the guards failed to inform a medical
professional and instead recorded Mr. Palmer’s behavior as “Quiet/Seclusive” on
the prison check sheet. (Id. ¶ 28-30.)
Mr. Palmer’s mental health continued to decline throughout the night and into
the early hours of April 8, 2018. He yelled and howled from his cell for long periods
of time. (Id. ¶ 31.) At one point, he disrobed and rubbed urine on himself while he
screamed at the guards assigned to observe him. (Id. ¶ 33.) As his screaming
continued, Mr. Palmer ripped his mattress from the bed and stood on top of the bed
platform, causing one John Doe guard to joke to another, “he’s not that big.” (Id. ¶¶
34-35.) On their check sheets, the guards recorded Mr. Palmer’s behavior as “Self-
Contained Activity” or “Quiet/Seclusive,” and nobody alerted a medical
professional. (Id. ¶¶ 36-37.)
Later in the morning on April 8, Mr. Palmer met with a mental health
specialist at the prison who had not been informed about his prior behavior. (Id. ¶¶
44-45.) The specialist assessed Mr. Palmer as suffering from psychosis and noted
evidence of thought disorder or perceptual disturbance. (Id. ¶ 45.) Mr. Palmer was
thereafter returned to his cell. (Id. ¶ 46.)
In the afternoon of April 8, surveillance video footage shows that one of the
Guard Defendants approached Mr. Palmer’s cell and handed him a bag containing
what Ms. Palmer believes to be illicit methamphetamine. (Id. ¶ 47.) The amended
complaint alleges Mr. Palmer was later found to have such high levels of
methamphetamine and amphetamine in his blood that, given the half-life of the drug,
it would have been “impossible” for him “to have consumed all of the
methamphetamine prior to turning himself in to York County Authorities.” (Id. ¶
101.) The Guard Defendant handed the bag to Mr. Palmer “directly in front of” three
other Guard Defendants, but none did anything to stop the transfer or alert a medical
professional. (Id. ¶¶ 49-51.) The amended complaint also alleges that twice later that
evening, a medical provider was seen giving Mr. Palmer an unknown substance that
was never recorded in his medical chart. (Id. ¶ 52.)
Mr. Palmer continued to deteriorate overnight and into the morning of April
9. He tore his mattress off his bed, searched for items in his toilet bowl, yelled
incoherently, climbed on top of his sink, and screamed as he disrobed. (Id. ¶ 56-60.)
Two of the Guard Defendants responded to Mr. Palmer’s behavior by writing him
an infraction for placing his mattress over the door, and they recorded his condition
throughout this time as “Quiet/Seclusive” or “Self-Contained Activity” on the
prison’s check sheet. (Id. ¶¶ 61-62, 64.)
At around 4:00 am on April 9, Mr. Palmer “continued to scream and yell
incomprehensibly, crawl and run around his cell naked, and try to remove his sink
and toilet from the wall while Defendants watched but took no action.” (Id. ¶ 72.)
Mr. Palmer then began injuring himself by “slamming his fist, feet, and eventually
his head into the cell door.” (Id. ¶ 74.) As a result, the prison’s tactical unit, which
included ten of the Guard Defendants, was called to respond. (Id. ¶ 77.)
The tactical unit, or CERT team, arrived at Mr. Palmer’s cell and advised him
to lay on the ground and place his hands behind his back. (Id. ¶ 78.) Mr. Palmer
complied for a brief period. (Id.) At around 4:17 am, the CERT team opened the cell
door. (Id. ¶ 80.) One of the Guard Defendants tased Mr. Palmer, who was standing
near the door with his hands clasped in front of him to be handcuffed, and Mr. Palmer
recoiled to the back of the cell. (Id. ¶¶ 80-81.) Another Guard Defendant then jumped
on Mr. Palmer with a tactical shield, and six other Guard Defendants entered and
piled on top as they kicked, struck, and stood on Mr. Palmer. (Id. ¶¶ 82-83.) Two
Guard Defendants tased Mr. Palmer at least three more times total. (Id. ¶¶ 84-85.)
At some point, a spit hood was placed over Mr. Palmer’s head. (Id. ¶ 87.) Mr. Palmer
laid at the bottom of the pile of guards for 3 minutes and 7 seconds. (Id. ¶ 86.)
The CERT team eventually carried Mr. Palmer out of the cell and placed him
in an Emergency Restraint Chair with his arms shackled over his head. (Id. ¶¶ 88-
89.) As they locked him into the chair with the spit hood still over his head, Mr.
Palmer’s chest was heaving and his face turned blue. (Id. ¶ 90-91.) His chest then
stopped moving, and he appeared to be unconscious. (Id. ¶ 92-93.) In response, the
CERT team transported Mr. Palmer, with the spit hood over his head, to the prison’s
medical unit. (Id. ¶ 93.) When Mr. Palmer arrived, he showed no signs of breathing
and had little or no pulse. (Id. ¶ 95.) According to the amended complaint, the spit
hood was left on Mr. Palmer’s head for 8 minutes and 13 seconds after he stopped
breathing. (Id. ¶ 97.) Mr. Palmer was declared dead at a local hospital later that
morning. (Id. ¶ 98.)
A post-mortem analysis revealed extremely high levels of methamphetamine
and amphetamine in Mr. Palmer’s blood. (Id. ¶¶ 99-100.) As noted above, the
amended complaint alleges that, given the half-life of methamphetamine, such high
levels would not have been possible unless Mr. Palmer ingested the substance while
he was in custody. (Id. ¶ 101.)
Mr. Palmer’s autopsy was performed by a coroner with the York County
Coroner’s Office, who ruled that the cause of death was “undetermined.” (Id. ¶¶ 103,
106.) The amended complaint alleges that the coroner’s conclusion contravened “the
National Association of Medical Examiners position paper on Deaths in Custody,”
and that his findings in fact “lead to the unambiguous medical conclusion that [Mr.
Palmer] died from asphyxiation.” (Id. ¶¶ 106-107.)
On April 1, 2020, Ms. Palmer filed the original complaint in this action. (Doc.
1.) The original complaint named numerous defendants including, among others,
York County, the York County Prison Board, the York County Coroner, the York
County District Attorney, and various John Doe corporations including the
manufacturer of the spit hood that was placed over Mr. Palmer’s head. (See id. ¶¶ 4-
22.) It also named “John Doe Prison Guards 1-10” as defendants and asserted claims
against them for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, assault and battery, and
Pennsylvania wrongful death and survival action claims. (See id. pp. 13-16.)
In May 2020, Ms. Palmer obtained certain prison records and surveillance
footage from York County pursuant to a York County Court Order, which she claims
allowed her to identify for the first time those prison officials that were involved in
the events that led to Mr. Palmer’s death. (See Doc. 57, p. 11.) As a result of the new
information, Ms. Palmer amended her complaint on July 8, 2020. (Doc. 26.)
The amended complaint contains several new factual allegations, outlined
above, and names multiple new defendants, including the Guard Defendants. The
amended complaint alleges that the Guard Defendants were prison guards at York
County Prison during the relevant period, and that they are liable in their individual
capacities under Section 1983 for violating Mr. Palmer’s Fourteenth Amendment
rights, including by providing Mr. Palmer with methamphetamine that caused him
to have a psychotic break, by repeatedly failing to alert medical personnel about his
increasing mental instability, by using excessive force against him when the CERT
team entered his cell, by placing a spit hood over Mr. Palmer’s head that caused his
breathing to stop, and by subsequently failing to remove the spit hood for more than
eight minutes after his breathing stopped. (See id. ¶¶ 4, 55, 139, 140.) The amended
complaint also asserts claims for assault and battery against the Guard Defendants,
as well as a Pennsylvania wrongful death and survival action.
On November 20, 2020, the Guard Defendants filed a motion for judgement
on the pleadings, arguing that all Ms. Palmer’s claims against them are time barred.
(Doc. 52.) The matter has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) allows a party to move for judgment
after the pleadings are closed, but early enough to avoid a delay in trial. Judgement
on the pleadings is appropriate if “the movant clearly establishes there are no
material issues of fact, and he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Sikirica v.
Nationwide Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 214, 220 (3d Cir.2005) (citing Soc’y Hill Ass'n v.
Harris, 632 F.2d 1045, 1054 (3d Cir.1980)). To be entitled to relief, the defendant
must show that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts to support his or her claim
which would entitle him or her to relief. See Sikirica, 416 F.3d at 220. In deciding a
motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court must view the facts and the
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Sikirica, 416 F.3d at 220.
III. DISCUSSION
The Guard Defendants’ motion correctly points out that Ms. Palmer has a
statute of limitations problem. Ms. Palmer’s claims against the Guard Defendants
are all governed by two-year statute of limitations periods that began running on
April 9, 2018, the date of Mr. Palmer’s death. See Garvin v. City of Phila., 354 F.3d
215, 220 (3d Cir. 2003); 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524; 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524. The statute of
limitations for each of Ms. Palmer’s claims against the Guard Defendants therefore
expired on April 9, 2020, approximately three months before Ms. Palmer named the
Guard Defendants for the first time in this action by filing the amended complaint.
Given this timing issue, the parties appear to agree that Ms. Palmer can only
maintain her claims against the Guard Defendants if they relate back to the original
complaint she filed before the statute of limitations expired. Under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 15(c), where an amendment to a pleading changes the party or the
naming of the party against whom a claim is asserted, three conditions must be
satisfied for the amendment to relate back to the original pleading. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 15(c). These conditions are: (1) that the claim against the defendant sought to be
brought in arose out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth in the
original pleading; (2) that within the 90–day period for service of the summons and
complaint set forth in Rule 4(m), the newly-named defendant received notice of the
commencement of the action such that it will not be prejudiced in defending on the
merits; and (3) that within the same time period, the newly-added defendant must
have known, or should have known, that but for a mistake, he or she would have
been named as a defendant in the initial pleading. Miller v. Hassinger, 173 F. App’x
948, 955 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Singletary v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corrections, 266
F.3d 186, 194 (3d Cir. 2001)).
Only the second and third conditions involving notice are in dispute here. To
determine whether a defendant had actual notice that the initial complaint was filed
and that he or she was one of the intended defendants, “the focus is on whether the
defendant had timely notice that the plaintiff sought to assert claims” against him or
her. Green v. Robinson, 112 F. App’x 165, 169 (3d Cir. 2004). The Third Circuit
also permits notice to be imputed under certain circumstances based on the presence
of a shared attorney or identity of interest. Under the shared attorney method, “when
an originally named party and the party who is sought to be added are represented
by the same attorney, the attorney is likely to have communicated to the latter party
that he may very well be joined in the action.” Singletary, 266 F.3d at 196. Under
the identity of interest method, notice is imputed to parties that “are so closely related
in their business operations or other activities that the institution of an action against
one serves to provide notice of the litigation to the other.” Id. at 197 (quoting 6A
Charles A. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1499, at 146 (2d ed. 1990)).
Here, the Guard Defendants argue that they could not have had actual notice
of this case within the 90-day period for service of the summons and complaint
because the amended complaint that brought them into this action was filed more
than 90 days after the original complaint was filed. This argument is unpersuasive.
As explained above, the notice conditions of the relation back doctrine focus on
whether and when the newly-named defendant had knowledge of the original
complaint and the fact that the plaintiff sought to assert claims against him or her.
See Green, 112 F. App’x at 169. Neither inquiry necessarily turns on when the
amended complaint was filed or served.
Rather, the law in the Third Circuit is clear that “notice may be deemed to
have occurred when a party who has some reason to expect his potential involvement
as a defendant hears of the commencement of litigation through some informal
means.” Singletary, 266 F.3d at 195. Contrary to the Guard Defendants’ arguments,
the record by no means forecloses that they received sufficient notice of this action
and Ms. Palmer’s intent to name them as defendants within 90 days of its
commencement. Ms. Palmer’s original complaint made clear that she sought to learn
the identity of the guards that were involved in her son’s death and assert claims
against them. The Guard Defendants do not submit any affidavits or other evidence
to suggest when they learned about this case, and Ms. Palmer has not had an
opportunity to conduct discovery. Moreover, considering the gravity of the
underlying events and the internal investigations and other proceedings that grew
out of Mr. Palmer’s death, the media attention that this case spurred, and
representations in Ms. Palmer’s brief regarding communications between counsel,
the court cannot conclude with any confidence that discovery is unlikely to yield
evidence that some or all of the Guard Defendants had sufficient notice for purpose
of the relation back doctrine. (See e.g., Doc. 7, Doc. 57, pp, 3-7, 14-17.)
Ms. Palmer’s opposition brief also demonstrates that she acted expeditiously
to identify and name the Guard Defendants in this action, and that her failure to do
so sooner was largely attributable to York County’s repeated refusals to turn over
records, even after it was ordered to do so by multiple Pennsylvania judges. (See
Doc 57, pp. 2-7.) There may well have been a good reason for those refusals, and
the Guard Defendants should not suffer prejudice for the actions of a co-defendant,
but it would be manifestly unjust to simply assume at this stage, without the benefit
of any discovery and or even a single sworn statement by a defendant, that none of
the Guard Defendants had sufficient notice of this action for the amended complaint
to relate back. See generally Miller, 173 F. App’x at 956. As such, the Guard
Defendants’ motion for judgement on the pleadings will be denied without prejudice
to their right to renew their statute of limitations argument in a later motion for
summary judgment.1
1 The court agrees with the Guard Defendants’ argument that notice cannot be imputed to them
based solely on the fact that they share an attorney with an originally-named defendant given that
the shared representation did not begin until after the Rule 4(m) period expired. See Miller, 173 F.
App’x at 956 (“The shared attorney method requires that a plaintiff demonstrate that there was
‘some communication or relationship’ between the attorney for the named defendants and the
parties sought to be added as defendants prior to the expiration of the 120–day period for service
of the summons and complaint.”) (quoting Singletary, 266 F.3d at 196-97).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the court will deny the Guard Defendants’
motion for judgment on the pleadings. An appropriate order shall follow.
Dated: February 9, 2021
s/Sylvia H. Rambo
Sylvia H. Rambo
United States District Judge