Opinion

Brooks v. Hurwitz

Court
District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
Filed
Jan 5, 2021
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 29.1%

holding §2241 may not be used to raise an Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) claim that is barred by the - 5 - procedural limitations imposed by the AEDPA

How later courts described this case

  • holding §2241 may not be used to raise an Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) claim that is barred by the - 5 - procedural limitations imposed by the AEDPA
  • “§2241 is not available for an intervening change in the sentencing laws.”
  • “A party seeking reconsideration must show more than a disagreement with the Court’s decision, and ‘recapitulation of the cases and arguments considered by the court before rendering its original decision fails to carry the moving party’s burden’.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CHARLES AARON BROOKS, :

Petitioner : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:19-0302

v. : (JUDGE MANNION)

HUGH J. HURWITZ, :

Respondent :

MEMORANDUM

Petitioner, Charles Aaron Brooks (“Petitioner”), an inmate currently

confined in the Allenwood United States Penitentiary, White Deer,

Pennsylvania, filed the above captioned petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2241. (Doc. 1). He challenges his 1996 conviction on

five counts of armed bank robbery and three counts of use of a firearm during

a crime of violence. Id. Following an order to show cause, (Doc. 8)

Respondent filed a response on April 23, 2019. (Doc. 10). A traverse was

filed on May 2, 2019. (Doc. 11).

By Memorandum and Order dated February 13, 2020, this Court

denied Brooks’ petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Docs.12, 13). Presently

before the Court is Brooks’ motions for reconsideration of this Court’s

February 13, 2020 Memorandum and Order, closing the above captioned

action. (Docs. 14, 18). For the reasons that follow, the Court will deny all of

the Petitioner’s motions.

I. Discussion

A motion for reconsideration is a device of limited utility, which may

“not be used as a means to reargue matters already argued and disposed of

or as an attempt to relitigate a point of disagreement between the Court and

the litigant.” Ogden v. Keystone Residence, 226 F. Supp. 2d 588, 606 (M.D.

Pa. 2002) (citations omitted); see also Baker v. Astrue, Civ. No. 07-4560,

2008 WL 4922015, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2008). Rather, a court may alter

or amend its judgment only upon a showing from the movant of one of the

following: “(1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability

of new evidence ... or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to

prevent manifest injustice.” Max’s Seafood Cafe v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669,

677 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing North River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co.,

52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995)). A motion for reconsideration is

appropriate when a court has “patently misunderstood a party or has made

a decision outside the adversarial issues presented to the [c]ourt by the

parties or has made an error not of reasoning but of apprehension.”

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Rohrbach v. AT&T Nassau Metals Corp., 902 F. Supp. 523, 527 (M.D. Pa.

1995) (quoting Above the Belt, Inc. v. Mel Bohannan Roofing, Inc., 99 F.R.D.

99, 101 (E.D. Va. 1983)), vacated in part on other grounds on

reconsideration, 915 F. Supp. 712 (M.D. Pa. 1996). “It may not be used as a

means to reargue unsuccessful theories or argue new facts or issues that

were not presented to the court in the context of the matter previously

decided.” Gray v. Wakefield, No. 3:09-cv-979, 2014 WL 2526619, at *2 (M.D.

Pa. June 4, 2014); see also Database Am., Inc. v. Bellsouth Adver. & Publ’g

Corp., 825 F. Supp. 1216, 1220 (D.N.J. 1993) (“A party seeking

reconsideration must show more than a disagreement with the Court’s

decision, and ‘recapitulation of the cases and arguments considered by the

court before rendering its original decision fails to carry the moving party’s

burden’.”). “Because federal courts have a strong interest in the finality of

judgments, motions for reconsideration should be granted sparingly.”

Continental Cas. Co. v. Diversified Indus., Inc., 884 F. Supp. 937, 943 (E.D.

Pa. 1995).

A review of this Court’s Memorandum and Order reveal that Brooks’

petition was denied as follows:

Here, Petitioner attempts to challenge his 1996 criminal

conviction and sentence, based on issues that have previously

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been raised, or could have been raised in a §2255 motion. As

discussed above, to proceed under §2241, he must demonstrate

that a §2255 motion “is inadequate or ineffective to test the

legality of his detention.” 28 U.S.C. §2255(e). Petitioner has not

met this burden. As such, his claim does not fall within the

purview of the savings clause, as he has not demonstrated that

an intervening change in the law made his underlying conviction

non-criminal and that he had no prior opportunity to challenge his

conviction, and could not satisfy the stringent standard for filing

a second or successive §2255 motion.

Brooks’ lack of success in his direct appeal or his subsequent

§2255 motions does not render §2255 inadequate or ineffective

to address his claims. Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137

(1995), was decided before Brooks’ conviction on July 26, 1996.

Therefore, neither his belated attempt to raise a Bailey claim, nor

the remaining claims challenging issues which arose during his

prosecution and trial do not come within §2241’s safety valve

provision. See Mahasin v. Bledsoe, 505 Fed. App’x 85, 86-87 (3d

Cir. 2012) (Bailey claims asserted for convictions which occurred

after the date of the Bailey decision must be asserted at trial,

during direct appeal or in a §2255 motion).

“The remedy afforded under §2241 is not an additional,

alternative, or supplemental remedy to that prescribed under

§2255.” Dusenbery v. Oddo, No. 17 2402, 2018 WL 372164, at

*4 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2018). Because Petitioner has failed to

demonstrate that a §2255 motion is inadequate or ineffective to

test the legality of his detention, permitting him to proceed under

§2241, the Court will dismiss Petitioner’s petition for a writ of

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §2241, for lack of jurisdiction.

(Doc. 12 at 8-10).

Petitioner’s motions fail to meet the narrowly-defined factors governing

motions for reconsideration, as they do not identify an intervening change in

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controlling law, provide any evidence that was not previously available to this

Court, or show the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or prevent

manifest injustice. Petitioner’s motions for reconsideration of this Court’s

February 13, 2020 Memorandum and Order, seek to reassert the same

arguments set forth in Brooks’ petition for writ of habeas corpus, as well as

attempts to raise the following new claims: (1) an alleged Sixth Amendment

violation because he was not permitted to cross examine a co-conspirator

whose statement would prove his actual innocence; (2) the redacted

superseding indictment issued on July 26, 1996 was not signed by the grand

jury; (3) the sentencing court failed to grant him a downward departure in

light of his mental illness. (Doc. 18). Petitioner’s new claims, however, just

like those raised in his instant petition, fall outside this Court’s jurisdiction to

be considered in a §2241 motion. As recognized in In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d

245 (3d Cir. 1997) a federal prisoner can pursue relief under §2241 only

where a subsequent statutory interpretation reveals that the prisoner’s

conduct is not criminal so as to avoid a complete miscarriage of justice.

Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251; see also Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d

117, 120-21 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding §2241 may not be used to raise an

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) claim that is barred by the

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procedural limitations imposed by the AEDPA); Brown v. Mendez, 167 F.

Supp. 2d 723, 726-27 (M.D. Pa. 2001). “Section 2241 is not available for

intervening changes in the sentencing law,” such as arguments based on

Apprendi. United State v. Kenney, 391 F. App'x 169, 172 (3d Cir. 2010).

Sentencing claims “[do] not fall within the purview of the savings clause.”

Adderly v. Zickefoose, 459 F. App'x 73 (3d Cir. 2012); Pearson v. Warden

Canaan USP, 685 F. App’x 93, 96 (3d Cir. 2017) (“§2241 is not available for

an intervening change in the sentencing laws.”).

Accordingly, this Court finds that its Memorandum and Order of

February 13, 2020, is not troubled by manifest errors of law or fact and

Petitioner has not presented anything new, which if previously presented,

might have affected our decision. Consequently, the motion for

reconsideration will be denied. A separate Order shall issue.

s/ Malachy E. Mannion

MALACHY E. MANNION

United States District Judge

DATE: January 5, 2021

19-0302-02

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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