PIZARRO v. WETZEL

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SHANTA PIZARRO, : Civil No. 3:20-CV-511

:

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : (Magistrate Judge Carlson)

:

JOHN WETZEL, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

The plaintiff, Shanta Pizarro, has brought the instant civil action against

multiple defendants in their individual capacities, all of whom are employed by the

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”). These defendants include three

correctional officers at the State Correctional Institution at Dallas (“SCI Dallas”),

Defendants Gardazalla, Bradley, and Reese; a Lieutenant at SCI Dallas, Defendant

Eyer; the Superintendent of SCI Dallas, Defendant Mahally; and the Secretary of the

Pennsylvania DOC, John Wetzel.

Pizarro’s complaint seeks monetary damages and declaratory relief for alleged

violations of her constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in connection

with an incident she experienced at SCI Dallas. (Doc. 17). Specifically, Pizarro

claims that her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when

correctional staff conducted a strip search, vehicle search, and a search of her cellular

phone when she attempted to visit her boyfriend, Edward Woods, who is currently

an inmate at SCI Dallas. (Id.)

Pending before the court is a motion to dismiss filed by the various

supervisory defendants, Defendants Wetzel, Mahally, and Eyer, which argues that

the plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim for supervisory liability under §1983.

(Doc. 22). In response, the plaintiff relies in large part upon Department of

Corrections policy, DC-ADM 812(3)(B)(6), to assert that defendants Wetzel,

Mahally, and Eyer acquiesced in conduct that she claims systematically deprives

visitors to the DOC of their constitutional rights. (Doc. 25).

Notably, according to the plaintiff, the DOC policy cited in her complaint

forbade searches like the search conducted in the instant case. (Doc. 1, ¶ 14). Thus,

Pizzaro alleges that the cations which took place at the prison violated the policies

prescribed by prison supervisors. Nonetheless the plaintiff seeks to impose

supervisory liability upon those officials whose policies were allegedly violated

because Pizarro alleges that the DOC has a conflicting system of policies—one

“public” and one “highly confidential”—that these defendants implemented and

participated in, thereby imputing to them the necessary degree of knowledge to

support a claim of supervisory liability. (Id.) Pizzaro advances this claim that there

exists a surreptitious policy to violate the Constitution which contradicts the publicly

stated DOC policy in a conclusory fashion without any well-pleaded supporting

facts. (Id. ¶¶ 100-111). For their part, the defendants contend that the plaintiff’s

complaint contains “nothing but conclusions devoid of further factual enhancement

and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” (Doc. 23).

After consideration, we find that the plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient

facts to support her claims that defendants Wetzel, Mahally and Eyer had any actual

knowledge of either her search, or of any other searches that allegedly amount to a

repeated pattern of deprivation of constitutional rights. At their core, Pizarro’s

claims consist of bald assertions of respondeat superior liability, coupled with

dissatisfaction at the DOC’s policy formulation process and implementation.

Therefore, for the reasons set forth below, we will grant the motion to dismiss.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

On March 26, 2018, Pizarro attempted visit her boyfriend, Edward Woods, at

SCI Dallas, where he is currently confined. (Doc. 17). After going through the usual

measures of facility security, Pizarro was approached by Defendants Gardazalla and

Bradley and escorted to a separate location for questioning. (Id., at 4). Pizarro was

brought to a private room in the Administration Building, where she was informed

by Gardazalla and Bradley that they had monitored her emails and calls with Woods,

as well as activity on her JPay account. (Id., at 5).

Gardzalla and Bradley then questioned Pizarro about whether she had brought

narcotics into the facility, specifically synthetic marijuana and suboxone. (Id.)

Additionally, Pizarro was questioned regarding various money transfers she sent, as

well as money transfers that were sent to her from Woods. (Id., at 6). Pizarro

answered all questions and insisted that she was not involved with smuggling

contraband into SCI Dallas. (Id.) She stated that the transfers between herself and

Woods were in made connection with his poker games, not criminal activity. (Id.)

Pizarro contends that she was told by Gardazalla and Bradley that she must

either comply with their requests to search her and answer their questions, or she

would be arrested. (Doc. 17, at 5). Importantly, Pizarro alleges that she did not feel

free to decline to answer their questions and their later request that she be strip

searched for fear of arrest. (Id.) As a result, she felt forced to agree to the search,

even though she “did not consent.” (Id., at 6). Pizarro was then strip searched by

correctional officer Melynda Reese, and her vehicle and phone were searched as

well. (Id., at 6-8). No contraband was found on her person, in her car, or on her

phone. (Id., at 7-9). Ultimately, Pizarro was denied visitation with Woods after being

questioned and searched, and she left the facility. (Id., at 9).

Following these events, Woods filed a grievance with SCI Dallas officials

regarding what he felt was the unwarranted the search of Pizarro. (Id.) Defendant

Eyer denied this grievance on the grounds that Woods did not have standing to bring

a grievance for events that involved Pizarro, and that Pizarro had consented to be

searched. (Id.) Woods appealed Eyer’s decision but ultimately, Defendant Mahally

dismissed his grievance and took no further action. (Id., at 10).

Subsequently, Pizarro filed this suit in the United States District Court in the

Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and this lawsuit was subsequently transferred to

this Court. After the plaintiff amended her complaint, the defendants filed the instant

motion to dismiss. (Doc. 22). Pizarro is seeking to hold each defendant personally

liable, and seeks $150,000 in punitive and compensatory damages from each

defendant. (Doc. 17, at 14). However, after review, we find that the plaintiff has

failed to state a claim against these supervisory defendants under the exacting

standards prescribed by case law. Therefore, we will grant the defendants’ motion

and dismiss Defendants Wetzel, Mahally and Eyer from this action.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. It is proper for

the court to dismiss a complaint in accordance with Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure only if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). With respect to this benchmark standard for

the legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal

court, stating that:

Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in

recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), continuing with our

opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir.

2008)], and culminating recently with the Supreme Court’s decision in

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, BU.S.B, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), pleading standards

have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more

heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than

the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).

In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all

reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, Inc.,

20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court “need not credit a complaint’s

bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v.

Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court

need not “assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not

alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of

Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action, a

plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which “requires more than

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

actions will not do.” Id., at 555. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right

to relief above the speculative level.” Id.

In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has

underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon

which relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to

dismiss, a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no

more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 679.

According to the Supreme Court, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id., at 678. Rather,

in conducting a review of the adequacy of a complaint, the Supreme Court has

advised trial courts that they must:

[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than

conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal

conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be

supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual

allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine

whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.

Id., at 679.

Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain

more than mere legal labels and conclusions; it must recite factual allegations

sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere

speculation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated:

[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First,

the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The

District Court must accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as

true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court

must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are

sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” In

other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s

entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement

with its facts.

Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.

As the Court of Appeals has observed:

The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the “plausibility” standard for

overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The

plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege “enough facts to

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard

when the factual pleadings “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,

129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955).

This standard requires showing “more than a sheer possibility that a

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint which pleads facts

“merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, [ ] “stops short of the

line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement of relief.’ ”

Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied,

132 S. Ct. 1861 (2012).

In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a

three-step analysis:

First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead

to state a claim.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should

identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions,

are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 1950. Finally, “where

there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their

veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an

entitlement for relief.”

Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950).

In considering a motion to dismiss, the court generally relies on the complaint,

attached exhibits, and matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263,

268 (3d Cir. 2007). The court may also consider “undisputedly authentic

document[s] that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the

plaintiff’s claims are based on the [attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar.

Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover,

“documents whose contents are alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no

party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading, may be

considered.” Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir.

2002); see also U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 2002)

(holding that “[a]lthough a district court may not consider matters extraneous to the

pleadings, a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be

considered without converting the motion to dismiss in one for summary

judgment”). However, the court may not rely on other parts of the record in

determining a motion to dismiss, or when determining whether a proposed amended

complaint is futile because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).

IV. DISCUSSION

The plaintiff asserts that her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were

violated when she was subjected to a strip search, vehicle search, and a search of her

cellular phone while attempting to visit Edward Woods, an inmate at SCI Dallas.

(Doc. 17). Specifically, she states that the defendants acted in “concert and

conspiracy” to deprive her of her “civil and constitutional rights.” (Id., at 10). With

respect to the supervisory officials named in this complaint, there is no allegation

that they participated in this conduct, or directly and specifically approved or

acquiesced in these particular actions. Instead, Pizarro argues that Defendants

Wetzel, Mahally and Eyer are “directly liable and responsible for the acts of

individual defendants because . . . they repeatedly and knowingly failed to enforce

the laws and guidelines of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the [DOC]

policy, pertaining to strip searches of visitors . . . thereby creating an atmosphere of

lawlessness.” (Id., at 11). In effect, the plaintiff is articulating a theory of supervisory

liability as to her claims against these defendants. As part of this theory of liability,

Pizarro cites what she perceives as the defendants’ failure to oversee their

subordinates and their “reckless and deliberate indifference.” (Id.)

The defendants argue that Pizarro has not meet the required pleading standard

as her complaint contains “only [a] formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action”. (Doc. 23). Additionally, the defendants note that the plaintiff has not

alleged any facts to show that they had either actual knowledge of her search, or

were aware of or endorsed any pattern or practice by subordinates that systematically

deprived visitors to DOC facilities of their constitutional rights. (Id.)

A. Section 1983 Standard of Review

Section 1983 provides a private cause of action for the violation of a federal

constitutional right. The text of the statute provides, in pertinent part, that:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or

other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or

other proper proceeding for redress...

42 U.S.C. § 1983. In order to prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must establish

that the defendant deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the United States

Constitution while acting under color of state law. See Mark v. Borough of

Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995).

The defendants in this case argue that the plaintiff has failed to plead

allegations of their direct, personal involvement with the events at issue. Indeed, to

state a § 1983 claim against supervisory defendants, a plaintiff must show that these

supervisory defendants actively deprived her of a right secured by the Constitution.

Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902 , 907 (3d Cir. 1997); see also

Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 , 4 , 100 S. Ct. 2502 , 65 L. Ed. 2d 555 (1980). It is

well settled that “[a] defendant in a civil rights action must have personal

involvement in the alleged wrongdoing; liability cannot be predicated solely on the

operation of respondeat superior. Personal involvement can be shown through

allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.” Rode v.

Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). Applying these benchmarks,

courts have frequently held that, without allegations of supervisory knowledge and

approval of subordinates’ actions, a plaintiff may not maintain an action against

supervisors based upon the misdeeds of their subordinates. O'Connell v. Sobina, No.

06-238, 2008 WL 144199,  at *21 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2008); Neuburger v. Thompson,

305 F. Supp. 2d 521, 535 (W.D. Pa. 2004).

With respect to supervisory liability claims, the Third Circuit has noted that

“[n]umerous courts, including this one, have expressed uncertainty as to the viability

and scope of supervisory liability after Iqbal.” Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 366 n.

5 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal quotations and citations omitted). To the extent that

supervisory liability survives after Iqbal, the scope of that liability is clearly and

narrowly defined. On this score, there are two theories of supervisory liability which

the Court of Appeals has recognized:

[O]ne under which supervisors can be liable if they “established and

maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly cause [the]

constitutional harm” and another under which they can be liable if they

“participated in violating plaintiff’s rights, directed others to violate

them, or as the person[s] in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced

in [their] subordinates’ violations.” A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne

Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004) (second

alteration in original).

Santiago, 629 F.3d at 129.

To incur liability as a supervisory official, it “is not enough for a plaintiff to

argue that the constitutionally cognizable injury would not have occurred if the

superior had done more than he or she did.” Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1118

(3d Cir. 1989). The imposition of liability in a § 1983 action relies on a showing by

the plaintiff that the defendants had “personal involvement in the alleged wrongs.”

Chavarriaga v. New Jersey Department of Corrections, 806 F.3d 210, 222 (3d Cir.

2015) (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 537 n. 3 (1981)). Importantly, a

plaintiff “cannot predicate defendants’ liability on a respondeat superior theory.” Id.

Rather, as we have explained, to state a valid cause of action, the plaintiff

must demonstrate the defendants’ “personal involvement in the alleged

wrongs.” Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 222 (quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207) (internal

quotations omitted). To set forth sufficient allegations of defendants’ personal

involvement, the plaintiff must describe “the defendant's participation in or actual

knowledge of and acquiescence in the wrongful conduct.” Id. Allegations of

constructive knowledge are not enough. Id. (citing Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d

1186, 1194 (3d Cir.1995); Rode, 845 F.2d at 1201 n. 6. Instead, a plaintiff “must

portray specific conduct by state officials which violates some constitutional

right.” Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1, 3 (3d Cir. 1970).

Therefore, the determinative question in this case is whether the defendants

had actual knowledge, or knowledge of a pattern or practice of searches similar to

Pizarro’s, such that a claim of supervisory liability can proceed. To be clear, under

current Third Circuit law, to find the defendants liable under a supervisory official

theory, there must be both contemporaneous actual knowledge of the offending

incident or actual knowledge of a prior pattern of similar incidents, and,

circumstances under which the supervisor’s actions could be found to have

communicated a message of approval to the offending subordinate. Chavarriaga, 806

F.3d at 222. It is worth noting again that a theory of respondeat superior is a not a

sufficient basis for imposing liability on supervisory defendants. Id.

B. These Defendants Will Be Dismissed.

Despite Pizarro’s apparent dissatisfaction with the way that the DOC creates

and implements policy, she has not alleged any facts to support her claims against

Defendants Wetzel, Mahally, and Eyer. First, the plaintiff’s complaint contains no

factual allegations suggesting that the defendants, in their supervisory capacities,

had knowledge of and acquiesced in their subordinates’ specific actions in this case.

Santiago, 629 F.3d at 129. Additionally, Pizarro’s theory of supervisory liability is

not supported by any well-pleaded factual allegations to support her assertion that

the defendants “established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which

directly caused [a] constitutional harm.” Id. Absent any supporting factual

allegations by the plaintiff, this Court cannot infer that the defendants had the

requisite knowledge for supervisory liability to be found under § 1983. Likewise,

as we have explained, respondeat superior is not sufficient theory to impute liability

to the defendants. The insufficiency of Pizarro’s factual allegations becomes clear

when examining her claims as to each defendant.

Regarding Defendant Wetzel, it is evident that he was named in this action

solely for his supervisory role in the Pennsylvania DOC. Pizarro’s complaint does

not allege any facts to show that Wetzel had actual knowledge regarding her search

by correctional officers. (Doc. 17). While Pizarro claims that Wetzel, as Secretary

of the DOC, helped to create and implement the DOC’s policies, she does not allege

that Wetzel knew of, approved of, or acquiesced in the searches in question.

Moreover, Pizarro has not alleged sufficient facts to support her assertion that

Wetzel was aware of, and complicit in maintaining a policy or practice which

directly caused constitutional harm. The fact that Wetzel is involved in formulating

and issuing a DOC policy is not sufficient to show that he is aware of or complicit

in a systematic deprivation of the rights of visitors to correctional institutions. In

framing the theory of supervisory liability in this way, the plaintiff seems to be taking

broader issue with the way that DOC policy is created. In the past, courts have

acknowledged that liability under § 1983 may be imposed on officials with the final

policymaking authority, if that official creates an unconstitutional policy that injures

a plaintiff when it is implemented. Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 223 (citing Sample, 885

F.2d at 1118). However, to establish this type of § 1983 claim against a policymaker,

a plaintiff must allege and prove that the policymaker established or enforced

policies directly causing the deprivation of constitutional rights. Id. That is not the

case here. Pizarro’s amended complaint does not contain facts to support that Wetzel

created or enforced an unconstitutional policy which has directly caused the

deprivation of constitutional rights. (Doc. 17).

Pizarro repeatedly asserts that SCI Dallas and the DOC have a policy that

explicitly prohibits strip searches of visitors under any circumstance. (Doc. 25). She

claims that defendant Wetzel has “affirmatively mislead the Commonwealth

citizenry” by publishing certain DOC policies while privately instructing his

subordinates to ignore them. (Id.) However, Pizarro has not alleged any facts to

support her conclusory assertion that Wetzel has implemented two contemporaneous

policy mandates, one of which adheres to constitutional benchmarks while the

second surreptitious policy instructs subordinates to take actions that are potentially

in violation of the Constitution, and that ultimately led to her search. Rather, she

asserts conclusory allegations that Wetzel, as Secretary of the DOC, is responsible

for implementing policies and thus, he should be liable for the alleged violations of

Pizarro’s constitutional rights. Moreover, she alleges, with no well-pleaded factual

support, that the DOC has a pattern of illegally strip-searching visitors. This is

simply not enough to state a supervisory liability claim against Defendant Wetzel.

The plaintiff’s allegations against defendants Mahally and Eyer are similar in

nature. Pizarro implies that Mahally is subject to supervisory liability under § 1983

as he “implemented, distributed and enforced” DOC policies throughout the prison.

(Doc. 25). Likewise, the plaintiff contends Eyer may incur liability for his role in

“monitor[ing], at least minimally,” DOC policies in his capacity as a grievance

officer. (Id.) However, the factual allegations against these defendants in the

plaintiff’s amended complaint seem largely confined to their involvement in the

dismissal of Woods’ grievance regarding Pizarro’s treatment, and Mahally’s

decision not to discipline any officers involved. (Doc. 17). The defendants highlight

this when noting that the “sole allegations against Mahally and Eyer” seem to be

“that they participated in the grievance process.” (Doc. 23). The grievance at issue

was denied by both Mahally and Eyer because it was brought by Woods, who they

determined did not have standing to bring a grievance on behalf of a visitor.

However, even if defendants Eyer and Mahally had improperly denied

Woods’ grievance, in the past, this Court has held that an inmate cannot sustain a

constitutional tort claim against prison supervisors based solely upon assertions that

officials failed to fully investigate or respond to his past grievances. Inmates do not

have a constitutional right to a prison grievance system. Speight v. Sims, 283 F.

App'x 880 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641 , 647 (7th Cir.

2001) ("[T]he existence of a prison grievance procedure confers no liberty interest

on a prisoner."). Consequently, dissatisfaction with a response to an inmate's

grievances does not support a constitutional claim. See Alexander v. Gennarini, 144

F. App'x 924 (3d Cir. 2005) (involvement in post-incident grievance process not a

basis for § 1983 liability); Pryor-El v. Kelly, 892 F. Supp. 261, 275 (D. D.C. 1995)

(because prison grievance procedure does not confer any substantive constitutional

rights upon prison inmates, the prison officials' failure to comply with grievance

procedure is not actionable); see also Cole v. Sobina, No. 04-99J, 2007 WL

4460617, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 19, 2007) (“[M]ere concurrence in a prison

administrative appeal process does not implicate a constitutional concern”).

Moreover, the Third Circuit has held that summary dismissal of these types

of claims are appropriate “because there is no apparent obligation for prison officials

to investigate prison grievances.” Paluch v. Sec’y Pennsylvania Dept. Corr., 442 F.

App’x 690, 695 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller,

477 F.2d 375 , 382 (2d Cir. 1973)). Because there are no other supporting allegations

to show that Mahally and Eyer either had knowledge of or acquiesced in a systematic

practice of deprivation of constitutional rights, they cannot incur supervisory

liability under § 1983.

In sum, Pizarro’s claims against Defendants Wetzel, Mahally, and Eyer

amount to little more than allegations of respondeat superior, which we have

explained are insufficient to state claims against these officials under § 1983.

Moreover, Pizarro may not bring claims against these officials based solely upon

their participation in the grievance process. Thus, we find that Pizarro’s claims

against these supervisory defendants fail as a matter of law. Accordingly, we will

grant the motion to dismiss and dismiss Defendants Wetzel, Mahally, and Eyer from

this suit.

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we find that the plaintiff has failed to

state a claim against defendants Wetzel, Mahally, and Eyer. Thus, we will GRANT

the defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 22) and dismiss these defendants from this

suit.

An appropriate order follows.