The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
LAWRENCE STUART, :
Plaintiff, : 1:18-cv-0430
:
v. : Hon. John E. Jones III
:
KIMBERLY MURRAY, et al., :
Defendants. :
MEMORANDUM
November 16, 2020
Lawrence Stuart (“Stuart” or “Plaintiff”), at all relevant times, an inmate in
the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”), incarcerated
at the State Correctional Institution at Mahanoy (“SCI-Mahanoy), Frackville,
Pennsylvania, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, on
February 15, 2018, alleging Defendants Kimberly Murray (“Murray”), Janice Hale
(“Hale”), Margaret Ward (“Ward”), John Steinhart (“Steinhart”) Corrections
Health Care Administrator, Kimberly Minarchick (“Minarchick”), Superintendent
Delbalso (“Delbalso”), Dorina Varner (“Varner”) (collectively referred to as “DOC
Defendants”), and medical doctor Courtney Rodgers (“Rodgers”), were
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth
Amendment of the Constitution. (Doc. 1).
Pending are Defendants’ motions (Docs. 89, 90, 93) for summary judgment
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. For the reasons set forth below,
the Court will grant Defendants’ motions for summary judgment.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment “should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and
disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Turner v. Schering-Plough Corp., 901 F.2d 335, 340
(3d Cir. 1990). “[T]his standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged
factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported
motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of
material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986)
(emphasis in original); Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1111 (3d Cir. 1990).
A disputed fact is “material” if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect
the outcome of the case under applicable substantive law. Id.; Gray v. York
Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1078 (3d Cir. 1992). An issue of material fact is
“genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for
the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257; Brenner v. Local 514, United
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, 927 F.2d 1283, 1287-88 (3d
Cir. 1991).
The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing the
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absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 79 F.3d 1358, 1366 (3d
Cir. 1996). Although the moving party must establish an absence of a genuine
issue of material fact, it need not “support its motion with affidavits or other
similar materials negating the opponent's claim.” Celotex, 477 U.S. 317, 323
1986). It can meet its burden by “pointing out ... that there is an absence of
evidence to support the nonmoving party’s claims.” Id. at 325.
Once such a showing has been made, the non-moving party must go beyond
the pleadings with affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories or the like to
demonstrate specific material facts which give rise to a genuine issue. FED. R. CIV.
P. 56; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475
U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (stating that the non-moving party “must do more than
simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts”);
Wooler v. Citizens Bank, 274 F. App’x 177, 179 (3d Cir. 2008). The party
opposing the motion must produce evidence to show the existence of every
element essential to its case, which it bears the burden of proving at trial, because
“a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving
party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at
323; see also Harter v. G.A.F. Corp., 967 F.2d 846, 851 (3d Cir. 1992). “[T]he
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non-moving party ‘may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own
pleadings; rather, its response must . . . set out specific facts showing a genuine
issue for trial.’” Picozzi v. Haulderman, 2011 WL 830331, *2 (M.D. Pa. 2011)
(quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(2)). “Inferences should be drawn in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, and where the non-moving party’s evidence
contradicts the movant’s, then the non-movant’s must be taken as true.” Big Apple
BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North America. Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992).
If the non-moving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will
bear the burden at trial,” summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at
322. The adverse party must raise “more than a mere scintilla of evidence in its
favor” and cannot survive by relying on unsupported assertions, conclusory
allegations, or mere suspicions. Williams v. Borough of W. Chester, 891 F.2d 458,
460 (3d Cir. 1989). The mere existence of some evidence in support of the non-
movant will not be adequate to support a denial of a motion for summary
judgment; there must be enough evidence to enable a jury to reasonably find for
the non-movant on that issue. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50.
II. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
Defendants filed joint statements of material facts detailing Stuart’s medical
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encounters beginning in February 2016, with the report of a hernia, and ending in
May 2018. (Docs. 91, 95). In response, Stuart states “[t]his case is not about the
plaintiff [sic] hernia or his diagnosis of diabetes. This case is about DOC
Defendant’s [sic] Hale, Ward, Murray and Renninger1 denying the plaintiff Stuart
medical treatment. On 6-10-2016 the plaintiff fell out, and receive [sic] no medical
treatment” which was caught on a video provided to the Court on March 8, 2019.
(Doc. 102, ¶ 2; Doc. 103, ¶ 2; Doc. 106). He further clarifies that his “complaint is
not solely based on his fall on June 10, 2016, rather the failure of these Defendants
to provide adequate treatment from June 10, 2016 through June 19, 2016, which
began with Stuart experiencing symptoms of feeling weak, dizziness,
lightheadedness, and pain in his groin.” (Id.; Id.). The statement of material facts
will therefore be confined to the pertinent time period.
On May 26, 2016, Stuart complained of dizziness to registered nurse Jodie
Martino (“Martino”). (Doc. 91, ¶ 7; Doc. 95, ¶ 8; Doc. 102, ¶ 8; Doc. 103, ¶ 7).
His vitals and physical exam were normal and Martino concluded that he exhibited
no signs or symptoms of dizziness. He also complained of constipation; Martino
instructed him to submit a sick call request to address this concern and to increase
his fluid intake. Dr. Khanum signed Martino’s notes on May 31, 2106.
1 Renninger has been dismissed from the action. (Doc. 87).
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On May 31, 2016, physician’s assistant Nancy Palmigiano (“Palmigiano”)
attended to Stuart at sick call. (Id. at 8; Id. at 9; Id. at 9; Id. at 8). He reported
weight loss, which was confirmed. Palmigiano noted that Stuart suffered a loss of
weight since September 2015. She also noted that he presented with appropriate
speech, a steady gait, and normal pupils. She ordered bloodwork to test for
anemia, infection, or thyroid problems. Also, she informed him that he was
scheduled for a urology telemedicine appointment.
On the morning of June 10, 2016, psychologist Sarah Falkson (“Falkson”)
met with Stuart on his cell block after reports that he told the block officer he was
hearing and seeing things that were not there. (Id. at 9; Id. at 10; Id. at 10; Id. at 9).
He also expressed that he had a number of medical concerns. Falkson contacted
psychiatry, and psychiatry instructed her to contact the medical department. She
noted that medical personnel assessed Stuart on his block but, by that time, he was
no longer hearing or seeing things. He made several references to filing grievances
and lawsuits. Falkson assessed his behavior as hostile and demanding, found his
insight limited, and determined his perceptions to be grandiose. She indicated he
was “[a]gitated, manipulative, appears to be exaggerating mental health symptoms
to achieve a personal gain (medical treatment). Complaints regarding the medical
department appear to be associated with entitlement and lack of patience as well as
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wanting information about appointment times that cannot be given out for security
reasons.” She also noted that he exhibited no physical impairments and was
oriented to person, place, and time.
In the medical progress notes, Defendant Ward, a registered nurse, noted
that medical was called to DB block after Stuart made a claim that his “testicle is
falling out.” (Id. at 10; Id. at 11; Id. at 11; Id. at 10). She examined him and
detected a receding testicle, a known, chronic problem. She advised him to
continue taking Motrin until he had his urology consultation. Thereafter, upon his
insistence, he was transported to the medical department and attended to by Dr.
Robel. Dr. Robel informed him that his urology consultation had been approved
and that he should return to the block. He refused to leave. Eventually, a
correctional officer escorted him out of the medical department.
A surveillance video shows Stuart leaving the medical department and,
within steps of the door, tipping to the right and falling to the ground. (Doc. 106).
Defendant Ward noted that Stuart “proceeded to throw himself to [the] ground and
refused to get into [a] wheel chair.” Stuart maintains that Defendants Ward, Hale,
and Murray, all registered nurses, were present after the fall and that Murray told
him to “get up and stop faking.” (Doc. 97, p. 2). A correctional officer and
Defendant Ward assisted him into a wheelchair and took him back to the medical
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department. Stuart asserts that Defendants failed to examine him. According to
the medical notes, no injuries were noted and he was discharged back to his block.
He had a blood workup and urinalysis sample taken on June 17, 2016. His
June 19, 2016 results showed elevated glucose levels. (Doc. 91, ¶ 11; Doc. 103, ¶
11). He indicates that “Defendants let [him] suffer for nine days before taking his
complaints serious[ly] on June 20, 2016.” (Doc. 103, ¶ 11). He further states that
the fact that he was ultimately diagnosed with diabetes is proof that his fall outside
of medical was the result of his symptoms and not attention seeking behavior as
alleged by DOC Defendants. (Id.).
On June 20, 2016, Stuart reported to nurse Amy Kratz (“Kratz”) that he was
dizzy, was drinking a lot, and was experiencing excessive urination, cramping and
dry mouth. (Doc. 91, ¶ 12; Doc. 103, ¶ 12). His vitals were taken and his blood
sugar was checked. Upon being made aware of Stuart’s blood sugar, weight loss,
and lab results, Dr. Eisenberg directed that he be monitored and scheduled for the
doctor’s line. Later that day, Dr. Khanum saw Plaintiff in triage and noted that
his morning fasting sugar was 436, and that he had been sent back to medical to
start insulin. Dr. Khanum opined that he had new onset hyperglycemia. She
admitted him to the infirmary for 23 hour observation, ordered that an IV be
administered, prescribed Metformin 850mg twice daily, and directed that a basic
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metabolic panel be done the following morning.
On the morning of June 21, 2016, he had no signs or symptoms of
hypoglycemia. Nurse Deborah Fryer (“Fryer”), contacted Dr. Stirling who gave
orders for insulin. Stuart later complained to Dr. Khanum of constipation, blood
during bowel movement, and fatigue. He denied having chest pain, shortness of
breath, or sweating, and reported that his thirst and frequent urination had lessened.
Although his blood sugar had improved with treatment, Dr. Khanum determined
that he had new onset diabetes. He was educated on the condition, instructed to
continue with Accu-check twice per day, and prescribed Metformin 850mg twice
per day, Atorvastatin (Lipitor), Colace 100mg twice per day and a glycerin
suppository. He was approved for discharge to his block and advised to increase
hydration and return to sick call in three days. He was also added to the Chronic
Care Clinic. Dr. Khanum also noted that, on that same day, Stuart was seen by an
offsite urologist for left testicular pain secondary to epididymitis and infarct. He
was to start antibiotics, and an orchiectomy, removal of the testicle, was
recommended when his diabetes became controlled.
On June 11, 2016, Stuart sent an “Inmate’s Request to Staff Member” to
Defendant Steinhart, the Corrections Health Care Administrator, seeking an
investigation into the June 10, 2016 incident. (Doc. 1, p.6, ¶ 9; p. 18). On June 24,
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2016, he filed Grievance Number 631977 concerning the events of June 10, 2016.
(Doc. 91, ¶ 18; Doc. 95, ¶ 18; Doc. 102, ¶ 18; Doc. 103, ¶ 18). Defendant
Minarchick denied the request noting that after leaving the medical department he
was witnessed falling and it did not appear that he hit his head. (Doc. 91-2, p. 5).
She noted that he had no areas of swelling, redness, or skin abrasions or apparent
injuries and that he was assisted into a wheelchair and seated in the medical
department while medical personnel reviewed the surveillance video. She stated
that it appeared from the video that he did not hit his head. (Id.). She indicated
that he refused to leave the medical department so he was transported back to the
block via a wheelchair. It was also noted that he was added to chronic clinic for
diabetes treatment. (Doc. 91, ¶ 19; Doc. 95, ¶ 19; Doc. 102, ¶ 19; Doc. 103, ¶ 19).
Minarchick’s denial of the grievance was upheld by Defendants Delbalso and
Varner. (Doc. 91-2).
Defendant Dr. Rodgers began working at SCI-Mahanoy on July 25, 2016.
(Doc. 93-3; Doc. 95, ¶ 252; Doc. 102, ¶ 25).
III. DISCUSSION
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code offers private citizens a
cause of action for violations of federal law by state officials. See 42 U.S.C. §
2 The statement of material facts misidentifies the year Defendant Rodgers began working at
SCI-Mahanoy. The correct year, per Defendant Rodgers’ declaration, is 2016. (Doc. 93-3).
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1983. The statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress. . . .
Id.; see also Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002); Kneipp v.
Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996). To state a claim under §1983, a
plaintiff must allege “the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws
of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by
a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
A. Defendant Rodgers
Defendant Rodgers seeks an entry of summary judgment based on a lack of
personal involvement in the June 2016 conduct of which Stuart complains.
Individual liability will be imposed under Section 1983 only if the state actor
played an “affirmative part” in the alleged misconduct. See Evancho v. Fisher,
423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195,
1207 (3d Cir. 1998)). In other words, defendants in Section 1983 civil rights
actions “must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs . . . shown through
allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.”
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Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 271 (3d Cir. 2003); Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207-08.
A plaintiff must establish the particulars of conduct, time, place, and the person
responsible. Evancho, 423 F.3d at 354; Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207-08. When a
plaintiff merely hypothesizes that an individual defendant may have had
knowledge of or personal involvement in the deprivation of his or her rights,
individual liability will not follow. Atkinson, 316 F.3d at 271; Rode, 845 F.2d at
1207-08.
In the matter sub judice, it is undisputed that Defendant Rodgers did not
begin working at SCI-Mahanoy until July 25, 2016, more than a month after the
disputed events. Accordingly, he is entitled to an entry of summary judgment.
B. DOC Defendants
1. Defendants Murray, Hale, and Ward
In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), the Supreme Court held that
prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment when they are deliberately
indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs. Id. at 104-05. To succeed on
such a claim, “a plaintiff must make (1) a subjective showing that ‘the defendants
were deliberately indifferent to [his or her] medical needs’ and (2) an objective
showing that ‘those needs were serious.’” Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850
F.3d 526, 534 (3d Cir. 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting Rouse v. Plantier, 182
12
F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999)).
Deliberate indifference occurs when prison officials “intentionally deny[ ] or
delay[ ] access to medical care or interfer[e] with the treatment once prescribed.”
Pearson, 850 F.3d at 534 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05). A mere complaint
“that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition
does not state a valid [constitutional] claim of medical mistreatment[.]” Estelle,
429 U.S. at 106. Moreover, “mere disagreement as to the proper medical treatment
does not support a claim of” deliberate indifference. Pearson, 850 F.3d at 535
(internal quotations omitted); Monmouth County Correctional Institutional Inmates
v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326 (3rd Cir.1987). Rather, where there has been medical
care, “we presume that the treatment of a prisoner is proper absent evidence that it
violates professional standards of care.” Id. As long as a physician exercises
professional judgment, his or her behavior does not violate a detainee’s
constitutional rights. See Brown v. Borough of Chambersburg, 903 F.2d 274, 278
(3d Cir. 1990).
We begin with the events of June 10, 2016. On that date, upon being
dispatched to DB Block to address Stuart’s complaint that his “testicle is falling
out” Defendant Ward examined him and detected a receding testicle, a known,
chronic problem. She suggested that he continue taking Motrin until he had his
13
urology consultation. Despite being attended to and examined, he insisted on
being transported to the medical department. Upon being apprised of Stuart’s
issues, Dr. Robel directed Defendant Ward to inform him that his urology
consultation had been approved and instruct him to return to his block. (Doc. 93-1,
p. 144). Because he refused to leave the medical department, he was escorted out
by a correctional officer. Once outside, Stuart fell. Review of the surveillance
video shows that, within steps of the medical department door, he tipped to the
right and fell to the ground. The video does not conclusively demonstrate that
Stuart intentionally fell to the ground. Nor does it unequivocally show whether he
hit his head in the fall. Nonetheless, after he fell, Defendants Ward, Hale, and
Murray were immediately on the scene. They assisted him into a wheelchair and
he was returned to the medical department and evaluated. He sustained no
abrasions, contusions, and did not display any redness, swelling, or outward sign of
injury. Further, medical personnel concluded from the video that he did not suffer
a head injury. Therefore, he was discharged and escorted back to his block.
No reasonable factfinder could conclude from this record that Defendants
acted with deliberate indifference to Stuart’s serious medical needs. Although
Stuart reasserts, as alleged in his complaint, that on that same evening “due to his
continued bouts of lightheadedness, dizziness and vomiting Lieutenant Trometter
14
did transport [him] back to the medical department, where nursing staff once again
sent [him] back to his housing unit without faking his injuries/complaints,” he
provides no evidence in support of this allegation. Nor does he allege that the
named Defendants were among the medical staff that allegedly turned him away
that evening. (Doc. 1, ¶ 8; Doc. 97, p. 2). There simply is no evidence, at any
point during the various events and medical interactions that transpired on June 10,
2016, that Defendants Murray, Hale or Ward intentionally denied Stuart medical
treatment, delayed access to medical care, or interfered with any prescribed course
of medical treatment.
Stuart also contends that Defendants exhibited deliberate indifference to his
serious medical needs in failing to ascertain that the symptoms he experienced on
June 10, 2016, as well as the fall he sustained upon leaving the medical
department, were related to his diabetes diagnosis. On May 26, 2016, Stuart
complained of dizziness to nurse Martino. His vitals and physical exam were
normal and he exhibited no signs or symptoms of dizziness. On May 31, 2016,
physician’s assistant Palmigiano noted that Stuart suffered a loss of weight since
September 2015, which prompted her to order bloodwork to test for anemia,
infection, or thyroid problems. At the time, his speech was appropriate, his gait
was steady and his pupils were normal. On June 10, 2016, by the time medical
15
arrived to address Stuart’s medical complaints, the only issue he raised was related
to his chronic testicular issues. The record does not permit us to conclude that
Defendants were deliberately indifferent in failing to appreciate that the symptoms
Stuart was experiencing on June 10, 2016, and his fall outside the medical
department, were indicative of diabetes.
Notably, Stuart’s diabetes diagnosis did not come until approximately ten
days later. The June 19, 2016 results from his June 17, 2016 bloodwork and urine
sample, revealed that he had elevated glucose levels. On June 20, 2016, after
reporting various symptoms including dizziness, excessive urination, cramping and
dry mouth, nurse Kratz took his vital signs and tested his blood sugar. She advised
Dr. Eisenberg of Plaintiff’s blood sugar, weight loss and recent lab results and the
doctor ordered that he be monitored and scheduled for triage. Later that same day,
Dr. Khanum determined that Stuart had new onset hyperglycemia and directed that
he be admitted to the infirmary for observation and blood sugar checks. She
instructed that he be given Metformin, 850 mg, twice daily, and that a metabolic
panel be repeated the next day. The monitoring continued and, on the morning of
June 21, 2016, there were no symptoms of hypoglycemia. Nurse Fryer contacted
Dr Stirling that morning and the doctor gave orders for insulin. Later in the day,
Dr. Khanum again attended to Stuart and concluded that he had new onset
16
diabetes. She educated him on the condition, instructed him to continue blood
sugar tests twice daily, and provided various prescriptions. She advised him to
increase hydration and return to the sick call line in three days. She also added him
to the Chronic Care Clinic. Dr. Khanum also noted that Stuart had been seen by an
offsite urologist for left testicular pain that day and that the urologist started a
regimen of antibiotics, and recommended surgical removal of the testicle when the
diabetes became controlled.
It is clear that professional judgment was exercised by Defendants in
addressing Stuart’s medical complaints and rendering treatment from June 10,
2016 through the date of his diabetes diagnosis. As such, we are precluded from
finding that they acted with the “obduracy and wantonness” necessary to sustain an
Eighth Amendment violation, see Whitley v Algers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986).
Defendants Murray, Hale and Ward are entitled to an entry of summary judgment.
2. Defendants Steinhart, Minarchick, Delbalso, and Varner
Stuart seeks to impose liability on Defendants Steinhart, Minarchick,
Delbalso, and Varner for their roles in adjudicating Grievance Number 631977.
(Doc. 1, pp. 1, 9; ¶¶ 9, 16, 17). The “after-the-fact” review of a grievance, or an
inmate’s dissatisfaction with a grievance response, do not establish the
involvement of officials and administrators in any underlying constitutional
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deprivation. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1998)
(finding where a defendant, after being informed of the violation through the filing
of grievances, reports or appeals, failed to take action to remedy the alleged wrong
is not enough to show that the defendant has the necessary personal involvement);
Pressley v. Beard, 266 F. App’x 216, 218 (3d Cir. 2008) (not precedential) (“The
District Court properly dismissed these defendants and any additional defendants
who were sued based on their failure to take corrective action when grievances or
investigations were referred to them.”); Brooks v. Beard, 167 F. App'x 923, 925
(3d Cir. 2006) (not precedential) (holding that allegations that prison officials
responded inappropriately to inmate’s later-filed grievances do not establish the
involvement of those officials and administrators in the underlying constitutional
deprivation). These Defendants are also entitled to an entry of summary judgment.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ motion (Doc. 46) for summary
judgment will be granted.
An appropriate Order will issue.
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