The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JODY EDELMAN, :
Petitioner :
: No. 1:20-cv-01040
v. :
: (Judge Kane)
WARDEN ERIC BRADLEY, :
Respondent :
AMENDED MEMORANDUM1
On June 22, 2020, pro se Petitioner Jody Edelman (“Petitioner”), who is presently
incarcerated at the United States Penitentiary Canaan in Waymart, Pennsylvania (“USP
Canaan”), initiated the above-captioned action by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. No. 1.) Petitioner paid the requisite filing fee on July 8,
2020. In an Order dated July 13, 2020, the Court directed Respondent to show cause why
Petitioner should not receive the relief requested. (Doc. No. 5.) Respondent filed his response
on July 28, 2020. (Doc. No. 7.) Petitioner filed neither a traverse nor a motion seeking an
extension of time to do so. Accordingly, in a Memorandum and Order dated August 19, 2020,
the Court dismissed Petitioner’s § 2241 petition. (Doc. Nos. 8, 9.)
Subsequently, the Court received from Petitioner a letter dated August 24, 2020. (Doc.
No. 10.) In that letter, Petitioner maintained that he did not receive Respondent’s response until
one (1) day after he received the Court’s August 19, 2020 Memorandum and Order. (Id. at 1.)
Petitioner further alleged that he had only received half of the response and requested a new copy
and to be provided “sufficient time to respond to the same.” (Id. at 1-2.) In an Order dated
1 The purpose of this Amended Memorandum is to address Petitioner’s traverse (Doc. No. 12),
filed on September 21, 2020, and Respondent’s response thereto (Doc. No. 14), filed on
September 23, 2020. This Amended Memorandum and accompanying Order also serves to
protect Petitioner’s appellate rights.
August 31, 2020, the Court directed the Clerk of Court to mail Petitioner a copy of Respondent’s
response and directed Petitioner to file his traverse within twenty-one (21) days. (Doc. No. 11.)
The Court noted that it would reconsider its August 19, 2020 Memorandum and Order once
Petitioner filed his traverse. (Id. at 2.)
Petitioner filed his traverse on September 21, 2020. (Doc. No. 12.) In an Order dated
that same day, the Court concluded that a response from Respondent would aid in the final
resolution of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition. (Doc. No. 13.) The Court, therefore, directed
Respondent to file a response to the traverse within ten (10) days. (Id.) Respondent did so on
September 23, 2020. (Doc. No. 14.) Upon consideration of all filings in the above-captioned
case, including Petitioner’s response and Respondent’s response thereto, the Court will once
again deny Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
I. BACKGROUND
As noted by Respondent, “[Petitioner] has an extensive history of criminal convictions
and recidivism.” (Doc. No. 7 at 2.) The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
has set forth the following summary of Petitioner’s criminal history:
In 1993 [Petitioner] was convicted in federal court of conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute cocaine, receiving a sentence of seven years’ imprisonment
followed by three years of supervised release. On July 9, 2002 he pled guilty in
state court to possession of a controlled substance, receiving a sentence of six years
to life imprisonment. On September 25, 2007, after his release from state custody,
[Petitioner] began serving his federal supervised release, at which time he was also
subject to lifetime parole supervision with New York State due to his state law
possession conviction. In early 2008, on two separate occasions, [Petitioner] was
arrested and charged with misdemeanors, which led to New York State filing a
parole violation and remanding [Petitioner] to state custody.
As a result of [Petitioner’s] parole violation, the New York State Parole Board and
United States Parole Board jointly recommended that the district court impose more
restrictive conditions on his supervised release. On March 25, 2008 [Petitioner]
signed a waiver agreeing to a modification of the terms of his supervised release,
which provided that [Petitioner] would reside in a residential reentry facility for a
period of five months. It also stated:
You shall submit your person, and any property, house, residence,
vehicle, papers, computer, other electronic communications or data
storage devices or media, and effects to search at any time, which or
without a warrant, by any federal probation officer, or to any other
law enforcement officer from whom the Probation Office has
requested assistance, with reasonable suspicion concerning a
violation of a condition of probation or supervised release or
unlawful conduct by you. Any items seized may be removed to the
Probation Office or to the office of their designee for a more
thorough examination.
On April 21, 2008 the district court imposed the modifications agreed to in the
waiver. On May 30, 2008, in a state proceeding, [Petitioner] agreed to have his
parole revoked and then restored on the condition that he abide by the conditions,
including modifications, of his supervised release. On June 6, 2008 [Petitioner]
began his placement at the Syracuse Pavilion Residential Reentry Center
(“Pavilion”) in Syracuse, New York, a facility designated by the Department of
Justice as a residential reentry facility or halfway house.
At Pavilion, [Petitioner] received an “Orientation Checklist” that set forth the
facility’s rules. The Checklist stated, inter alia, that residents could not leave
without notifying staff; could only leave the building for up to 12 hours at a time;
and could not combine work, leisure, or other activities, but instead had to return to
the facility and sign out separately before each activity. It also provided that
“[r]esidents are subject to search of their persons and property by staff at any time.”
On August 29, 2008 [Petitioner] walked past Pavilion’s entrance monitor, left, and
never returned. On September 16, 2008 the district court issued an arrest warrant,
and on October 2, 2008, following a tip from a confidential source, the United
States Marshals arrested [Petitioner] in the lobby of the Skyline Apartments in
Syracuse. Officers found a set of apartment keys on [Petitioner] during his arrest.
After investigation, the Marshals determined that the keys opened Apartment 509,
an apartment legally leased by Adrienne Iauco, who had verbally agreed to sublet
the apartment to [Petitioner]. With Iauco’s consent, but without a search warrant,
officers entered Apartment 509, where they found evidence of drug trafficking in
plain view. Later that day, officers executed a search warrant and then returned to
the apartment, where they found drugs, packaging material, and paraphernalia. On
October 10, 2008 the Drug Enforcement Administration, after receiving
information from a relative of [Petitioner’s], returned to Apartment 509 and found
$12,000 in currency along with two credit cards in [Petitioner’s] name.
United States v. Edelman, 726 F.3d 305, 307-08 (2d Cir. 2013).
Petitioner was subsequently indicted in the Northern District of New York with
possession with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin, possession with intent to
distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of
cocaine base, and escape from the Syracuse Pavilion. See id. at 308. A jury convicted Petitioner
of all four (4) counts, and he was sentenced to 200 months’ imprisonment. See id. In 2013, the
Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, specifically concluding that Petitioner’s
residence at the Syracuse Pavilion satisfied the “in custody” requirement for an escape
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 751(a). See id. at 308-10. Petitioner subsequently filed a motion
to vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which the United States District Court for the Northern
District of New York denied. See United States v. Edelman, No. 5:09-cr-40 (N.D.N.Y.) (Doc.
Nos. 155, 190.) In 2015, the court reduced Petitioner’s sentences for his drug convictions to 160
months’ incarceration for each, to still be served concurrently with his escape sentence, pursuant
to retroactive sentencing guidelines changes made by the United States Sentencing Commission.
See id.; Doc. No. 163.
On October 7, 2019, Petitioner filed a motion for leave to file a second or successive
§ 2255 motion with the Second Circuit. See Edelman v. United States, No. 19-3221 (2d Cir.)
(Doc. Nos. 1-2.) Petitioner asserted that he was now actually innocent of the § 751(a) conviction
pursuant to the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191
(2019). (Id.) In Rehaif, the Supreme Court held that “in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)
and § 924(a)(2), the Government must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a
firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing
a firearm.” See Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2200. Petitioner asserted that under Rehalf, he did not
“‘knowingly’ escape from federal custody as charged.” See Edelman, No. 19-3221 (Doc. No. 1-
2 at 7). On November 4, 2019, the Second Circuit denied Petitioner’s motion, concluding that
Petitioner “ha[d] not made a prima facie showing that the requirements of § 2255(h) are
satisfied.” See id.; Doc. No. 20. Specifically, the Second Circuit concluded that “Rehaif
presented a question of statutory interpretation rather than constitutional rights and, in any event,
has not been made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” See id.
In his § 2241 petition, Petitioner again raises his Rehaif claim, arguing that he is actually
innocent of violating § 751(a) because he did not “knowingly” escape from federal custody.
(Doc. No. 1 at 1.) According to Petitioner, he did not knowingly do so because “he was never
informed that the agreed upon modification of his supervised release conditions to ‘reside’ at the
Syracuse Pavilion actually changed his ‘status’ from that of a probationer released from custody
to that of a person placed back into federal custody.” (Id. at 11.) As relief, Petitioner asks that
the Court vacate his conviction and sentence for the escape charge. (Id. at 18.)
II. DISCUSSION
Respondent asserts that Petitioner’s § 2241 petition should be dismissed pursuant to the
concurrent sentence doctrine. (Id. at 6.) Under that doctrine, “a federal court may decline to
review an alleged error where concurrent sentences were imposed on separate counts, where the
alleged error is associated with only one count, and where the remaining sentences are
unassailable.” See Nosov v. Schuylkill, 634 F. App’x 379, 380 (3d Cir. 2016). Because “the
defendant remains sentenced in any event, reviewing the concurrently sentenced counts is of no
utility. The practice is eminently practical and conserves judicial resources for more pressing
needs.” See Jones v. Zimmerman, 805 F.2d 1125, 1128 (3d Cir. 1986). This doctrine, however,
should be applied “only when it is apparent that the defendant will not suffer collateral
consequences from the unreviewed conviction.” See Nosov, 634 F. App’x at 380.
As noted supra, in addition to his sentence for his escape conviction, Petitioner is serving
a concurrent sentence of 160 months’ incarceration for his three (3) drug convictions. In his
traverse, Petitioner argues that he can demonstrate collateral consequences because his “escape
conviction is tied to his drug convictions.” (Doc. No. 12 at 2.) Petitioner argues that the district
court’s “holding that [he] had ‘escaped’ directly resulted in the denial of his motion to suppress
the drug evidence supporting his drug convictions.” (Id.) Petitioner asserts that if his escape
conviction is vacated, he “will be able to attack the rulings of his motion to suppress on the
ground that those rulings erroneously assumed that Petitioner had knowingly escaped under [18
U.S.C. § 751(a)].” (Id. at 3.) Petitioner maintains further that his escape charge “led to [him]
being shackled during his trial over his objection.” (Id.)
The Court agrees with Respondent that Petitioner has not demonstrated that he would
suffer any collateral consequences arising from his challenged conviction, let alone any collateral
consequences that rise to the level of “custody” for purposes of § 2241. See Gardner v. Warden
Lewisburg USP, 845 F.3d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2017). As an initial matter, Petitioner’s objection to
his being shackled at trial is plainly insufficient to establish collateral consequences when such
shackling occurred at his trial in 2012, eight (8) years ago. Moreover, with respect to
Petitioner’s assertion that his escape conviction tainted his drug convictions, Petitioner overlooks
the fact that on direct appeal, the Second Circuit concluded that the district court properly denied
Petitioner’s motion to suppress evidence. See Edelman, 726 F.3d at 310. As the Second Circuit
noted, Petitioner did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment
because “[a]s a condition of both (i) the modification of his supervised release and (ii) his
residence at the halfway house, [Petitioner] agreed to subject himself to search of his person and
property ‘at any time.’” See id. In his traverse, Petitioner argues that “the warrantless search of
the apartment—which formed the basis for [his] drug convictions—was not conducted pursuant
to any condition of Petitioner’s term of supervised release or parole.” (Doc. No. 12 at 3.) A
review of Petitioner’s criminal proceedings, however, indicates that when his supervised release
was modified, the following condition was included:
You shall submit your person, and any property, house, residence, vehicle, papers,
computer, other electronic communications or data storage devices or media, and
effects to search at any time, with or without a warrant, by any federal probation
officer, or any other law enforcement officer from whom the Probation Office has
requested assistance, with reasonable suspicion concerning a violation of a
condition of probation or supervised release or unlawful conduct by you.
United States v. Edelman, No. 5:93-cr-205 (N.D.N.Y.) (Doc. No. 86). As the Second Circuit
noted, “[p]ersons on supervised release who sign [waivers] manifest an awareness that
supervision can include intrusions into their residence and, thus, have a severely diminished
expectation of privacy.” See Edelman, 726 F.3d at 310 (quoting United States v. Newton, 369
F.3d 659, 665 (2d Cir. 2004)). Thus, as previously determined in Petitioner’s direct appeal and
post-conviction proceedings, his drug convictions and sentences are valid, meaning that
Petitioner must still serve these sentences regardless of the validity of his escape conviction. See
Logan v. Dist. Att’y Allegheny Cty., 752 F. App’x 119, 122 (3d Cir. 2018) (noting that “[o]nly
one [of the petitioner’s convictions] will be abrogated if his petition is successful and any
potential relief would not reduce the time he is required to serve”). Under these circumstances,
the Court concludes that it is appropriate to invoke the concurrent sentence doctrine and,
therefore, dismiss Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.2
2 Respondent argues further that the Court should dismiss Petitioner’s § 2241 petition for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction because he fails to state a claim of actual innocence. (Doc. No. 7 at
6.) In light of the Court’s conclusion that Petitioner’s § 2241 petition is subject to dismissal
pursuant to the concurrent sentence doctrine, the Court declines to address Respondent’s
alternate argument.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court will again dismiss Petitioner’s § 2241 petition. (Doc.
No. 1.) An appropriate Order follows.