The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JOSEPH P. MOFFITT, : Civil No. 3:19-CV-00899
:
Plaintiff, :
:
v. :
:
TUNKHANNOCK AREA SCHOOL :
DISTRICT, et al., :
:
Defendants. : Judge Jennifer P. Wilson
MEMORANDUM
This is a civil rights case arising from an allegedly wrongful termination.
The court dismissed the complaint on April 15, 2020, but granted Plaintiff leave to
amend his claims against the individual defendants in their individual capacities.
Plaintiff has since filed an amended complaint, and Defendants have filed a motion
to dismiss. Because the court finds that the amended complaint is barred by the
issue preclusion doctrine, the motion to dismiss is granted.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff Joseph P. Moffitt (“Moffitt”) was formerly employed as a principal
with the Tunkhannock Area School District (“TASD” or “the district”). (Doc. 21 ¶
4.) Moffitt was terminated from his position with the district on September 12,
2016, based on two driving under the influence incidents. (Id. ¶ 18.) This
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termination decision was made following a Loudermill hearing1 that occurred on
May 26, 2016 and June 9, 2016. (Id. ¶¶ 28–51.) Moffitt appealed the district’s
termination decision to Pennsylvania’s Secretary of Education, who upheld the
termination. Moffitt v. Tunkhannock Area Sch. Dist., 192 A.3d 1214, 1216 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2018) [hereinafter Moffitt I]. Moffitt then appealed that decision to
the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, which upheld Moffitt’s termination on
August 13, 2018. (Id. at 1219.)
Moffitt filed the instant case on May 28, 2019, again challenging his
termination and naming as defendants TASD, the TASD Board of School
Directors (“the Board”), and the individual members of the Board, who were sued
in both their individual and official capacities. (Doc. 1.) Defendants moved to
dismiss the complaint on September 16, 2019, arguing that Moffitt’s claims were
barred by the issue preclusion and claim preclusion doctrines and that they failed to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. (Doc. 7.)
The court granted the motion to dismiss on April 15, 2020. (Docs. 19–20.)
The court found that Moffitt’s claims against the district, the Board, and the
individual defendants in their official capacities were barred by the claim
1 Employees with a protected property interest in continued employment are entitled to an
opportunity to hear and respond to charges against them prior to being deprived of continued
employment. Loudermill v. Cleveland Bd. Of Educ., 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
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preclusion doctrine and that Moffitt’s claims against the individual defendants in
their individual capacities failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. (Doc. 19.) The court accordingly dismissed all claims with prejudice
except Moffitt’s claims against the individual defendants in their individual
capacities, which the court allowed Moffitt to amend. (Doc. 20.)
Moffitt filed an amended complaint on May 5, 2020. (Doc. 21.) Moffitt’s
allegations in the amended complaint focus on Defendants’ actions during his
Loudermill hearing. (See id.) Moffitt raises two counts for violation of his due
process and equal protection rights, one count for First Amendment retaliation, and
one count for wrongful suspension and termination. (Id. ¶¶ 56–83.)
Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint on May 19, 2020,
arguing that Moffitt’s claims are barred by the issue preclusion doctrine and that
they fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Doc. 22.) Briefing on
the motion has concluded, and it is ripe for the court’s disposition. (Docs. 24–26.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In order “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible on its face “when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
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inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Conclusory allegations of liability are insufficient” to
survive a motion to dismiss. Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 92 (3d Cir.
2019) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79). To determine whether a complaint
survives a motion to dismiss, a court identifies “the elements a plaintiff must plead
to state a claim for relief,” disregards the allegations “that are no more than
conclusions and thus not entitled to the assumption of truth,” and determines
whether the remaining factual allegations “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to
relief.” Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012).
DISCUSSION
A. The Court Will Not Convert the Motion to a Motion for Summary
Judgment
At the outset, the court will consider whether to convert Defendants’ motion
to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Moffitt argues that the court
should convert the motion and accordingly permit extra time for discovery because
Defendants have made two factual statements that are outside the scope of his
amended complaint. (Doc. 25 at 10–12.) Specifically, Moffitt challenges the
following two statements:
Regarding the unlawful retaliation claim, Plaintiff offered mere
speculation that Defendants terminated Plaintiff because of motion
rulings in an unrelated federal lawsuit. However, this speculation
hardly rises to the level of a plausible claim as Plaintiff’s two DUI
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convictions constituted the true substantial and motivating factors for
Plaintiff’s suspension and termination.
(Doc. 24 at 11.)
Further, Plaintiff offered no plausible or factually-sufficient pleadings
against any Defendants in their individual capacities regarding any of
his claims.
(Id. at 14.)
The decision of whether to convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for
summary judgment is left to the discretion of the district court. Kulwicki v.
Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1463 n.11 (3d Cir. 1992). Here, the court declines to
convert the motion. The two statements that Moffitt challenges are only relevant
to Defendants’ argument that Moffitt has not sufficiently pleaded facts to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. As the court concludes below, however,
Moffitt’s amended complaint is barred by the issue preclusion doctrine, rendering
analysis of the factual sufficiency of his pleading unnecessary. Thus, even
assuming for the sake of argument that the Defendants’ statements introduced facts
that should not be considered at this stage, this fact would have no impact on the
court’s resolution of the motion. Accordingly, the court will not convert the
motion into a motion for summary judgment.
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B. Moffitt’s Amended Complaint Is Barred by the Issue Preclusion
Doctrine
Defendants’ first argument is that Moffitt’s amended complaint is barred by
the issue preclusion doctrine because his claims were already decided by the
Commonwealth Court in a previous case. (Doc. 24 at 5–9.) Issue preclusion, also
referred to as collateral estoppel, bars re-litigation of an issue identical to an issue
that was raised in a prior action. Edmundson v. Borough of Kennett Square, 4 F.3d
186, 189 (3d Cir. 1993). When the issue was previously litigated in state court, a
federal court is required to give the state court’s judgment full faith and credit and
“apply the same preclusion rules as would the courts of that state.” Id.
Under Pennsylvania preclusion rules, the issue preclusion doctrine applies
when five conditions are met:
(1) the issue decided in the prior case is identical to the one presented
in the later action; (2) there was a final adjudication on the merits; (3)
the party against whom the plea is asserted was a party or in privity with
a party in the prior case; (4) the party or person privy to the party against
whom the doctrine is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
the issue in the prior proceeding; and (5) the determination in the prior
proceeding was essential to the judgment.
Skotnicki v. Ins. Dep’t, 175 A.3d 239, 247 (Pa. 2017) (quoting Office of
Disciplinary Counsel v. Kiesewetter, 889 A.2d 47, 50–51 (Pa. 2005)).
Issue preclusion is an affirmative defense that the moving party must prove.
See Weiner v. Lex, 176 A.3d 907, 926 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017). Accordingly, the
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defense fails if the movant fails to establish any of the elements of the defense.
Perelman v. Perelman, 125 A.3d 1259 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015). Although the
doctrine is an affirmative defense, it can be raised in a motion to dismiss. Connelly
Found. v. Sch. Dist. of Haverford Twp., 461 F.2d 495, 496 (3d Cir. 1972).
Here, the court finds that all conditions are present for application of the
issue preclusion doctrine. The first condition requires that the issues raised in the
prior case and the current case are identical. Skotnicki, 175 A.3d at 247. That
condition is present here. Moffitt alleges in the present case that his Loudermill
hearing violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection, that
his termination constituted retaliation, and that he was wrongfully terminated and
suspended. (Doc. 21 ¶¶ 56–83.) All of those issues were litigated before the
Commonwealth Court and decided by that court. See Moffitt I, 192 A.3d at 1217–
19 & n.5.
Moffitt nonetheless argues that the first condition of the issue preclusion
analysis is not present. He asserts that “the issue of the Defendants’ bias and
pretextual behavior has never, in fact, been litigated” because the Secretary of
Education denied his appeal and affirmed the district’s termination decision “after
a legal argument without the taking of testimony.” (Doc. 25 at 18.) This argument
is without merit. As noted above, the Commonwealth Court directly addressed all
of Moffitt’s claims. Moreover, Moffitt’s amended complaint does not make any
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allegations about the process he was afforded during proceedings before the
Secretary of Education, so even if that issue had not been litigated before the
Commonwealth Court, that fact would have no bearing on this case.
The second condition of the issue preclusion analysis is present because the
Commonwealth Court reached a final decision on the merits of Moffitt’s claims.
See Moffitt I, 192 A.3d at 1219. The third condition is also present because Moffitt
was a party before the Commonwealth Court and is a party in the present case. Id.
The fourth condition requires a finding that the party “against whom the
doctrine is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior
proceeding.” Skotnicki, 175 A.3d at 247. Here, Moffitt was given a full and fair
opportunity to litigate his case before the Commonwealth Court, see Moffitt I, 192
A.3d at 1217–18, and Moffitt does not present any arguments to the contrary. This
condition is accordingly met.
The fifth and final condition of the issue preclusion analysis requires a
finding that the determination in the prior proceeding was “essential to the
judgment.” Skotnicki, 175 A.3d at 247. This condition is clearly present here. As
noted above, Moffitt’s constitutional claims, retaliation claim, and wrongful
suspension and termination claim were all directly presented to the Commonwealth
Court. See Moffitt I, 192 A.3d at 1214. The court’s resolution of those issues was
therefore essential to its judgment.
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Other than his aforementioned argument regarding the first element of the
issue preclusion analysis, Moffitt raises only one argument as to why his claims are
not precluded. Moffitt argues that his claims are not precluded because he was
required to exhaust his administrative remedies by appealing to the Secretary of
Education and then filing a second appeal to the Commonwealth Court. (Doc. 25
at 13–17.)
Moffitt’s argument is based on the erroneous premise that he was required to
exhaust state court remedies prior to filing suit in federal court. It is a long-settled
principle that “exhaustion of state remedies is not a prerequisite to an action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Knick v. Twp. of Scott, Pa., 588 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2167
(2019) (emphasis in original) (quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 480
(1994)). This general rule extends to cases like the present one where an employee
of a Pennsylvania school district challenges the district’s adverse personnel
decision. See, e.g., Donovan v. Pittston Area Sch. Dist., No. 3:14-CV-01657, 2015
WL 3771420, at *8 (M.D. Pa. June 17, 2015) (holding that plaintiff employee
challenging school district’s decision to demote her “need not exhaust her
administrative remedies before filing her § 1983 claim”); Moffitt v. Tunkhannock
Area Sch. Dist., No. 3:13-CV-01519, 2013 WL 6909958, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 31,
2013) (previous action filed by Moffitt and involving same plaintiff’s counsel in
which Moffitt challenged the district’s decision to suspend him and the court held
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that Moffitt was not required to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing
suit). In addition, as the court held in rejecting this argument when analyzing
Defendants’ motion to dismiss Moffitt’s original complaint, see Doc. 19 at 10–11,
“[d]ecisions of state administrative agencies that have been reviewed by state
courts are . . . given preclusive effect in federal courts.” Edmundson, 4 F.3d at 189
(quoting Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 479–85 (1982)).
Accordingly, because all of the elements necessary for a finding of issue
preclusion are present and Moffitt has not presented any meritorious arguments to
the contrary, the court finds that his amended complaint is barred by the issue
preclusion doctrine. Having reached that conclusion, the court will not consider
whether the amended complaint alleges sufficient facts to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted. An
appropriate order follows.
s/Jennifer P. Wilson
JENNIFER P. WILSON
United States District Court Judge
Middle District of Pennsylvania
Dated: September 30, 2020
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