T.W. v. Southern Columbia Area School District

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

T.W., a minor, by and through his No. 4:20-CV-01688

father, THOMAS WALTMAN, and his

mother, KAREN WOJTOWICZ, (Judge Brann)

THOMAS WALTMAN, individually,

and KAREN WOJTOWICZ,

individually,

Plaintiffs,

v.

SOUTHERN COLUMBIA AREA

SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

SEPTEMBER 25, 2020

Pending before this Court is a motion for a preliminary injunction and

temporary restraining order filed by Plaintiff, T.W. on September 17, 2020.

Plaintiff commenced this action on September 16, 2020 pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 after he was suspended from participating in all school athletic programs

for the 2020-21 school year for violating the Southern Columbia School District’s

Code of Conduct. T.W. seeks injunctive relief to prevent Defendant, the Southern

Columbia School District, from enforcing the applicable section of its Code of

Conduct against him, thereby lifting his suspension and allowing him to play sports

this year. T.W. asserts that the policy is invalid on its face and raises equal

protection, substantive due process, procedural due process, and state law

challenges against the District.

Following an expedited briefing schedule, this matter is now ripe for the

Court’s consideration. For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for a

temporary restraining order will be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The District Code of Conduct and Student Handbook

This case arises from the Southern Columbia School District’s Code of

Conduct. The District has formalized its Code of Conduct in its High School

Student Handbook.1 Acknowledging that participation in extracurriculars is a

“privilege and not a right,” Section VII of the Handbook explains that those who

participate in extracurriculars will be held to a higher standard than those who do

not.2 The purpose of holding these students to a higher standard is to “instill in

students a respect for good citizenship in the form of positive peer pressure.”3

Accordingly, Section VII states that the Code of Conduct will be enforced against

such students “regardless of whether the offense occurs on or off school

1 Doc. 11-1.

2 Id. at 39.

3 Id. at 41. The general purpose of the Handbook is to “give school district students and their

parents/guardians an understanding of the general rules and guidelines for attending and

property.”4 Supplementing the rules listed in the general Code of Conduct, Section

VII sets forth additional rules applicable only to those involved in extracurriculars.5

One such rule (and the rule at issue in this case) prohibits students from

“attending any event in which underage drinking, smoking, or drug use is

occurring.”6 Actual consumption of alcohol or drugs is not required to establish a

violation.7 On its face, this rule applies to all students subject to Section VII, and

thus to all students who participate in extracurriculars.8 On the next page, the

Handbook includes a section titled “Tobacco/Nicotine

Products/Alcohol/Controlled Substances/Paraphernalia.”9 This section prohibits

students from selling, giving, delivering, using, possessing, or being under the

influence of alcohol or drugs.10

Immediately below this section, the Handbook specifies punishments for

violations of this rule.11 These punishments are as follows. A first violation results

in the student’s suspension from 25% of the games of the current or upcoming

4 Id. at 39.

5 Id. at 39-45. The District also has an Athletic Handbook specifically for student athletes. Doc.

11 at ¶ 31. Because the challenged policy is listed in both handbooks in identical form, the

Court will refer only to the High School Student Handbook. Id.

6 Id. at 40. Students will not be disciplined for attending such an event if, after determining in a

reasonable amount of time that a violation has occurred, they immediately leave the premises.

Id.

7 Id. at 41.

8 Id. at 40. The Handbook explicitly provides that “[a]ny student involved in an extra-curricular

program who is found to be in violation of any of the infractions mentioned [within Section

VII] will face disciplinary action.” Id.

9 Id. at 41.

10 Id.

season in which the student has intended to participate.12 A second violation

results in a suspension from 50% of such games.13 And a third violation results in

a suspension from all interscholastic athletics for one full calendar year.14

The Handbook then repeats the rule that no student shall attend any off-

campus parties or gatherings where alcohol or drug use occurs.15 The Handbook

does not include any other specific punishments within Section VII. However, the

Handbook does provide that coaches or advisors have the authority to impose

“reasonable sanctions, which may include extra workouts, suspension from

practice or competition, or removal from the activity for students who breach

team/group conduct expectations but do not engage in prohibited conduct.”16 The

Handbook further states that “[a] student’s failure to maintain good conduct,

regardless of whether the behavior is school-related, will be grounds for

disciplinary action ranging from counseling to immediate suspension or removal

from the team or group depending on the severity of the misconduct.”17

Section VII also lays out the procedures for establishing a violation and

imposing sanctions.18 When the school learns that a violation has occurred, the

“Principal or the Principal’s designee shall give the student oral notice of the

12 Id.

13 Id.

14 Id.

15 Id.

16 Id. at 43.

17 Id.

allegations and an opportunity to explain or defend the conduct.”19 The Principal

or designee will then determine if the violation has occurred and will impose

sanctions as appropriate.20 The Handbook maintains that all students will be

provided due process, which it defines as notice of the alleged violation and an

opportunity for the student to tell his or her story.21

B. T.W.’s Violations of the District Code of Conduct

T.W., a seventeen-year-old student athlete and senior at the Southern

Columbia Area High School, has been suspended three times for violating the

District’s Code of Conduct.22 First, in November 2019, T.W. was suspended for

twenty-five percent of the 2019 football season for an incident involving alcohol.23

Second, in February 2020, T.W. was suspended for attending an off-campus party

where underage drinking or drug use was taking place.24 While he did not

consume alcohol or drugs at the party, he was banned from participating in the

remainder of the 2020 wrestling season, as well as the first four games of the 2020

football season.25 Third, on September 5, 2020, T.W. was again suspended for

attending an off-campus party where underage drinking or drug use was taking

19 Id.

20 Id.

21 Id.

22 Doc. 11 at ¶¶ 1, 14, 18, 23.

23 Id. at ¶ 14. T.W. was also required to attend drug and alcohol counseling and was placed on

probation as a result of this incident. Id. at ¶ 17.

24 Id. at ¶ 18.

25 Id. at ¶ 21. T.W.’s suspension during the 2020 football season was reduced after discussions

place.26 He did not consume alcohol or drugs at the party.27 However, pursuant to

the Handbook’s policy, T.W. was then suspended from all athletics for the entire

participating in all athletics for the entire 2020-21 school year.28

This suit followed. T.W. presently seeks injunctive relief enjoining his

suspension and allowing him to participate in athletics for the 2020-21 school year

pending a preliminary injunction hearing on October 15, 2020.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remedy, which should be granted only

in limited circumstances.”29 A party seeking a temporary restraining order must

establish four factors: “(1) a likelihood of success on the merits, (2) the probability

of irreparable harm if the relief is not granted, (3) that granting injunctive relief

will not result in even greater harm to the other party, and (4) that granting relief

will be in the public interest.”30 Courts will use a balancing test to determine

whether injunctive relief is warranted.31 However, the movant will bear the

ultimate burden of establishing all four elements.32

26 Id. at ¶ 23.

27 Id. at ¶¶ 24-25.

28 Id. at ¶ 26. The complaint does not go into detail regarding the procedures followed prior to

T.W.’s final suspension. It is thus unclear whether T.W. attended any hearings or spoke with

the District before his suspension became effective.

29 Frank’s GMC Truck Center, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 102 (3d Cir. 1988)

(citing Morton v. Beyer, 822 F.2d 364, 376 (3d Cir. 1987)).

30 Bieros v. Nicola, 857 F. Supp. 445, 446 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (citing Frank’s GMC Truck Center,

847 F.2d at 102). “The standards for a temporary restraining order are the same as those for a

preliminary injunction.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

31 Oburn v. Shapp, 521 F.2d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 1975).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

The first factor to consider is whether the movant can demonstrate that their

claims have a likelihood of success on the merits. To satisfy this showing, a

movant need only establish a prima facie case demonstrating a “reasonable

probability” of success;33 they are not required to prove that success is “more likely

than not.”34 Nevertheless, as with the other three factors, the movant bears the

burden of making this showing.35

1. Equal Protection Claim

T.W. fails to establish that his equal protection claim has a likelihood of

success on the merits. Equal protection claims, when not involving a suspect class

or fundamental right, will be governed by the “rational basis test.”36 Under this

test, government action will be upheld so long as it “rationally furthers some

legitimate, articulated state purpose.”37 The rational basis test is a heavy burden to

overcome, as “it has long been settled that the Equal Protection Clause is offended

only by laws that are invidiously discriminatory—only by classifications that are

wholly arbitrary or capricious.”38 Because the District’s policy does not implicate

33 Issa v. School Dist. of Lancaster, 847 F.3d 121, 131 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal quotations

omitted).

34 Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 179 n. 3 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal quotations omitted).

35 Adams, 204 F.3d at 486.

36 Moreland v. Western Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic League, 572 F.2d 121, 124 (3d Cir.

1978).

37 San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).

a suspect class or fundamental right,39 T.W.’s claim will be governed by the

rational basis test.

T.W. challenges the Handbook’s prohibition against attending off-campus

parties as facially unconstitutional because the listed punishments in Section VII

only apply to athletes. He cites the list of punishments provided for in the

Handbook that refer only to suspensions from “games” and “seasons.” While

acknowledging that the policy on its face applies to all students, T.W. argues that,

per the Handbook’s list of punishments, the District would only be able to

meaningfully enforce the rule against athletes.

This argument is unavailing. As T.W. concedes, the Handbook’s policy

applies not just to athletes but to all students who participate in extracurriculars.

More importantly, however, the Handbook explicitly states that any student who

participates in extracurriculars and violates this policy “will face disciplinary

action.” The Handbook is not required to list in detail every punishment that every

student may conceivably face if they violate the policy. And it is clear from the

language of Section VII that any student who participates in extracurriculars is

subject to punishment for violating any policy contained within the Handbook.

That Section VII explicitly states that a “student’s failure to maintain good

conduct” may result in “immediate suspension or removal from the team or group”

39 Participating in “extra-curricular activities is not a fundamental right under the Constitution.”

sufficiently shows that the listed punishments are not the exclusive means of

enforcing this rule.40

Even taking T.W.’s argument at face value that the Handbook distinguishes

between athletes and non-athletes by providing for specific punishments only

available against athletes, T.W. cannot demonstrate that such a distinction is

irrational. The stated purpose of the Handbook is to give students and parents “an

understanding of the general rules and guidelines” while attending school.41 And

the District’s stated reason for adopting these specific sanctions is to “combat

student drug and alcohol use while also mak[ing] discipline among various student

activities consistent.”42 These punishments, though clearly easier to apply to

athletes than to, say, someone in the drama club, are rationally related to the

District’s interests in giving student’s notice of the possible consequences of their

actions and making punishments, to the extent possible, more consistent.43

40 Doc. 11-1 at 43. While not properly in evidence, the District has also alleged that the policy

has been enforced against non-athlete students, including one cheerleader currently serving a

suspension. Doc. 12 at 11. The District also claims that non-athlete students have been

punished for violations by being “barred from drama club practices or . . . prevented from

attending the prom.” Id.

41 Doc. 11-1 at 1.

42 Doc. 12 at 11.

43 It is also relevant to note that the District has found it necessary to create an entire student

handbook specifically for athletes. Doc. 11 at ¶ 31. Importantly, T.W. does not challenge the

fact that athletes in the District are in many ways subject to greater regulation and supervision

than those who participate in other extracurriculars. E.g., Doc. 11-1 at 48-50 (detailing specific

Because T.W. can neither prove that the District’s policy discriminates

against athletes nor that any alleged discrimination would be irrational, he cannot

establish that his equal protection claim has a likelihood of success.

2. Substantive Due Process

T.W.’s parents fail to establish that their substantive due process claim has a

likelihood of success on the merits. To assert a substantive due process claim

under § 1983, “a plaintiff must demonstrate the defendant, acting under color of

state law, deprived [plaintiff] of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of

the United States.”44 Accordingly, the first step in evaluating such a claim is to

“‘identify the exact contours of the underlying right said to have been violated’ and

to determine ‘whether the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of a constitutional

right at all.’”45 Because “the core of the concept [of due process is] protection

against arbitrary action,” “only the most egregious official conduct can be said to

be arbitrary in the constitutional sense.”46 Thus, to succeed on a substantive due

process claim, a plaintiff “must prove the particular interest at issue is protected by

the substantive due process clause and the government’s deprivation of that

protected interest shocks the conscience.”47

44 Chainey v. Street, 523 F.2d 200, 219 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted).

45 Id. (citing Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 279, 806 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc)).

46 Id. (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998)).

47 Id. (citing United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392, 400-02

T.W.’s parents assert that the substantive right at issue is their right as

parents to direct and control their children’s upbringing and education.48 The

Supreme Court first articulated this right in Meyer v. Nebraska49 and Pierce v.

Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary.50 In Meyer, the Court

struck down a law forbidding the teaching of certain language to students at

primary schools.51 And in Pierce, the Court held that states may not force parents

to enroll their children in public school.52 The Court has also considered this right

in the context of the child-parent relationship; however, it has mostly given

attention to laws that directly infringe upon parental or custodial rights.53

The Supreme Court has yet to “define the precise boundaries of a parent’s

right to control a child’s upbringing and education.”54 “It is clear, however, that

the right is neither absolute nor unqualified.”55 Where the government has only

indirectly infringed upon a parent’s right, the infringement will be “subject to

minimum scrutiny, requiring only that the action rationally advance a legitimate

48 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).

49 262 U.S. 390 (1923).

50 268 U.S. 510 (1925).

51 262 U.S. at 403.

52 268 U.S. at 534-35.

53 E.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. at 71-72 (striking down a state law permitting courts to disregard

decisions made by parents regarding visitation with third parties); Santosky v. Kramer, 455

U.S. 745, 769-70 (1982) (requiring states to support allegations by at least clear and convincing

evidence to permanently sever parental rights); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657 (1972)

(holding that a father was entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before losing parental

rights).

54 C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 182 (3d Cir. 2005).

government interest.”56 Because the District’s policy does not directly impose

upon T.W.’s parents,57 this Court shall consider any effect it has on their interests

to be incidental. Consequently, this Court will review the District’s policy under

the rational basis test.

T.W.’s parents have not shown that the District has infringed upon their

right to direct and control T.W.’s upbringing and education. They argue that the

District’s rule punishing students for attending parties where underage drinking or

drug use is occurring “prohibits the parent from making decisions as to where and

when it is acceptable for their children to socialize and under what

circumstances.”58 But T.W.’s parents do not cite any cases or attempt to explain

why “making decisions as to where and when” their children socialize is or should

be considered a constitutional right. There are no cases previously, to this Court’s

knowledge, recognizing such a right. And this Court declines to expand

substantive due process merely to accommodate T.W.’s parents’ claim.

Moreover, even if T.W.’s parents could establish such a right, they have not

satisfied their burden of showing that the District’s policy is irrational or shocks

the conscience. The District has a valid interest in discouraging and preventing

56 Angstadt v. Midd-West School Dist., 377 F.3d 338, 344 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Philadelphia

Police and Fire Ass’n for Handicapped Children, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 874 F.2d 156,

168 (3d Cir. 1989).

57 Unlike the cases cited above, the policy punishes only T.W., and not his parents, for his

behavior.

alcohol and drug use amongst its students.59 Prohibiting students from attending

parties where they are exposed to alcohol or drugs is rationally related to this

interest. Because T.W.’s parents cannot show that their right to direct and control

T.W.’s upbringing and education have been violated, they have failed to establish a

likelihood of success on the merits of their substantive due process claim.

3. Procedural Due Process

T.W. fails to establish that his procedural due process claim has a likelihood

of success on the merits. To succeed on a due process claim, plaintiffs must prove:

“(1) a deprivation of an individual interest encompassed by the Fourteenth

Amendment’s protection of life, liberty, or property, and (2) that the procedures

available did not provide due process of law.60

Students have a recognized property-interest in education.61 However, as

this Court has stated previously in Dallam v. Cumberland Valley School District,

students have an interest in the “entire process” of education; they do not have

numerous individual property rights in the “myriad activities which combine to

form” their entire education.62 Accordingly, students do not have a recognized,

59 See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 407 (2007) (“[D]eterring drug use by schoolchildren is

an ‘important—indeed, perhaps compelling’ interest.”) (quoting Vernonia School Dist. 47J v.

Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655-56 (1995)); Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S.

656, 656 (1989) (acknowledging the government’s strong interest in detecting drug use among

certain employees).

60 Culinary Serv. Of Delaware Valley, Inc. v. Borough of Yardley, Pa, 385 Fed. Appx. 135, 140-

41 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 233-34 (3d Cir. 2006));

Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 2000).

61 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972).

freestanding property-interest in participating in athletic and extracurricular

activities.63

Nevertheless, a school may create such a property interest where it explicitly

guarantees that it will provide students with due process.64 In Davis v. Central

Dauphin School District School Board, this Court determined that the school in

question created a property interest in playing basketball by informing students that

they would receive due process before being subject to removal from an

extracurricular activity.65 The Court interpreted this as requiring the school to

provide the student with “oral or written notice of the charges against him and if he

denies them, an explanation of the evidence that the school authorities have and an

opportunity to present his side of the story.”66 In setting forth these procedures, the

Court looked to Goss v. Lopez for guidance.67 Because Goss prescribed these

exact requirements for students facing a ten-day suspension, this Court found it

appropriate to adopt the same rules where a student faces possible removal from a

sports team.68

63 Id. at 362; see also Angstadt v. Midd-West Sch. Dist., 377 F.3d 338, 344 (3d Cir. 2004);

Dominic J. v. Wyoming Valley West High School, 362 F. Supp. 2d 560, 671 (M.D. Pa. 2005).

64 Davis v. Central Dauphin School Dist. School Bd., 466 F. Supp. 1259, 1263-64 (M.D. Pa.

1979).

65 Id.

66 Id. (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975)).

67 Id.

Turning to the present case, the Court finds that the District has established a

legal property-interest in participating in extracurriculars. The Handbook’s

statement that all students subject to Section VII will be “provided due process”

throughout the disciplinary process is enough to establish a legal interest in these

activities. That said, the District’s suspension will only violate the Due Process

Clause if the procedures offered do not satisfy the requirements set forth in

Davis.69 The District will thus have provided T.W. with sufficient due process so

long as it gave T.W. oral or written notice of the charges against him, and if he

denies them, an opportunity to present his side of the story.

T.W. has not shown that did not receive due process before being suspended.

All T.W. alleges is that he was “not afforded a pre-deprivation hearing or an

opportunity to present his side of the story prior to the deprivation.”70 But under

Davis, T.W. does not have an unqualified right to a hearing, and he only will have

the opportunity to present his side of the story if he chooses to rebut the factual

basis for his charges.71 T.W. does not contest that he received notice of his

charges. And he does not allege that he ever tried to deny the factual basis for his

suspension, which would in turn have triggered his right to present his side of the

69 The Court does not take any opinion as to whether due process requires less than that set forth

in Davis; it simply recognizes that satisfying the Davis requirements will be sufficient to defeat

T.W.’s due process claim.

70 Doc. 11 at ¶ 76.

story.72 Consequently, T.W. has not shown that his procedural due process claim

has a likelihood of success on the merits.

4. State Law

T.W. fails to establish that his state law claim has a likelihood of success on

the merits. At issue here is whether the District’s authority under Section 511 of

the Public School Code of 194973 permits it to suspend a student from participating

in extracurricular activities when that student attends an off-campus party where

underage drinking or drug use is present.74

When evaluating the validity of a local school-board or district action, courts

in Pennsylvania have been well-warned to exercise caution and restraint.75 As the

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has advised: “courts should not function as super

school boards.”76 Accordingly, a school is subject to injunctive relief only where it

abuses and “transcends the limits of its legal discretion.”77 “The burden of

showing such an abuse is a heavy one and rests with the party seeking the

injunction.”78

72 In fact, the crux of T.W.’s entire argument has been to concede the factual basis for his

suspension while challenging its legal validity.

73 24 P.S. § 5-511(a).

74 Both parties agree that such a suspension is beyond the power of the District under Section 510

of the Public School Code. Doc. 12 at 14-15.

75 Zebra v. Sch. Dist. of City of Pittsburgh, 296 A.2d 748, 750-51 (Pa. 1972).

76 Id.

77 Id. (internal citations omitted).

With these background principles in mind, the Court now turns to the statute

itself. The text of Section 511 reads as follows:

The board of school directors in every school district shall prescribe,

adopt, and enforce such reasonable rules and regulations as it may

deem proper, regarding (1) the management, supervision, control, or

prohibition of exercises, athletics, or games of any kind . . . and (2) the

organization, management, supervision, control financing, or

prohibition of organizations, clubs, societies and groups of the

members of any class or school, and may provide for the suspension,

dismissal, or other reasonable penalty in the case of any . . . pupil who

violates any of such rules or regulations.79

Section 511 is a “broad legislative mandate and deserves a broad

interpretation.”80 However, the analysis required to review local authority under

Section 511 is necessarily fact-intensive, and any challenge will be considered on a

case-by-case basis.”81

The two cases offered by the parties are useful in determining the scope of

the District’s authority under Section 511. In Billman v. Big Spring School

District, the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, Pennsylvania upheld

the suspension of two students who consumed a bottle of wine before attending a

school dance as a valid exercise of school authority.82 Despite the students having

consumed the wine off-campus, the court found their intoxication at a school

function to be sufficient grounds for the school district to assert its authority under

79 24 P.S. § 5-511(a) (emphasis added).

80 King v. Hempfield School Dist., 8 Pa. D. & C.4th 48, 52 (1990).

81 Id. (citing Delisio v. Elwood City Area Sch. Dist., 70 Pa. D. & C.2d 524 (1975)).

Section 511.83 The court found it unnecessary to address the scope of the school

district’s authority to punish students who engaged in misconduct wholly off-

campus.84

In King v. Hempfield School District, the Court of Common Pleas of

Lancaster County, Pennsylvania addressed whether a school district has authority

under Section 511 to suspend a student athlete who drinks alcohol off-campus but

who does not subsequently attend a school-related event.85 The court answered in

the affirmative, holding that Section 511 authorized such a suspension.86 It

reasoned that, by agreeing to comply with the school district’s policy against off-

campus alcohol and substance use, and by being a “participant in extracurricular

activities,” the student had thereby placed himself “under school supervision.”87

Relying on this interpretation, the court found it not unreasonable for the school

district to apply its policy to the student, even where all misconduct occurred off-

campus.88

83 Id.

84 Id. Contrary to T.W.’s assertions, Billman does not stand for the proposition that a school

district’s “rules and regulations” must be “related to the school program.” Doc. 13 at 13 n. 4.

The “rule” that T.W. claims exists appears to come from the language of Section 511 rather

than from Billman. 24 P.S. § 5-511(a) (“The board of school directors . . . shall prescribe,

adopt, and enforce such reasonable rules and regulations . . . regarding (1) the management,

supervision, control, or prohibition of exercises, athletics, or games of any kind, school

publications, debating, forensic, dramatic, musical, and other activities related to the school

program.”) (emphasis added).

85 King, 8 Pa. D. & C. 4th at 52.

86 Id.

87 Id.

King is directly applicable to the present case. Section VII of the Handbook

explicitly provides that students who participate in extracurriculars are held to a

higher standard than other students. T.W., by being a student athlete, has thus

agreed to comply with the rules and regulations set forth in Section VII. The

appropriate question here is not whether the party T.W. attended was school-

related, but whether T.W. had subjected himself to greater school supervision by

participating in extracurricular activities. Because T.W. had done so, this Court

finds the District’s policy to be a reasonable exercise of discretion.

As Billman recognized, “it is often necessary for school officials to regulate

a student’s activities outside the actual classroom.”89 Because the District has a

valid interest in preventing and discouraging alcohol-use amongst students90 and

because prohibiting students from attending parties where underage drinking is

present is reasonably related to this goal, the Court cannot hold that the District’s

policy is an abuse of discretion. Consequently, T.W. has failed to show that his

state claim has a likelihood of success on the merits.

B. Irreparable Harm

The second requirement for a temporary restraining order is “a showing that

the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if an injunction is not issued.”91 In D.M.

by Bao Xiong v. Minnesota State High School League, the United States Court of

89 Billman, 27 Pa. D. & C. 3d at 496.

90 Id.; King, 8 Pa. D. & C. 4th at 52.

Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that two students who were denied from

participating on their school’s dance team had established irreparable harm.92 The

court reasoned that the students could not “get that season back,” and that

“deprivations of temporally isolated opportunities[] are exactly what preliminary

injunctions are intended to relieve.”93

Here, T.W. has sufficiently demonstrated irreparable harm. Being unable to

participate in athletics for a year is a “temporally isolated opportunity” and is, the

Court agrees, precisely the type of injury that preliminary injunctive relief is

intended to prevent. While the District is correct to note that D.M by Bao Xiong

dealt with a gender discrimination claim, the Eighth Circuit’s temporal analysis is

still persuasive in interpreting the possible harm caused by being deprived of the

opportunity to participate in athletics for a year. T.W. has thus satisfied his

showing of irreparable harm.

C. Balance of Harm

The third factor, the balance of harms, requires determining “whether

granting preliminary relief will result in even greater harm to the nonmoving

party.”94 “To determine which way the balance of hardship tips, a court must

identify the harm to be caused by the preliminary injunction against the possibility

92 917 F.3d 994, 1003 (8th Cir. 2019).

93 Id.

of the harm caused by not issuing it.”95 A court may consider a party’s likelihood

of success on the merits when determining in which direction the balance of harm

tilts.96 The Court is satisfied that the risk of harm from enjoining the District’s

ability to consistently enforce its disciplinary rules sufficiently outweighs the risk

that T.W. faces as a result of his suspension. T.W. has not established a likelihood

of success on the merits, and the balance of harms consequently weighs in favor of

the District.

D. Public Interest

The fourth factor involves determining whether the public interest weighs in

favor of or against injunctive relief. T.W. argues that the public interest weighs in

favor of relief because, in the absence of legitimate countervailing concerns, “the

public’s interest favors the protection of constitutional rights.”97 Here, however,

neither T.W. nor his parents have established a likelihood of success on their

constitutional claims. Moreover, the public has a strong interest in deterring

underage drinking amongst students that would be harmed by enjoining T.W.’s

suspension.98 Accordingly, the public interest weighs against injunctive relief.

95 Buck v. Stankovic, 485 F. Supp. 2d 576, 586 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (citing Los Angeles Memorial

Coliseum Commission v. NFL, 634 F.2d 1197, 1203 (9th Cir. 1980)).

96 Easton Area School Dist., 827 F. Supp. 2d at 409.

97 B.H. v. Easton Area Sch. Dist., 827 F. Supp. 2d 392, 409 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (quoting Council of

Alternative Political Parties v. Hooks, 121 F.3d 876, 884 (3d Cir. 1997)).

98 See Morse, 551 U.S. at 407; Acton, 515 U.S. at 655-56; Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v.

IV. CONCLUSION

Taken together, T.W. and his parents have not met their burden for proving

that injunctive relief is warranted under the circumstances. His motion for a

temporary restraining order is thus denied.

An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

United States District Judge