Beatty v. Garman

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WILLIAM SCOTT BEATTY, SR., : No. 3:19-CV-01802

Petitioner, (Judge Mariani)

MARK GARMAN, et al., :

Respondents. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Petitioner William Scott Beatty, Sr., a state prisoner presently confined at the State

Correctional Institution at Rockville in Bellefonte, Pennsylvania, filed this petition for a writ of

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his state court convictions by arguing

that statements of his codefendant indicate that Petitioner was not, in fact, his codefendant’s

accomplice. Doc. 1. Petitioner also alleges that certain criminal counts were withdrawn

against this codefendant. /d. Petitioner asserts that this information was not available at the

time he decided to plead guilty. /d.

Respondents filed an answer raising as an affirmative defense the statute of

limitations, arguing that the petition is untimely. Doc. 11. Petitioner filed no reply. For the

reasons discussed below, the Court will dismiss the petition as time-barred under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d).

I. BACKGROUND

On March 24, 2010, Petitioner was charged with ninety-five (95) counts of various

state law offenses, including burglary, robbery, and unlawful possession of a firearm. Doc.

11-1 at 1. Petitioner proceeded to trial on April 4, 2011, on an amended criminal information

filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County. After the first day of trial, however,

Petitioner entered an open plea of nolo contendere. Id. On May 18, 2011, Petitioner was

sentenced to a total minimum term of 497 months and a maximum term of 994 months

imprisonment. /d. at 2. Petitioner did not file a direct appeal of his plea or sentence, and the

time for doing so expired on June 17, 2011. fd. at 2, 7 (citing Pa. R. Crim. P. 720(a)(3)

providing for thirty days after imposition of sentence to file a direct appeal).

On May 24, 2011, Petitioner filed his first Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) petition.

Id. at 2. The petition was ultimately denied on the merits by the trial court on June 23, 2015.'

Id. at 3. Petitioner appealed this denial to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, who affirmed

the denial of the first PCRA petition on February 5, 2016. /d. Petitioner did not seek to appeal

this affirmance to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, and the time for doing so expired on

1 During the first appeal of Petitioner's first PCRA petition, the Pennsylvania Superior Court on February

4, 2014, vacated the denial of that petition. In doing so, the Superior Court explained that the first PCRA

petition challenged both Petitioner's 2009 and 2010 criminal actions, but the trial court had only determined

the PCRA issues raised regarding the 2009 action and not the 2010 action. The petition was thus remanded

to the trial court for disposition of the 2010 action on the merits.

March 6, 2016, a Sunday, thus actually providing until Monday, March 7, 2016 for any such

filing.2 Id. at 4 n.3.

Shortly after Petitioner's Superior Court appeal was denied, Petitioner filed a second

PCRA petition on March 21, 2016. /d. at 3. In that proceeding, Petitioner sought to challenge

the effectiveness of his PCRA counsel, specifically as it related to his counsel's failure to

petition the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for allowance of appeal of his first PCRA petition

which had been denied. /d. at 3-4. The second PCRA petition was denied on July 21, 2017,

however the trial court permitted Petitioner to file a petition for allowance of appeal to the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court within thirty days from the date of that order. /d. at4. Rather

than filing that petition for allowance of appeal, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal as to the

second PCRA petition’s denial. fd. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the denial of

the second PCRA petition on February 23, 2018, holding that the petition is “patently untimely”

because it was filed well after a year past the date Petitioner's conviction became final and

because Petitioner failed to allege any “after-discovered facts” sufficient to permit a second

2 Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1113 provides that any petition for allowance of appeal shall

be filed within thirty days after the entry of the order of the Superior Court sought to be reviewed.

Although Petitioner did not initially file that petition for allowance of appeal, he did file a motion with the

trial court to stay the thirty-day period in which to file the petition for allowance of appeal pending his appeal

of his denied PCRA claims to the Superior Court. See Doc. 11-32. That stay was granted by order dated

August 24, 2017. Doc. 11-33. Given the affirmance by the Superior Court of the denial of the second PCRA

petition on February 23, 2018, it appears that the time for filing the petition for allowance of appeal would

have expired on March 25, 2018, which was a Sunday, and thus the time for filing was extended to and

expired on March 26, 2018.

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PCRA petition.4 Id. Doc. 37. Petitioner did not file a petition for allowance of appeal after the

Superior Court upheld the denial of his second PCRA petition as untimely.

Petitioner next filed a third PCRA petition on March 23, 2018, in which he alleged

collusion between trial counsel, the trial court, and the Commonwealth, in addition to

prosecutorial misconduct. This third petition was also dismissed as untimely on August 31,

2018 by the trial court. /d. at 5. Petitioner appealed that denial, and the Pennsylvania

Superior Court affirmed the denial on May 9, 2019. /d. Petitioner then filed a petition for

allowance of appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which was denied on August 22,

2019. Id.

Petitioner filed the instant Petition on October 17, 2019. Doc. 1. The Court issued an

order to show cause as to why the petition should not be granted, and Respondents filed an

answer raising the issue of timeliness. See Docs. 6 (order), 11 (answer). Petitioner has not

filed a reply in support of his Petition.

ll. | DISCUSSION

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (‘AEDPA”) outlines the applicable

statute of limitations for Petitioner's habeas petition, and it provides, in pertinent part:

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to a judgment of a State court. The limitation

period shall run from the latest of-

4 The Superior Court noted that the portion of the trial court's order on the second PCRA petition granting

pougoner thirty days in which to file a petition for allowance of appeal was not before them. See Doc. 37 at

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction

or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending

shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). See also Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d 153, 157 (3d Cir. 1999). Pursuant

to § 2244(d), evaluation of the timeliness of a § 2254 petition requires a determination of, first,

when the pertinent judgment became “final,” and, second, the period of time during which an

application for state post-conviction relief was “properly filed” and “pending.” The judgment

is determined to be final by the conclusion of direct review, or the expiration of time for seeking

such review, including the ninety-day period for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the

Supreme Court of the United States. See Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 653-54 (2012).

Here, Petitioner did not file a direct appeal of his conviction and sentence, so his

sentence became final thirty days later, i.e. on June 17, 2011. His one year federal habeas

statute of limitations would have begun to run on June 18, 2011, however Petitioner filed his

first PCRA petition on May 24, 2011. That action tolled his federal habeas statute of

limitations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) until the conclusion of his first PRCA

proceedings including any appeals. According to the record before the Court, those

proceedings ended on March 7, 2016, when the time for filing a petition for allowance of

appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court expired. Thus, the habeas statute of limitations

started to run on March 8, 2016, and expired on or about March 8, 2017.

Petitioner's two later PCRA petitions have no effect on and did not toll the running of

the statute of limitations because they were dismissed as untimely. For the statute of

limitations to be tolled or remain tolled, any PCRA petition must be both pending and properly

filed. See Fahy v. Horn, 240 F.3d 239, 243 (3d Cir. 2001). “The AEDPA statute of limitations

can only be statutorily tolled when a collateral petition for state relief was submitted according

to the state's procedural requirements, such as the rules governing the time and place of

filing.” Id. A federal habeas court must “must look to state law governing when a petition for

collateral relief is properly filed” and “defer to a state’s highest court when it rules on an issue.”

Merritt v. Blaine, 26 F.3d 157, 165 (3d Cir. 2003).

In Pennsylvania, a PCRA petitioner need not appeal his or her petition to the Supreme

Court of Pennsylvania; an appeal to the Superior Court constitutes full exhaustion for the

purposes of a § 2254 petition. See In re Exhaustion of State Remedies in Criminal and Post-

Conviction Relief Cases, No. 218 Judicial Administration Docket No. 1 (Pa. May 9, 2000)

(“Order No. 218”); Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 233-34 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that a

petitioner in Pennsylvania need not lodge a discretionary appeal to Pennsylvania Supreme

Court in order to exhaust state remedies in order to pursue federal habeas relief, appeal to

Superior Court will suffice). Here, Petitioner's appeals of his denied PCRA petitions to the

Superior Court constitute the exhaustion of state remedies for this federal habeas petition,

and, because the Superior Court has reached the issue of timeliness of the second and third

PCRA petitions, this Court must defer to the Superior Court’s determination that both were

untimely. See Fahy, 240 F.3d at 243: Merritt, 26 F.3d at 165-66. Because the Pennsylvania

Superior Court found both of Petitioner's second and third PCRA petitions to be untimely,

those petitions cannot toll the federal habeas statute of limitations.5

Before concluding that the Petition is untimely, the Court must determine whether

Petitioner would be entitled to an alternative starting point for the one-year limitations period

pursuant to § 2244(d)(1)(D) because Petitioner has referenced “newly discovered evidence”

in his petition. Under § 2244(d)(1)(D), the Petition may be timely if the petition has been

brought within one year of the date on which the facts giving rise to the grounds for relief in

the petition could have been discovered through the use of due diligence. Here, Petitioner

fails to explicitly identify this newly discovered fact or evidence other than offering general

allegations. Instead, Petitioner simply states that “newly discovered evidence indicat[es]

Petitioner was in fact not [codefendant’s] accomplice” and references the documents attached

to the Petition. Those documents consist of approximately twenty pages from the state court

record, including various criminal docket sheets, correspondence, sample motions, PCRA

5 The Court notes that Petitioner's second PCRA petition was originally decided on the merits and only

found to be untimely on appeal. Even assuming—for the sake of argument—that his second PCRA petition

was timely and thus further tolled the federal habeas statute of limitations, this third PCRA petition was

dismissed as untimely and not decided on the merits. The conclusion of his third PCRA proceedings ended

on March 23, 2018, and the federal habeas statute of limitations would have expired on or about March 23,

2019, well before this petition was filed.

>

petitions, and a partial state court order in his codefendant’s criminal case. From what the

Court can discern from a comprehensive review of these documents, at best, it appears that

Petitioner considers the “discovered” factual predicate for his claims made under §

2244(d)(1)(D) to be that certain criminal counts were withdrawn against his codefendant who

would have testified against him, which he asserts to be new evidence. The Court reaches

this conclusion from a hand written PCRA petition included as an exhibit that appears to recite

a portion of an unknown transcript in which Petitioner's counsel is questioned regarding the

withdrawal of certain common criminal charges against Petitioner's codefendant:

Mr. Diederick, were you aware that counts 59 through 91 were withdrawn

against Mr. Lighty [condefendant]?

Mr. Diederick: | was not aware that certain counts were withdraw\[n] [until] after

you were sentenced.

See Doc. 1 at 27. Petitioner then goes on to state in this hand written PCRA petition that

“newly-discovered evidence would have been available prior to plea and also would establish

defendants request for suppression of evidence and motion to sever.”6 Id.

Although Petitioner may not have discovered this information until well after he

decided to plead guilty, court records are generally public records and easily accessible. and

Petitioner makes no argument to the contrary. Notably, Petitioner raised this factual issue in

his third PCRA petition, which was filed on March 23, 2018, and thus, it is clear to the Court

that this factual information was discovered more than one year before October 17, 2019, the

6 This issue was raised in this PCRA petition in the context of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

date of the filing of his § 2254 petition in this Court. Therefore, the Court finds that Petitioner

cannot avail himself of § 2244(d)(1)(D), and the petition is untimely.

Next, the Court must determine whether equitable tolling may apply to Petitioner's

untimely petition. In Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649-50 (2010), the Supreme Court

held that AEDPA’s one-year limitations period is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate

cases, on a case-by-case basis. See Ross v. Varano, 712 F.3d 784, 798 (3d Cir. 2013). A

litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: “(1) that he

has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood

in his way.” Holland, 560 U.S. at 649 (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005).

See also Jenkins v. Superintendent of Laurel Highlands, 705 F.3d 80, 89 (3d Cir. 2013).

The diligence required for equitable tolling is reasonable diligence, not maximum,

extreme, or exceptional diligence. Holland, 560 U.S. at 653. “This obligation does not pertain

solely to the filing of the federal habeas petition, rather it is an obligation that exists during the

period appellant is exhausting state court remedies as well.” LaCava v. Kyler, 398 F.3d 271,

277 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). See also Alicia v. Karestes, 389 F. App'x 118, 122 (3d

Cir. 2010) (holding that the “obligation to act diligently pertains to both the federal habeas

claim and the period in which the petitioner exhausts state court remedies”). Reasonable

diligence is examined under a subjective test, and it must be considered in light of the

particular circumstances of the case. See Ross, 712 F.3d at 799; Schlueter v. Varner, 384

F.3d 69, 74 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Due diligence does not require the maximum feasible diligence,

but it does require diligence in the circumstances.”).

The Court also must determine whether extraordinary circumstances exist to warrant

equitable tolling. “[G]arden variety claim[s] of excusable neglect” by a petitioner's attorney do

not generally present an extraordinary circumstance meriting equitable tolling. Holland, 560

U.S. at 651 (citations omitted). See also Merritt v. Blaine, 326 F.3d 157, 168 (3d Cir. 2003).

Rather, equitable tolling can be triggered only when “the principles of equity would make the

rigid application of a limitation period unfair, such as when a state prisoner faces extraordinary

circumstances that prevent him from filing a timely habeas petition and the prisoner has

exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to investigate and bring his claims.” LaCava,

398 F.3d at 275-276. See also Holland, 560 U.S. at 648-49 (relying on Pace, 544 U.S. at

418); Jenkins, 705 F.3d at 89 (holding that equitable tolling should be applied sparingly, and

only when the “principles of equity would make the rigid application of a limitation period

unfair’).

Indeed, extraordinary circumstances have been found only where (a) the respondent

has actively misled the petitioner, (b) the petitioner has in some extraordinary way been

prevented from asserting his rights, (c) the petitioner has timely asserted his rights mistakenly

in the wrong forum, or (d) the court itself has misled a party regarding the steps that the party

needs to take to preserve a claim. See Brinson v. Vaughn, 398 F.3d 225, 230 (3d Cir. 2005).

Nevertheless, it must be restated that, even where extraordinary circumstances do exist, “if

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the person seeking equitable tolling has not exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to

file after the extraordinary circumstances began, the link of causation between the

extraordinary circumstances and the failure to file is broken, and the extraordinary

circumstances therefore did not prevent timely filing.” Brown v. Shannon, 322 F.3d 768, 773

(3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Valverde v. Stinson, 224 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir. 2000)).

Respondents’ Answer asserted the untimeliness of Petitioner's federal habeas

petition, which also addressed why equitable tolling would be inappropriate. Petitioner had

an opportunity to respond to the answer, but has failed to file a reply and has not offered an

explanation for the delay in bringing his federal habeas petition which would allow this Court

to consider equitable tolling. Furthermore, the Court has reviewed Petitioner's filings and

finds no circumstances which could potentially trigger equitable tolling. Thus, the Court will

dismiss the Petition as untimely.

lll. | CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate

of appealability, an appeal may not be taken from a final order in a proceeding under 28

U.S.C. § 2254. A certificate of appealability (“COA”) may issue “only if the applicant has made

a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “A

petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with

the district court's resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the

issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v.

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Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003) (citation omitted), cited in United States v. Williams, 536

F. App’x 169, 1714 (3d Cir. 2013).

“When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without

reaching the prisoner's underlying constitutional claim, a COA should issue when the prisoner

shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid

claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable

whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.

473, 484 (2000).

Here, jurists of reason would not find it debatable whether this Court is correct in its

procedural ruling. No certificate of appealability shall issue.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, William Scott Beatty, Sr.’s § 2254 habeas petition will

be dismissed as untimely filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), and a certificate of appealability

shall not issue.

A separate order shall issue.

BY THE CO

MWALdet

obert D. Mari ni |

Dated: pf / Ww United States District Judge

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