The opinion
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4307
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JULIUS B. BROWN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. George L. Russell, III, District Judge.
(8:12-cr-00525-GLR-1)
Submitted: September 11, 2013 Decided: September 16, 2013
Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Hughie D. Hunt, II, KEMET & HUNT, LLC, College Park, Maryland,
for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Jane
F. Nathan, Assistant United States Attorney, Greenbelt,
Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Julius B. Brown appeals from his conviction and
sentence of twelve months of probation and a $430.00 fine for
driving under the influence of alcohol, in violation of 36
C.F.R. § 4.23(a)(1) (2013), and improper use of a cell phone, in
violation of Md. Code Ann., Transp. § 21-1124.2 (LexisNexis
Supp. 2012), following his bench trial before a magistrate
judge. Brown argues that the magistrate judge erred in denying
his motion to suppress the fruits of his seizure during a
traffic stop. The Government contends that we should not
consider the issue because Brown did not timely brief his appeal
to the district court under D. Md. Loc. R. 302. 18 U.S.C. §
3402 (2006); Fed. R. Crim. P. 58(g). Although we assume for the
sake of this appeal that Brown’s failure to comply with the
district court’s local rules forfeited, rather than waived, the
issue of his seizure’s legality, we nonetheless affirm.
In a criminal case, forfeited issues are reviewed for
plain error. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733-34
(1993). To establish plain error, Brown must show that “an
error occurred, that the error was plain, and that the error
affected his substantial rights.” United States v. Muhammad,
478 F.3d 247, 249 (4th Cir. 2007). Even if Brown satisfies
these requirements, however, we retain discretion to correct the
error, which we will “not exercise unless the error seriously
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affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration
omitted). Brown fails to meet this high standard.
Officers may make a traffic stop if they have
reasonable, articulable suspicion that a driver has committed a
traffic violation. United States v. McBride, 676 F.3d 385, 391-
92 (4th Cir. 2012). “A reasonable suspicion is demonstrated
when an officer is able to point to specific and articulable
facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those
facts, evince more than an inchoate and unparticularized
suspicion or hunch of criminal activity.” United States v.
Ortiz, 669 F.3d 439, 444 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Our review of the record leads us to conclude
that the magistrate judge did not err, much less plainly so, in
finding that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Brown
and investigate whether the cause of his erratic driving might
be intoxication.
Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Brown’s motion to
suppress. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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