Miller v. Berryhill

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MICHAELA MILLER, ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:19-CV-871

Plaintiff )

)

v. )

) (ARBUCKLE, M.J.)

ANDREW SAUL,1 )

Defendant )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Michaela Miller, an adult individual who resides within the Middle

District of Pennsylvania, seeks judicial review of the final decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her applications for

disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and

XVI of the Social Security Act. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to

42 U.S.C. §405(g) and 42 U.S.C. §1383(c)(3).

This matter is before me, upon consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. After reviewing the

parties’ briefs, the Commissioner’s final decision, and the relevant portions of the

certified administrative transcript, I find the Commissioner's final decision is not

1 Andrew Saul is now the Commissioner of Social Security and is automatically

substituted as a party pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). See also section 205(g) of

the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (action survives regardless of any

change in the person occupying the office of Commissioner of Social Security).

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supported by substantial evidence. In evaluating Plaintiff’s physical capacity, the

ALJ arrived at a physical capacity assessment that was more robust than the

physical limitations assessed by all physicians to offer an opinion on the subject.

Accordingly, the Commissioner’s final decision will be VACATED and this case

REMANDED to the Commissioner to conduct a new administrative hearing.

II. BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 23, 2015, Plaintiff protectively filed applications for disability

insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the

Social Security Act. (Admin. Tr. 17; Doc. 8-2, p. 18). In these applications,

Plaintiff alleged she became disabled as of January 1, 2009, when she was 36 years

old, due to the following conditions: depression, migraines, blood pressure, neck

pain, back pain, fibromyalgia, bone spurs, asthma, and anxiety. (Admin. Tr. 260;

Doc. 8-8, p. 6). Plaintiff alleges that the combination of these conditions affects her

ability to lift, squat, bend, stand, reach, walk, sit, kneel, and climb stairs. (Admin.

Tr. 290; Doc. 8-8, p. 36). Plaintiff has obtained her GED. (Admin. Tr. 25; Doc. 8-

2, p. 26). Before the onset of her impairments, Plaintiff worked as a motor vehicle

assembler. (Admin. Tr. 24; Doc. 8-2, p. 25).

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On December 18, 2015, Plaintiff’s applications were denied at the initial

level of administrative review. (Admin. Tr. 17; Doc. 8-2, p. 18). On February 8,

2016, Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing. Id.

On January 8, 2018, Plaintiff, assisted by her counsel, appeared and testified

during a hearing before Administrative Law Judge Howard Kauffman (the “ALJ”).

Id. On March 29, 2018, the ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff’s applications

for benefits. (Admin. Tr. 17-26; Doc. 8-2, pp. 18-27). On May 24, 2018, Plaintiff

requested review of the ALJ’s decision by the Appeals Council of the Office of

Disability Adjudication and Review (“Appeals Council”). (Admin. Tr. 226; Doc.

8-6, p. 3).

On April 26, 2019, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for

review. (Admin. Tr. 1-3; Doc. 8-2, pp. 2-4).

On May 21, 2019, Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a Complaint. (Doc.

1). In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ’s decision denying the

applications is not supported by substantial evidence, and improperly applies the

relevant law and regulations. (Doc. 1, p. 3). As relief, Plaintiff requests that the

Court reverse the decision at the administrative level below, and award Plaintiff

disability, disability insurance benefits, and supplemental security income, or,

alternatively, remand. Id.

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On July 23, 2019, the Commissioner filed an Answer. (Doc. 7). In the

Answer, the Commissioner maintains that the decision denying Plaintiff’s

applications for benefits was made in accordance with the law and regulations and

is supported by substantial evidence. (Doc. 7, pp. 3-4). Along with his Answer, the

Commissioner filed a certified transcript of the administrative record. (Doc. 8).

Plaintiff’s Brief (Doc. 11), the Commissioner’s Brief (Doc. 12), and

Plaintiff’s Reply (Doc. 13) have been filed. This matter is now ripe for decision.

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE REVIEW – THE ROLE OF THIS COURT

When reviewing the Commissioner’s final decision denying a claimant’s

application for benefits, this Court’s review is limited to the question of whether

the findings of the final decision-maker are supported by substantial evidence in

the record. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3); Johnson v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 200 (3d Cir. 2008); Ficca v. Astrue, 901 F. Supp. 2d 533,

536 (M.D. Pa. 2012). Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or considerable

amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552,

565 (1988). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance of the evidence but

more than a mere scintilla. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). A

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single piece of evidence is not substantial evidence if the ALJ ignores

countervailing evidence or fails to resolve a conflict created by the evidence.

Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993). But in an adequately

developed factual record, substantial evidence may be “something less than the

weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions

from the evidence does not prevent [the ALJ’s decision] from being supported by

substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Fed. Maritime Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620

(1966).

“In determining if the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial

evidence the court must scrutinize the record as a whole.” Leslie v. Barnhart, 304

F. Supp. 2d 623, 627 (M.D. Pa. 2003). The question before this Court, therefore, is

not whether Plaintiff is disabled, but whether the Commissioner’s finding that

Plaintiff is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based

upon a correct application of the relevant law. See Arnold v. Colvin, No. 3:12-CV-

02417, 2014 WL 940205, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2014) (“[I]t has been held that

an ALJ’s errors of law denote a lack of substantial evidence.”) (alterations

omitted); Burton v. Schweiker, 512 F. Supp. 913, 914 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (“The

Secretary’s determination as to the status of a claim requires the correct application

of the law to the facts.”); see also Wright v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 675, 678 (3d Cir.

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1990) (noting that the scope of review on legal matters is plenary); Ficca, 901 F.

Supp. 2d at 536 (“[T]he court has plenary review of all legal issues . . . .”).

B. STANDARDS GOVERNING THE ALJ’S APPLICATION OF THE FIVE-STEP

SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS

To receive benefits under the Social Security Act by reason of disability, a

claimant must demonstrate an inability to “engage in any substantial gainful

activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment

which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to

last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A);

42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a); 20 C.F.R. §

416.905(a).2 To satisfy this requirement, a claimant must have a severe physical or

mental impairment that makes it impossible to do his or her previous work or any

other substantial gainful activity that exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §

423(d)(2)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a); 20 C.F.R. §

416.905(a). To receive benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, a claimant

must show that he or she contributed to the insurance program, is under retirement

2 Throughout this Report, I cite to the version of the administrative rulings and

regulations that were in effect on the date the Commissioner’s final decision was

issued. In this case, the ALJ’s decision, which serves as the final decision of the

Commissioner, was issued on March 29, 2018.

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age, and became disabled prior to the date on which he or she was last insured. 42

U.S.C. § 423(a); 20 C.F.R. § 404.131(a).

In making this determination at the administrative level, the ALJ follows a

five-step sequential evaluation process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a); 20 C.F.R. §

416.920(a). Under this process, the ALJ must sequentially determine: (1) whether

the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has

a severe impairment; (3) whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals a

listed impairment; (4) whether the claimant is able to do his or her past relevant

work; and (5) whether the claimant is able to do any other work, considering his or

her age, education, work experience and residual functional capacity (“RFC”). 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4).

Between steps three and four, the ALJ must also assess a claimant’s RFC.

RFC is defined as “that which an individual is still able to do despite the

limitations caused by his or her impairment(s).” Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

220 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(e); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e); 20 C.F.R. §

416.945(a)(1). In making this assessment, the ALJ considers all the claimant’s

medically determinable impairments, including any non-severe impairments

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identified by the ALJ at step two of his or her analysis. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(2);

20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(2).

At steps one through four, the claimant bears the initial burden of

demonstrating the existence of a medically determinable impairment that prevents

him or her in engaging in any of his or her past relevant work. 2 U.S.C. §

423(d)(5); 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(H)(i) (incorporating 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5) by

reference); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a); 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(a); Mason, 994 F.2d at

1064. Once this burden has been met by the claimant, it shifts to the

Commissioner at step five to show that jobs exist in significant number in the

national economy that the claimant could perform that are consistent with the

claimant’s age, education, work experience and RFC. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(b)(3);

20 C.F.R. § 416.912(b)(3); Mason, 994 F.2d at 1064.

The ALJ’s disability determination must also meet certain basic substantive

requisites. Most significant among these legal benchmarks is a requirement that the

ALJ adequately explain the legal and factual basis for this disability determination.

Thus, to facilitate review of the decision under the substantial evidence standard,

the ALJ's decision must be accompanied by “a clear and satisfactory explication of

the basis on which it rests.” Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981).

Conflicts in the evidence must be resolved and the ALJ must indicate which

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evidence was accepted, which evidence was rejected, and the reasons for rejecting

certain evidence. Id. at 706-707. In addition, “[t]he ALJ must indicate in his

decision which evidence he has rejected and which he is relying on as the basis for

his finding.” Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 181 F. 3d 429, 433 (3d Cir. 1999).

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff raised the following issues in her Brief:

(1) Substantial Evidence does not support the ALJ’s evaluation of treating

physician Dr. Kramer’s opinion; and,

(2) The ALJ’s multiple errors with symptom evaluation compel reversal.

(Doc. 11, p. 1).

A. THE ALJ’S DECISION DENYING PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATIONS

In his March 2018 decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured

status requirement of Title II of the Social Security Act through December 31,

2016. (Admin. Tr. 19; Doc. 8-2, p. 20). Then, Plaintiff’s applications were

evaluated at steps one through five of the sequential evaluation process.

At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not engage in substantial

gainful activity at any point between May 1, 20113 and December 31, 2016

(Plaintiff's date last insured) (“the relevant period”). (Admin. Tr. 22; Doc. 8-2, p.

3 Although Plaintiff alleged an onset date of January 1, 2009, she also indicated

that her medical condition did not prevent her from working until April 30, 2011.

The ALJ therefore found that she engaged in substantial gainful activity from

January 1, 2009 to April 30, 2011. (Admin. Tr. 19-20; Doc. 8-2, pp. 20-21).

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23). At step two, the ALJ found that, during the relevant period, Plaintiff had the

following medically determinable severe impairments: obesity, degenerative disc

disease, and migraines. (Admin. Tr. 20; Doc. 8-2, p. 21). At step three, the ALJ

found that, during the relevant period, Plaintiff did not have an impairment or

combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of an

impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Admin. Tr. 21;

Doc. 8-2, p. 22).

Between steps three and four, the ALJ assessed Plaintiff’s RFC. The ALJ

found that, during the relevant period, Plaintiff retained the RFC to engage in light

work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) and 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b) except:

claimant can lift and/or carry up to 20 pounds occasionally and 10

pounds frequently; can sit, stand or walk for a total of six hours each

in an eight-hour work day; can engage in occasional postural

maneuvers; and cannot use ladders ropes or scaffolds. Additionally,

due to the effects of her pain, the claimant is limited to the

performance of simple routine and repetitive tasks, and should have

only occasional interaction with coworkers, supervisors or the public.

(Admin. Tr. 21-22; Doc. 8-2, pp. 22-23).

At step four, the ALJ found that, during the relevant period, Plaintiff could

not engage in her past relevant work. (Admin. Tr. 24; Doc. 8-2, p. 25). At step five,

the ALJ found that, considering Plaintiff’s age, education and work experience,

Plaintiff could engage in other work that existed in the national economy. (Admin.

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Tr. 25; Doc. 8-2, p. 26). To support his conclusion, the ALJ relied on testimony

given by a vocational expert during Plaintiff’s administrative hearing and cited the

following three (3) representative occupations: Bakery Racker, DOT #524.687-

018; Small Products Assembler, DOT #739.687-030; Housekeeping Cleaner, DOT

#323.687-014. (Admin. Tr. 26; Doc. 8-2, p. 27).

B. WHETHER SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE ALJ’S RFC

ASSESSMENT IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

Two sources provided medical opinions concerning Plaintiff’s physical

functional capacity: Dr. Kramer (“Plaintiff’s primary care physician); and Dr.

Long (a consultative examiner retained by the Social Security Administration).

On December 8, 2015, Dr. Long examined Plaintiff and completed a

narrative report and check-box medical source statement. In his narrative report,

Dr. Long made the following observations:

General Appearance, Gait, Station: The claimant is right handed. The

claimant appeared to be in no acute distress. Gait normal. Cannot

walk on heels and toes. Cannot squat. Stance normal. Used no

assistive devices. Needed no help changing for exam or getting on and

off exam table. Able to rise from chair without difficulty.

. . . .

Musculoskeletal: No scoliosis, kyphosis, or abnormality in thoracic

spine. [Straight leg raise] to 70 degrees bilaterally produces back pain.

No evident joint deformity. Joints stable and nontender. No redness,

heat or effusion. 10 out of 18 trigger points are positive.

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Neurologic: [Deep tendon reflexes] physiologic and equal in upper

and lower extremities. No sensory deficit noted. Strength 5/5 in the

upper and lower extremities.

Extremities: No cyanosis, clubbing or edema. Pulses physiologic and

equal. No significant varicosities or trophic changes. No muscle

atrophy evident.

(Admin. Tr. 531-532; Doc. 8-13, pp. 67-68). In his medical source statement, Dr.

Long assessed that Plaintiff could: occasionally lift or carry up to ten pounds; sit

up to one hour at a time, and for a total of eight hours per workday; stand up to ten

minutes at a time, for a total of twenty minutes per eight-hour workday; and walk

up to fifteen minutes at one time, and for a total of thirty minutes per eight-hour

workday; frequently reach (in all directions except overhead), handle, finger, feel,

and operate foot controls; occasionally reach (overhead), push/pull, balance, stoop,

kneel, crouch, and crawl. (Admin. Tr. 534-539; Doc. 8-13, pp. 71-75).

In his decision, the ALJ gave “limited” weight to Dr. Long’s medical source

statement. In doing so the ALJ explained:

In forming the residual functional capacity assessment the

undersigned has given limited weight to the opinion of consultative

examiner Dr. Long in Exhibit 5F. Dr. Long’s opinion that the claimant

would be limited to a range of sedentary work activity was not clearly

supported by his own documented clinical observations of the

claimant’s functioning on the date of the evaluation and is not

consistent with the claimant’s reported capabilities and demonstrated

performance in treatment notes over the course of the period

beginning May 2011.

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(Admin. Tr. 24, Doc. 8-2, p. 25).

On November 11, 2017, Dr. Kramer completed a check-box/fill-in-the-blank

questionnaire about Plaintiff’s physical functional capacity. (Admin. Tr. 647-651;

Doc. 8-15, pp. 30-34). In that questionnaire, Dr. Kramer assessed that Plaintiff

could: sit for up to twenty minutes at one time, and for less than two hours total per

eight-hour workday; stand up to fifteen minutes at one time, and stand or walk for

less than two hours total per eight-hour workday; occasionally lift or carry up to

ten pounds; rarely twist, stoop (bend) crouch/squat, climb ladders, or climb stairs.

He also assessed that Plaintiff would need to get up and walk every twenty

minutes, must be permitted to shift positions at will, will frequently require

unscheduled work breaks lasting up to one hour at a time, and would be absent

from work more than four days per month. Dr. Kramer identified the following

clinical findings and objective signs to support his assessment: anxious

mood/depressed affect/[illegible word] focus/ decreased neck roll, and tenderness

with palpation.

The ALJ gave “little” weight to Dr. Kramer’s physical RFC assessment. In

doing so, he explained:

[t]he degree of restriction reflected in [Dr. Kramer’s] opinion

(including an inability to sit or stand/walk for a total of even two

hours per day, and a likelihood of more than four work absences per

month) is clearly inconsistent with Dr. Kramer’s contemporaneous

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treatment notes and examination findings, as well as with the nature of

the claimant’s longitudinal treatment history during the period at

issue.

(Admin. Tr. 24; Doc. 8-2, p. 25).

Plaintiff argues:

Lastly, the ALJ rejected all opinions regarding Miller’s functional

limits—“limited weight” was assigned to the opinion of consultative

examiner Dr. Long and “little weight” was assigned to treating

physician Dr. Kramer’s opinion. (Tr. 24) The ALJ’s rejection of all of

the opinion evidence regarding Miller’s impairments created an

“evidentiary deficit” that he could not reasonably fill with his lay

medical opinion. See Suide v. Astrue, 371 Fed.Appx. 684, 690 (7th

Cir. 2010) (remanding where ALJ created an evidentiary deficit when

the ALJ rejected treating physician’s opinion and then made a RFC

determination without supporting medical evidence); Knier v.

[Berryhill], No. 3:16cv457[, 2017 WL 2882289] (M.D. Pa. Jul. 5,

2017). .[sic] Rather than using one of the resources available to him to

properly support his finding, the ALJ erred by forgoing ahead with his

independent assessment of Miller’s abilities to fill the evidentiary gap

based on his own interpretation of the medical evidence, which was

not grounded in the medical record or otherwise properly supported.

Instead, the ALJ should have requested the presence of a medical

expert at the hearing or sent interrogatories to a medical expert,

following the hearing to obtain a supported opinion. By filing the

evidentiary gap with his own lay assessment that lacked record

support, the ALJ reversibly erred.

(Doc. 11, p. 9).

In response, the Commissioner argues:

Consistent with governing regulations and policy, the Third Circuit

Court of Appeals reiterated in Chandler, 667 F.3d at 359, that it is

“[t]he ALJ – not treating or examining physicians or State agency

consultants – [who] must make the ultimate disability and RFC

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determinations . . . The law is clear that the opinion of a treating

physician does not bind the ALJ on the issue of functional capacity.”

Id. at 361 (quoting Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 197 n.2 (3d Cir.

2011)). Because it is the ALJ who has primary responsibility for

making the RFC determination “based on the medical evidence, [sic]

he is not required to seek a separate medical opinion.” Mays v.

Barnhart, 78 F. App’x 808, 813 (3d Cir. 2003) (emphasis added).

Thus, the ALJ was not bound by any opinion in the record. The ALJ

nevertheless considered the opinion evidence in accordance with the

regulation, and articulated appropriate reasons for affording them less

weight.

(Doc. 12, pp. 16-17).

It appears that Plaintiff’s argument falls within the growing number of cases

that require the Court to compare the language offered in two Third Circuit

opinions: Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 667 F.3d 356 (3d Cir. 2012), and Doak

v. Heckler, 790 F.2d 26 (3d Cir. 1986). Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s RFC

assessment is not supported by the medical opinion evidence of record, and indeed

my review of the ALJ’s opinion confirms that they ALJ gave “little” weight to

both medical opinions about Plaintiff’s physical limitations. My review of those

opinions also reveals that both of those medical opinions include much more

restrictive limitations than set by the ALJ in his RFC assessment. In response, the

Commissioner argues that the ALJ is permitted to reach RFC determinations

without outside medical expert review of each fact incorporated into the decision.

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There is no dispute that it is the ALJ’s duty to assess a claimant’s RFC. 20

C.F.R. § 404.1546(c); 20 C.F.R. § 416.946(c). Further, the Commissioner’s

regulations and Third Circuit caselaw are clear that an ALJ must consider more

than just medical opinions when evaluating a claimant’s RFC. 20 C.F.R. §

404.1545(a)(3) (“We will assess your residual functional capacity based on all of

the relevant medical and other evidence.”); 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(3) (same as 20

C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3)); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513 (explaining that “evidence” is

“anything you or anyone else submits to us or that we obtain that relates to your

claim.”); 20 C.F.R. § 416.913 (same as 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513); Burnett v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec. , 220 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 2000) (“In making a residual functional

capacity determination, the ALJ must consider all evidence before him.”).

Although objective medical evidence and treatment records are relevant to an

ALJ’s RFC assessment and, if they include findings about a claimant’s functional

abilities may be enough to support specific findings in an RFC assessment on their

own, as a practical matter such documents do not always contain this information.

Thus, the reality in Social Security cases is that “[r]arely can a decision be made

regarding a claimant’s residual functional capacity without an assessment from a

physician regarding the functional abilities of the claimant.” McKean v. Colvin,

150 F. Supp.3d 406, 418 (M.D. Pa, 2015).

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As this Court has explained:

It is well established that an ALJ “is not free to set his own expertise

against that of a physician who presents competent evidence.

Ferguson v. Schweiker, 765 F.2d 31, 37 (3d Cir. 1985). In cases where

the ALJ does not give any significant or great weight to any medical

opinion, the Court has found that the ALJ “seemingly interpreted the

medical evidence of record, and substituted her own opinion for that

of a medical one in arriving at [a] Plaintiff's RFC.” McKay v. Colvin,

No. 3:14-CV-2020, 2015 WL 5124119, *17 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 13,

2015). McKean is particularly on point in this matter, as there the

Court found the ALJ's RFC not supported by substantial evidence

where the ALJ dismissed the only medical opinion in the record

rendered in regard to the claimant's physical limitations. See McKean,

150 F. Supp. 3d at 418.

Decker v. Berryhill, No. 1:17-cv-00945, 2018 WL 4189662 at *6 (M.D. Pa. June 8,

2018) report and recommendation adopted 2018 WL 4184304 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 31,

2018).

“It is not error in and of itself to disagree with the opinion of a medical

professional.” Id. An RFC assessment, however, is not supported by substantial

evidence where an ALJ assesses a lesser degree of limitation than found by any

medical professional without citing to another type of evidence that supports his or

her assessment. Id. (listing cases). The ALJ in this case fails to cite any evidence

consistent with his ultimate conclusion that Plaintiff is able to lift up to twenty

pounds, stand six hours per day, or walk six hours per day. Unlike in this case,

where the ALJ found that Plaintiff had a lesser degree of physical limitation than

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any medical source, the ALJ in Chandler crafted RFC assessments that reflected a

greater degree of limitation than was contemplated by the physician’s findings.

Chandler, 667 F.3d at 361-63. “[W]hen an ALJ is saying that a claimant can

do more than the medical source opinion states, courts exercise caution and suggest

that only rarely can an ALJ unilaterally impose an RFC on a claimant that is less

restrictive than the residual functional capacity found by the medical professional.”

Metzgar v. Colvin, No. 3:16-CV-1929, 2017 WL 1483328 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 29,

2017) (emphasis in original), report and recommendation adopted 2017 WL

1479426 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2017).

In exercising that caution, I find that the facts of this case compel remand.

Both Dr. Kramer and Dr. Long assessed that Plaintiff could not lift 20 pounds and

could not stand or walk for up to six hours per day—as is required to perform light

work pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) and 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b). There is no

treatment record that affirmatively states that Plaintiff is able to lift 20 pounds or is

able to stand or walk for up to six hours per day. Instead, the ALJ appears to rely

on the lack of specific evidence on that subject to discount the opinions of Doctors

Kramer and Long. While that lack may be a proper basis to choose between two

competing medical opinions that reach different conclusions under 20 C.F.R. §

404.1527 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.927, it is not enough by itself to support an RFC

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assessment when all medical opinions of record contradict it. Accordingly, I find

that the ALJ’s RFC assessment is not supported by substantial evidence. On

remand, the ALJ should reevaluate the existing medical opinion evidence, and may

develop the record as he or she deems necessary.

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for reversal and disability insurance benefits

or, alternatively, remand will be GRANTED as follows:

(1) The final decision of the Commissioner will be VACATED.

(2) This case will be REMANDED to the Commissioner to conduct a new

administrative hearing pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

(3) An appropriate Order shall issue

Date: May 4, 2020 BY THE COURT

s/William I. Arbuckle

William I. Arbuckle

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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