The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
THE ALPHA UPSILON CHAPTER No. 4:19-CV-01061
OF THE FRATERNITY OF BETA
THETA PI, INC., (Judge Brann)
Plaintiff,
v.
THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE
UNIVERSITY; DAMON SIMS,
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY; DANNY
SHAHA, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN
HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY; and
ERIC J. BARRON, INDIVIDUALLY
AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
MARCH 20, 2020
I. BACKGROUND
On June 21, 2019, Plaintiff, The Alpha Upsilon Chapter of the Fraternity of
Beta Theta Pi, Inc. (“House Corp.”), filed a seven-count complaint against
Defendants The Pennsylvania State University (“Penn State”), Damon Sims
(“Sims”), Danny Shaha (“Shaha”), and Eric J. Barron (“Barron”).1
On November 12, 2019, the Court decided Defendants’ initial motion to
dismiss2 and disposed of part of House Corp.’s complaint. The Court dismissed
four claims with prejudice. Another claim—for breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing—survived. The Court provided House Corp. leave to amend
its due process claim and its third-party beneficiary claim.3 House Corp. filed an
amended complaint two weeks later.4
On December 17, 2019, Defendants moved to dismiss Counts I (due
process) and VII (third-party beneficiary) of House Corp.’s amended complaint for
failure to state a claim.5 Defendants also requested that the Court dismiss Count V
(breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing) against Sims, Shaha, and
Barron.6 And Defendants moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e) for a
more definite statement of House Corp.’s Count V as a general matter.
I deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss in part and grant it in part. I grant
Defendants’ motion for a more definite statement.
2 ECF No. 7.
3 ECF Nos. 20 and 21.
4 ECF No. 24.
5 The peculiar numbering here comes from House Corp.’s inartful pleading. Though the Court
dismissed four of House Corp.’s original claims with prejudice, House Corp. asserts them
again in its amended complaint.
6 Defendants make this request in their motion. But Defendants do not provide any briefing in
support. (They do brief a similar issue, but with respect to Count VII, not Count V. See ECF
No. 27 at 35-37.) Owing to the lack of briefing, the Court will deny this particular dismissal
at this time, but Defendants may assert it again later when House Corp. submits a further
II. DISCUSSION
A. Motion to Dismiss Standard for Failure to State a Claim
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court dismisses a
complaint, in whole or in part, if the plaintiff has failed to “state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.” A motion to dismiss “tests the legal sufficiency of a
pleading”7 and “streamlines litigation by dispensing with needless discovery and
factfinding.”8 “Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a
dispositive issue of law.”9 This is true of any claim, “without regard to whether it is
based on an outlandish legal theory or on a close but ultimately unavailing one.”10
Following the Roberts Court’s “civil procedure revival,”11 the landmark
decisions of Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly12 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal13
tightened the standard that district courts must apply to 12(b)(6) motions.14 These
7 Richardson v. Bledsoe, 829 F.3d 273, 289 n.13 (3d Cir. 2016) (Smith, C.J.) (citing Szabo v.
Bridgeport Machines, Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2001) (Easterbrook, J.).
8 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326–27 (1989).
9 Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 326 (citing Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)).
10 Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.
11 Howard M. Wasserman, THE ROBERTS COURT AND THE CIVIL PROCEDURE REVIVAL, 31 Rev.
Litig. 313, 316, 319-20 (2012).
12 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
13 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
14 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 670 (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957))
cases “retired” the lenient “no-set-of-facts test” set forth in Conley v. Gibson and
replaced it with a more exacting “plausibility” standard.15
Accordingly, after Twombly and Iqbal, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.’”16 “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”17 “Although the
plausibility standard does not impose a probability requirement, it does require a
pleading to show more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.”18 Moreover, “[a]sking for plausible grounds . . . calls for enough facts
to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of
[wrongdoing].”19
The plausibility determination is “a context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”20 No matter
the context, however, “[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent
with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and
15 Id.
16 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
17 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
18 Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780 (3d Cir. 2016) (Jordan, J.) (internal quotations
and citations omitted).
19 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
plausibility of entitlement to relief.’”21
When disposing of a motion to dismiss, the Court “accept[s] as true all
factual allegations in the complaint and draw[s] all inferences from the facts
alleged in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff].”22 However, “the tenet that a
court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in the complaint is
inapplicable to legal conclusions.”23 “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause
of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”24
As a matter of procedure, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit has instructed that:
Under the pleading regime established by Twombly and Iqbal, a court
reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps. First, it
must tak[e] note of the elements [the] plaintiff must plead to state a
claim. Second, it should identify allegations that, because they are no
more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.
Finally, [w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, [the] court
should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly
give rise to an entitlement to relief.25
“Generally, consideration of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is
limited to consideration of the complaint itself.”26 Typically, to consider materials
21 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (internal quotations omitted)).
22 Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008) (Nygaard, J.).
23 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal citations omitted); see also Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578
F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (Nygaard, J.) (“After Iqbal, it is clear that conclusory or ‘bare-
bones’ allegations will no longer survive a motion to dismiss.”).
24 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
25 Connelly, 809 F.3d at 787 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
outside the complaint, a motion to dismiss must be converted to a motion for
summary judgment.27 However, “[c]onsideration of materials outside the complaint
is not entirely foreclosed on a 12(b)(6) motion.”28 It is permissible to consider full
text of documents partially quoted in the complaint.29 It is also permissible to
consider documents relied upon by plaintiff in drafting the complaint and integral
to the complaint.30 “However, before materials outside the record may become the
basis for a dismissal, several conditions must be met.”31 “For example, even if a
document is ‘integral’ to the complaint, it must be clear on the record that no
dispute exists regarding the authenticity or accuracy of the document.”32 It must
also be clear that there exist no material disputed issues of fact regarding the
relevance of the document.33 In this matter, I find that these conditions have been
met, and will consequently consider Defendants’ attachments.
B. Motion for More Definite Statement Standard
A “party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading to which a
responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party
27 See id. and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
28 Faulkner, 463 F.3d at 134.
29 San Leandro Emergency Med. Group Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Cos., 75 F.3d 801,
808–09 (2d Cir.1996).
30 Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 47–48 (2d Cir.1991).
31 Faulkner, 463 F.3d at 134.
32 Id, see also e.g., Kaempe v. Myers, 367 F.3d 958, 965 (D.C.Cir.2004); Alternative Energy,
Inc. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 267 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir.2001).
cannot reasonably prepare a response.”34 Put another way, this motion “is directed
to the rare case where because of the vagueness or ambiguity of the pleading the
answering party will not be able to frame a responsive pleading.”35
A party must make this motion “before filing a responsive pleading and
must point out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the court orders
a more definite statement and the order is not obeyed within 14 days after notice of
the order or within the time the court sets, the court may strike the pleading or
issue any other appropriate order.”36
C. Facts Alleged in the Amended Complaint
In my November 12, 2019 Memorandum Opinion, I gave a thorough factual
background based on House Corp.’s initial complaint. The Court has modified that
factual background to account for the allegations of House Corp.’s amended
complaint. I accept these facts as true for the purposes of disposing of Defendants’
instant motion.
1. The Deed
On or about October 29, 1928, Howard Walton Mitchell, an original
organizer of House Corp, and the then-president of the Board of Trustees for The
34 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e).
35 Wadhwa v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 505 F. App’x 209, 214 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting
Schaedler v. Reading Eagle Publ’n, Inc., 370 F.2d 795, 798 (3d Cir. 1967).
Pennsylvania State College,37 executed a certain Deed transferring certain real
property now known as 220 North Burrowes Road to House Corp. The current
chapter house (the “Beta house”) was built upon this real property and has been
used by House Corp. to serve as a fraternity house continuously from 1928 to the
present, as a place where the unincorporated association of Penn State students and
members of the national fraternity Beta Theta Pi (“Beta”) known as “the Chapter”
live.38
2. Penn State’s Student Conduct Policies
All Penn State students are governed by the Office of Student Conduct,
which oversees the University’s disciplinary process, as administered by the Office
of Student Affairs. Danny Shaha is the Senior Director of the Office of Student
Conduct at Penn State and is responsible for complying with the terms of the Code
of Conduct and the Student Conduct Procedures, which are particular policies and
agreements that govern Penn State student conduct.39
Eric J. Barron is the President of Penn State and is responsible for
overseeing the programs, policies, and governing bodies that affect student
conduct. This role includes implementing policies and procedures that ensure a
37 Penn State acquired its current name in the 1950s.
38 See ECF No. 24 (“Amended Complaint”) at ¶ 10.
safe environment for all students, and assuring compliance with the rules and
regulations published by Penn State that govern such conduct.40
The Office of Student Affairs of Penn State regulates the conduct of the
Penn State student population, including students living in dormitories owned by
Penn State and properties not owned by Penn State, such as fraternities,
apartments, houses, and other alternative living arrangements. In other words, the
Office of Student Affairs purports to exercise disciplinary control over all Penn
State students regardless of the living arrangements for any particular student.41
3. The Chapter’s and House Corp.’s Relationships with Penn
State
As part of the Penn State community, the Chapter also participates in the
governing body for fraternities known as the Inter Fraternity Council of the
Pennsylvania State University (“IFC”). The IFC is a branch of Penn State that
participates in setting and enforcing policies, procedures and regulations relating to
Greek life. The IFC regulates the conduct of students living in fraternities. Penn
State and the Chapter are signatories to the Conduct Process, an agreement that
governs the relationship between the Chapter and Penn State.42
Damon Sims is the Vice President of Student Affairs at Penn State and is
responsible for complying with the terms of the Conduct Process. He is also
40 Id. at ¶ 24.
41 Id. at ¶ 25.
responsible for implementing programs and policies to ensure that all Penn State
students are safe.43
Penn State also acted as House Corp’s landlord by collecting, administering
and processing payment of rents and other fees for members of the Chapter;
withholding registration for Penn State classes if such rent and fees were not paid;
and charging a fee on behalf of Penn State for such services provided.44 In
particular, Penn State processed and administered rental payments from Chapter
members. After Penn State deducted a fee, and ensured compliance by the student
in question with respect to their performance and standing, Penn State then
forwarded the net payment amount to House Corp.45
Penn State, acting through the IFC, regularly conducted monitoring and
approval of social events hosted by the Chapter to confirm compliance with the
IFC Code of Conduct, including on the evening on February 2, 2017. In addition,
by the terms of the Deed from Penn State to House Corp., Penn State purported to
exercise supervision and/or control of the Beta house.46 Penn State did such
exercising of supervision and/or control via the provision of student regulations
and disciplinary procedures that I described above.47 These policies, procedures,
43 Id. at ¶ 22.
44 Id. at ¶ 26.
45 Id. at ¶ 85.
46 Id. at ¶ 26.
and guidelines included the above IFC, Code of Conduct, and Student Conduct
Procedures.48
Penn State also solicited and collected donations from donors. Such
donations were to be used to support the Chapter and its endeavors, including the
operation of the IFC, and the sponsoring of various student activities (such as
Homecoming and Greek organizations). The donations were also to be used for
the safety and security of the Chapter—for example, providing monitoring and
security checks for social functions.49
4. Timothy Piazza’s Death, and Penn State’s Ban of the
Chapter
On or about February 2, 2017, Timothy Piazza, a Penn State student who
desired to join the chapter, died while at the Beta house.50
After Mr. Piazza’s death, Penn State officials, including Defendants,
commenced an investigation without regard to the published procedures of the IFC
and/or Office of Student Affairs. Penn State, among other things, conducted
interviews directly with the local police department, reviewed grand jury
information and interviewed grand jury witnesses without notice to House Corp. or
the Chapter. House Corp. has repeatedly been denied access to a video recording
48 Id. at ¶ 85.
49 Id. at ¶ 85.
which was confiscated from the Beta house showing the events of the evening of
February 2, 2017.51
On February 16, 2017, Penn State issued a press release stating that its
Office of Student Conduct was conducting an inquiry into Mr. Piazza’s death,
“focusing on issues related to the University’s Code of Student Conduct and
behavioral expectations for the fraternities the University recognizes.” Penn State
stated that based “on information gained through its inquiry thus far, the University
has decided to withdraw immediately recognition of Beta Theta Pi fraternity. This
revocation will remain in effect no less than five years and may be made
permanent upon completion of the criminal and University investigations now
underway.” Penn State also announced “additional measures impacting all
Interfraternity Council chapters recognized by Penn State at University Park.”52
On March 30, 2017, Penn State issued a second press release announcing
that it was permanently banning the Chapter from Penn State, and that the Chapter
had no right to appeal this decision. Penn State stated that as its “student conduct
investigation of the Beta Theta Pi fraternity continues, more disturbing facts have
emerged, including a persistent pattern of serious alcohol abuse, hazing, and the
use and sale of illicit drugs. The University has decided to permanently revoke
recognition of Beta Theta Pi banning it from ever returning as a chapter at Penn
51 Id. at ¶ 28.
State. This extraordinary action occurs in the context of a continuing criminal
investigation into the death of Penn State sophomore Timothy Piazza.” 53
Penn State made the decision to permanently ban the Chapter from Penn
State without following any of the published procedures and/or guidelines of the
Office of Student Affairs and/or the IFC. As a direct result, House Corp. was
forced to vacate the Beta house and House Corp. was cut off from all sources of
income and/or ability to function as owner of the Beta house.54 Further, Penn State
made its announcement that it was permanently banning the Chapter without
giving the Chapter or House Corp. any opportunity to state their respective
positions in relation to Penn State’s investigation. Penn State did not permit either
the Chapter or House Corp. to review the information upon which Penn State
allegedly based its decision—including, among other things, the video of February
2, 2017 (to which Penn State was granted access), witness statements, and other
information which Penn State indicated that it received.55
In previous situations, Sims and Penn State had recognized that an
investigative and deliberative process was critical and needed to be relied upon to
make decisions. Per Penn State’s own guidelines and policies, a detailed report by
the Office of Student Conduct and a hearing with the leadership of a fraternity
53 ECF No. 11-4.
54 Amended Complaint at ¶ 29.
charged with a violation must occur. Fraternities are private associations existing
on private property and are governed by the IFC, which is associated with Penn
State.56
In purporting to permanently ban the Chapter from conducting business and
operating as a Beta Theta Pi chapter, Penn State was attempting to surreptitiously
trigger a deed provision purporting to grant Penn State the option of purchasing the
valuable real estate owned by House Corp. if the property is not utilized as a Beta
Theta Pi Chapter House at below-market rates, in order to convert such real estate
for its own purposes. On August 28, 2018, Penn State provided notice of their
intent to exercise these alleged property rights based upon their assertion that the
property is no longer being used as a Chapter or fraternity house.57
D. Analysis
1. Due Process
House Corp.’s amended complaint does not make out a substantive due
process or a procedural due process claim.58
56 Amended Complaint at ¶ 35.
57 Id. at ¶ 36.
58 See ECF No. 20 at 19-26 for the Court’s earlier, more fulsome discussion of House Corp.’s
due process claim. Even with House Corp.’s amended complaint now before the Court, the
The only deprivation of process House Corp. alleges against itself59 is Penn
State’s exercising of the Deed right. House Corp. has made only conclusory
allegations that Penn State’s exercising of the Deed right constituted an arbitrary or
capricious government action.60 Therefore, House Corp. has not made out a
substantive due process claim.61
Further, House Corp. has not alleged that the procedures available to it
concerning Penn State’s exercising of the Deed right did not provide due process
of law. Therefore, House Corp. has not made out a procedural due process claim.62
2. Third-Party Beneficiary
The Court first concluded that House Corp. “has not shown that Penn State
intended for it to be a third-party beneficiary of the IFC Conduct Process, the Code
of Conduct, and the Student Conduct procedures.” The problem for House Corp.,
in the Court’s first analysis, was that House Corp. was extrapolating that Penn
State’s entry into “procedures governing student conduct” related to its right under
59 The Court already ruled that House Corp. lacked prudential standing to vindicate the
Chapter’s interest in due process, ECF No. 20 at 24, and that, therefore, “House Corp. does
not have standing to seek redress for injuries stemming from Penn State’s ban of the
Chapter,” id. at 25.
60 See ECF No. 24 at ¶¶ 41-42.
61 Sameric Corp. of Delaware v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 590 (3d Cir. 1998).
62 Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 233 (3d Cir. 2006). Even if House Corp. had
alleged either of the above violations, the Court notes that House Corp. has provided no
Pennsylvania authority that a landlord’s right to derive to rent is a protected property interest
for Constitutional purposes. Ruiz v. New Garden Twp., 376 F.3d 203, 207 (3d Cir. 2004),
which House Corp. cites, supports the proposition that a tenancy creates a procedural due
process property interest for the tenant. That case does not go so far as to provide the
the Deed to exercise “control and supervision of private property.” And House
Corp. was backing up this extrapolation with only “vague and broad” factual
support.63
Here, the second time around, House Corp. has again failed to make out a
third-party beneficiary claim. House Corp. describes “the contracts at issue” as
“the agreements between the Chapter and Penn State, including the agreements to
follow the IFC rules and procedures in disciplining the Chapter.”64 House Corp.’s
claim regarding these contracts is deficient for three reasons.
First, the absence of compelling circumstances. In this case, in order to
attain third-party beneficiary status, House Corp. needs to make out that “the
circumstances are so compelling that recognition of the beneficiary’s right is
appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties.”65 I find that House Corp. has
not satisfied this burden.66
Second, the absence of meaningful evidence of Penn State’s intent to
benefit House Corp. As with its first Complaint, House Corp. has not presented
meaningful evidence that in entering into the contracts at issue, which are
63 See ECF No. 20 at 27-29.
64 ECF No. 29 at 23.
65 Zeigler v. Correct Care Sys., No. 1:16-CV-1895, 2018 WL 1470786, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Mar.
26, 2018) (citation omitted).
66 House Corp. seems to hint at “circumstances” flowing from the “intertwined” nature of the
Deed and the “Chapter’s right to maintain its standing as a recognized fraternity on Penn
State’s campus.” ECF No. 29 at 27. But House Corp. provides no caselaw to support this
procedures designed to regulate student conduct as a general matter, Penn State
intended to benefit House Corp., which was the Chapter’s Beta house landlord.
House Corp.’s invocation of an IFC statement that the IFC is designed to “maintain
cooperation among . . . alumni . . . and the University” is not convincing.67 It does
not follow from this generalized statement that Penn State’s entry into student
conduct and student discipline procedures (which, as one might expect, apply only
to current students) was intended to benefit all fraternities’ alumni, including
House Corp.68
And third, the lack of liability for Sims, Shaha, and Barron. As House
Corp. concedes, House Corp. has not alleged that Sims, Shaha, and Barron were
individual parties to the contracts at issue. House Corp. has only alleged that Penn
State, as an institution, entered into these contracts.69 “It is fundamental contract
law that one cannot be liable for a breach of contract unless one is a party to that
contract.”70 A third-party beneficiary claim requires a viable underlying breach of
contract claim.71 House Corp. has not alleged liability against Sims, Shaha, and
Barron for an underlying breach of contract claim. This provides an independent
67 ECF No. 29 at 26-27.
68 House Corp. does not provide any caselaw to support such a leap in logic.
69 See Amended Complaint at ¶ 22 (“Penn State and the Chapter are signatories to the Conduct
Process . . .”) (emphasis added).
70 Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Pittsburgh & W. Virginia R.R., 153 F. Supp. 3d 778, 806 (W.D. Pa.
2015), aff’d, 870 F.3d 244 (3d Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).
reason to dismiss House Corp.’s third-party beneficiary claim, as to Sims, Shaha,
and Barron in particular, with prejudice.
3. Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing
As Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires that plaintiffs only make a
short and plain statement of their claim, motions for a more definite statement,
such as the one Defendants bring here, are “highly disfavored.” Courts will only
grant these motions “if a pleading is so vague or ambiguous that the opposing party
cannot reasonably be required to make a responsive pleading.”72
But here, House Corp. has commingled two claims—one that the Court, in
“a liberal read” as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandate, construed as a
claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,73 and one,
for “civil conspiracy,” that House Corp. withdrew during initial briefing.74 House
Corp. refers to its Count Five as “Civil Conspiracy and Bad Faith,” and continues
this commixture in its description of the claims.75
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(b), “where a plaintiff asserts
multiple claims of relief, the complaint should present each claim for relief in a
72 Country Classics at Morgan Hill Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc. v. Country Classics at Morgan
Hill, LLC, 780 F. Supp. 2d 367, 371 (E.D. Pa. 2011).
73 See ECF No. 20 at 26.
74 ECF No. 15 at 6 n.3.
75 Amended Complaint at ¶ 74 (“. . . as required for a claim of civil conspiracy and bad faith”)
separate count . . . and with such clarity and precision that the defendant will be
able to discern what the plaintiff is claiming and to frame a responsive pleading.”76
Given that House Corp.’s “Count Five” was in practice two counts, one of which
the Court subsequently dismissed with prejudice, House Corp. runs afoul of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(b). “A motion for a more definite statement is
one tool by which a defendant may seek to remedy alleged deficiencies under Rule
10.”77 Here, Defendants’ motion is an appropriate method for remedying a Rule
10(b) deficiency, and House Corp. must, therefore, amend its Count Five.
III. CONCLUSION
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and denied in part. The
Court denies the Motion to Dismiss with respect to House Corp.’s breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim (Count V). The Court grants the
Motion to Dismiss with respect to House Corp.’s due process claim (Count I) and
its third-party beneficiary claim (Count VII). Both of these claims are dismissed
with prejudice.
76 Airgood v. Twp. of Pine, No. CV 14-1249, 2016 WL 1247237, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 30,
2016) (cleaned up).
77 R.B. v. Hollibaugh, No. 1:16-CV-01075, 2017 WL 663735, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2017),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:16-CV-1075, 2017 WL 661577 (M.D. Pa. Feb.
The Court grants Defendants’ Motion for a More Definite Statement. House
Corp. will have fourteen days to further amend its complaint with respect to its
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim (Count V).
An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Matthew W. Brann
Matthew W. Brann
United States District Judge