Moy v. DeParlos

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TYREE TYQUAN MOY, : CIVIL NO. 1:18-CV-1575

:

Plaintiff : (Chief Judge Conner)

:

v. :

:

KEVIN DEPARLOS, et al., :

:

Defendants :

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Tyree Tyquan Moy (“Moy”) is an inmate currently under the

jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections (“DOC”) who was housed at all

relevant times at the Lycoming County Prison, in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. Moy

commenced this action by filing complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1).

Moy subsequently filed a supplement to the complaint. (Doc. 8). Named as

defendants are Kevin DeParlos, Brad Shoemaker, Ryan Barnes, Harry Entz, Kim

Poorman, Mayleen Murphy, Erin Dosvack, Aisha Glover, and Andrea Hoover1

(collectively, “Lycoming County defendants”), and William Keenan, M.D. (“Dr.

Keenan”). Before the court are two Rule 12(b) motions (Doc. 30, 31) to dismiss filed

by the Lycoming County defendants and Dr. Keenan, respectively. For the reasons

set forth below, the Lycoming County defendants’ motion (Doc. 30) will be granted

in part and denied in part, and Dr. Keenan’s motion (Doc. 31) will be denied.

1 Andrea Hoover has not yet been properly served or joined as a defendant in

this action. An appropriate service order shall issue on this date.

I. Allegations of the Complaint

Moy was committed to the Lycoming County Prison on November 29, 2017.

(Doc. 1, at 4). Moy claims that he is allergic to onions, someone at the prison hide

onions in his food, and he received inadequate medical treatment for an allergic

reaction to the onions. (Id. at 10). Moy also alleges that unnamed maintenance staff

at the prison sawed metal objects, causing smoke and fire, which he inhaled. (Id.)

Moy alleges that he received inadequate medical treatment for the smoke

inhalation. (Id.)

Defendant DeParlos, in his role as Warden of the prison, was allegedly

responsible for the conduct of all defendants and operations of the prison until May

2018. (Doc. 1, at 11; Doc. 8, at 1). Moy alleges that defendant DeParlos denied his

grievance regarding a denial of access to the courts claim. (Doc. 8, at 5, ¶ 7).

Moy states that defendant Shoemaker was named Warden in May 2018 and

became responsible for the conduct of all defendants and the operations of the

prison from that date forward. (Doc. 1, at 11; Doc. 8, at 1). Moy asserts that

defendant Shoemaker denied his grievance regarding a denial of access to the

courts claim. (Doc. 8, at 5, ¶ 7). Moy states that defendant Barnes assumed the role

of Deputy Warden in May 2018 and was “accountable” for all defendants. (Doc. 8, at

1). Moy also states that defendants Shoemaker and Barnes arrived at his cell-block

after he engaged in a fight with another inmate. (Doc. 8, at 6, ¶ 10).

2

Moy alleges that defendant Entz was a first shift supervisor. (Doc. 8, at 1).

After Moy had an allergic reaction to eating “hidden onions”, defendant Entz

escorted him to the Special Management Unit (“SMU”). (Doc. 1, at 9; Doc. 8, at 11).

Moy alleges that, in December 2017, defendant nurse Poorman ordered the

removal of a nebulizer machine from his cell. (Doc. 1, at 10; Doc. 8, at 2 ¶ 2). He

further asserts that all defendants were under her supervision. (Doc. 8, at 9 ¶ 14).

Moy alleges that defendant nurse Murphy provided inadequate medical care

by denying and delaying medical treatment to him. (Doc. 1, at 9).

In January 2018, Moy claims that he choked on and spit up a two-inch

chicken bone that was hidden inside his mashed potatoes. (Doc. 8, at 4, ¶ 5). He

reported the event to prison staff and gave staff the chicken bone. (Id.) Defendant

nurse Dosvack was the nurse at the prison that day and Moy alleges that she did not

provide any treatment to him. (Id.) Moy further asserts that defendant Dosvack

administered eye drops to his eye through the cell bars, and, because she was not

paying attention to what she was doing, she poked him in the eye, causing pain and

infection. (Doc. 1, at 11; Doc. 8, at 7-8, ¶ 11). Also in January 2018, Moy alleges that

defendant Dosvack provided untimely treatment after he suffered an allergic

reaction to onions. (Doc. 1, at 10). In June 2018, after Moy had another allergic

reaction to eating hidden onions, defendant Dosvack treated him with Benadryl,

and performed an oxygen test on him but failed to check his lungs. (Doc. 8, at 11, ¶

16).

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Moy alleges that defendant nurse Glover provided inadequate medical care

for a swollen eye he suffered after a fight with another inmate, and failed to send

him for treatment at an outside hospital. (Doc. 1, at 10-11; Doc. 8, at 6, ¶ 10). He

further alleges that she provided untimely medical care after he had an allergic

reaction to hidden onions. (Id.)

Moy alleges that defendants Poorman, Murphy, Dosvack, and Glover

administered eye drops without wearing gloves, they had dirt and bacteria on their

fingers, and had painted finger nails, which contaminated the eye drops, causing

pain, infection, and redness. (Doc. 8, at 13, ¶ 18).

Moy alleges that defendant Dr. Keenan was the head doctor responsible for

the actions of the prison medical staff. (Doc. 8, at 1). He avers that Dr. Keenan

denied him eye drops that were prescribed to help heal his detached retina. (Id. at

2).

II. Legal Standard

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the

dismissal of complaints that fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the

court must “accept as true all [factual] allegations in the complaint and all

reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and view them in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff.” Kanter v. Barella, 489 F.3d 170, 177 (3d Cir. 2007)

(quoting Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 350 (3d Cir. 2005)). Although the court is

generally limited in its review to the facts contained in the complaint, it “may also

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consider matters of public record, orders, exhibits attached to the complaint and

items appearing in the record of the case.” Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran &

Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1384 n. 2 (3d Cir. 1994); see also In re Burlington Coat

Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997).

Federal notice and pleading rules require the complaint to provide “the

defendant notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”

Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To test the sufficiency of the complaint in the

face of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must conduct a three-step inquiry. See

Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130-31 (3d Cir. 2010). In the first step,

“the court must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.’”

Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)). Next, the factual and legal

elements of a claim should be separated; well-pleaded facts must be accepted as

true, while mere legal conclusions may be disregarded. Id.; see also Fowler v.

UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). Once the well-pleaded factual

allegations have been isolated, the court must determine whether they are sufficient

to show a “plausible claim for relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Twombly, 550

U.S. at 556); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (requiring plaintiffs to allege facts sufficient

to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level”). A claim “has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

5

III. Lycoming County Defendants’ Motion

A. Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs2

In order to establish an Eighth Amendment medical claim, a plaintiff “must

show (i) a serious medical need, and (ii) acts or omissions by prison officials that

indicate deliberate indifference to that need.” Natale v. Camden Cty. Correctional

Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197

(3d Cir. 1999)). A serious medical need is “one that has been diagnosed by a

physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would

recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Monmouth Cty. Corr. Institutional

Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987). In addition, “if unnecessary

and wanton infliction of pain results as a consequence of denial or delay in the

provision of adequate medical care, the medical need is of the serious nature

contemplated by the eighth amendment.” Id. (citation omitted). A prison official

acts with deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs when he

“knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official

must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a

2 Moy’s claims are based on his status as a pretrial detainee. Pretrial

detainees are protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,

not the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment. See Bell

v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979). However, the Fourteenth Amendment

provides “at least as much protection as does the Eighth Amendment,” and in cases

involving allegations of inadequate medical care, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals

typically reviews both claims using the Eighth Amendment standard. Gannaway v.

Berks Cnty. Prison, 439 F. App’x 86, 89 n.2 (3d Cir. 2011) (nonprecedential) (citing

Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 583 (3d Cir. 2003)). Thus, the

court will address Moy’s claims pursuant to the Eighth Amendment standard.

6

substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). A mere difference of opinion between

the prison’s medical staff and the inmate regarding the diagnosis or treatment

which the inmate receives does not support a claim of cruel and unusual

punishment. See Farmer v. Carlson, 685 F. Supp. 1335, 1339 (M.D. Pa. 1988); see

also McCracken v. Jones, 562 F.2d 22, 24 (10th Cir. 1977); Smart v. Villar, 547 F.2d

112, 113 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981).

Individual liability can be imposed under Section 1983 only if the state actor

played an “affirmative part” in the alleged misconduct and “cannot be predicated

solely on the operation of respondeat superior.” Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347,

353 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1998)).

“A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged

wrongs. . . . Personal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal

direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.” Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207-08; see

also Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257 (3d Cir.

2003). Such allegations, however, must be made with appropriate particularity in

that a complaint must allege the particulars of conduct, time, place, and person

responsible. Evancho, 423 F.3d at 354; Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207-08. Alleging a mere

hypothesis that an individual defendant had personal knowledge or involvement in

depriving the plaintiff of his rights is insufficient to establish personal involvement.

Rode, 845 F.2d at 1208.

7

1. Defendants DeParlos, Shoemaker, and Barnes

With respect to former Warden DeParlos, Warden Shoemaker, and Deputy

Warden Barnes, it appears that Moy attempts to hold these defendants liable based

on their supervisory roles. (See Doc. 8, at 1, alleging that defendants DeParlos,

Shoemaker, and Barnes are “responsible for all defendants”). However, it is well-

established that officials may not be held liable for unconstitutional conduct of their

subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior. See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207.

Accordingly, to the extent that Moy’s deliberate indifference claim relies on a

respondeat superior theory of liability against defendants DeParlos, Shoemaker, and

Barnes, these claims will be dismissed.

Additionally, for purposes of Eighth Amendment medical claims, nonmedical

staff may not be “considered deliberately indifferent simply because they failed to

respond directly to the medical complaints of a prisoner who was already being

treated by the prison doctor.” Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1993).

“If a prisoner is under the care of medical experts . . . , a non-medical prison official

will generally be justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands.” Spruill

v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004). Courts have repeatedly held that, absent

some reason to believe that prison medical staff are mistreating prisoners, non-

medical corrections staff who refer inmate medical complaints to physicians may

not be held personally liable for medically-based Eighth Amendment claims. See,

e.g., id. at 236-37 (citing Durmer, 991 F.2d at 69). Moreover, a claim of a

constitutional deprivation cannot be premised merely on the fact that the named

8

defendant was the prison warden, or a prison supervisor, when the incidents set

forth in the complaint occurred. See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207.

With respect to these nonmedical defendants, Moy fails to establish a viable

claim. Defendant DeParlos is the former Warden of the Lycoming County Prison,

defendant Shoemaker is the current Warden, and defendant Barnes is the Deputy

Warden. They are not trained members of the medical staff subject to liability for

an Eighth Amendment claim. Moy has not set forth any allegations that these

corrections defendants provided him with medical care, refused to provide medical

care, or prevented him from receiving medical care; nor has he established that

these corrections defendants were aware of or acquiesced in purported Eighth

Amendment violations. Because Moy was under the regular care of medical

experts, the nonmedical defendants were justified in believing that he was in

capable hands. See Spruill, 372 F.3d at 236; Durmer, 991 F.2d at 69.

To the extent that Moy attempts to hold defendants DeParlos and Shoemaker

liable based on their involvement in the grievance procedure, this claim also fails.

The “failure of a prison official to provide a favorable response to an inmate

grievance is not a federal constitutional violation.” Flanagan v. Shively, 783 F.

Supp. 922, 931-32 (M.D. Pa. 1992), aff’d, 980 F.2d 722 (3d Cir. 1992). Thus, insofar as

defendants DeParlos and Shoemaker are sued in their capacity for denying Moy’s

grievance, dissatisfaction with responses to an inmate’s grievances does not support

a constitutional claim. See Alexander v. Gennarini, 144 F. App’x 924 (3d Cir. 2005)

(concluding that involvement in the post-incident grievance process is not a basis

9

for § 1983 liability); Cole v. Sobina, 2007 WL 4460617, at *5 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (“[M]ere

concurrence in a prison administrative appeal process does not implicate a

constitutional concern.”).

2. Defendant Entz

Moy alleges that defendant Entz, in his role as supervisor, escorted Moy to

the SMU after he was treated by medical for an allergic reaction he suffered after

eating onions. (Doc. 1, at 9; Doc. 8, at 11). Moy has failed to establish that defendant

Entz was personally involved in the alleged violation of his constitutional rights. To

the extent that Entz is sued based on his supervisory role, this claim fails. Any

attempt by Moy to hold defendant Entz liable for the actions of his subordinates is

essentially an assertion of respondeat superior liability which seeks to hold this

defendant liable based on his supervisory role. See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207. For

these reasons, the allegations against Entz will be dismissed based on lack of

personal involvement in the alleged wrongful conduct.

3. Defendants Poorman, Murphy, Dosvack, and Glover

Moy asserts that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when defendant

Poorman ordered the removal of a nebulizer machine from his cell, despite knowing

he suffered from asthma. (Doc. 1, at 10; Doc. 8, at 2 ¶ 2). He claims that he was

discriminated against because another inmate was allowed to keep a similar

machine in a different cell. (Id.) He further asserts that defendant Poorman

supervised “all defendants.” (Doc. 8, at 9 ¶ 14).

10

Moy next alleges that defendant Murphy denied and delayed medical

treatment during his confinement at the Lycoming County Prison. (Doc. 1, at 9).

With respect to defendant Dosvack, Moy alleges that she provided untimely

treatment for an allergic reaction, she failed to treat him after he choked on a

chicken bone and, after he had an allergic reaction to eating hidden onions, she

treated him with Benadryl, and performed an oxygen test, but did not check his

lungs. (Doc. 1, at 10; Doc. 8, at 4, ¶ 5; Doc. 8, at 11, ¶ 16). Moy also alleges that

defendant Dosvack administered eye drops to his eye through the cell bars and,

because she was not paying attention, she poked him in the eye, causing pain and

infection. (Doc. 1, at 11; Doc. 8, at 7-8, ¶ 11).

Moy alleges that after he was assaulted by a fellow inmate, he was escorted to

the medical department and treated by defendant Glover, who provided an ice pack

and antibiotic ointment. (Doc. 1, at 11; Doc. 8, at 6). Moy further alleges that

defendant Glover provided medical care approximately one hour after he had an

allergic reaction to onions. (Doc. 1, at 10).

Lastly, Moy alleges that defendants Poorman, Murphy, Dosvack, and Glover

administered eye drops without wearing gloves, they had dirt and bacteria on their

fingers, and had painted finger nails, which contaminated the eye drops. (Doc. 8, at

13, ¶ 18). He alleges that the nurses’ failure to wear gloves while dispensing the eye

drops caused an infection, pain, and redness. (Id.)

At this stage of the litigation, where the court is limited to an assessment of

the pleadings, the court must deny the motion to dismiss the claims against

11

defendants Poorman, Murphy, Dosvack, and Glover. A review of the complaint

reveals that Moy has made detailed factual assertions, alleging that these

defendants removed a nebulizer machine from his cell, provided inadequate and

untimely medical care, and administered eye drops without wearing gloves, causing

pain and infection. The court finds that these factual recitals are sufficient to state

a viable Eighth Amendment claim.

B. Monell Liability3

A municipality may be held liable under § 1983 “if the governmental body

itself ‘subjects’ a person to a deprivation of constitutional rights or ‘causes’ a person

‘to be subjected’ to such deprivation.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011)

(quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 692). Thus, a plaintiff seeking to impose constitutional

liability on a municipality must meet the difficult burden of proving that “action

pursuant to official municipal policy” caused their injury. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691,

694. This requires the plaintiff to identify an official or unofficial municipal policy—

including “decisions of a government’s lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking

officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force

of law,” Connick, 563 U.S. at 61 (citations omitted), and demonstrate that said policy

was the “moving force” behind his injury, Berg v. Cty. of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261,

275-76 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404

(1997)).

3 Although Moy does not title his claim as a Monell claim, defendants address

these allegations in their motion to dismiss as a Monell claim because Moy sets forth

policy-based claims.

12

Additionally, the absence of a policy may provide the basis for a Monell claim

if sufficiently pled. In Natale, the Third Circuit determined that a prison with “no

policy ensuring that an inmate having need of medication for a serious medical

condition would be given that medication during the first 72 hours of . . .

incarceration” was a “‘particular[ly] glaring omission’ in a program of medical

care.” Natale, 318 F.3d at 584-85 (quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 410-11).

Moy alleges that defendants violated various prison policies and procedures.

(Doc. 8, at 7-8, 14). He asserts that defendants violated prison policy by failing to

promptly refer him to an eye doctor, and that the defendant nurses violated prison

rules and procedures by administering eye drops without wearing gloves. (Id.) Moy

claims that the alleged deficiency in his medical treatment is the result of

defendants’ failure to follow prison policies. Moy adequately claims that defendants

failed to follow prison policies and procedures when rendering medical treatment to

him. In light of these allegations, the motion to dismiss Moy’s Monell claim will be

denied.

IV. Dr. Keenan’s Motion

A. Legal and Factual Considerations Preclude a Finding at this Time

that Dr. Keenan was not a State Actor

As a threshold matter, Dr. Keenan argues that the section 1983 claim against

him fails because Moy has not alleged any facts to indicate that he was a state actor.

(Doc. 32, at 6-8). In support of this argument, Dr. Keenan asserts that Moy failed to

allege that he ever had any contact or involvement with Moy at the prison, and

13

there are no facts to suggest that Dr. Keenan had any role at, or on behalf of, the

prison. (Id.)

“To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a person

acting under color of state law engaged in conduct that violated a right protected by

the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165-

66 (3d Cir. 2013). A private party may be regarded as a “a federal actor . . . under

one of three interrelated theories of government action: (i) the ‘public function’ test,

(ii) the ‘close nexus’ test and (iii) the ‘symbiotic relationship’ test.” Brown v. Philip

Morris Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 801 (3d Cir. 2001). Under any test, “[t]he inquiry is fact-

specific.” Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 638 (3d Cir. 1995). In making

this very “fact-specific” state action determination “the focus of our inquiry is not

on whether the state exercises control over a putative state actor as a general

matter, but whether the state has exercised control over the particular conduct that

gave rise to the plaintiff's alleged constitutional deprivation.” Kach v. Hose, 589

F.3d 626, 649 (3d Cir. 2009).

With respect to medical services provided to inmates, it is clear that private

physicians who are contracted to provide health care services inside prison walls

will be considered state actors. In West v. Adkins, 487 U.S. 42, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101

L.Ed.2d 40 (1988) the Supreme Court expressly extended § 1983 liability to private

physicians who contract to provide medical services inside prisons. The West

Court rejected a claim that this contractual relationship was insufficient to make

the private doctors state actors, and held that:

14

The fact that the State employed [the doctor] pursuant to a contractual

arrangement that did not generate the same benefits or obligations

applicable to other “state employees” does not alter the analysis. It is

the physician’s function within the state system, not the precise terms

of his employment, that determines whether his actions can fairly be

attributed to the State. Whether a physician is on the state payroll or

is paid by contract, the dispositive issue concerns the relationship

among the State, the physician, and the prisoner. Contracting out

prison medical care does not relieve the State of its constitutional duty

to provide adequate medical treatment to those in its custody, and it

does not deprive the State’s prisoners of the means to vindicate their

Eighth Amendment rights. The State bore an affirmative obligation to

provide adequate medical care to [the prisoner]; the State delegated

that function to [a doctor]; and respondent [doctor] voluntarily

assumed that obligation by contract.

West, 487 U.S. at 55-56.

However, it is unsettled whether a doctor who works for a private medical

facility can nonetheless be considered a state actor for having treated a prisoner.

Compare Conner v. Donnelly, 42 F.3d 220 (4th Cir. 1994) (doctor considered state

actor) with Nunez v. Horn, 72 F. Supp. 2d 24 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (doctor not considered

a state actor). See also Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.2d 211 (6th Cir. 1996) (doctor who

examined state employee only once was not a state actor by virtue of having

performed that examination). Many courts have thus held that the issue of whether

a private physician’s actions amount to state action for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983

liability may not be resolved on a motion to dismiss, but rather requires

development of a factual record. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance, 577

F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2009) (reversing screening dismissal of complaint on state action

grounds and calling for factual development); Tatsch-Corbin v. Feathers, 561

F.Supp.2d 538 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (denying motion to dismiss private physician on state

15

action grounds); see also Kach, 589 F.3d at 646 (noting that the state action inquiry

is “fact-specific”).

Moy alleges that all defendants were acting under color of state law, Dr.

Keenan is the head prison doctor, and that Dr. Keenan denied his previously

prescribed eye drops. (Doc. 8, at 1-4, 7, 9, 12, 14). Viewing the complaint in the light

most favorable to Moy, the court concludes that Moy adequately alleges that Dr.

Keenan is a state actor. The motion to dismiss Dr. Keenan on state action grounds

will be denied.

B. Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs

Moy alleges that Dr. Keenan, as head prison doctor with decision making

authority over medical treatment at the Lycoming County Prison, violated federal

law when he was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. (Doc. 8, at 1).

Prison medical personnel may be found to have acted with deliberate indifference

where they “prevent[ed] an inmate from receiving recommended treatment for

serious medical needs.” Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 346-47. Moy can also establish

deliberate indifference by alleging facts showing that Dr. Keenan “den[ied]

reasonable requests for medical treatment . . . and such denial expose[d] [him] to

undue suffering or the threat of tangible residual injury.” Id. If the alleged

inadequate care “was a result of an error in medical judgment,” then Moy’s claims

must fail. Durmer, 991 F.2d at 69. If, however, the failure to provide adequate care

was deliberate, and motivated by non-medical factors, then Moy’s claims are

actionable.

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Moy sufficiently alleges deliberately indifferent conduct by Dr. Keenan. Moy

asserts that he arrived at the Lycoming County Prison with three different

prescription eye drops to treat a detached retina. (Doc. 1, at 9; Doc. 8, at 2). Moy

alleges that Dr. Keenan refused to provide his prescribed eye drops. (Doc. 8, at 2).

Without the eye drops, Moy alleges that his eye became infected, painful, and red.

(Id.) In accepting all facts alleged in the complaint as true, and construing them in

the light most favorable to Moy, the court finds that the complaint adequately

alleges a claim against Dr. Keenan in violation of Moy’s constitutional rights.

Therefore, the court will deny Dr. Keenan’s motion to dismiss.

V. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Lycoming County defendants’ motion

(Doc. 30) will be granted in part and denied in part. The motion (Doc. 31) filed on

behalf of Dr. Keenan will be denied. An appropriate order shall issue.

/S/ CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER

Christopher C. Conner, Chief Judge

United States District Court

Middle District of Pennsylvania

Dated: September 5, 2019