BEY v. AMOROSO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RESHAN SAVAGE BEY : CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiff :

:

v. : NO. 24-CV-1786

:

AYLSSA AMOROSO, et al., :

Defendants :

M E M O R A N D U M

NITZA I. QUIÑONES ALEJANDRO, J. JUNE 20, 2024

Reshan Savage Bey, a pretrial detainee housed at the Philadelphia Detention Center, filed

a lengthy and repetitive 98-page pro se civil rights Complaint naming as Defendants Assistant

District Attorney Aylssa Amoroso, SEPTA police officers Sgt. Bryan Carney, Anthony Michetti,

and Grabov, and the City of Philadelphia.1 The individuals are each named in their individual and

official capacities. Bey has also applied to proceed in forma pauperis. For the reason set forth,

the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted and the case will be dismissed on statutory

screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

1 Bey identifies as a Moorish American National and has attached numerous pages to his

Complaint, including spurious legal papers that he claims the state courts refuse to accept and thereby grant

him relief based upon their content. (Compl. at 9.) The numerous pages of exhibits contain sovereign

citizen verbiage about the status of the United States, holders in due course, jurisdiction, the Uniform

Commercial Code, and incomprehensible legalisms that the Court will not recount. (See Compl. at 9-12,

14-15; ECF No. 2-1 at 7, 25-32, 38-96.) Portions of the Complaint that merely repeat other allegations will

also not be cited in this screening Memorandum.

Bey does not spell or provide his name consistently in the Complaint. The Court notes he has also

filed civil cases in this District under the name “Rashan-I: Savage.” See Savage v. Lederer, No. 19-1114

(E.D. Pa.); Savage v. City of Philadelphia, No. 21-4136 (E.D. Pa.). The Court will refer to him as “Bey.”

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS2

In his complaint, Bey asserts that Defendant Carney conducted an investigation of an April

29, 2022 robbery at 15th and Market Streets in Philadelphia that violated his rights. (Id. at 19-20,

29.) Bey went to SEPTA police headquarters on April 30, 2022 and was interviewed. (Id. at 19.)

The victim allegedly failed to identify Bey from a photo lineup. (Id. at 19-20.) Nonetheless, Bey

asserts he was unlawfully detained on May 4, 2022 by Defendant Grabov at 15th and Market Streets

for about 20-45 minutes when allegedly there was no warrant for his arrest on robbery charges.

(Id. at 13, 19.) He claims that Carney instructed officers in the area to stop him for the alleged

robbery. (Id. at 19-20.) He was released on that date, but Carney was “very aggressive, hostile”

and made false allegations that Bey was “on surveillance robbing and assaulting someone at gun-

point, who is artistic [possibly meaning autistic], and that I was expelled from public transportation

for one (1) year.” (Id. at 20.)

Then, on June 7, 2022 at the same location, Defendant Michetti approached Bey and asked

him for identification, stating there was a warrant for Bey’s arrest. (Id. at 13.) When Bey asked

to see the warrant, Michetti refused to produce it or describe the basis for the warrant. (Id. at 13,

20.) When Bey produced identification showing his name as Rashan I. Savage, he was arrested

for the April 29 robbery, but the charges were later dismissed for lack of evidence on November

15, 2022. (Id. at 13.) He asserts that while he was in custody at SEPTA police headquarters he

had to wear “an arm band that clearly indicated [he] was unlawfully arrested,” was handcuffed and

placed in a cold cell when he refused to be fingerprinted, and was not allowed to make a phone

call. (Id. at 23.) He claims he was unlawfully detained from June 7, 2022 until November 15,

2 The facts set forth in this Memorandum are taken from Bey’s Complaint (ECF No. 2). The

Court adopts the pagination assigned to the Complaint by the CM/ECF docketing system.

2022. (Id. at 6.) Bey asserts constitutional claims based on false arrest and false imprisonment

due to the June 7th arrest. (Id. at 16, 19-23.) He also raises a First Amendment retaliation claim

against Carney, Michetti, and Grabov based on the May 4, 2022 stop, alleging that the stop

occurred because Bey had filed an amended complaint on April 12, 2019 alleging a false arrest

claim based on an incident on April 6, 2018, that also happened at 15th and Market Streets. (Id. at

25-26.)

On September 5, 2023, two unknown non-defendant Philadelphia police officers allegedly

came to Bey’s residence with a subpoena for refiling the dismissed charges. (Id. at 7, see also id.

at 13.) At a hearing on October 12, 2023, Bey challenged the court’s jurisdiction under the

common law and the law of admiralty, but he claims that the Judge would not answer him and

ADA Amoroso allegedly failed to object to his jurisdictional challenge. (Id. at 7.) He refused to

participate in any mental health evaluation. (Id.) At his next court dates on December 14, 2023

and February 15, 2024, he again objected to the court’s jurisdiction and refused to participate in

mental health evaluations. (Id. at 7-8, 14, 18-19.) He claims that Amoroso and the presiding judge

were “cohorting” to have him forcibly abducted to Norristown State Hospital (“NSH”) for sixty

days without his consent. (Id. at 8.) After the February 15th hearing he was allegedly placed in a

cell, strip searched, had his legal material temporarily held, handcuffed to another prisoner, and

transferred to Curran-Fromhold Correctional Center. (Id.) His request for court transcripts were

also refused and documents he submitted to the court were not filed on the docket. (Id. at 8-9.)

Bey asserts that Amoroso and “said SEPTA transit police officers” – presumably Carney,

Michetti, and Grabov – engaged in a “fraudulent non-disclosure of adhesion impaired contracting,”

by which he appears to refer to the criminal complaint, subpoena, and an allegedly forged affidavit

of probable cause in his criminal case. (Id. at 9.) These documents, he asserts, resulted in his

being falsely imprisoned even though the victim failed to identify him and Amoroso failed to prove

the state court had jurisdiction. (Id. at 12-13.)

Bey asserts that at the February 15, 2024 hearing he was erroneously ordered by a Common

Pleas Court judge to be confined at NSH. (Compl. at 5.) He was, instead, confined at a county

prison for a “psychological disorder.” (Id.) He asserts that ADA Amoroso refiled criminal charges

against him three times “without substantial evidence,” leading to the charges being dismissed due

to lack of evidence and lack of prosecution, apparently because the alleged victim failed to identify

Bey. (Id. at 6.) In doing so, Bey asserts that Amoroso committed barratry and champerty. (Id. at

6, 16.)

Finally, Bey asserts a claim for municipal liability against the City of Philadelphia alleging

that the City has a policy of malicious prosecution as shown by the initiation, dismissal, and refiling

of the charges lodged against him. (Id. at 27.) He claims the City is thus liable for the actions of

ADA Amoroso and the SEPTA police officers because it failed to investigate, supervise,

discipline, and educate them on constitutional axioms, treaties, and international laws, rights, and

freedoms. (Id. at 28.) Bey seeks money damages. (Id. at 29.)

Publicly available court dockets reflect that Bey charged under the name of Rashan I.

Savage with robbery involving the infliction of serious bodily injury, recklessly endangering

another person, simple assault, theft by unlawful taking, and related charges. Commonwealth v.

Savage, MC-51-CR-9513-2022 (M.C. Philadelphia). At a preliminary hearing on June 9, 2022,

the charges were held for court. On October 19 and 26, 2022, orders were entered to conduct a

mental health evaluation to determine whether Bey was competent to stand trial. At another

preliminary hearing on November 15, 2022, the charges were dismissed for lack of evidence and

Bey was released from custody. The criminal complaint was then refiled on December 9, 2022

but dismissed for lack of prosecution on March 27, 2023. The charges were refiled again on April

12, 2023 but again dismissed for lack of prosecution on June 6, 2023. Finally, the charges were

reinstated on August 11, 2023 and a commitment order was entered on February 15, 2024. The

case remains pending and Bey remains in custody.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court will grant Bey leave to proceed in forma pauperis.3 Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires the court to dismiss the complaint if it fails to state a claim. Here, the

Court must determine whether the Complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,

to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(quotations omitted). ‘“At this early stage of the litigation,’ ‘[the Court will] accept the facts

alleged in [the pro se] complaint as true,’ ‘draw[] all reasonable inferences in [the plaintiff’s]

favor,’ and ‘ask only whether [that] complaint, liberally construed, . . . contains facts sufficient to

state a plausible [] claim.’” Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting

Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 774, 782 (7th Cir. 2015)). Conclusory allegations do not suffice.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Because Bey is proceeding pro se, the Court construes the allegations of

the Complaint liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021). However, ‘“pro se

litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.’” Id. (quoting Mala

v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F. 3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013)).

3 Because Bey is a prisoner, he must still pay the full amount of the filing fee for this case in

installments as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act.

III. DISCUSSION

Bey asserts constitutional violations. The vehicle by which federal constitutional claims

may be brought in federal court is 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff

must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and

must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.”

West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). “A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal

involvement in the alleged wrongs” to be liable. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207

(3d Cir. 1988); see also Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 290 (3d Cir. 2018) (“Each

Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.”)

(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677) (emphasis in original).

A. ADA Amoroso

Bey brings § 1983 claims against ADA Amoroso asserting that she sought to have him

detained for a mental health evaluation, engaged with the SEPTA officers in a “fraudulent non-

disclosure of adhesion impaired contracting” that resulted in his being falsely imprisoned, and

refiled criminal charges against him after the Common Pleas Judge dismissed them. These claims

are not plausible.

Prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity from liability under § 1983 for acts that are

“intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process” such as “initiating a

prosecution and . . . presenting the State’s case.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31

(1976). Absolute immunity extends to the decision to initiate a prosecution, Imbler, 424 U.S. at

431, including “soliciting false testimony from witnesses in grand jury proceedings and probable

cause hearings,” Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1465 (3d Cir. 1992), presenting a state’s

case at trial, Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431, and appearing before a judge to present evidence. Fogle v.

Sokol, 957 F.3d 148, 160 (3d Cir. 2020). The allegations concerning Amoroso – bringing charges,

refiling the charges, and seeking a mental health evaluation – all involve her actions representing

the Commonwealth in Bey’s criminal case. Accordingly, she is absolutely immune from liability

under § 1983. See, e.g., Corbin v. James, No. 22-4212, 2022 WL 17995548, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Dec.

29, 2022) (holding that prosecutor was absolutely immune from § 1983 claim based on barratry).4

To the extent that Bey raises state law claims against Amoroso for barratry and champerty,

Pennsylvania law affords absolute immunity to prosecutors from tort claims that are based on

actions taken or statements made in the course of their official duties. See Durham v. McElynn,

772 A.2d 68, 69-70 (Pa. 2001) (holding that assistant district attorneys are entitled to absolute

immunity from liability for actions taken in their official capacity); McCormick v. Specter, 275

A.2d 688 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1971) (holding that a district attorney who was sued for defamation as a

result of statements made at a press conference was immune, since the statements were made in

the course of his official duties to inform the public regarding a matter pending in his office).

Moreover, even if Amoroso were not immune, the claims for champerty and barratry are not

plausible.

Under Pennsylvania law, champerty is a “bargain by a stranger with a party to a suit, by

which such third person undertakes to carry on the litigation at his own cost and risk, in

consideration of receiving, if successful, a part of the proceeds or subject to be recovered.”

Belfonte v. Miller, 243 A.2d 150, 152 (Pa. Super Ct. 1968); see Richette v. Pennsylvania R.R., 187

4 To the extent Bey asserts § 1983 claims against Amoroso in her official capacity, those claims are

actually claims against the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,

165-66 (1985) (“Official-capacity suits . . . ‘generally represent only another way of pleading an action

against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’”) (quoting Monell v. N.Y.C. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.

658, 690, n. 55 (1978)). However, district attorney’s offices in Pennsylvania are not entities subject to suit

under § 1983. See Reitz v. Cnty. of Bucks, 125 F.3d 139, 148 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that “the Bucks

County District Attorney’s Office is not an entity for purposes of § 1983 liability”). Accordingly, official

capacity claims against Amoroso are also not plausible.

A.2d 910 (Pa. 1963) (stating that a champertous agreement is “one in which a person having

otherwise no interest in the subject matter of an action undertakes to carry on the suit at his own

expense in consideration of receiving a share of what is recovered.”). In order to state a claim for

champerty, three elements must be alleged plausibly: the party involved must be one who has no

legitimate interest in the suit, the party must expend his own money in prosecuting the suit, and

the party must be entitled by the bargain to a share in the proceeds of the suit. Belfonte, 243 A.2d

at 152. As Amoroso is a prosecutor representing the Commonwealth, she has a legitimate interest

in the criminal case. Also, a criminal prosecution has no monetary proceeds. Accordingly, Bey’s

champerty claim is not plausible.

In Pennsylvania, the tort of barratry has been elevated to a crime, specifically a

misdemeanor of the third degree, that occurs when a person “vexes others with unjust and

vexatious suits.” 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5109; Andresen v. Pennsylvania, 20-989, 2022 WL

3045843, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 2, 2022). The United States Supreme Court has described barratry

as one of the “evils” associated with encouraging unnecessary litigation, the others being

“maintenance” – the helping of another to prosecute a suit, and champerty. In re Primus, 436 U.S.

412, 425 n.15 (1978) (citing 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 134–136). Barratry is a “continuing

practice of maintenance or champerty.” Id. It follows then that the failure to allege a plausible

champerty claim means that there can be no continuing practice of champerty upon which to allege

a plausible barratry claim. All claims against Amoroso are, accordingly, dismissed with prejudice

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

B. Official Capacity Claims against SEPTA Police Officers

Bey has named SEPTA police officers Carney, Michetti, and Grabov as defendants in both

their individual and official capacities. Claims against SEPTA police officers named in their

official capacities are indistinguishable from claims against SEPTA. Graham, 473 U.S. at 165-

66. SEPTA is a Pennsylvania government agency that is treated as a municipality for purposes of

claims brought under § 1983. See Brown v. SEPTA, 539 F. App’x 25, 27 (3d Cir. 2013); Thompson

v. Se. Pennsylvania Transportation Auth., No. 20-756, 2021 WL 2414610, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June

14, 2021), aff’d, No. 21-2286, 2022 WL 17958629 (3d Cir. Dec. 27, 2022).

To plead a basis for liability against a municipal entity under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege

that a municipal policy or custom caused the violation of his constitutional rights. See Monell, 436

U.S. at 694. “To satisfy the pleading standard, [the plaintiff] must . . . specify what exactly that

custom or policy was.” McTernan v. City of York, PA, 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009). “‘Policy

is made when a decisionmaker possess[ing] final authority to establish municipal policy with

respect to the action issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.’” Estate of Roman v. City of

Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d

1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990)). “‘Custom, on the other hand, can be proven by showing that a given

course of conduct, although not specifically endorsed or authorized by law, is so well-settled and

permanent as virtually to constitute law.’” Id. (quoting Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850

(3d Cir. 1990)). For a custom to be the proximate cause of an injury, a plaintiff must establish that

the Defendant “had knowledge of similar unlawful conduct in the past, failed to take precautions

against future violations, and that its failure, at least in part, led to [plaintiff’s] injury.” Id. (internal

quotations and alterations omitted). It is not enough, however, to allege the existence of a policy

or custom. “A plaintiff must also allege that the policy or custom was the ‘proximate cause’ of his

injuries.” Estate of Roman, 914 F.3d at 798 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199,

1213 (3d Cir. 1996)). This can be done “by demonstrating an ‘affirmative link’ between the policy

or custom and the particular constitutional violation” alleged. Id. Allegations that simply

paraphrase the standard for municipal liability, are too vague and generalized to support a plausible

claim. See, e.g., Szerensci v. Shimshock, No. 20-1296, 2021 WL 4480172, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Sept.

30, 2021) (“Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegation, which generally paraphrases the relevant standard, is

insufficient to state a claim for § 1983 liability under Monell.”) (citing cases).

Bey makes policy allegations regarding the City of Philadelphia, but not SEPTA.

Specifically, he asserts that the City has a policy of malicious prosecution as shown by the

initiation, dismissal, and refiling of the charges lodged against him. (Compl. at 27.) Even if the

Court were to liberally construe this allegation as being directed at SEPTA rather than the City, it

fails to state a plausible basis for municipal liability. First, it is conclusory and thus insufficient.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Second, a policy allegation based solely on the incident involved in this

case is not plausible; rather Bey must allege sufficient facts to show that SEPTA had knowledge

of similar unlawful conduct in the past, failed to take precautions against future violations, and

that its failure, at least in part, led to Bey’s injury. Estate of Roman, 914 F.3d at 798. Accordingly,

Bey’s official capacity/municipal liability claims will be dismissed.

C. City of Philadelphia

As just stated, Bey asserts a Monell claim against the City based on an implausible policy

allegation. He also claims that the City is liable for the actions of ADA Amoroso and the SEPTA

police officers because it failed to investigate, supervise, discipline, and educate them. To the

extent Bey seeks to hold the City liable because it employed the individual Defendants, the claim

is not plausible. First, municipalities “are not vicariously liable under § 1983 for their employees’

actions.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011). Second, even construing the Complaint

liberally, none of the individual Defendants appears to be an employee of the City since assistant

district attorneys are employees of the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office and SEPTA police

officers are employees of SEPTA. Thus, there can be no plausible claim that the City is liable to

Bey based on the actions of the individual Defendants. As Bey has not alleged a plausible Monell

claim either, the City will be dismissed as a Defendant with prejudice.

D. Individual Capacity Claims against the SEPTA Police Officers

Bey asserts individual capacity § 1983 claims against Carney, Michetti, and Grabov based

on two distinct incidents: (1) the May 4, 2022 investigative stop by Grabov at 15th and Market

Streets lasting 20-45 minutes during which Carney was hostile and made allegedly false allegations

that Bey was involved in a robbery (Compl. at 13, 19-20); and (2) the June 7, 2022 arrest at the

same location, during which Defendant Michetti allegedly refused to produce a warrant or describe

the basis for the warrant (id. at 13, 20), resulting in Bey’s subsequent detention from June 7 to

November 15, 2022.

1. The May 4 Investigatory Stop

a. Terry v. Ohio

A § 1983 claim based on false detention or arrest is grounded in the Fourth Amendment,

which protects private citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. Terry

v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). For a seizure to be reasonable, the Fourth Amendment requires

that the seizure be “effectuated with a warrant based on probable cause.” United States v.

Robertson, 305 F.3d 164, 167 (3d Cir. 2002). In Terry, however, the Supreme Court recognized

an exception to the warrant requirement, permitting police officers with “reasonable, articulable

suspicion” of possible criminal activity to conduct an investigatory stop. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528

U.S. 119, 123 (2000). “Reasonable, articulable suspicion is a less demanding standard than

probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, and

only a minimal level of objective justification is necessary for a Terry stop.” United States v.

Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 392, 396 (3d Cir. 2006) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Further, the reasonable suspicion standard considers “the totality of the circumstances” faced by

the officer and an officer’s “reasonable mistake of fact does not violate the Fourth Amendment.”

Id. at 397-398 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

To determine whether an investigatory stop was executed within the bounds of the Fourth

Amendment, the Supreme Court prescribed a dual inquiry into “whether the officer’s action was

justified at its inception,” in that it was supported by reasonable suspicion, and “whether the

manner in which the stop was conducted was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances

which justified the interference in the first place.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 20; see United States v.

Johnson, 592 F.3d 442, 452 (3d Cir. 2010). A lawful stop and frisk under Terry is a seizure that

may elevate into a de facto arrest, depending on “the reasonableness of the intrusion.” United

States v. Edwards, 53 F.3d 616, 619-20 (3d Cir. 1995). Only if the Terry stop escalates into an

arrest must the seizure be justified under a higher probable cause standard. United States v. Sharpe,

470 U.S. 675, 684 (1985). “[W]hen police officers make an investigative stop, they may take such

steps as are ‘reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo’”

during the course of the stop. Edwards, 53 F.3d at 619 (quoting United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S.

221, 235 (1985)); see also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414 (1997) (“The risk of harm to

both the police and the occupants [of a stopped vehicle] is minimized if the officers routinely

exercise unquestioned command of the situation.”) (internal citations omitted). Thus, where they

have a reasonable suspicion, officers may frisk, handcuff, and detain a suspect while conducting

their investigation. See, e.g., United States v. Burney, 35 F. App’x 354, 355 (3d Cir. 2002); United

States v. Benitez, 328 F. App’x 823, 824 (3d Cir. 2009) (“A police officer may also frisk a

temporarily detained person if — in addition — they have a reasonable belief that the person is

armed and dangerous.” (citing Terry)).

Bey’s Fourth Amendment claim based on the May 4 stop is not plausible under these

standards. He concedes he was detained during the investigatory stop for at most forty-five

minutes, after which he was released. While he asserts that Carney was aggressive and hostile,

Bey also alleges that Carney articulated a reasonable suspicion for the stop, namely that Bey was

“on surveillance robbing and assaulting someone at gun-point,” and thus possibly armed and

dangerous.5 Since Bey alleges that the officers had a reasonable, articulable suspicion of his

possible involvement in armed criminal activity, their conducting an investigatory stop did not

plausible violate Bey’s Fourth Amendment rights. Benitez, 328 F. App’x at 824. Accordingly,

this aspect of Bey’s claim is dismissed with prejudice.

b. First Amendment Retaliation

Bey also raises a First Amendment retaliation claim against Carney, Michetti, and Grabov

based on the May 4, 2022 stop. He alleges that the stop occurred because he had filed an amended

complaint on April 12, 2019 alleging a false arrest claim based on an incident on April 6, 2018,

that also happened at 15th and Market Streets. (Compl. at 25-26.) This claim is not plausible.

In order to state a plausible First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must allege that:

(1) he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct, (2) the defendant engaged in retaliatory

action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights,

5 To the extent that Bey seeks to assert a claim based on Carney’s verbal hostility, that claim

would also not be plausible. Verbal threats or taunts, without more, are insufficient to violate the

Constitution. See Dunbar v. Barone, 487 F. App’x 721, 723 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding that threats that inmate

was a “marked man and that his days were numbered” did not state Eighth Amendment claim); DeWalt v.

Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 612 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Standing alone, simple verbal harassment does not constitute

cruel and unusual punishment, deprive a prisoner of a protected liberty interest or deny a prisoner equal

protection of the laws.”).

and (3) a causal link between the constitutionally protected conduct and the retaliatory action.

Palardy v. Twp. of Millburn, 906 F.3d 76, 80-81 (3d Cir. 2018). A causal link is plausibly alleged

where the constitutionally protected conduct was “a substantial or motivating factor” for the

adverse action. See Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001); Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d

523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003); Coit v. Garman, 812 F. App’x 83, 86 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam). The

timing and pattern of allegedly retaliatory behavior relative to the constitutionally protected

conduct is a way that a plaintiff may plead a plausible causal link between the protected conduct

and the alleged act of retaliation for purposes of establishing motivation. See Watson, 834 F.3d at

422; see also Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007) (“To

establish the requisite causal connection, a plaintiff usually must prove either (1) an unusually

suggestive temporal proximity between the protected activity and the allegedly retaliatory action,

or (2) a pattern of antagonism coupled with timing to establish a causal link.”) A plaintiff must

allege that the defendant had knowledge of the protected activity to show that such activity was “a

substantial or motivating factor” for the retaliation. Ambrose v. Twp. of Robinson, 303 F.3d 488,

493-94 (3d Cir. 2002).

Bey’s retaliation allegations also fail to provide a sufficient basis upon which a plausible

claim can proceed. The retaliatory act, the May 4, 2022 Terry stop, allegedly occurred more than

three years after the alleged protected conduct, Bey’ April 12, 2019 filing of an amended

complaint. Bey alleges no facts in the intervening period upon which to base a pattern of

antagonism. Thus, the First Amendment claim will be dismissed with prejudice.

2. The June 7 Arrest

Bey alleges he was falsely arrested on June 7 and falsely detained from that date until

November 15, 2022.6 “False arrest and false imprisonment are ‘nearly identical claims’ that are

‘generally analyzed together.’” Karkut v. Target Corp., 453 F. Supp. 2d 874, 879 (E.D. Pa. 2006)

(quoting Brockington v. Phila., 354 F. Supp. 2d 563, 570 n. 8 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (citation omitted)).

To state a plausible claim for false arrest and related false imprisonment under the Fourth

Amendment, a plaintiff must allege facts to show plausibly that he was arrested without probable

cause. See Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir. 1995). “[P]robable cause to

arrest exists when the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge are

6 Although Bey also uses the words “malicious prosecution” in his Complaint (see Compl.

at 3), he does not allege he was arrested on June 7 pursuant to a warrant and the public records is unclear

on this point. An arrest pursuant to a warrant is properly construed as one arising under the Fourth

Amendment for malicious prosecution, rather than for false arrest. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 390

(2007) (explaining false arrest pursuant to a warrant and related imprisonment is generally treated as

malicious prosecution claim because the warrant issued pursuant to legal process; thus the claim accrues at

the time the charges terminate in the litigant’s favor); Noviho v. Lancaster Cnty. of Pa., 683 F. App’x 160,

166 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“Arrests made pursuant to a ‘validly issued — if not validly supported —

arrest warrant’ generally occur after the institution of legal process and, thus, sound in malicious

prosecution rather than false arrest or imprisonment.” (quoting Myers v. Koopman, 738 F.3d 1190, 1195

(10th Cir. 2013). Because he does not allege he was arrested pursuant to legal process, but rather appears

to assert the Defendants did not have a warrant because they refused to show a warrant to him, the Court

will construe the claim as a Fourth Amendment false arrest/false imprisonment claim. Should Bey choose

to file an amended complaint, he should include allegations concerning a malicious prosecution claim if he

was arrested pursuant to a warrant.

As noted earlier, Bey also uses sovereign citizen verbiage asserting that Carney, Michetti, and

Grabov engaged with Amoroso in a “fraudulent non-disclosure of adhesion impaired contracting.” (Compl.

at 9.) While this allegations may have been intended to be part of Bey’s claim, “legal-sounding but

meaningless verbiage commonly used by adherents to the so-called sovereign citizen movement” is nothing

more than a nullity. See United States v. Wunder, No. 16-9452, 2019 WL 2928842, at *5 (D.N.J. July 8,

2019) (discussing the futility of the sovereign citizen verbiage in collection claim for student loan); United

States v. Crawford, No. 19-15776, 2019 WL 5677750, at *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 1, 2019) (holding that criminal

defendant’s attempt to use fake UCC financing statements against prosecutor was a legal nullity); Banks v.

Florida, No. 19-756, 2019 WL 7546620, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 17, 2019), report and recommendation

adopted, 2020 WL 108983 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 9, 2020) (collecting cases and stating that legal theories espoused

by sovereign citizens have been consistently rejected as “utterly frivolous, patently ludicrous, and a waste

of . . . the court’s time, which is being paid by hard-earned tax dollars”).

sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been or is

being committed by the person to be arrested.” Id. at 483. “False arrest and false imprisonment

claims will ‘necessarily fail if probable cause existed for any one of the crimes charged against the

arrestee.’” Harvard v. Cesnalis, 973 F.3d 190, 199 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Dempsey v. Bucknell

Univ., 834 F.3d 457, 477 (3d Cir. 2016)). “To properly analyze a claim asserting an illegal search

and seizure under the Fourth Amendment, [the plaintiff] must plead the circumstances under which

the search arose.” Medina v. Aprile, No. 23-1057, 2023 WL 3440236, at *9 (E.D. Pa. May 12,

2023) ((citation omitted); Godfrey v. Pennsylvania, 525 F. App’x 78, 80 (3d Cir. 2013) (per

curiam).

Bey fails to allege that the SEPTA officers lacked probable cause to arrest him on June 7.

Even though the public record indicates that the charges were later dismissed and then reinstated

several times, this is not alone determinative of whether the officers had or did not have probable

cause to make the June 7 arrest. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36 (1979) (holding that the

fact that criminal charges were subsequently dismissed is irrelevant to the determination of

whether probable cause existed in the first instance); Shurney v. Scott’s Econo Inn, Inc., No. 05-

196, 2006 WL 1766813, at *5 (W.D. Pa. June 23, 2006) (“the fact that the charges were dismissed

at the preliminary hearing stage does not thereby negate the existence of probable cause to support

Plaintiff’s initial arrest and detention”); Vassallo v. Timoney, No. 00-84, 2001 WL 1243517, at *7

(E.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 2001), aff’d, 40 F. App’x 734 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at

36 (“[t]he validity of the arrest does not depend on whether the suspect actually committed the

crime” and his later acquittal of the offense for which he is arrested is “irrelevant to the validity of

the arrest”)).

While his Complaint is lengthy and repetitive, Bey’s allegations with regard to June 7 are

quite sparse. Bey asserts only that Defendant Michetti approached him and asked him for

identification, stating there was a warrant for Bey’s arrest, but that Michetti refused to produce the

warrant. (Compl. at 13, 20.) Bey was then allegedly arrested for the April 29 robbery when he

produced identification showing his name was Rashan I. Savage. (Id.) There are no allegations

at all that Carney and Grabov were involved in the June 7 arrest and Bey fails to provide sufficient

factual allegations in support of his Fourth Amendment claims against Michetti. He does not

provide any details about the circumstances surrounding the arrest and detainment, including any

affirmative allegation that Michetti lacked probable cause to believe he had committed the robbery

for which he was arrested on that day. The allegations regarding Bey’s interview with SEPTA

police on April 30, 2022 and his assertion that the robbery victim on some unstated date failed to

identify Bey from a photo lineup, are not an affirmative assertion that Michetti lacked probable

cause to arrest Bey on June 7. In short, Bey has simply not pled sufficient allegations about the

June 7 arrest and detainment to support an inference that they were unconstitutional. See Godfrey

v. Pennsylvania, 525 F. App’x 78, 80 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (explaining that, to the extent

plaintiff was asserting claims for false arrest and imprisonment, “[plaintiff] needed to point to facts

suggesting that Defendant Thompson lacked probable cause to believe he had committed the

offense for which he was arrested”); Santiago v. Humes, No. 14-7109, 2015 WL 1422627, at *4

(E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2015) (dismissing false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution

claims when plaintiffs failed to “affirmatively assert facts to show that the Officer Defendants did

not have probable cause” when plaintiffs simply alleged that all of the allegations against them in

the underlying criminal proceedings were false); Jenkins v. City of Philadelphia, No. 15-3271,

2015 WL 5585186, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2015) (dismissing false arrest, false imprisonment

and malicious prosecution claims because plaintiff failed to assert a plausible claim of lack of

probable cause where plaintiff, while alleging that he was twice arrested, did not have drugs in his

possession, did not break the law and the police confiscated his property, “assert[ed] no other facts

that would shed light on the circumstances under which he was arrested, on what the officers knew

or should have known at the time of the arrest, or on any other factor that might have a bearing on

the claims he attempts to raise”). Without additional details about the June 7 arrest and subsequent

detainment, and the Defendants’ alleged lack of probable cause, Bey’s Fourth Amendment claims

for false arrest and false imprisonment are undeveloped and will be dismissed.

3. Other Allegations

Bey asserts that while he was in custody at SEPTA police headquarters after his June 7

arrest he had to wear “an arm band that clearly indicated [he] was unlawfully arrested,” was

handcuffed and placed in a cold cell when he refused to be fingerprinted, and was not allowed to

make a phone call. He also asserts that after his February 15th hearing he was allegedly placed in

a cell, strip searched, had his legal material temporarily held, handcuffed to another prisoner, and

transferred to Curran-Fromhold Correctional Center. His request for court transcripts were also

refused and documents he submitted to the court were not filed on the docket. Because Bey fails

to assert that any named Defendant was personally involved in creating the conditions under which

he was confined after his arrest, or was personally involved in refusing to file his documents, these

claim will be dismissed with prejudice. See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss Bey’s Complaint because his claims are

not plausible as pled. The following claims are dismissed with prejudice: (1) Bey’s claims against

ADA Amoroso and the City of Philadelphia; and (2) his false arrest, false imprisonment and First

Amendment retaliation claims against Carney, Michetti, and Grabov based on the May 4, 2022

investigative stop. Bey’s claims based on conditions of confinement after his June 7, 2022 arrest

and November 15, 2023 hearing will be dismissed without prejudice, but with no leave to amend

those claims in this case. Bey must bring a new civil action if he seeks to pursue those claims

against a defendant who was personally involved in a violation of his constitutional rights. Bey’s

claims against Carney, Michetti, and Grabov based on the June 7, 2022 arrest and detainment will

be dismissed without prejudice. Bey will be granted an opportunity to file an amended complaint

if he is able to cure the defects the Court has identified in his June 7, 2022 false arrest and false

imprisonment claim. Should he file an amended complaint, Bey is again advised to “avoid

invocations of alchemistic, archaic, and irrelevant formalisms that are unlikely to bring him relief

in any court of law.” Savage v. Lederer, No. 19-1114, 2019 WL 1303944, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar.

20, 2019) (emphasis in original). Bey should provide merely a short plain statement of facts and

“flesh out [his] allegations by . . . explaining in [the] amended complaint the ‘who, what, where,

when and why’ of [his] claim.” Davis v. Internal Revenue Serv., No. 21-4728, 2022 WL 407639,

at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 2022).

An appropriate Order with additional information about amendment will be entered

separately.

NITZA I. QUIÑONES ALEJANDRO, J.