WALLS v. MILLER EDGE, INC.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MARK WALLS :

Plaintiff, : CIVIL ACTION

:

v. :

:

MILLER EDGE, INC., : No. 22-3596

JOHN CAGGIANO, and :

TIMOTHY CASTELLO, :

:

Defendants.

OPINION MEMORANDUM

Perez, J. April 26, 2024

Plaintiff, Mark Walls, brings this employment discrimination action against Defendant

Miller Edge, Inc. (“Miller Edge”) and current or former Miller Edge employees Timothy Castello

and John Caggiano, under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C §§ 2611 et

seq. This case arises out of Plaintiff’s claim that Miller Edge interfered with his rights under the

FMLA and retaliated against him for exercising those same rights. Presently before the Court is

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Having reviewed Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition and

Defendant’s Reply thereto, and for the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED

in part and DENIED in part.

I. BACKGROUND

Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the relevant facts are as follows.

Plaintiff has been employed by Defendant since 2008 and was a Miller Edge employee at the time

of the filing of this lawsuit. It is undisputed that Plaintiff qualified as an eligible employee under

the FMLA and was entitled to FMLA leave for the serious health condition of avascular necrosis.

Plaintiff’s health condition required both continuous medical treatment and inpatient care at a

hospital. Defendant was an employer subject to the FMLA’s requirements. At the time of the

events relevant to this case, Defendant John Caggiano was Director of Manufacturing & Supply

Chain at Miller Edge and Defendant Timothy Castello was Vice President of Manufacturing and

Product Development.1

On April 22, 2019, Plaintiff gave notice to Defendant in advance of his medical leave,

through his supervisor, as well as through his spouse, who was also employed by Miller Edge in

the Human Resources department (“HR”).2 Defendant granted Plaintiff’s request for leave. While

on leave, Plaintiff asked to return on August 29, 2019, requesting that Defendant approve him for

light duty accommodations as necessitated by his serious health condition. In his request, Plaintiff

reminded Miller Edge’s Controller and HR Manager that the company had previously made such

accommodations for other employees. At the time of Plaintiff’s request, Defendant had employees

working with light duty accommodations. Plaintiff presented the company with solutions to allow

him to work with restrictions, such as performing manual lifting with a forklift.3 Nevertheless,

Miller Edge denied the request.4 Furthermore, while the Complaint is not clear as to the precise

steps taken by Plaintiff’s spouse, Plaintiff also alleges that his wife attempted to facilitate his return

in her role in HR but was likewise denied.5 As a result of Defendant’s denial, Plaintiff remained

on FMLA leave for several additional days. Plaintiff returned to work on September 4, 2019

without any of his requested light duty accommodations.6

Upon his return to work, Plaintiff’s medical condition persisted, requiring him to take

leave again. Despite Defendant’s previous denial, Defendant accommodated Plaintiff’s two

subsequent FMLA requests, approving medical leave and returning Plaintiff to work with his

1 ECF No. 1 at ¶ 2.

2 Id. at ¶ 10.

3 Id. at ¶ 14.

4 Id. at ¶ 11, 14.

5 Id. at ¶ 13.

6 Id. at ¶ 11, 14.

proposed light duty accommodations. Plaintiff suggests that Miller Edge approved these later

requests because of a change in management involving Defendant Caggiano.7 Plaintiff avers that

Caggiano continued to interfere with his return to work, fabricating performance and dishonesty

allegations against him which were later disproven by Defendant and the HR Manager.

On September 25, 2019, at Caggiano’s direction, Plaintiff’s supervisor initiated

disciplinary corrective action against Plaintiff for dishonesty involving an inventory item.8

Plaintiff complained internally about his treatment by Caggiano to HR, the Controller, and other

management personnel.9 On January 16, 2020, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the U.S. Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). EEOC issued Plaintiff a Right to Sue Letter on

or about August 14, 2020.10

Defendants’ hostility and antagonism towards Plaintiff escalated after he filed his EEOC

complaint.11 In the fall of 2020, Caggiano again falsely accused Plaintiff of improper inventory

counts after certain items went missing even though Plaintiff was able to establish delivery of the

supposedly missing items to the intended recipient. These allegations were later disproven.12

Importantly, prior to his FMLA leave, Plaintiff never experienced allegations of dishonesty or poor

performance.13 On January 8, 2021, Plaintiff’s wife was demoted and given a pay cut following

her complaints about Plaintiff’s treatment. On January 15, 2021, Miller Edge terminated Plaintiff’s

wife’s employment.14

7 Id. at ¶ 22.

8 Id. at ¶ 17.

9 Id. at ¶ 16, 28.

10 Id. at ¶ 20.

11 Id. at ¶ 21.

12 Id. at ¶ 18.

13 Id. at ¶ 19.

14 Id. at ¶ 23.

Plaintiff’s individual claim against Caggiano arises from his role in the denial of light duty

accommodations and in the allegedly groundless disciplinary actions that followed Plaintiff’s

FMLA leave.15 Plaintiff’s individual claim against Castello involves Castello’s knowledge of

Caggiano’s treatment of Plaintiff and his overruling objections made by Plaintiff’s wife and Miller

Edge’s Controller on his behalf.16 Plaintiff filed the instant complaint on September 9, 2022.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss all claims on January 31, 2023.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A complaint need only contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), and does not require “detailed factual

allegations.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2006). In deciding a 12(b)(6)

motion to dismiss, the court must accept all facts as true in the light most favorable to the plaintiff

and determine whether such facts establish a plausible claim for relief. See Twombly; Fowler v.

UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-211 (3d Cir. 2009); Phillips v. Alleghany, 515 F.3d 224 (3d

Cir. 2008). The Third Circuit requires application of a three-step analysis under a 12(b)(6) motion:

(1) “it must ‘tak[e] note of the elements [the] plaintiff must plead to state a claim;’ ” (2) “it should

identify allegations that, ‘because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the

assumption of truth;’ ” and, (3) “[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, [the] court

should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement

for relief.” Connelly v. Lane Construction Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 675, 679); see also Burtch, 662 F.3d at 221; Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d

Cir. 2011); Santiago v. Warminster Township, 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010).

15 Id. at ¶¶ 13, 15-18.

16 Id. at ¶ 16, 28.

III. LEGAL DISCUSSION

1. Sufficiency of Plaintiff’s Retaliation Claim

“To prevail on a retaliation claim under the FMLA, the plaintiff must prove that: (1) she

invoked her right to FMLA-qualifying leave; (2) she suffered an adverse employment decision,

and; (3) the adverse action was causally related to her invocation of rights.” Lichtenstein v.

University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, 691 F.3d 294, 301-02 (3d Cir. 2012). Neither party

disputes that Plaintiff invoked his right to FMLA leave for a qualified condition. Defendants argue

that Plaintiff cannot establish that he was subjected to an adverse employment action that was

causally connected to his invocation.

An “adverse employment action” is one that “alters the employee's compensation, terms,

conditions, or privileges of employment, deprives him or her of employment opportunities, or

adversely affects his or her status as an employee.” Budhun v. Reading Hosp. and Medical Center,

765 F.3d 245, 257 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Robinson v. City of Pi ttsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1300

(3d Cir.1997) (quotation marks omitted).17

To establish a causal link, a plaintiff must demonstrate “either (1) an unusually suggestive

temporal proximity between the protected activity and the allegedly retaliatory action, or (2) a

pattern of antagonism coupled with timing.” Budhun at 258 (internal citations omitted). In

determining a causal link, courts consider “the specific facts and circumstances encountered” in

the case. Id. (quoting Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 279 n. 5 (3d Cir. 2000).

17 Defendants argue that Plaintiff “mistakenly believes that the less restrictive standard for ‘adverse employment

action’ promulgated in the Title VII context by the U.S. Supreme Court in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway

Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) applies here.” ECF No. 6 at 17. The Third Circuit has yet to expressly adopt the

Burlington standard for FMLA retaliation claims. However, several district courts have concluded that “Burlington

Northern provides guidance in determining whether plaintiff was subject to an ‘adverse employment action’” and

have used the test to analyze FMLA retaliation claims. See Grosso v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 467 F. Supp. 2d 449, 459 (E.D.

Pa. 2006); see also Foraker v. Apollo Group, Inc., 2006 WL 3390306, *2 (D.Ariz. Nov. 22, 2006); Campbell v.

Washington County Public Library, 2006 WL 2612985, *6 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 8, 2006). Nevertheless, this Court will

analyze the adverse employment action definition under Budhun, which establishes a more stringent test for Plaintiffs

to meet.

Here, Defendants’ denial of Plaintiff’s light duty accommodation request, the fabricated

allegations concerning his truthfulness and job performance, and continuing workplace

antagonism18 fit the definition of “adverse employment action” set forth in Robinson and Budhun.

120 F.3d at 1300; 765 F.3d at 258. In addition to temporal proximity,19 Plaintiff adequately pleads

a pattern of hostility, which escalated in the weeks following his return to work after leave as well

as also in the months following his filing of an EEOC complaint.20 Notably, Plaintiff never

experienced the disciplinary action involved in this pattern of hostility until he invoked his FMLA

rights.21 The timing of the pattern in relation to Plaintiff’s FMLA leave sufficiently alleges a causal

connection.

2. Sufficiency of Plaintiff’s Interference Claim

To facially state a claim of interference under the FMLA, a plaintiff must establish:

(1) he or she was an eligible employee under the FMLA; (2) the defendant was an

employer subject to the FMLA's requirements; (3) the plaintiff was entitled to

FMLA leave; (4) the plaintiff gave notice to the defendant of his or her intention to

take FMLA leave; and (5) the plaintiff was denied benefits to which he or she was

entitled under the FMLA.

Ross v. Gilhuly, 755 F.3d 185, 191–92 (3d Cir. 2014). Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s FMLA

interference claim fails because Plaintiff did not establish (1) that he provided sufficient notice to

Defendants that he was able to return to work; or (2) that the position he returned to was

meaningfully different from the one he had prior to taking leave. At the outset, this Court accepts

as true Plaintiff’s assertion that he provided sufficient notice of his intent to return from medical

leave.22

18 ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 11-18

19 ECF No. 1 at ¶ 39.

20 ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 15-18, 21-22, 28, 39.

21 ECF No. 1 at ¶ ¶ 18-19.

22 ECF No. 1 at ¶ 9.

Defendant’s interference claim appears to only concern Defendants’ refusal to allow

Plaintiff’s return to work with lifting restrictions and light duty accommodations between August

29, 2019 and September 3, 2019. He was not reinstated until September 4, 2019 when he was able

to fully return to his former position. The fact that Plaintiff’s interference allegation involves

merely four days of missed work does not defeat this claim, however, the claim, as presented, is

outside the statute of limitations as discussed infra. See Collison v. City of Phila., 430 F.3d 117,

119 (3d Cir. 2005)( “[a]n employee may not be required to take more FMLA leave than necessary

to resolve the circumstance that precipitated the need for leave.”).

3. Sufficiency of Plaintiff’s Claims Against Individual Defendants

Defendant contends that the claims against Defendants Caggiano and Castello cannot stand

because Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to impute individual FMLA liability. “[A]n

individual is subject to FMLA liability when he or she exercises ‘supervisory authority over the

complaining employee and was responsible in whole or part for the alleged violation’ while acting

in the employer's interest.” Haybarger v. Lawrence County Adult Probation and Parole, 667 F.3d

408, 417 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal citations omitted). “Most courts look to the ‘economic reality’ of

the employment situation” in examining whether the individual supervisor carried out the

functions of an employer. Id. In discerning the economic reality, a court considers whether the

individual “(1) had the power to hire and fire the employee[ ], (2) supervised and controlled

employee work schedules or conditions of employment, (3) determined the rate and method of

payment, and (4) maintained employment record.” Id. at 418 (citing Herman v. RSR Sec. Servs,

172 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1999). Additionally, courts must consider “any relevant evidence” and

“[n]o one of the four factors standing alone is dispositive.” Id. (quoting Herman at 139). The

Haybarger court found that, even if the defendant did not exercise control over every aspect of the

plaintiff’s employment, he still exercised significant control over the conditions of her

employment. Id. at 419; see also Herman at 139 (noting that an individual need not engage in

“continuous monitoring” for liability to attach).

Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that Defendant Caggiano had control over his conditions

of employment, including Plaintiff’s return to work timeline and the accommodations available to

him, as well as allegations of dishonesty and poor performance and the disciplinary actions that

followed those allegations.23 With respect to Caggiano, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied.

However, Plaintiff has not sufficiently pled Defendant Castello’s supervisory authority

over Plaintiff. The Complaint fails to draw substantial connection between Castello’s authority or

actions and the action taken against Plaintiff responsibility for the violation. Courts have dismissed

individual FMLA claims for failure to plausibly allege that an individual defendant exercised

supervisory authority. In Christopherson v. Polyconcept North America, Inc., the court dismissed

the plaintiff’s case because the complaint was “devoid of allegations indicating that any of the

Individual Defendants supervised and controlled her work schedule or employment conditions,

determined her rate and method of payment, had the power to hire or fire her, or maintained

employment records.” 2021 WL 3113221 at *6 (M.D. Pa. 2021). Further, knowledge of another

employee’s violation of a plaintiff’s FMLA rights, by itself, does not plausibly plead a claim of

individual liability. See Santee v. Lehigh Valley Health Network, Inc., 2013 WL 6697865 at *9-10

(E.D. Pa. 2013) (finding that plaintiff’s information about employees, to whom she had

complained about her treatment by her supervisor, did not plausibly allege that the employees met

the standard for individual liability, even where the individual defendants “did not do anything to

help resolve the situation”).

23 ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 13-15, 17-19, 22.

As Defendants note, Castello’s name is only referenced a few times in the Complaint,

wherein Plaintiff avers that Castello knew about and/or condoned Defendants’ treatment of the

Plaintiff and overruled objections by Plaintiff’s wife about his treatment.24 The Complaint does

not adequately define the individual Defendants’ respective roles in the corporate hierarchy at

Miller Edge, nor does it contain any specific facts to support the assertion that Defendant Castello

controlled any aspect of Plaintiff’s employment. Without this information, or any facts to allege

that Castello is responsible for the FMLA violation, the only inference the Court may make with

any confidence is that Castello knew about Defendant Caggiano’s treatment of Plaintiff. Mere

knowledge is inadequate to impute individual FMLA liability. Santee, 2013 WL 6697865 at *10.

The suit with respect to Defendant Castello is dismissed.

4. Statute of Limitations

The statute of limitations for FMLA violations is two years, unless an action is brought for

a willful violation, which carries a three-year statutory period. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(c)(1)-(2).

Defendants argue that both Plaintiff’s FMLA interference claim and his FMLA retaliation claim

fail because they were filed after the two-year period. Plaintiff asserts that the three-year statute

applies, making it timely due to the willfulness of Defendant’s actions.

The statute of limitations for a willful violation of the FMLA is three years from the date

of the last event constituting the alleged violation for which the action is brought. 29 U.S.C. §

2617(c)(1)-(2). To allege a willful violation, a plaintiff must show that the employer either knew

or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the statute.

McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe, 486 U.S. 128, 133 (1988) (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.

Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 125–30). In Caucci v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., the court found the

24 ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 16, 28.

plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, which alleged that “[d]efendant’s conduct was ‘willful,

intentional and in flagrant disregard’ [of the FMLA],” sufficient to plead willfulness. 153 F. Supp.

2d 605, 609 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b)). In denying a defendant’s motion to dismiss,

courts have found that allegations that an employer’s actions “were done ‘knowingly, intentionally

and discriminatorily’ and also in retaliation for exercising [] rights under the FMLA” successfully

alleged a willful violation of the FMLA. Ridner v. Salisbury Behav. Health, Inc., No. 3:11-CV-

572, 2011 WL 5089806, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, No.

3:11-CV-00572, 2011 WL 5314187 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 25, 2011).

A. FMLA Interference Claim (Count One)

Even considering the three-year statute, the only interference alleged is with Plaintiff’s

return to work. (ECF No.1 ¶¶ 25-27.) Nothing contained within the pleadings alleges an

interference with FMLA rights, past the denial of Plaintiff’s return to work with light duty

accommodations from August 29, 2019 to September 3, 2019. Because the instant lawsuit was not

filed until September 9, 2022, Plaintiff’s FMLA interference claim is time-barred unless he can

establish either 1) a nexus between the original leave date and the later dates implicated in the

Complaint; or 2) another allegation of interference that survives the three-year statute of

limitations. Therefore, Defendants’ motion regarding this claim will be granted.

B. FMLA Retaliation Claim (Counts Two and Three)

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges a string of specific, willful actions from at least September

2019 through the fall of 2020 by Defendant which were intended to discourage Plaintiff’s exercise

of his FMLA rights and to create a hostile work environment. Defendant Caggiano denied Plaintiff

light duty accommodations despite awarding identical requests to other employees, repeatedly

initiated discipline against him, and asserted allegations of dishonesty, inventory irregularity, and

poor performance.25 One such attempted disciplinary action occurred on September 25, 2019 and

others occurred in the fall of 2020. Notably, Plaintiff did not experience these allegations prior to

requesting FMLA leave.26 Further, Defendant only granted Plaintiff light duty accommodations

once Caggiano no longer had control over the decision, demonstrating a plausible claim for willful

retaliation and the availability of a job with lifting restrictions. Finally, after Plaintiff’s wife

complained to other Miller Edge employees about his treatment, Plaintiff’s wife was demoted,

given a pay cut, and eventually terminated on January 15, 2021.27 Even taking the earliest date of

FMLA retaliation clearly articulated, September 25, 2019, Plaintiff’s claim was brought within the

three-year statute of limitations for a willful violation and plausibly gives rise to an entitlement for

relief.

IV. CONCLUSION

Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED with respect to Count I (Family and Medical Leave

Interference) regarding all named Defendants. Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED with respect to

Counts II and III (Family and Medical Leave Act Discrimination and Retaliation) with respect to

Defendant Timothy Castello only. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), these

claims are dismissed without prejudice. Defendants’ Motion is DENIED with respect to Counts

II and III (Family and Medical Leave Act Discrimination and Retaliation) with respect to

Defendants Miller Edge and John Caggiano.

25 ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 15, 17-19.

26 Id. at ¶ 21.

27 Id. at ¶ 23.