OKEKE v. LNL HOME SERVICES, LLC

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

LINDA OKEKE, :

Plaintiff : CIVIL ACTION

v. :

LNL HOME SERVICES, LEC, No. 21-4705

Defendant :

MEMORANDUM

Ch

PRATTER, J. MARCH — __, 2024

LNL Home Services allegedly did not pay Linda Okeke wages and revenue-based

compensation to which she was contractually entitled. Ms. Okeke ultimately resigned from LNL

because of the racial discrimination she experienced as an employee and now asserts claims for

race discrimination under 42. U.S.C. § 1981 (Count D, unpaid wages under the Pennsylvania Wage

Payment and Collection Law (Count I), and breach of contract (Count III).

LNL Home Services filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Ms. Okeke was

paid the wages to which she was contractually entitled, and that she was not entitled to overtime

or revenue-based compensation. Because material issues of fact remain in dispute, including the

material terms of the employment contract, the Court denies the motion for summary judgment.

BACKGROUND

Linda Okeke is an African American woman. She contends that she began her employment

with LNL Home Services on September 30, 2020 as a Program Specialist. Under her employment

contract, Ms. Okeke avers that LNL Home Services agreed to pay her an annual salary of $40,000

to be paid bi-weekly. The contract also listed a four-year term of employment.

Ms. Okeke contends that LNL Home Services did not pay her the wages she was owed

under her contract during her period of employment. Although she began working for LNL Home

Services on September 30, 2020, she reports that she did not receive her first paycheck until

February 8, 2021. She never received back pay for her time worked between September 30, 2020

and February 7, 2021, Although she was paid her proper salary from February 8 to March 28, she

was underpaid for the period between March 29 and her resignation on April 7, She also contends

that LNL Home Services failed to pay her for additional time that she worked outside of her regular

shifts.

Ms. Okeke further contends that LNL’s owner, Larry Allouche, promised to pay her 5% of

LNL’s revenue, Mr, Allouche has decision-making authority over the LNL’s employment

decisions. In her deposition, Ms. Okeke explained that on December 1, 2020, she met with Mr.

Allouche, and he promised to pay Ms, Okeke 5% of LNL Home Services’ revenue moving

forward. Ms. Okeke contends that she accepted this offer by continuing to work for LNL Home

Services. No written memorialization of this agreement has been produced.

During Ms. Okeke’s time as an LNL Home Services employee, Mr. Allouche made racially

charged comments to her and other staff members. For example, Mr. Allouche told Ms. Okeke

that he wanted more white people working for LNL Home Services. He also called another

employee the n-word and encouraged clients to use racist language with LN, employees. As a

result of the allegedly toxic work environment created by Mr. Allouche, Ms. Okeke resigned her

position at LNL Home Services on April 7, 2021. When Ms. Okeke went to Mr. Allouche’s office

to get her final paycheck, he refused to give her the paycheck and called Ms. Okeke a “Black bitch?’

and “big gorilla,”

By contrast, LNL Home Services contends that it overpaid Ms. Okeke under the terms of

her employment contract. First, LNL maintains that Ms. Okeke’s employment began not on

September 30, 2020 but on December 18, 2020. LNL emphasizes that, on December 18, Ms.

Okeke signed an offer letter, which set her wages at the minimum wage of $7.25 per hour.' Because

this letter asserts that Ms. Okeke was only entitled to $7.25 per hour rather than $40,000 annually,

LNL Home Services argues that Ms. Okeke was paid substantially more than what was promised

in the December 18, 2020 offer letter. In support of this position, LNL Home Services points to an

excerpt from Ms. Okeke’s deposition testimony during which she putatively stated that she was

paid for the hours she spent working but was not paid a higher overtime rate for these hours.”

According to Ms. Okeke’s ADP pay statements, she was paid $1,538 every two weeks,

which corresponds to $769 per weck.? LNI Home Services asserts that this amount would

compensate Ms. Okeke for 106 hours per week at the $7.25 rate of compensation set forth in the

December 18 offer letter. Alternatively, LNL Home Services provides that, if “overtime” hours

were included in this $769 per week, then Ms. Okeke would be compensated for 40 hours per week

at her normal rate and 44 overtime hours, meaning she was being compensated for a total of 84

hours worked in one week. Relying on this characterization of Ms. Okeke’s compensation, LNL

Home Services argues that Ms. Okeke was overpaid under the terms of her contract,

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is only appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a). An issue is “genuine” if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248 (1986), A factual dispute is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under

: Ms. Okeke argues that this offer letter did not set the wages for her employment with LNL Home

Services, rather it set the wage for the New Hire Orientation trainings. The letter reads in relevant part “All

New Hire Orientation trainings will be paid at a rate of $7.25 per hour and will be included in your first

working paycheck.” The offer letter has a blank space where the employee’s salary is intended to £0.

2 Ms. Okeke is not asserting a claim for overtime pay.

3 These payments correspond to an annual salary of $40,000 per year paid bi-weekly,

the governing law.” Jd. “On a motion for summary judgment, facts must be viewed in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a genuine dispute as to those facts.” Ricci

v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Scott v. Harris,

550 U.S, 372, 380 (2007)). The moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating the absence

of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

Section 1981 provides that “[al]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall

have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts... .” 42 U.S.C. §

1981 (a). “Make and enforce contracts” is defined as “the making, performance, modification, and

termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the

contractual relationship.” 42 U.S.C, § 1981(b). “Section 1981 offers relief when racial

discrimination blocks the creation of a contractual relationship, as well as when racial

discrimination impairs an existing contractual relationship, so long as the plaintiff has or would

have rights under the existing or proposed contractual relationship.” Domino’s Pizza, Ine. v.

McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 476 (2006). “Tn order to state a claim under § 1981, a plaintiff ‘must

allege facts in support of the following elements: (1) [that plaintiff} is a member of a racial

nunority; (2) intent to discriminate on the basis of race by the defendant; and (3) discrimination

concerning one or more of the activities enumerated in the statute[,] which includes the right to

make and enforce contracts ....’” Brown v. Philip Morris, Ine., 250 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2001)

{alterations in original) (quoting Yelverton vy. Lehman, No. Civ. A, 94-6114, 1996 WL 29655], at

*7 (ELD. Pa, June 3, 1996), aff'd mem., 175 F.3d 1012 Gd Cir. 1999)),

“All claims of race discrimination brought under Title VII [and] § 1981... are governed

by the familiar burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,

93 8. Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).” Vaughan v. Boeing Co., 733 F. App’x 617, 622 (3d Cir.

2018) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Collins v. Kimberly-Clark Pa., LLC, 247 F. Supp.

3d 571, 588 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (collecting cases), The plaintiff thus “carrjies| the initial burden. . .

of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination.” McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.

To establish racial discrimination, the “plaintiff must show that: 1) [she] is a member ofa protected

class, 2) [she] was qualified for the position [she] sought to attain or retain, 3) [she] suffered an

adverse employment action, and 4) the action occurred under circumstances that could give rise to

an inference of intentional discrimination.” Vaughan, 733 F. App’x at 622 (quoting Mandel v. M

& O Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 169 (3d Cir. 2013)). If the plaintiff makes a prima facie case,

“the burden then ‘shift[s] to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason

for the employce’s rejection.” Jd. (alteration in original) (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S,

at 802). Lastly, if the employer successfully articulates such a reason, “the burden shifts back to

the plaintiff to show that the employer’s ‘stated reason ... was in fact pretext.’” Jd (alteration in

original) (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804),

“Adverse employment action” under § 1981 “is linked to Title VII’s description of

employment actions that may not be based on an employee’s race.” Barnees v. Nationwide Mut.

Ins. Co,, 598 F. App’x 86, 89-90 (3d Cir. 2015). “Title VII and section 1981, therefore, do not

provide relief for general unpleasantness that can occur in the workplace, even if that

unpleasantness may be motivated by racial animus. Rather, those statutes provide relief only if

discrimination is serious and tangible enough to alter an employee’s compensation, terms,

conditions, or privileges of employment.” /d. at 90 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Moreover, a plaintiff must demonstrate that “race was a but-for cause of [her] injury.”

Comcast Corp. v. Nat'l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1014 (2020). The Third

Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that

[tjo establish the fourth element [of a race discrimination claim], a plaintiff may

either: (1) introduce evidence of comparators (i.e., similarly situated employees

who (a) were not members of the same protected class and (b) were treated more

favorably under similar circumstances); or (2) rely on circumstantial evidence that

otherwise shows a causal nexus between his membership in a protected class and

the adverse employment action.

Greene v. Vl. Water & Power Auth., 557 F. App’x 189, 195 Gd Cir, 2014). An inference of

discrimination can be supported through various means and is not limited to the presentation of

comparator evidence. Golod v. Bank of Am. Corp., 403 F. App’x 699, 702 n.2 (3d Cir, 2010). The

plaintiff can also introduce “evidence of similar racial discrimination of other employees, or direct

evidence of discrimination from statements or actions by her supervisors suggesting racial

animus,” id. Comments by decisionmakers, which demonstrate racial bias, can also give rise to an

inference of intentional discrimination. See Abrams v. Lightolier, Inc., 50 F.3d 1204, 1215 (d Cir.

1995) (“[D]iscriminatory comments by an executive connected with the decisionmaking process

will often be the plaintiffs strongest circumstantial evidence of discrimination.”),

DISCUSSION

A. Ms. Okeke’s § 1981 Claim

The parties do not dispute the first two elements of Ms. Okeke’s prima facie § 1981 claim:

Ms. Okeke is a member of a protected class, and she was qualified for the position of Program

Specialist, Their dispute centers around the third and fourth elements, namely whether Ms. Okeke

suffered an adverse employment action, and to the extent she did, whether the action occurred

under circumstances giving rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.

a. Adverse Employment Action

LNL Home Services argues that the only adverse action underlying Ms. Okeke’s claim is

LNL Home Services’ alleged failure to pay Ms. Okeke for all hours worked. Indeed, Count I of

Ms. Okeke’s complaint—her § 1981 claim—explains; “Plaintiff avers that Defendant

discriminated against her with respect to the terms and conditions of her employment on account

of race by failing to pay Plaintiff her agreed upon wages.” Compl. { 35, Doc. No. 1. According to

LNL, because the record demonstrates that LNL either adequately paid or overpaid Ms. Okeke,

there can be no § 1981 claim because there is no adverse action. This contention presumes that

Ms. Okeke’s employment contract is the December 18, 2020 offer letter, which purports to set Ms.

Okeke’s compensation at $7.25 per hour.

Ms. Okeke argues that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she suffered

an adverse employment action. She notes that her paystubs support her deposition testimony that

LNL Home Services failed to pay (1) her salary for the first 19 weeks of her employment, from

September 30, 2020 through February 7, 2021; (2) her full salary for the time she worked from

March 29, 2021 through April 7, 2021; (3) revenue-based compensation; and (4) additional time

that she worked outside of her regular shifts,

LNL Home Services has not met its burden of demonstrating the absence of a factual

dispute regarding this claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. There is clearly a dispute as to whether

or not Ms. Okeke was paid in accordance with the terms of her employment contract because there

is a dispute about what constitutes the employment contract. A reasonable jury could conclude that

LNL owed Ms. Okeke a $40,000 salary under her employment contract, see Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 248, especially in light of the improbability that LNL overpaid Ms. Okeke by paying her exactly

the amount she would have been owed under such a contract, A jury could also conclude that Mr.

Allouche orally promised to pay Ms. Okeke 5% of LNL’s total revenue based on her consistent

testimony to that effect, See Okeke Dep. Tr., 37:20-22, 98:4-99:13, 100:17--102:3, Finally, that

same jury could reasonably conclude that Ms. Okeke was owed overtime pay. See, e. g., Okeke

Dep. Tr., 122:1-19 (describing overtime worked on and around the Easter holiday). Because there

is a factual dispute as to whether Ms. Okeke was not paid what she was due, it would be

inappropriate to grant summary judgment on this basis.

a. Inference of Discrimination

LNL Home Services argues that, even if the Court were to conclude that a jury could

reasonably find an adverse employment action, Ms. Okeke’s § 1981 claim still fails as a matter of

law because she cannot produce evidence giving rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.

LNL has failed to carry its burden with respect to this argument.

LNL Home Services argues that most of Mr. Allouche’s statements upon which Ms, Okeke

relies to demonstrate racial animus are inadmissible because Ms. Okeke does not have first-hand

knowledge of these statements, and they arguably constitute inadmissible hearsay. According to

LNL, the only statements regarding which Ms. Okeke indisputably has first-hand knowledge are

the statements made by Mr. Allouche to Ms, Okeke when she tried to pick up her final paycheck.

LNL emphasizes that these statements were uttered about two weeks after Ms. Okeke resigned and

asserts that they are therefore irrelevant to whether a reasonable inference of intentional

discrimination could be drawn.

For at least two reasons, LNL has failed to demonstrate the absence of an issue of material

fact with respect to the inference of intentional discrimination. First, LNL misidentifies the adverse

employment action at issue in this case. The Court recognizes that “stray remarks by . . .

decisionmakers unrelated to the decision process are rarely given great weight, particularly if they

were made temporally remote from the date of decision,” Parker v. Verizon Pa., Inc.,309 F. App’x

551, 559 Gd Cir, 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d

759, 767 (3d Cir, 1994)). However, Mr. Allouche’s statements were not temporally remote from

the adverse employment action at issue here, namely the failure to pay Ms. Okeke. By arguing that

Mr, Allouche’s statements are irrelevant to the inference of intentional discrimination because they

post-date Ms, Okeke’s resignation, LNL ignores the fact that Mr. Allouche called Ms. Okeke a

“black bitch” and “big gorilla” while he was refusing to give Ms. Okeke her final paycheck.

Because the adverse employment action in this case is LNL’s failure to pay Ms. Okeke, she has

first-hand knowledge of Mr. Allouche’s use of racial slurs precisely when the alleged adverse

employment action occurred in part. A jury could reasonably infer intentional discrimination based

on this evidence alone.

Second, in a bit of a headscratcher, most of LNL’s perfunctory hearsay argument appears

to be irrelevant to the issue of racial discrimination. After dismissing Mr, Allouche’s statements

discussed in the previous paragraph, LNL’s Motion for Summary Judgment summarily asserts,

“fals for the remaining statements, [Ms. Okeke] does not have first-hand knowledge of any of

them,” citing excerpts from Ms. Okeke’s deposition transcript without explanation. Mot. for

Summ. J. at 11, Doc. No. 27 (citing without explanation Okeke Dep. Tr. 64:46, 64:2-66:14;

67:15—68:1; 113:7~18; 113:19-114:21), In most of these unexplained excerpts, Ms. Okeke

discusses Mr, Allouche’s discriminatory attitude towards Ms. Okeke based on her weight, not her

race. See Okeke Dep. Tr., 64:4-6, Doc. No. 27-5 (discussing statement that Ms. Okeke was “too

big”); id. at 64:2-66:14 (discussing Mr. Allouche’s concern that Ms. Okeke was not “physically

healthy enough to chase a client down”); id. at 67:15-68:1 (discussing Mr, and Mrs. Allouche’s

concern that Ms. Okeke was “too big to do this job”), However, this case is about LNL Home

Services’ discrimination against Ms. Okeke based on her race, not her weight. To the extent LNL

has hearsay objections to evidence that Mr. Allouche used the n-word with employees and

encouraged clients to use racially charged language with LNL employees, see id. 111:9-112:7,

LNL can make those objections with specificity and citation to authority at trial. In the meantime,

the Court finds that a reasonable jury could infer racial discrimination based solely on the

statements Mr. Allouche made to Ms. Okeke when he refused to give Ms. Okeke her final

paycheck.

Thus, the Court denies LNL Home Services’ motion for summary judgment on Ms.

Okeke’s § 1981 claim,

I. Failure to Pay Under the WPCL

Ms. Okeke asserts that LNL Home Services violated the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and

Compensation Law (“WPCL”). The WPCL provides that any employee may take action to recover

wages payable. 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 260.9a. Wages are defined broadly as including “all earnings

of an employee” and “fringe benefits or wage supplements . . . .” 43 Pa, Cons. Stat. § 260.2a.

Bonuses and equity interest payments owed under a contract or an agreement are also “wages”

under the WPCL. Gautney v. Amerigas Propane, Inc., 107 ¥. Supp. 2d 634, 646 (E.D. Pa. 2000).

The WPCL “does not create a right to compensation... . Rather, it provides a statutory

remedy when the employer breaches a contractual obligation to pay earned wages. The contract

between the parties governs in determining whether specific wages are earned.” Antol v. Esposto,

100 F.3d t11i, 1117 Gd Cir. 1996) (quoting Weldon v. Krafi, Inc., 896 F.2d 793, 801 Gd Cir,

1990)); see also Gautney, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 646 (“Whether specific wages are due is determined

by the terms of the contract.”) (citing Dees v. Kohn Nast & Graf, P.C., 862 F, Supp. 1310, 1325

(E.D. Pa. 1994)). Thus, to successfully present a WPCL claim, the plaintiff must “aver that [s}he

was contractually entitled to compensation from wages and that [s}he was not paid.” Sullivan v.

Chartwell Inv, Partners, LP, 873 A.2d 710, 716 (Pa, Super. Ct. 2005).

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Where no express contract exists, the employee “will have to establish the formation of an

implied oral contract” to recover under the WPCL. De Asencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 342 ¥.3d 301,

309 (3d Cir, 1996); see also Braun v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 24 A3d 875, 954 (Pa. Super. Ct.

2011) ({A]bsent a formal employment contract or collective bargaining agreement, an employee

raising a WPCL claim would have to establish, at a minimum, an implied oral contract between

the employee and employer.”). “Under Pennsylvania law, an implied contract arises when parties

agree on the obligation to be incurred, but their intention, instead of being expressed in words, is

inferred from the relationship between the parties and their conduct in light of the surrounding

circumstances.” Oxner v. Cliveden Nursing & Rehab. Ctr. PA, L.P., 132 F. Supp. 3d 645, 649

(E.D. Pa. 2015),

There are numerous disputed issues of material fact that preclude granting summary

judgment on Ms, Okeke’s WPCL claim. First, there is a dispute of materiai fact between the parties

as to which purported employment contract or agreement governed Ms. Okeke’s wages, and thus,

governs her WPCL claim. LNL Home Services argues that the governing employment agreement

is the December 18, 2020 offer letter, signed by Ms, Okeke, which states that Ms. Okeke’s

compensation is $7.25 per hour. Ms. Okeke, on the other hand, argues that there was a contract

between her and LNL Home Services for $40,000 per year, which is corroborated by those of her

paystubs which are consistent with a $40,000 salary. This dispute is “material” because it “might

affect the outcome” of Ms, Okeke’s WPCL claim. Anderson vy. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

248 (1986), Under the WPCL, a specific contract must “govern]] in determining whether specific

wages are earned.” Antol, 100 F.3d at 1117. There is evidence to support the existence of either or

both of these contracts. On the one hand, there is the evidence of Ms. Okeke’s dated signature on

the contract LNL claims to be operative, and, on the other hand, there is evidence in the form of

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paystubs supporting the contract Ms. Okeke claims to be operative. Additionally, the contracts are

not mutually exclusive: Ms. Okeke could both be owed a $40,000 salary and be owed $7.25 per

hour for “New Hire Orientation trainings.” See Offer Letter, Doc. No. 27-3. Thus, there is a

disputed issue of material fact as to what contract governs the WPCL dispute.

There is also a disputed issue of material fact as to whether there is an implied oral contract

for 5% of LNL Home Services’ revenue. LNL asserts that Ms. Okeke has “produced no evidence”

to support her allegation that Mr. Allouche promised her 5% of LNL’s revenue, but this statement

is inaccurate. While the evidence may be thin, LNL ignores Ms. Okeke’s deposition testimony

about her putative 5% share. See Okeke Dep. Tr. 37:20-22; 98:4-99:13: 100:18-101:9.

Specifically, Ms. Okeke explained: “I was there helping build a company. I was patt of the

organization ... [I]f {Mr. Allouche] wanted me gone, he would have told me to leave. He didn’t.

I was part of the organization, That’s how it works. .. . That’s why [he] offered me five percent of

the company.” /d, 37:10-22. Thus, there is evidence that Ms. Okeke continued to work for the

newly established LNL because Mr. Allouche promised her 5% of LINNL’s revenue, and Mr.

Allouche continued to employ Ms. Okeke because she was helping to start the new company. Cf

Oxner, 132 F. Supp. 3d at 649 (explaining that implied contracts arise “when parties agree on the

obligation to be incurred, but their intention, instead of being expressed in words, is inferred from

the relationship between the parties and their conduct in light of the surrounding circumstances.”),

The Court will not determine the credibility of Ms. Okeke’s deposition testimony at summary

judgment. See Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 287 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Petruzzi’s IGA

Supermarkets v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1230 Gd Cir. 1993)) (“At the summary

judgment stage of proceedings, courts do not ‘weigh the evidence or make credibility

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determinations,’ but, instead, leave that task to the fact-finder.. .”). Thus, there is a factual

dispute regarding Ms. Okeke’s putative 5% share in LNL Home Services.

The Court denies LNL’s motion for summary judgment on Ms, Okeke’s WPCL claim,

Il. Breach of Contract

Finally, LNL requests that the Court grant summary judgment on Ms. Okeke’s breach of

contract claim, Under Pennsylvania law, “a plaintiff seeking to proceed with a breach of contract

action must establish ‘(1) the existence of a contract, including its essential terms, (2) a breach of

a duty imposed by the contract[,] and (3) resultant damages.” Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322

F.3d 218, 225 3d Cir. 2003) (quoting CoreStates Bank, N.A. v. Cutillo, 723 A.2d 1053, 1058 (Pa.

Super. Ct. 1999)) (alteration in original).

The Court denies LNL’s motion for summary judgment on Ms. Okeke’s breach of contract

claim for the same reasons that it denies LNL’s motion for summary judgment on her WPCL

claim. The parties agree that a contract exists. However, the Court cannot resolve Ms. Okeke’s

breach of contract claim because there are genuine disputes of material fact as to what duties Ms.

Okeke’s contract imposed upon LNL and whether or not LNL Home Services breached those

contractual duties by failing to pay Ms. Okeke, If the December 18, 2020 offer letter setting

compensation at $7,25 is the operative contract, then LNL Home Services argues that it could not

have breached a contractual duty because it fully complied with the terms of this letter, If the

agreements for a $40,000 salary plus 5% revenue-based compensation constitute the operative

contract, then it appears that LNL has not fulfilled its contractual obligations.

The Court denies LNL Home Services’ motion for summary judgment on Ms. Okeke’s

breach of contract claim.

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CONCLUSION

Genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on Ms. Okeke’s § 1981,

WPCL, and breach of contract claims. Thus, the Court denies LNL Home Services’ motion for

summary judgment. An appropriate order follows.

BY THE COURT:

g Lo 4

of een

Lik hak 0 tpl bie

GENE EK. PRATTER

~ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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