BUCHANAN v. VANHORN

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SHAWN C. BUCHANAN, :

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 24-CV-0600

:

POLICE OFFICE JOSHUA VANHORN, :

et al., :

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM

SCHMEHL, J. /s/ JLS FEBRUARY 15, 2024

Currently before the Court is a Complaint filed by Plaintiff Shawn C. Buchanan pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based on criminal charges that were filed against him in Delaware County.

Buchanan seeks to proceed in forma pauperis. For the following reasons, the Court will grant

Buchanan leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss his Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS1

Buchanan names the following Defendants in their individual and official capacities: (1)

Police Officer Joshua Vanhorn of the Upland Police Department; (2) Magisterial District Judge

Georgia L. Stone; (3) Assistant District Attorney John Meehan; and (4) Probation/Parole Officer

Daniel Scanlan. (Compl. at 1-3.) Buchanan alleges that the events giving rise to his claims

1 The following facts are taken from the Complaint and the publicly available court

dockets of which this Court takes judicial notice. See Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d

256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006) (courts may consider “matters of public record” in determining whether

a pleading has stated a claim); Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414,

416 n.3 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that court may take judicial notice of the record from previous

court proceedings). The Court adopts the pagination on the Complaint provided by the CM/ECF

docketing system.

occurred on three dates: (1) on May 25, 2023 at the Upland Borough Police station; (2) at his

Gagnon I “hearing with parole” on May 26, 2023; and (3) at his preliminary hearing at

Brookhaven District Court on June 5, 2023. (Id. at 4.) These allegations appear to correlate with

a criminal prosecution initiated against Buchanan in Delaware County charging him with

strangulation and related crimes in connection with offenses that occurred on May 5, 2023.

Commonwealth v. Buchanan, No. CP-23-CR-0002858-2023 (C.P. Delaware); see also

Commonwealth v. Buchanan, No. MJ-32239-CR-0000249-2023 (C.P. Delaware).2

Buchanan alleges that he “was arrested and imprisoned for an incident that the officers

already addressed and cleared that no crime took place.” (Compl. at 6.) Buchanan contends that

someone recanted the statement they provided on the scene “and that is when [Defendant] Joshua

Vanhorn took another statement and determined that was a more truthful version than the ones

that the actual officers who were on the scene took.” (Id.) Vanhorn also allegedly “add[ed] his

[input] into the affidavit [presumably the affidavit supporting the criminal charges against

Buchanan] to make it sound worse.” (Id.)

“When it came time for the preliminary hearing the officer told the . . . victim to say the

version he wrote on the police affidavit if she didn’t he was going to make sure she was

arrested.” (Id.) Buchanan alleges that Defendant Judge Stone presided over the preliminary

hearing, which he claims “felt more like a classroom than a courtroom due to its lack of

2 The docket for proceedings before the magisterial district judge reflects that Buchanan

received two preliminary arraignment hearings — one on June 2, 2023 and a second on June 5,

2023 — and a preliminary hearing on June 8, 2023. Buchanan, No. MJ-32239-CR-0000249-

2023. Judge Stone handled the preliminary hearing, following which the charges against

Buchanan were held for court. Id. The case was transferred to the Court of Common Pleas in

July. It appears Buchanan may have confused the date of his second preliminary arraignment

with the date of his preliminary hearing.

seriousness and ethics.” (Id.) He further alleged that Defendant Meehan, who is listed on

Buchanan’s criminal dockets as the prosecutor assigned to his case, “failed to see the lack of

justice and continue[d] to proceed with the case,” from which Buchanan has concluded there is

“some corruption going on.” (Id.) Defendant Scanlan “was saying [Buchanan] did things and

was hearing the accusation third party not even from the alledged [sic] victim” at a time when

Buchanan had not yet been charged. (Id.)

Based on the above allegations, Buchanan brings constitutional claims that he describes

as “wrongful imprisonment, procedural and substantive Due process.” (Id. at 3.) He seeks

damages to compensate him for harm suffered as a result of his imprisonment. (Id. at 7.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court grants Buchanan leave to proceed in forma pauperis because it appears that he

does not have the ability to pre-pay the fees to commence this case.3 Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires the Court to dismiss the Complaint if it fails to state a claim. Whether

a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard

applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see Tourscher

v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to determine whether

the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted). “At this

early stage of the litigation,’ ‘[the Court will] accept the facts alleged in [the pro se] complaint as

true,’ ‘draw[] all reasonable inferences in [the plaintiff’s] favor,’ and ‘ask only whether [that]

complaint, liberally construed, . . . contains facts sufficient to state a plausible [] claim.’”

3 However, as Buchanan is currently incarcerated, he will be obligated to pay the filing

fee in installments in accordance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act. See 28 U.S.C. §

1915(b).

Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d

768, 774, 782 (7th Cir. 2015)). Conclusory allegations do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

As Buchanan is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his allegations liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel,

8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45

(3d Cir. 2013)).

III. DISCUSSION

The vehicle by which federal constitutional claims may be brought in federal court is 42

U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right

secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged

deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.

42, 48 (1988). In a § 1983 action, the personal involvement of each defendant in the alleged

constitutional violation is a required element, and, therefore, a plaintiff must allege how each

defendant was involved in the events and occurrences giving rise to the claims. Rode v.

Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904

F.3d 280, 290 (3d Cir. 2018).4

4 In drafting his Complaint, Buchanan checked the boxes on the form he used indicating

that he seeks to name the Defendants in their official capacities. (Compl. at 2-3.) Buchanan

appears not to have understood the implication of checking the official capacity boxes. Claims

against government employees named in their official capacity are indistinguishable from claims

against the governmental entity that employs the Defendant. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.

159, 165-66 (1985) (“Official-capacity suits . . . ‘generally represent only another way of

pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’”) (quoting Monell v. N.Y.C.

Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, n. 55 (1978)). This means official capacity claims are

“treated as a suit against the entity” and must meet the pleading standards for claims against an

entity to be plausible. Id. Buchanan, however, does not attempt to allege an official capacity

claim against the municipal employees, see Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 (holding that, to state a

claim for municipal liability, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant’s policies or customs

caused the alleged constitutional violation), and his official capacity claims against Judge Stone

and Scanlan lack a legal basis. See Will v. Michigan State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989)

(holding that “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under

A. Claims Against Judge Stone

Buchanan’s claims against Judge Stone are based on the manner in which the Judge

handled Buchanan’s preliminary hearing. Judges are entitled to absolute immunity from civil

rights claims that are based on acts or omissions taken in their judicial capacity, so long as they

do not act in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349,

355-56 (1978); Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303-04 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam). An act is

taken in a judge’s judicial capacity if it is “a function normally performed by a judge.” Gallas v.

Supreme Ct. of Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 768 (3d Cir. 2000). Moreover, “[g]enerally . . . ‘where a court

has some subject matter jurisdiction, there is sufficient jurisdiction for immunity purposes.’”

Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 443-44 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Barnes v. Winchell, 105

F.3d 1111, 1122 (6th Cir. 1997)). As Buchanan’s § 1983 claims against Judge Stone are based

on acts she took in her judicial capacity while presiding over Buchanan’s criminal case for which

she clearly had jurisdiction to act, the claims against Judge Stone are not plausible and will be

dismissed.

B. Claims Against Meehan

Buchanan named Meehan as a Defendant in this lawsuit because Meehan, as the

Assistant District Attorney assigned to Buchanan’s criminal case, continued to prosecute him

despite allegedly observing injustices that occurred during the preliminary hearing. Prosecutors

§ 1983”); Haybarger v. Lawrence Cnty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 551 F.3d 193, 198 (3d Cir. 2008)

(“As an arm of the State, an individual judicial district and its probation and parole department

are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.”); Benn v. First Judicial Dist. of Pa., 426 F.3d

233, 241 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that Pennsylvania’s Judicial Districts are arms of the

Commonwealth). Accordingly, the Court will dismiss any claims raised against the Defendants

in their official capacity and will instead focus its analysis on the claims against the Defendants

in their individual capacity. See Downey v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 968 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir. 2020)

(“To determine whether a plaintiff sued state officials in their official capacity, we first look to

the complaints and the course of proceedings.” (quotations omitted)).

are entitled to absolute immunity from damages under § 1983 for acts that are “intimately

associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process” such as “initiating a prosecution and . .

. presenting the State’s case.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976); Roberts v. Lau,

90 F.4th 618, 624 (3d Cir. 2024) (“Prosecutors . . . are absolutely immune from liability under §

1983 for engaging in conduct that serves a quasi-judicial function.”). This means Meehan is

immune from claims such as those brought by Buchanan, because they are based on Meehan’s

role in prosecuting the criminal case against Buchanan on behalf of the Commonwealth.

Accordingly, Buchanan’s claims against Meehan will be dismissed.

C. Claims Against Officer Vanhorn

Buchanan’s claims against Officer Vanhorn are best construed as Fourth Amendment

claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, rather than due process

claims. See Manuel v. City of Joliet, Ill., 580 U.S. 357, 367 (2017) (“If the complaint is that a

form of legal process resulted in pretrial detention unsupported by probable cause, then the right

allegedly infringed lies in the Fourth Amendment.” ); Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273-74

(1994) (explaining that “[w]here a particular Amendment provides an explicit textual source of

constitutional protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment[] . . .

must be the guide for analyzing these claims” (internal quotations omitted)); see also U.S. Const.

amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,

against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,

but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place

to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”). To state a claim for false arrest under

the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff must allege facts establishing that he was arrested without

probable cause. See Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir. 1995). “[P]robable

cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge

are sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been or

is being committed by the person to be arrested.” Id. at 483. “False arrest and false

imprisonment claims will ‘necessarily fail if probable cause existed for any one of the crimes

charged against the arrestee.’” Harvard v. Cesnalis, 973 F.3d 190, 199 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting

Dempsey v. Bucknell Univ., 834 F.3d 457, 477 (3d Cir. 2016)).

A plaintiff asserting a constitutional malicious prosecution claim must establish that “(1)

the defendants initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in the

plaintiff’s favor; (3) the proceeding was initiated without probable cause; (4) the defendants

acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff

suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal

proceeding.” McKenna v. City of Philadelphia, 582 F.3d 447, 461 (3d Cir. 2009). “Probable

cause exists if there is a fair probability that the person committed the crime at issue.” Harvard,

973 F.3d at 199 (internal quotations omitted). “To demonstrate a favorable termination of a

criminal prosecution for purposes of the Fourth Amendment claim under § 1983 for malicious

prosecution, a plaintiff need only show that his prosecution ended without a conviction.”

Thompson v. Clark, 142 S. Ct. 1332, 1335 (2022).

The gist of Buchanan’s allegations is that Vanhorn falsely arrested him for unspecified

crimes because Vanhorn completed an affidavit — which was presumably used as the basis for

arresting and/or charging Buchanan, though the Complaint does not say — based on a statement

provided by someone (perhaps the victim, although this is also unclear) recanting statements

given to police at the crime scene. Buchanan also alleges that when Vanhorn spoke to the victim

prior to the preliminary hearing, he threatened to arrest her if she did not testify to the subsequent

statement she provided. Although Buchanan does not say so in his Complaint, it appears that his

allegations relate to the pending prosecution against him in Delaware County cited earlier, i.e.,

Buchanan, No. CP-23-CR-0002858-2023 and No. MJ-32239-CR-0000249-2023.

Buchanan’s allegations fall far short of stating a claim. Buchanan does not describe the

statements that were provided to Vanhorn, nor does he explain any of the circumstances that led

police to arrest him for the charged crimes. He vaguely alleges that statements were made, but

does not allege their content. Without clarifying factual allegations, it is not possible to discern

whether Buchanan was arrested or prosecuted without probable cause because crucial facts and

circumstances have been left out of the Complaint. Furthermore, since the prosecution against

Buchanan is still pending in the Court of Common Pleas, Buchanan cannot, at this time, establish

that the relevant criminal proceeding terminated in his favor as is necessary to allege a malicious

prosecution claim. For these reasons, the Court will dismiss the claims against Vanhorn because

they are not plausible as pled. See Godfrey v. Pennsylvania, 525 F. App’x 78, 80 (3d Cir. 2013)

(per curiam) (explaining that, to the extent plaintiff was asserting claims for false arrest and

imprisonment, “[plaintiff] needed to point to facts suggesting that Defendant Thompson lacked

probable cause to believe he had committed the offense for which he was arrested”).

D. Claims Against Scanlan

The only allegation against Scanlan is that he “was saying [Buchanan] did things and was

hearing the accusation [against him from a] third party,” apparently at a May 26, 2023 Gagnon I

parole revocation hearing involving Buchanan before Buchanan was criminally charged for the

underlying events. (Compl. at 4, 6.) The Court understands this allegation to mean that Scanlan

testified at Buchanan’s parole revocation hearing and Buchanan is bringing a claim based on that

testimony. Individuals are entitled to absolute immunity from civil rights claims based on

testimony in court, including at pretrial hearings. See Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 369

(2012); Williams v. Hepting, 844 F.2d 138, 141 (3d Cir. 1988); Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325,

329-30 (1983). This means Scanlan is entitled to absolute immunity from Buchanan’s claims

based on testimony provided at a court parole or probation revocation hearing. Accordingly, the

Court will dismiss these claims.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Buchanan leave to proceed in forma

pauperis and dismiss his Complaint. Buchanan’s claims against Judge Stone, Assistant District

Attorney Meehan, and Scanlan will be dismissed with prejudice because Buchanan cannot cure

the defects in those claims. However, Buchanan will be given leave to file an amended

Complaint against Vanhorn in the event he can allege additional facts to state a plausible claim

against Vanhorn. Buchanan should note, however, that if he returns with an amended complaint

against Vanhorn, there is a possibility his case will be stayed until his pending criminal

prosecution is resolved in state court. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393-94 (2007) (“If a

plaintiff files a false-arrest claim before he has been convicted (or files any other claim related to

rulings that will likely be made in a pending or anticipated criminal trial), it is within the power

of the district court, and in accord with common practice, to stay the civil action until the

criminal case or the likelihood of a criminal case is ended.”); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-

44 (1971) (recognizing that the “longstanding public policy against federal court interference

with state court proceedings” generally requires federal courts to abstain from addressing issues

in state criminal proceedings absent exceptional circumstances); Rex v. Fisher, No. 12-4045,

2012 WL 3537846, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 2012) (staying false arrest and illegal search claims

for damages in light of pending criminal prosecution when plaintiff “ha[d] the opportunity to

raise his Fourth-Amendment challenges in the course of his criminal proceeding”).

An Order follows, which provides further instruction as to amendment.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Jeffrey L. Schmehl

JEFFREY L. SCHMEHL, J.