WOODS v. SEPTA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EARL JAMES WOODS, :

Plaintiff, :

v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 23-CV-2703

SEPTA, et al.,

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM

SCOTT, J. NOVEMBER 21, 2023

Currently before the Court is the Amended Complaint of pro se Plaintiff Earl James

Woods. For the following reasons, the Court will dismiss the Amended Complaint without

prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)Gi1). Woods will be

granted leave to file a second amended complaint.

1. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 10, 2023, Woods initiated this civil action by filing a sixteen-page submission,

along with a Motion to Proceed Jn Forma Pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1, 2.) Woods also filed a motion

for appointment of counsel. (ECF No. 3.) The Clerk’s Office, consistent with its obligation

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5, treated Woods’s initial filing as a Complaint raising

employment discrimination claims and opened a civil action. Named as Defendants were the

Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (““SEPTA”), SEPTA Midvale District, and

Local 234 Transit Workers Union. (See Compl. at 3, 6.) Woods’s Complaint suggested that he

was previously employed by SEPTA, but that his employment was terminated. (/d. at 3.) The

initial Complaint consisted of various documents, including, inter alia, a portion of the court’s

standard form complaint for use in employment discrimination cases, although several pages

were missing; the court’s instructions for requesting the appointment of counsel; the court’s form

concerning consent to receive notice of electronic filing for self-represented litigants; a June 16,

2023 right to sue letter prepared by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, as

well as instructions on how to file a lawsuit; and two copies of a May 10, 2022 report concerning

a formal hearing held on a complaint filed against Woods. (See id. at 1-16.)

By Memorandum and Order dated August 7, 2023, the Court granted Woods leave to

proceed in forma pauperis, denied the motion for appointment of counsel as premature, and

dismissed the Complaint without prejudice for failure to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. (ECF Nos. 8, 9.) Specifically, the Court found that Woods’s Complaint failed to

conform to the pleading requirements of Rule 8 because it was unclear what claims he sought to

present against each Defendant. Woods was given thirty-days leave to file an amended

complaint. He did so on August 24, 2023. (ECF No. 10.) Accordingly, the Court will screen

the Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

Woods again utilized the Court’s standard form complaint for use in employment

discrimination cases. (See Am. Compl. at 1-6.) Woods checked the box to indicate that he seeks

to bring his claims pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as codified, 42 U.S.C.

§§ 2000e-2000e17. Ud. at 1.) The sole named Defendant is SEPTA. (Ud. at 3.) Woods also

indicated that the discriminatory conduct of which he complains is the termination of his

employment and the unequal terms of his employment. (/d. at 3-4.) Woods represented on the

form complaint that the discriminatory acts began on or about May 17, 2022, that SEPTA

continued to commit the acts against him, and that SEPTA discriminated against him on the basis

of his race (Black) and his gender/sex (Male). Ud. at 4.) Woods did not check the box to

indicate that he seeks to bring an age discrimination claim, however, he provided his age, which

indicates that he was fifty-nine years old at the time he filed the Amended Complaint. (See id.)

Woods provides no other factual allegations to support his claims of discrimination, stating, “I

attach proof already when I first file.” Ud.) Woods also checked the boxes to indicate that he

_ seeks re-employment by SEPTA, as well as monetary relief. (/d. at 6.)

Il. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Since Woods is proceeding in forma pauperis, his Amended Complaint is subject to

screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), which requires the Court to screen and dismiss

the Amended Complaint if it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks relief from an

immune defendant. “[T]he plausibility paradigm announced in [Bell Atl. Corp. v.] Twombly{,

550 U.S. 544 (2007),] applies with equal force to analyzing the adequacy of claims of

employment discrimination.” Fowler v. UMPC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009)

(quotations omitted). To state an employment discrimination claim, as with any other claim, a

plaintiff must “put forth allegations that raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal

evidence of the necessary element.” Jd. at 213 (quotations omitted).

As Woods is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his allegations liberally. Vogt v.

Weitzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239,

244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)). This requires the Court to remain flexible, especially considering a

litigant’s pro se status. Id. The Court will “apply the relevant legal principle even when the

complaint has failed to name it.” Jd. However, ““pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts

in their complaints to support a claim.’” Jd. (quoting Mala, 704 F.3d at 245). An unrepresented

litigant also ‘““cannot flout procedural rules -they must abide by the same rules that apply to all

other litigants.’” Jd.

Moreover, a complaint may be dismissed for failing to comply with Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 8. Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 91 (3d Cir. 2019). To conform to Rule 8,

a pleading must contain a short and plain statement showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has

explained that in determining whether a pleading meets Rule 8’s “plain” statement requirement,

the Court should “ask whether, liberally construed, a pleading ‘identifies discrete defendants and

the actions taken by these defendants’ in regard to the plaintiff's claims.” Garrett, 938 F.3d at

93 (citation omitted). The important consideration for the Court is whether “a pro se complaint’s

language . . . presents cognizable legal claims to which a defendant can respond on the merits.”

Id. at 94,

Additionally, although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 contemplates amended

pleadings, “an amended pleading supersedes the original pleading and renders the original

pleading a nullity.” /d. at 82. “Thus, the most recently filed amended complaint becomes the

operative pleading.” Jd. While the Court must liberally construe pro se pleadings, “liberal

construction of a pro se amended complaint does not mean accumulating allegations from

superseded pleadings.” Argentina v. Gillette, 778 F. App’x 173, 175 n.3 (3d Cir. 2019) (per

curiam). This means that the submission of an amended complaint “effectively constitutes an

abandonment of any prior complaints filed by a plaintiff.” Smith v. Price, No. 11-1581, 2012

WL 1068159, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, No. 11-1581,

2012 WL 1072282 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2012). Consistent with these principles, the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure do not contemplate piecemeal pleadings or amalgamation of pleadings, even

in the context of a pro se litigant. See Bryant v. Raddad, No. 21-CV-1116, 2021 WL 2577061, at

*2 (E.D. Pa. June 22, 2021) (“Allowing a plaintiff to file partial amendments or fragmented

supplements to the operative pleading, ‘presents an undue risk of piecemeal litigation that

precludes orderly resolution of cognizable claims.’” (quoting Uribe v. Taylor, No. 10-2615, 2011

WL 1670233, at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 2, 2011)).

II. DISCUSSION

Federal law “proscribe[s] discrimination in employment based on several personal

characteristics” specifically, race, color, religion, sex, national origin, and age. See E.E.O.C. v.

Allstate Ins. Co., 778 F.3d 444, 448-49 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a),

29 U.S.C. § 623); see also Fowler v. AT&T, Inc., 19 F.4th 292, 298 (3d Cir. 2021) (claims under

the Age Discrimination in Employment Act align with claims under Title VII). In general, to

establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he is a

member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position in question; (3) he suffered an

adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise

to an inference of discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802

(1973); see also Sarullo v. United States Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2003).

Although a plaintiff need not allege a prima facie case to state an employment discrimination

claim, as with any other claim, a plaintiff must “put forth allegations that raise a reasonable

expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element.” Fowler, 578 F.3d at

213; see also Martinez v. UPMC Susquehanna, 986 F.3d 261, 266 (3d Cir. 2021).

As noted, Woods again utilized the Court’s standard form for employment discrimination

matters when he submitted the Amended Complaint. However, the Amended Complaint once

again falls short of providing sufficient factual allegations to state a plausible claim. It simply

does not provide any specific facts to support his assertion that SEPTA terminated his

employment for a discriminatory reason based on his membership in a protected class. Instead,

Woods indicates that he “attach[ed] proof already when I first file[d].” (Am. Compl. at 4.)

Woods may not have appreciated that, by filing the Amended Complaint, he was effectively

abandoning the factual allegations and claims raised in his initial Complaint. In any event, the

Court found Woods’s initial Complaint to be insufficient to state a claim, so even if he could rely

on it, it does not help him.

The Amended Complaint again fails to provide fair notice of the grounds upon which the

claims against SEPTA rest, as required by Rule 8. See Afzal v. N.J. Bd. of Med. Examiners, No.

22-1609, 2022 WL 4533826, at *3 (3d Cir. Sept. 28, 2022) (ver curiam) (affirming dismissal of

complaint pursuant to Rule 8 because plaintiff failed to plead adequate factual content to support

a reasonable inference that defendants were liable and failed to present cognizable legal claims to

which defendants could respond on the merits). Absent any factual allegations explaining why

the termination was motivated by Wood’s race, color, religion, sex, or age, the Amended

Complaint cannot support a plausible claim. See, e.g., Favors v. Sec’y United States Dep’t of

Veterans Affs., 695 F. App’x 42, 44 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of Title VII

race discrimination claim where plaintiff “included no allegations whatsoever linking his

termination to his race”); Shahin v. Del. Dep’t of Transp., 405 F. App’x 587, 588-89 (3d Cir.

2010) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of complaint where plaintiff failed to provide “details on

what position she applied for, how she was qualified for the position, and what protected classes

she belongs to”).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss the Amended Complaint without

prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim. Woods will be

given an opportunity to file a second amended complaint. The second amended complaint must

be complete in all respects. It must present all of Woods’s allegations, state the basis for his

claims, and the relief he seeks from the court. The second amended complaint must be a new

pleading that stands by itself as an adequate complaint without reference to the initial Complaint

or the Amended Complaint. To the extent Woods again requests appointment of counsel, such

request will be denied without prejudice as premature. See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155 (3d

Cir. 1993) (in determining whether appointment of counsel is appropriate, the Court should first

determine whether plaintiff's lawsuit has a legal basis).

An appropriate order follows, which contains additional instructions as to amendment.

BY THE COURT:

lf

KAIN. SCOTT, 7