Jennings v. ST. LUKE'S HEALTH NETWORK, INC.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

____________________________________

JESSICA JENNINGS, ON BEHALF OF :

HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS :

SIMILARLY SITUATED, :

Plaintiff :

:

v. : No. 5:23-cv-1229

:

ST. LUKE’S HEALTH NETWORK, INC., :

et al., :

Defendant. :

_____________________________________

O P I N I O N

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 7 – Denied

Joseph F. Leeson, Jr. September 12, 2023

United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

This case deals with an employer’s vaccine requirement, subsequent insurance premium

increase, and an unvaccinated employee’s claims of religious discrimination. Plaintiff Jessica

Jennings, on behalf of herself and all those similarly situated, initiated this action against

Defendant St. Luke’s Health Network, Inc. (“St. Luke’s”) for religious discrimination and failure

to accommodate in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et

seq. (“Title VII”) and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 P.S. § 951 et seq. (“PHRA”).

St. Luke’s has moved to dismiss all counts or, in the alternative, strike class action allegations.

For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is denied. St. Luke’s request to strike class action

allegations is also denied without prejudice.

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II. BACKGROUND

The following facts are alleged in the Complaint. On August 9, 2023, St. Luke’s

instituted a COVID-19 vaccination requirement for all employees. Compl. ¶ 13, ECF No. 1.

Employees were permitted to request an exemption for religious beliefs or medical reasons. Id.

Jennings applied for and was granted a religious exemption in September 2021. Compl. ¶ 14. At

least 500 other employees received a religious exemption to the vaccine requirement. Compl.

¶ 15. In October 2021, St. Luke’s instituted a policy that all employees would be charged an

additional $1,100 per year over the 2021 rate beginning the next calendar year. Compl. ¶ 16.

The increase amounted to $42.31 per pay period. Compl. ¶ 22.

Employees were notified of the policy change in an email which was sent only to those

with religious exemptions. Compl. ¶ 17, Ex. B. St. Luke’s employees with a medical exemption

to the vaccine requirement and those who received the vaccine were eligible for a premium

discount equal to the $1,100 increase. Compl. ¶ 18. There was no opportunity for employees

who received the religious exemption to receive the same discount. Compl. ¶ 19, Ex. B. St.

Luke’s asserts in the email announcing the policy that the policy was instituted to counteract

“more than $3.5 million in expenses over the past 18 months associated with COVID-related

hospital care.” Compl. ¶ 23, Ex. B.

On March 30, 2023, Jennings initiated this action by filing a Complaint, which alleged

Title VII religious discrimination claims under two theories of liability, “failure to

accommodate” and “disparate treatment,” as well as parallel claims under the PHRA. Compl.

pp. 10-17. On June 5, 2023, St. Luke’s filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, or in the

alternative, requested this Court to strike the class action allegations. Mot., ECF No. 7. Jennings

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filed a response in opposition, see Resp., ECF No. 10, St. Luke’s filed a reply brief, see ECF No.

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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW – Review of Applicable Law

In rendering a decision on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), this Court must

“accept all factual allegations as true [and] construe the complaint in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff.” Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v.

Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Only if “the ‘[f]actual allegations . . . raise a right to relief above the speculative level’” has the

plaintiff stated a plausible claim. Id. at 234 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 540,

555 (2007)). However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained

in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(explaining that determining “whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and

common sense”). “In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must consider only the complaint,

exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic

documents if the complainant’s claims are based upon these documents.” Mayer v. Belichick,

605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010). Also, “a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the

complaint may be considered.” In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426

(3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotations omitted). The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating

that a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Hedges v. United

States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d

1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991)).

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IV. ANALYSIS

Before bringing a claim of employment discrimination under Title VII, an employee must

first file a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and receive a

right-to-sue notice. Federoff v. Geisinger Clinic, 571 F. Supp. 3d 376, 385 (M.D. Pa. 2021).

Likewise, an employee must also file with Pennsylvania Human Rights Commission (“PHRC”)

before filing a PHRA claim. Leeck v. Lehigh Valley Health Network, No. 22-cv-4634, 2023 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 108543, at *26 (E.D. Pa. June 23, 2023). In this case, Jennings has made an

appropriate dual-filing with the PHRC and EEOC and received a right-to-sue notice from the

EEOC; therefore, she is permitted to bring a private right of action. See Compl., ¶¶ 9-11, Ex. A.

Jennings brings her Title VII and PHRA claims under two theories of liability: disparate

treatment and failure to accommodate. St. Luke’s moves to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety

for failure to state a claim. Addressing each theory in turn, this Court will allow Jennings’

discrimination claims to proceed under both theories at this time.

To state a prima facie case of employment discrimination under Title VII or the PHRA, a

“plaintiff must allege that: (1) [she] is a member of a protected class; (2) [she] was qualified for

the position [she] held; (3) [she] suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse

employment action occurred under circumstances that give rise to an inference of

discrimination.” Darby v. Temple Univ., 216 F. Supp. 3d 535, 541 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (citing

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). See Weston v. Pennsylvania,

251 F.3d 420, 425 n.3 (3d Cir. 2001) (“The proper analysis under Title VII and the Pennsylvania

Human Relations Act is identical, as Pennsylvania courts have construed the protections of the

two acts interchangeably.” (citations omitted)). However, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, an

employee need not establish each element of this test, but rather, simply allege sufficient facts to

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raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will uncover proof of their claims.” Blackwell v.

Lehigh Valley Health Network, No. 22-03360, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10747, at *12 (E.D. Pa.,

Jan. 23, 2023) (internal marks and citations omitted). In cases dealing with religious

discrimination, employees must have “informed their employers of their religious beliefs prior to

the alleged discriminatory action” because, unlike for other discrimination claims like race or

gender, “an employee’s religion is often unknown to the employer[.]” See Morrison v. Access

Servs., No. 14-4685, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146803, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 2014) (cleaned

up).

A. Disparate Treatment

Under a disparate treatment theory of liability, to show that the adverse employment

action occurred under circumstances that give rise to an inference of discrimination, an employee

may, but is not required to, show that her employer treated other similarly situated employees

outside the plaintiff’s protected class more favorably. Anderson v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 621

F.3d 261, 273 (3d Cir. 2010).

Here, Jennings has stated a plausible case of employment discrimination. See Connelly v.

Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 788-89 (3d Cir. 2016) (explaining that “for purposes of

pleading sufficiency, a complaint need not establish a prima facie case in order to survive a

motion to dismiss[,]” and the complaint is only required to allege “enough facts to raise a

reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of' the necessary elements”) (internal

marks and citations omitted). As an initial matter, it is undisputed that Jennings is a member of a

protected class due to her religious practice, which she informed St. Luke’s about prior to the

alleged discriminatory action. Her qualifications are not at issue. Further, Jennings suffered an

adverse employment action when she was forced to pay a higher insurance premium to maintain

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her health benefits, which effectively resulted in a net loss in salary. See Tourtellotte v. Eli Lilly

& Co., 636 Fed. Appx. 831, 842 (3d Cir. 2016) (“To constitute an adverse employment action,

the action must be ‘serious and tangible enough to alter an employee’s compensation, terms,

conditions, or privileges of employment.’” (citation omitted)). See also Compl., ¶ 22, Ex. B.

(explaining that an additional $42.31 was automatically withdrawn by St. Luke’s from each bi-

weekly paycheck to cover the cost of the premium increase). Finally, the adverse action, i.e. the

premium increase, occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination

because the only employees forced to pay the higher premium were those who had received a

religious exemption from St. Luke’s vaccination policy, as explained further below.

St. Luke’s makes three arguments for why Jennings has failed to state a claim for

disparate treatment: (1) St. Luke’s did not distinguish among religions of its employees when

imposing the premium increase; (2) Jennings failed to allege that St. Luke’s had a discriminatory

motive; and (3) St. Luke’s had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for implementing the

premium changes. Mot. pp. 7, 9, 12. The Court addresses, and rejects, each argument in turn.

First, St. Luke’s argument that it did not distinguish among religions when imposing the

premium increase is disingenuous. The premium increase was effectively only imposed on the

employees who received a religious accommodation because St. Luke’s gave premium

discounts, entirely offsetting the cost of the increase, to all employees except those who were

religiously exempt from receiving the COVID-19 vaccination. Necessarily, the increase was

only imposed on employees claiming to have a sincere religious belief that prevented them from

receiving the vaccination.1 For instance, an employee belonging to a religion without tenets that

1 St. Luke’s argues that it was required by law to give the premium discount to its

medically exempt employees. See Mot. at 1. If true, this may be relevant in assessing St. Luke’s

non-discriminatory motives during the burden-shifting analysis at a later stage. However,

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conflict with vaccination would have been unaffected by the premium increase, because that

employee would have been vaccinated under St. Luke’s vaccine policy and therefore would have

qualified for the premium discount. Therefore, this is not a case where the employer treated

employees of all religions neutrally.

Second, Jennings has adequately alleged facts that give rise to an inference of

discrimination, as previously mentioned, and Jennings is not required to show that St. Luke’s had

a discriminatory motive at this stage. St. Luke’s points to the following statement in the

Complaint as an “admission” that St. Luke’s lacked discriminatory animus when implementing

the policy:

When one cuts through the clutter of [St. Luke’s] convoluted

justifications, the true motive behind its “premium discount” policy

becomes clear: to “encourage vaccination efforts” so that it can

continue to publicly boast that it is “a leader in the fight against

COVID-19.” In and of itself, such an objective is not unlawful or

discriminatory and is, indeed, laudable.

Compl. ¶ 37 (emphasis added). However favorable this statement may appear to St. Luke’s, the

Court is not persuaded that it is an admission from Jennings that St. Luke’s lacked discriminatory

animus.2 Even so, the relevant standard of review for this Court to consider is whether Jennings

has alleged enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence that

the premium increase was implemented under circumstances giving rise to an inference of

construing the facts in favor of Jennings at the pleadings stage, St. Luke’s reason for giving the

premium discount to medically-exempt employees does not negate any resultant disparate

treatment of religiously-accommodated employees.

2 Although not mentioned by St. Luke’s, later in the Complaint Jennings alleges that the

policy “deliberately discriminates against employees whose religious beliefs interfere with [St.

Luke’s] ambitious vaccination campaign[,] and that St. Luke’s “either knew that its ‘premium

discount’ policy constituted religious discrimination under Title VII or didn’t care if it did.” See

Compl. ¶ 52. These statements, even if conclusory, undermine St. Luke’s argument that

Jennings “admitted” that St. Luke’s lacked discriminatory animus.

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discrimination. As already discussed, Jennings has alleged that the premium increase policy was

opted into by St. Luke’s only after St. Luke’s had granted religious accommodations to

unvaccinated employees, and then only the religiously accommodated employees were forced to

pay out of pocket for the premium increase, because St. Luke’s gave all other employees an

equivalent premium discount. Therefore, taking these allegations as true, employees outside of

Jennings’ protected class were treated more favorably, and Jennings has adequately alleged

circumstances that give rise to an inference of religious discrimination.

Third, St. Luke’s nondiscriminatory reasons for implementing the policy are not enough

to dismiss the Complaint, though they are relevant to the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting

framework that will come into play at a later stage of this case. See Connelly, 809 F.3d at 791

“[A]t [the motion to dismiss] stage [Plaintiff] is not obliged to choose whether she is proceeding

under a mixed-motive or pretext theory, nor is she required to establish a prima facie case, much

less to engage in the sort of burden-shifting rebuttal that McDonnell Douglas requires at a later

stage in the proceedings. It suffices for her to plead facts that, construed in her favor, state a

claim of discrimination that is ‘plausible on its face.’”) (internal citation omitted). Here,

Jennings has plausibly stated a claim and need not rebut St. Luke’s argument or establish pretext

at this stage.3

3 Nevertheless, even at this early juncture, the Complaint alleges facts supporting a

plausible inference that St. Luke’s nondiscriminatory reasons are pretextual. The primary reason

that St. Luke’s proposes for implementing the premium increase are the “cost-saving benefits” of

the increase. See Mot. at 12. St. Luke’s argues that had it granted a premium discount to the

approximately 500 unvaccinated, religiously exempt employees, this would have “eviscerated”

these cost-saving benefits. Id. However, Jennings points out in the Complaint that although

St. Luke’s justifies the implementation of the premium increase as a response to the “more than

$3.5 million in expenses over the past 18 months associated with COVID-related hospital care”

for unvaccinated employees and their family members, see Compl. ¶ 23, Ex. B, the apparent cost

to St. Luke’s of providing the premium discount to its vaccinated and medically-exempt

employees was approximately $18 million in 2022. See Compl. ¶ 29.

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B. Failure to Accommodate

Absent undue hardship, Title VII requires employers to reasonably accommodate

employee religious needs. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). To state a failure to accommodate claim,

“an employee must allege that (1) [she] held a sincere religious belief that conflicted with a job

requirement, (2) [she] informed [her] employer of the conflict, and (3) [she] was disciplined for

failing to comply with the conflicting requirement.” Winans v. Cox Auto., Inc., No. 22-3826,

2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114726, at *6 (E.D. Pa. July 5, 2023) (cleaned up) (citing Fallon v.

Mercy Cath. Med. Ctr., 877 F.3d 487, 490 (3d Cir. 2017)).

Generally speaking, a “reasonable accommodation” is one that removes the conflict

between an employee’s religious beliefs and an employer’s employment requirements. Further,

“any reasonable accommodation by the employer is sufficient to meet its accommodation

obligation[,]” and an employer is not required “to choose any particular reasonable

accommodation” or the one specifically requested by the employee. See Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v.

Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68 (1986) (emphasis added). Likewise, there is not “a duty [imposed]

on the employer to accommodate at all costs.” Id. at 70. In some instances, a proposed

accommodation may not be reasonable if it causes a reduction in pay or loss of benefits to the

recipient. See Baker v. Home Depot, 445 F.3d 541, 548 (2d. Cir. 2006) (“[A]n offer of

accommodation may be unreasonable if it causes an employee to suffer an inexplicable

diminution in his employee status or benefits.”) (internal marks and citation omitted) (emphasis

in original); Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 70-71 (holding that an unpaid leave policy for religious

observances was a reasonable accommodation because “the direct effect of unpaid leave is

merely a loss of income for the period the employee is not at work; such an exclusion has no

direct effect upon either employment opportunities or job status” but further opining that unpaid

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leave would not be a reasonable accommodation where “paid leave is provided for all purposes

except religious ones”) (emphasis in original). See also Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69,

75 (1984) (“A benefit that is part and parcel of the employment relationship may not be doled

out in a discriminatory fashion, even if the employer would be free under the employment

contract simply not to provide the benefit at all.”). The question of whether a particular

accommodation is reasonable, or whether it causes an undue hardship to an employer, are often

fact-specific inquiries evaluated on a case-by-case basis. See Shannon v. City of Philadelphia,

No. 98-5277, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2428, at *10 (E.D. Pa., Mar. 5, 1999) (holding, in the ADA

context, that “[w]hether granting the additional leave requested was a reasonable accommodation

and whether the [defendant] could provide it to [the plaintiff] without undue hardship are factual

inquiries that are not properly decided in the context of a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). See also Gravely v. Speranza, 219 F. App’x 213, 215 (3d Cir.

2007) (per curiam) (“[D]etermining the question of reasonableness is frequently one that should

be left to the ultimate factfinder . . . .”).

In the Complaint, Jennings alleges that the accommodation received was rendered

unreasonable by the premium increase, which “punished” the employees that received a religious

exemption from St. Luke’s vaccine policy. Compl. ¶ 61. To further support the failure-to-

accommodate theory of liability, Jennings argues in her responsive briefing that excluding her

from receiving the premium discount rendered her previously granted accommodation, the

exemption from the vaccine, ineffective.4 Resp. pp. 9-10. Here, the Court finds that Jennings

4 Jennies relies on several ADA cases regarding “ineffective” accommodations to support

her argument in her responsive briefing. See Resp. pp. 9-10. However, because this Court does

not find these cases particularly persuasive on this Title VII issue, the Court will analyze the

accommodation in terms of its reasonableness, rather than efficacy, pursuant to Title VII. See

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has plausibly stated a discrimination claim under the failure-to-accommodate theory, because the

loss of income associated with the premium increase may have rendered the religious

accommodation unreasonable.

St. Luke’s, however, makes two arguments for why Jennings has failed to state a claim.

First, that Jennings never requested a religious accommodation from the premium increase and,

second, that efficacy of the vaccine accommodation was not altered by the premium increase.

Resp. p. 14. Reply p. 5. The Court rejects both arguments.

First, St. Luke’s points out that the Complaint states neither Jennings “nor any other

proposed Class Member ever requested a premium discount as an accommodation for their

sincerely held religious beliefs.” See Compl. ¶ 27. St. Luke’s argues that this admission is

enough on its own to dismiss the failure to accommodate theory by framing the discount as an

“accommodation” that Jennings failed to request.5 See Compl. Ex. B (“While your religious

exemption permits you to remain employed at St. Luke’s, we are unable to grant you an

additional accommodation for a premium discount, since doing so would impose an undue

hardship.”). However, Jennings is not alleging that St. Luke’s failed to accommodate her

Groff v. DeJoy, __ U.S. __, 143 S. Ct. 2279, 2295 (2023) (clarifying the undue hardship test

under Title VII and declining to simply adopt ADA case law for the Title VII analysis).

5 St. Luke’s further argues that allowing the religiously exempt employees to receive the

premium discount would have caused an undue hardship because of the additional cost

associated, approximately $550,000. Though an accommodation may sometimes constitute an

undue hardship on an employer as a matter of law, see Webb v. City of Philadelphia, 562 F.3d

256, 258 (3d Cir. 2009), here, it is not clear as a matter of law that the approximated cost to

St. Luke’s would fit the bill, particularly considering that St. Luke’s was already providing

approximately $18 million in premium discounts to its other vaccinated or medically exempt

employees. Additionally, because the undue hardship analysis is a fact-specific inquiry,

St. Luke’s argument is premature at the motion to dismiss stage. See Miller v. Tithonus Tyrone,

L.P., No. 3:20-cv-31, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75429, at *12 (W.D. Pa., April 29, 2020)

(explaining that a plaintiff is not required at the pleading stage to show that the accommodation

was not unduly burdensome).

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religious needs by refusing to grant her the premium discount; she is alleging that St. Luke’s

rendered her religious accommodation to the vaccine requirement “unreasonable” by forcing her

to pay an insurance premium increase and effectively reducing her net pay as a result. Further,

even accepting St. Luke’s argument that the premium discount was an “accommodation,”

Jennings is not required to show that she asked for a particular accommodation at the pleading

stage. See Miller v. Tithonus Tyrone, L.P., No. 3:20-cv-31, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75429, at *12

(W.D. Pa., April 29, 2020) (explaining that a plaintiff is not required at the pleading stage to

show that she asked for an accommodation).

Second, in light of the resultant financial burden placed on Jennings, the Court cannot

find as a matter of law that the vaccine accommodation was reasonable without additional fact

finding. Construing all of the facts in the light most favorable to Jennings, a reasonable fact

finder could conclude that the additional $1,100 yearly cost placed on Jennings as a result of

requesting a religious accommodation was a punishment by St. Luke’s for failing to comply with

the vaccine requirement that rendered the previously granted accommodation unreasonable.

* * *

Because Jennings has stated a plausible case of religious discrimination under both

theories of liability, St. Luke’s motion to dismiss is denied. Discovery will ultimately reveal

whether one or both theories will fit the facts of this case, and St. Luke’s premature defenses

may be more appropriately raised at a later date.

C. Class Action Certification

St. Luke’s argues that Jennings’ class action claims should be struck for two reasons.

First, a finding of commonality is precluded under Rule 23(a)(2) where each claim requires an

individualized inquiry into the sincerity of each class member’s religious beliefs. Second,

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Jennings cannot establish predominance or superiority for a Rule 23(b)(3) class. See Mot. p. 17.

However, the Court is not persuaded that striking the class allegations at this juncture would be

appropriate.

“Courts are generally reluctant to strike class action allegations before the parties have

the opportunity to engage in discovery or before a motion to certify is before the court.”

Woodard v. FedEx Freight E., Inc., 250 F.R.D. 178, 182 (M.D. Pa. 2008). “Nevertheless, a

district court will strike class action allegations without permitting discovery or waiting for a

certification motion where the complaint and any affidavits clearly demonstrate that the plaintiff

cannot meet the requirements for a class action.” Gould v. EEG, Inc., No. 3:17-77, 2018 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 246975, at *3 (M.D. Pa., Sept. 20, 2018) (citing Zarichny v. Complete Payment

Recovery Servs., 80 F. Supp. 3d 610, 615 (E.D. Pa. 2015)). The Third Circuit has, however,

cautioned against striking class action allegations prior to discovery, remarking that there are a

“rare few [cases] where the complaint itself demonstrates that the requirements for maintaining a

class action cannot be met.” See Landsman & Funk PC v. Skinder-Strauss Assocs., 640 F.3d 72,

93, n.30 (3d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).

Here, the record as presently developed does not clearly demonstrate that Jennings cannot

meet the requirements for a class action, nor does it allow the Court to conduct the “rigorous

analysis” required to thoroughly evaluate the Rule 23 factors. See In re Hydrogen Peroxide

Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 318 (3d Cir. 2008). Therefore, St. Luke’s request to strike

Jennings’ class action claims is denied without prejudice. St. Luke’s may renew its arguments if

and when Jennings moves for class certification.

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V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Motion to Dismiss is denied and St. Luke’s request to

strike class action allegations is denied without prejudice. A separate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Joseph F. Leeson, Jr._________

JOSEPH F. LEESON, JR.

United States District Judge

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