SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION v. CAMMARATA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

:

: CIVIL ACTION

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE :

COMMISSION, :

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : No. 21-cv-4845

:

CAMMARATA, et al., :

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM

August 31, 2023

I. INTRODUCTION

The United States Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Commission”) seeks

summary judgment as to the liability of Defendant Joseph Cammarata (“Cammarata”) for: (1)

violating Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5(b) thereunder, 17

C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (Count I); and (2) violating Section 20(e) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.

§ 78t(e) (Count II). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant the Commission’s Motion

and enter judgment against Cammarata as to his liability on Counts I and II.

II. BACKGROUND

Collateral estoppel looms large in this case and, accordingly, the facts are largely drawn

from the record in the parallel criminal case, United States v. Cammarata, No. 21-CR-427-CFK

(E.D. Pa.) (“Criminal Case”). The Court notes that there is substantial overlap between the

evidence submitted in the criminal trial and the nearly 900 pages of evidence submitted with the

Commission’s motion (including trial transcripts). Cammarata points to no additional evidence.

A. Key Individuals and Entities

Cammarata is a seasoned securities professional who spent approximately three decades in

the brokerage business. Oct. 25, 2022 Crim. Tr. 111:21–25. Since approximately 1991, he has: (1)

been a trader; (2) worked at brokerage firm; (3) owned brokerage firms; and (4) sold trading

technology to brokerage firms. Id. at 12:1, 13:19–20, 112:2–11. To name just a few of

Cammarata’s legitimate accomplishments, he: (1) was the head trader of the fourth-largest online

brokerage firm (id. at 13:23–25); (2) founded a trading company to develop a system that aided

some of the largest broker-dealers in aggregating market data (id. at 14:7–8, 15:14–16); (3) was

the youngest Managing Director of The Bank of New York (id. at 20:8–9, 20:18–19); and (4) sold

his trading technology for $31 million (id. at 44:1–5). Suffice it to say, Cammarata understands

the securities market, and the relevant laws and regulations governing it, all too well. See id. at

111:13–21.

Erik Cohen (“Cohen”) met Cammarata in the early 2000s and the two went into business

together in approximately 2008. Oct. 20, 2022 Crim. Tr. at 203:10–204:9. The two worked

together on several ventures; most notably, they were partners at AlphaPlus. Id. at 197:14–18.

Cohen’s background is in technology assistance. Oct. 25, 2022 Crim. Tr. at 23:2 –24:6. Cohen

also used the alias “Eric Knowles” during the course of the scheme (described infra). Id. at 203:3–

4.

David Punturieri1 (“Punturieri”) met Cammarata in 2009 when Cammarata hired him to

perform administrative and operational work. Oct. 25, 2022 Crim. Tr. at 31:10–32:1. Punturieri

1 Collectively, Cammarata, Cohen, and Punturieri are referred to as “Defendants.”

was also a partner at AlphaPlus. Oct. 20, 2022 Crim. Tr.. at 197:14–18. Punturieri used the alias

“Paul Delfino” during the course of the scheme.2 Oct. 20, 2022 Crim. Tr. at 203:5–6.

AlphaPlus was founded in approximately 2014 and, in relevant part, was owned and

operated by Cammarata, Cohen, and Punturieri. Oct. 25, 2022 Crim. Tr. at 47:11–50:3. AlphaPlus

is a securities class action settlement recovery service, also referred to as a claims aggregator,

meaning that it assisted clients in collecting proceeds recovered in connection with securities class

actions or enforcement actions brought by the Commission. See Oct. 20, 2022 Crim. Tr. at 197:23–

199:16. Cammarata’s industry expertise was pivotal to AlphaPlus’ success. Oct. 25, 2022 Crim.

Tr. at 51:9–52:12.

Quartis Trade & Invest Inc.3 (“Quartis”), Nimello Holdings Limited4 (“Nimello”), and

Inversiones Invergasa5 SAS (“Invergasa”) (collectively, “Sham Clients”) are off-shore shell

companies—they never engaged in any business and, importantly, they never made any securities

trades. Oct. 20, 2022 Crim. Tr. at 217:10–219:7, 239:7–240:10; Oct. 19, 2022 Crim. Tr. at 137:11–

17; 140:2–13. Defendants acquired or controlled the Sham Clients because they were foreign

entities that were in existence when the relevant trades (upon which they made claims) were made.

See, e.g., Oct. 20, 2022 Crim. Tr. at 217:10–219:7. Despite their shared ownership, the Sham

Clients purported to be independent clients of AlphaPlus. Id. By submitting claims on behalf of

2 Cammarata also called Punturieri “little brother” because Punturieri was prone to making

mistakes. Oct. 24, 2022 Crim. Tr. at 14:14–21.

3 Steven Dickenson played the role of Quartis’ Director. Oct. 19, 2022 Crim. Tr. at 135:23–

136:1.

4 Todd Callender was “the client” for Nimello. Oct. 19, 2022 Crim. Tr. at 153:1–7.

5 Juan Pablo Gomez stood in as the client for Invergasa. Oct. 20, 2022 Crim. Tr. at 239:9–

12.

the Sham Clients through AlphaPlus, Cammarata, Cohen, and Punturieri collectively received

approximately $40 million in settlement proceeds.

SpeedRoute LLC (“SpeedRoute”) is a registered broker-dealer and, from 2010 to 2018,

Cammarata was its President and CEO. SpeedRoute is a conduit for its clients; it fills orders in the

market in its own name, on a fully disclosed basis,6 but it does so on behalf of its clients and

“never” on behalf of SpeedRoute. Oct. 21, 2022 Crim. Tr. at 265:6–24; see also Oct. 20, 2022

Crim. Tr. 23:2–28:7, 30:5–17, 34:3–42:25. In other words, SpeedRoute does not hold positions in

securities for itself. See Oct. 20, 2022 Crim. Tr. 7:10–15:22. SpeedRoute is “an agency-only

broker-dealer” meaning that it “only services broker-dealer clients” rather than individual clients.

Oct. 21, 2022 Crim. Tr. at 265:6–24. The trades SpeedRoute facilitated, on behalf of other large

broker-dealers, accounted for approximately one percent of trades made on the market each day.

Id. at 215:16–21. Accordingly, SpeedRoute clients were likely to be implicated in every major

securities class action and be entitled to proceeds of related settlement awards. Id. Quartis,

Nimello, and Invergasa were never customers of SpeedRoute. See, e.g., id. at 213:23–218:9.

B. Claims Process Generally

Following a settlement in a securities class action or an enforcement action brought by the

Commission, a settlement fund is set aside for distribution to those investors who made qualifying

trades during the class period. Oct. 19, 2022 Crim. Tr. at 57:9–58:25; Oct. 20, 2022 Crim. Tr. at

6 Trading on a “fully disclosed basis” means that the beneficial owner of the underlying trade

is known and disclosed to the clearing firm. Conversely, an “omnibus” trading structure is a

situation in which multiple individuals are associated with one account and the clearing firm does

not have the underlying information as to which specific individual is benefiting from the trade.

See, e.g., Oct. 20., 2022 Crim. Tr. at 16:1–10.

198:10–199:5. The funds are often held, at least in part, in money market funds (i.e., securities7).

ECF No. 260-7 ¶ 25. Potential class members submit supporting documentation, such as brokerage

statements, to the distribution fund administrator (the “administrator”), which then determines if

the investor made a qualifying trade during the class period. The class members can be individuals,

or they can be companies such as banks, hedge funds, and pension funds. Oct. 19, 2022 Crim. Tr.

at 59:4–13; Oct. 20, 2022 Crim. Tr. at 50:14–52:15. Once a class member has shown that they are

entitled to an award from the settlement fund, the administrator will distribute a prorated portion

of the settlement fund8 to the class member based on the percentage of shares the class member

held as compared to the total impacted shares. Oct. 19, 2022 Crim. Tr. at 60:12–15; Oct. 20, 2022

Crim. Tr. at 50:14–52:15. The natural consequence of the prorated payments is that if an

illegitimate claim is paid out, it lowers the amount of money that is available to be awarded to

legitimate class members. Oct. 19, 2022 Crim. Tr. at 103:23–104:2; Oct. 20, 2022 Crim. Tr. at

50:14–51:17.

In some instances, independent third-party institutions, such as claims aggregators, will file

claims on behalf of impacted individuals or entities (often large financial institutions that traded

in significant volumes). Oct. 19, 2022 Crim. Tr. at 60:16–61:22. In such scenarios, third-party

filers handle the many logistics of verifying voluminous claims for major traders with

administrators in exchange for a portion of the proceeds or a fee. See Oct. 20, 2022 Crim. Tr. at

54:16 –22. This can be a time-consuming endeavor because the administrator must verify the

7 See, e.g., Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 528 F. Supp. 1038, 1040–41, n.3

(S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff’d 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982); see S.E.C. v. Fife, 311 F.3d 1, 5, 11 (1st Cir.

2002); Kenneth Rothschild Tr. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 199 F. Supp. 2d 993, 999 (C.D.

Cal. 2002); see also United States v. Wosotowsky, 527 Fed. App’x 207, 211 (3d Cir. 2013).

8 If the settlement fund was held in securities, the securities will be liquidated in order to

provide the prorated payment. ECF No. 260-7 ¶ 25.

information provided by third-party filers to: (i) ensure that the filer has authorization to submit

the claim on behalf of their client; (ii) note the underlying beneficial owner (i.e., the one who has

the rights to the underlying shares); (iii) confirm that the trading volume for the specific day is not

less than the claim being made9 (i.e., volume checks); (iv) cross-check that the stock was trading

at the purchase price the claimant alleges (i.e., price checks); and (v) collect basic tax forms to

ensure that the entity or individual is legitimate. Oct. 19, 2022 Crim. Tr. at 61:6–63:4.

Additionally, third-party filers will include an attestation that the trade data they are providing is

accurate and that they have permission to submit the claim. Id. at 70:7–14; Oct. 20, 2022 Crim.

Tr. at 207:13–208:2. These checks and balances are necessary because administrators do not have

particularized data as to every single trade made, and by whom, on specific days. Oct. 19, 2022

Crim. Tr. at 72:4–11.

C. Defendants Submitted False Claims on Behalf of Sham Clients

As a claims aggregator, AlphaPlus created a system through which it could efficiently file

claims on behalf of class members for a percentage of the award (usually ten to thirty percent).

Oct. 20, 2022 Crim. Tr. at 199:7–21. To make their efforts worthwhile, AlphaPlus sought out large

clients, i.e., entities that traded in large volumes, so as to maximize AlphaPlus’ percentage of the

award. Id. Initially, AlphaPlus operated as a legitimate claims aggregator servicing clients who

were entitled to the relevant settlement funds. Id. at 211:4–7.

Eventually, however, Cammarata devised a scheme in which AlphaPlus used trade data

acquired through SpeedRoute to file fraudulent claims on behalf of the Sham Clients. Id. at 214:9–

16. Though the scheme was technical, it was not necessarily complex: AlphaPlus submitted claims

9 In other words, if a claim came in for more trades than were actually made on the specific

day, it would indicate that the trades were not actually made, and the claim is illegitimate.

to administrators on behalf of the Sham Clients by exploiting SpeedRoute’s trade data, falsifying

supporting documentation, and role-playing as independent broker-dealers. Indeed, Defendants

made claims based upon SpeedRoute’s trade data which confirmed that some qualifying trades

were made via SpeedRoute (though not by the Sham Clients). Administrators could not

independently confirm that particular entities or individuals made the specific trades and therefore

relied upon independent third parties (such as AlphaPlus) to verify the same. Unbeknownst to the

administrators, AlphaPlus was not an independent third party because it was owned and operated

by Defendants, who also owned and operated the Sham Clients. Indeed, when administrators

sought trade verification or additional information, Defendants or others involved in the scheme

pretended to be representatives of the third-party entities by lying, using aliases, creating fake

email addresses, or similar. This scheme was both effective and lucrative; between the three Sham

Clients, Defendants pocketed over $40 million dollars by way of over 400 class action settlement

funds. Id. at 234:6–20. Moreover, the proceeds of at least 130 settlement funds were escrowed in

securities and subsequently liquidated to pay the Sham Clients’ fraudulent claims. ECF No. 260-

7 ¶ 25; ECF No. 260-9 ¶¶ 3–4; ECF No. 260-10 ¶¶ 3–4; ECF No. 260-11 ¶¶ 4–7; ECF No. 260-

12 ¶¶ 4–5; ECF No. 260-13 ¶¶ 3–6; ECF No. 260-14 ¶¶ 4–7; ECF No. 260-15 ¶¶ 4–6.

The inner workings of the scheme were “by design,” and Cammarata was the mastermind.

See, e.g., Oct. 20, 2022 Crim. Tr. at 249:10–14. Initially, Cammarata told Cohen and Punturieri

that the claims were being filed on his behalf because he “owned” SpeedRoute’s trade data in his

role as its owner, CEO, and President. Id. at 214:20–215:8. However, when Punturieri and Cohen

prepared to file the claims, Cammarata instructed them to use the Sham Clients and fabricate the

necessary documentation rather than actually filing on his behalf. See id. at 215:24–216:24,

218:16–25. Then, notwithstanding that the Sham Clients never made any of the relevant trades (or

ever engaged in trading of any kind), AlphaPlus submitted claims to administrators. See id. at

217:2–7. These claims were accompanied by false securities trading records, fabricated trade data

attestation letters, and fake client agreements. See, e.g., id. at 215:22–221:13. Once successfully

processed, Defendants collected on the claims, received checks from administrators, and split the

entire award between those involved.10 Id. at 223:25–224:9; 224:14–226:1.

Defendants, including Cammarata, had been in the claim aggregation business for years,

and they knew the information that administrators might request. See id. at 230:20–24. Indeed,

Cammarata used his industry expertise to carefully choreograph the scheme. Id. at 231:3–9

(“Anything besides a basic question would be sent to [Cammarata] for his response . . . [t]ypically,

[Cammarata] would draft a response, and then [Punturieri] or [Cohen] would send it along to the

claims administrators.”). For example, Cammarata knew that administrators would have more

difficulty verifying foreign entities—thus, Defendants selected overseas companies as the Sham

Clients. Id. at 232:17–22. Cammarata even went so far as to identify individuals to play the role

of “clients” who could speak with administrators to the extent necessary. Id. at 219:13–25.

However, when administrators requested to connect with the client, those individuals were not

actually looped in. Instead, Defendants created and used fake email addresses to pose as the

“client” when communicating with administrators.11 See id. at 254:11–25. Cammarata also

directed Defendants to create fake websites for the Sham Clients to bolster their legitimacy and

fend off suspicions. See, e.g., Oct. 20, 2022 Crim. Tr. at 231:16–24. Most crucially, Cammarata

10 There was no need to collect only a portion of the award because there was no real client

to whom the majority of the award should be distributed.

11 Indeed, Steven Dickenson (the purported “director” of Nimello) testified at trial that he

never used the email address at issue, never received the relevant correspondence, and never wrote

the emails supposedly sent by him. Oct. 19, 2022 Crim. Tr. at 142:6–144:15.

used his control over broker-dealers (SpeedRoute and Levelx12) to masquerade as an independent

third party that could verify the Sham Client’s purported trades. Id. at 248:23–249:20. Indeed,

Cammarata made phone calls to administrators to validate the Sham Clients’ claims. ECF No. 260-

5 at 27, 40. In sum, Cammarata wove a technical web of lies based on his industry expertise that

took many years to untangle. 13

D. The Scheme Unravels

Despite Cammarata’s carefully laid plans, administrators eventually caught on. Indeed, two

different entities investigated the Sham Clients’ claims, determined that they were fraudulent, and

reached out to law enforcement. Cammarata, as a self-proclaimed “fixer,”14 scrambled to find a

way out as the walls closed in.

i. Strategic Claims

In late 2019, one administrator, Strategic Claims Services (“Strategic Claims”), conducted

an audit of AlphaPlus because their submissions were suspicious in several respects. See Oct. 19,

12 Defendants collectively own Levelx Capital LLC, a registered broker-dealer. ECF No. 3

¶¶ 8–11.

13 The above-described misstatements only scratch the surface. For example, Invergasa

purported to clear its trades through Cor Clearing—but it did not. Oct. 20, 2022 Crim. Tr. at 19:4–

15. Similarly, Nimello and Quartis purported to clear their trades through ICBC, by way of

SpeedRoute. Though SpeedRoute was a client of ICBC, it traded on a fully disclosed basis, and,

accordingly, ICBC would necessarily have record of Nimello and Quartis as the beneficial owners

of the trades. See Oct. 20, 2022 Crim. Tr. at 25:12–28:7. ICBC has no such records. Id. Moreover,

all three Sham Clients also purported to clear through APEX Clearing, via SpeedRoute. APEX did

not provide clearing services for SpeedRoute and has no record of the Sham Clients. Oct. 20, 2022

Crim. Tr. at 39:16–40:18. Defendants also listed Cammarata as a contact for ICBC and Apex,

though he never worked for either firm. See, e.g., Oct. 20, 2022 Crim. Tr. at 41:24–42:5. AlphaPlus

also falsely claimed that Invergasa was a customer of Levelx (or its predecessor) and that Quartis

and Nimello were customers of SpeedRoute and OES Market Group. See, e.g., Oct. 21, 2022 Crim.

Tr. at 257:21–258:1; 268:12–23; 269:5–11; ECF No. 3. None of these assertions were true, but

Cammarata’s expertise made them believable.

14 See, e.g., Oct. 25, 2022 Crim. Tr. at 11:19–20.

2022 Crim. Tr. at 88:18–21. First, AlphaPlus submitted more claims than any other entity,

including major financial institutions. Id. at 79:14–80:12. Second, Strategic Claims discovered

several instances where the trading volume was higher than average—even impossibly so. Id. at

80:23–81:11. Third, the AlphaPlus claims wholly ignored adjustments that should have been made

for stock splits—which would normally be reflected in claim submissions. Id. at 81:12–20. Fourth,

AlphaPlus submitted claims related to an Initial Public Offering (“IPO”) that had a negative

beginning balance, i.e., a “short” position, which is nearly impossible. Id. at 82:1–7. Fifth, the

mailing addresses used by both AlphaPlus and the Sham Clients were UPS stores or P.O. boxes—

this was highly unusual for major financial institutions. Id. at 80:13–22.

Upon review, Strategic Claims determined that the claims submitted by AlphaPlus were

likely fraudulent and would be rejected unless AlphaPlus submitted corroborating documents. Id.

at 82:10–85:22. Though AlphaPlus attempted to provide such information, including by involving

Cammarata (posing as a representative of SpeedRoute, ICBC, and APEX15), providing trading

information for clearing firms that did not exist, and submitting fabricated documents, Strategic

Claims was not swayed. Id. at 86:12–93:17; 100:4–24. Ultimately, Strategic Claims provided

relevant documentation to law enforcement. Id. at 103:7–15.

ii. Dan Dearden’s Investigation

In fall 2020, Dan Dearden (“Dearden”), a financial crimes investigator at Computershare,

began investigating AlphaPlus. Oct. 20, 2022 Crim. Tr. at 46:15–19; 55:7–14. Dearden oversees

any suspicious activity for all Computershare business lines including, inter alia, its class action

claims administration division (KCC). Id. at 46:22–49:14. AlphaPlus submitted a claim on behalf

15 See, e.g., Oct. 20, 2022 Crim. Tr. at 42:1–15.

of Nimello, which KCC rejected for lack of documentation. Id. at 58:6–13. AlphaPlus then

submitted documents to “verify” the trades that were obviously doctored, and KCC elevated the

matter to Dearden. Id. at 58:6–20. Dearden was then tasked with validating the claims. In doing

so, he sent the trade information for all Sham Clients to their purported brokers (i.e., SpeedRoute

for Nimello and Quartis and Gentem Capital for Invergasa). Id. at 58:1–60:12, 71:25–72:17, 74:3–

8.

However, SpeedRoute could not validate the trades purportedly made by Nimello or

Quartis and, even more damningly, indicated that the reports furnished by AlphaPlus did not

comport with SpeedRoute’s standard business practices. Id. at 72:25–73:6. Additionally, Dearden

called AlphaPlus to speak with Paul Delfino (who did not exist) and was instead directed to

Punturieri. Punturieri then directed Dearden to Alex Vlastakis at SpeedRoute to validate the

Nimello and Quartis trades. Id. at 101:8–102:13. Vlastakis was unable to do so. Dearden also

connected with someone claiming to be the Director of Nimello, but his questions went

unanswered. Id. at 149:16–165:3. Accordingly, Dearden deduced that the trades were not valid

and the Nimello and Quartis claims were rejected. Id. at 72:25–73:6, 75:1–5, 103:21–106:13.

Additionally, Dearden quickly alerted federal authorities to the fraudulent claims and, at the FBI’s

instruction, began recording relevant telephone calls16 as he sought to verify the Invergasa claims.

Id. at 80:9–14.

Dearden kept pulling at the strings of AlphaPlus, Nimello, Quartis, and Invergasa and soon

realized that they all tied back to Cammarata. For example, Dearden called Gentem Capital

(“Gentem”) where he was referred to someone named “Chris.” Id. at 83:9–85:11. However, it was

16 Many of these recordings were introduced at trial.

not Chris who spoke on Gentem’s behalf but Cammarata. Id. at 86:7–89:19. Because Dearden

understood Cammarata to be a representative of Gentem, Dearden sent a series of questions to

Cammarata regarding discrepancies and peculiarities related to the Invergasa claims.17 Id. at 91:8–

93:23. Then, Cammarata, purportedly speaking on behalf of Gentem, connected Dearden with Juan

Paublo Gomez at Invergasa. Gomez, in turn, identified Cammarata as his point of contact at

AlphaPlus rather than at Gentem. Oct. 20, 2022 Crim. Tr. at 168:2–175:4. This was significant

because Cammarata had previously represented that he was not affiliated with AlphaPlus and,

moreover, Dearden knew Cammarata to be the former CEO at SpeedRoute which was also

involved in the suspicious claims. Id. at 177:5–12. The full scope of Cammarata’s scheme was

then thrown into sharp relief. Id. (“[Cammarata] was trying to vouch for Nimello Holdings, as well

as Quartis, now Invergasa, so the whole circle was coming full circle.”).

iii. Cammarata’s Tell-Tale Heart

“I woke up in the middle of the night thinking about JAIL,” Cammarata wrote when claims

were not processed smoothly. ECF No. 260-5 at 260. His troubled sleep makes sense. Indeed,

Defendants knew that the scheme was entirely illegal all along. See Oct. 21, 2022 Crim. Tr. at

230:13 –16 (“By the time we got to Nimello, we fully understood what we were doing . . .”).

Accordingly, while Dearden’s investigation pressed on, Cammarata became increasingly

concerned. ECF No. 260-5 at 96 (“This is so serious and needs to be mitigated ASAP.”). At one

point, Defendants discussed bribing SpeedRoute employees to vouch for the trades and cover their

tracks. Oct. 21, 2022 Crim. Tr. at 113:23–114:12. Defendants also contemplated contacting

17 Following his calls with Dearden, Cammarata wrote to Cohen and Punturieri: “I think he

believed everything . . . this buys us a little bit of time. ECF No. 260-5 at 42. Punturieri was

relieved. “That gets me off the ledge for the time being,” he responded. Id. at 43.

Dearden’s supervisors to stifle his investigation. ECF No. 260-5 at 94–95. In their desperation,

Defendants also weighed going to Dearden’s home and bribing him with $1 million to drop the

investigation. Oct. 22, 2022 Crim. Tr. at 93:12–94:3; ECF No. 260-5 at 93. Finally, Defendants

discussed fleeing the country. Oct. 21, 2022 Crim. Tr. at 47:4–25 (Cohen describing the code word

“blue house” which represented Cammarata’s bright blue Bahamian home to which they would

flee if something went “critically wrong.”). Cammarata’s nightmare was realized when, in

November 2021, federal authorities raided the AlphaPlus office and Defendants’ homes.

III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Both this action and the Criminal Case have involved substantial motions practice,

hearings, postponements, and orders. Accordingly, the Court describes only the most relevant

procedural history here.

A. The Criminal Action

Cammarata was indicted on October 28, 2021, along with Cohen and Punturieri, and a

superseding indictment was returned on September 8, 2022. Punturieri and Cohen pled guilty to

conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and tax

evasion on October 13 and October 14, 2022, respectively. Crim. ECF Nos. 154, 164.

Cammarata’s trial commenced on October 19, 2022, and involved fourteen witnesses

called over six days and a significant volume of evidence introduced. Most notably, Cohen and

Punturieri testified for the Government and Cammarata testified in his own defense (for

approximately six hours). Through his testimony, Cammarata attempted to provide an innocent

explanation for the above-referenced scheme. Put simply, Cammarata claimed that he owned the

trades, they had been legitimately assigned to the Sham Clients, and, although Cohen and

Punturieri muddled the treatment of these claims, his and AlphaPlus’ conduct was not nefarious.

See, e.g., Oct. 25, 2023 Crim. Tr. at 53:7–12. Despite the alternative narrative Cammarata set forth

and the defense mounted by his highly-skilled counsel, on October 26, 2022, the jury returned a

verdict finding him guilty of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud (Count I); four counts of

wire fraud (Counts II–V); conspiracy to launder money (Count VI), and two counts of money

laundering (Counts XI–XII). Crim. ECF No. 194.

Following trial, Cammarata moved for a judgment of acquittal or, alternatively, a new trial.

Crim. ECF No. 264. The Court denied both motions on May 30, 2023. Crim. ECF No. 293–294.

On June 6, 2023, the Court sentenced Cammarata to ten years of incarceration and to monetary

liability totaling $48,020,572.65. Crim. ECF Nos. 306, 307. Cammarata’s appeal is presently

pending.18

B. The Civil Action

The Commission initiated this matter on November 3, 2021. ECF No. 1. That same day,

the Commission filed a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order Enjoining Violations of The

Federal Securities Laws, Freezing Assets, Granting Other Relief, and Order to Show Cause (the

“TRO”). ECF Nos. 2, 3. The Court entered the TRO on November 4, 2021 to preserve the status

quo of Defendants’ assets and prohibit the dissipation of the same. ECF No. 4. The TRO was

extended on December 3, 2021. ECF No. 38.

On January 11, 2022, counsel for the Commission and all Defendants appeared before the

Court to discuss the status of this case and an upcoming Preliminary Injunction hearing. ECF No.

18 A judgment is “deemed final for purposes of . . . collateral estoppel unless or until it is

reversed on appeal.” Adelphia Gateway, LLC v. Pa. Env. Hr’g Bd., 62 F.4th 819, 828 (3d Cir. 2023)

(quoting Shaeffer v. Smith, 673 A.2d 872, 874 (1996)).

64, 71. The next day, upon the representation that all parties (including Cammarata) agreed on the

matter, the Court entered a Preliminary Injunction Order that extended the relief set forth in the

TRO. ECF No. 66. Throughout the pendency of this case, the Court has liberally granted the release

of assets to pay legal fees, property maintenance expenses, cost of living expenses, and education

costs. See, e.g., ECF No. 179.

This case was stayed and placed in suspense to protect Cammarata’s Fifth Amendment

rights. Due to the stay, Cammarata has not answered the Complaint, nor have initial disclosures or

discovery been exchanged. Despite the stay, Cammarata, proceeding pro se, has enthusiastically

defended against the Commission’s claims and the Preliminary Injunction. Most relevant,

Cammarata filed a Motion to Dismiss which the Court denied. ECF Nos. 142, 162. The Court

lifted the stay in this case after Cammarata was sentenced in the criminal case. ECF No. 265.

The Commission now moves for summary judgment. ECF No. 260. Cammarata was served

with this motion,19 and he Responded on July 14, 2023. ECF No. 285. The Commission Replied

on July 26, 2023. ECF No. 289. This matter is now ripe for consideration.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a). Indeed, “[s]ummary judgment is appropriate when ‘the pleadings, depositions,

19 On July 7, 2023, the Court directed the Clerk’s Office to mail a copy of the Commission’s

Motion to Cammarata (notwithstanding that the Commission had previously done so). ECF No.

274. The Court has confirmed that the mailing address used and the location which the

Commission served Cammarata were both correct. Additionally, the Court has not heard

Cammarata complain that he has not received the Motion in nearly six weeks, despite his other

filings on the docket.

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.’” Wright v. Owens Corning, 679 F.3d 101, 105 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Orsatti

v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir. 1995)). A fact is “material” if it “might affect

the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

248 (1986). There is a genuine issue of material fact if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.

The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden “of informing the district

court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). Once the moving party has met this

burden, the non-moving party must counter with “‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine

issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)

(citation omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

The non-movant must show more than the “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” for

elements on which the non-movant bears the burden of production. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.

The non-movant opposing a motion for summary judgment may not “rely merely upon bare

assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions.” Fireman’s Ins. Co. v. DuFresne, 676 F.2d 965,

969 (3d Cir. 1982). Additionally, the non-moving party “cannot rely on unsupported allegations,

but must go beyond pleadings and provide some evidence that would show that there exists a

genuine issue for trial.” Jones v. United Parcel Serv., 214 F.3d 402, 407 (3d Cir. 2000). Moreover,

arguments made in briefs “are not evidence and cannot by themselves create a factual dispute

sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.” Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Lacey Twp.,

772 F.2d 1103, 1109–10 (3d Cir. 1985).

When determining the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, a court must “examine

the evidence of record in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, and

resolve all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” Wishkin v. Potter, 476 F.3d 180, 184 (3d

Cir. 2007). The court need only decide whether “a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the

plaintiff on the evidence presented.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. “Where the record taken as a

whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine

issue for trial’” and the court should grant summary judgment in favor of the moving party.

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

V. DISCUSSION

The Court will grant summary judgment against Cammarata on Count I (violation of

Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act) and Count II (violation of Section 20(e) of the Exchange Act).

A. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5

The Commission is entitled to summary judgment on Count I because of collateral estoppel

and because no reasonable jury could find that Cammarata did not commit securities fraud under

Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.

i. Legal Standard

Section 10(b) forbids the “use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any

security . . . [of] any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules

and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for

the protection of investors.” 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). S.E.C. Rule 10b-5 implements Section 10(b) by,

inter alia, declaring it unlawful to make “any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state

a material fact necessary in order to make the statement made, in the light of the circumstances

under which they were made, not misleading, . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of any

security.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b). Accordingly, to prevail on its claim under Section 10(b) and

Rule 10b-5(b) thereunder, the Commission must show that Defendant: (1) made a material

misrepresentation (or omission)20; (2) with scienter21; and (3) in connection with the purchase or

sale of securities.22 In re Aetna, Inc. Sec. Litig., 617 F.3d 272, 277 (3d Cir. 2010); see also GFL

Advantage Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 272 F.3d 189, 206 n.6 (3d Cir. 2001) (unlike private litigants, the

Commission is not required to prove either reliance or damages).

ii. Cammarata Made False Statements of Material Fact with Scienter

Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars “successive litigation of an issue of fact or

law actually litigated and resolved in a valid court determination, even if the issue recurs in the

context of a different claim.” Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008) (citations omitted). By

precluding parties from re-arguing matters that they have already had “full and fair opportunity to

litigate,” the doctrine “protect[s] against the expense and vexation attending multiple [actions],

20 Determining whether a misrepresentation is material is a fact-specific inquiry that asks

whether the misrepresentation “significantly alter[s] the ‘total mix’ of information made

available.” Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426

U.S. 438, 449 (1976)). Although materiality is frequently described as that which a “reasonable

investor” would consider important, this is so because of the facts underlying the case law that has

interpreted Section 10(b). While claims brought under Section 10(b) traditionally involve investors

who allege that stock prices were manipulated, that is not the only context in which a Section 10(b)

claim may be brought (discussed infra). Accordingly, the Court understands the materiality

requirement, in this specific context, to be fulfilled if an individual (here, the administrator) would

consider the fact important and altering the “total mix” of information available when deciding

whether to buy or sell securities.

21 Scienter “refers to a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”

Martin v. GNC Holdings, Inc., 757 Fed. App’x 151, 153 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Ernst & Ernst v.

Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976)).

22 Discussed infra.

conserve[s] judicial resources, and foste[rs] reliance on judicial action by minimizing the

possibility of inconsistent decisions.” Sturgell, 553 U.S. at 892 (internal citations omitted).

Collateral estoppel applies when: “(1) the issue sought to be precluded [is] the same as that

involved in the prior action; (2) that issue [was] actually litigated; (3) it [was] determined by a

final and valid judgment; and (4) the determination [was] essential to the prior judgment.” See,

e.g., Anderson v. C.I.R., 698 F.3d 160, 164 (3d Cir. 2012). As an equitable doctrine, collateral

estoppel generally only applies when the party against whom an estoppel is asserted (or those in

privity with the party) “had a full and fair opportunity to litigate” the underlying issue. S.E.C. v.

Teo, No. 04-CV-1815, 2009 WL 1684467, at *23 (D.N.J. June 12, 2009) (quoting Parkland

Hosiery Co., Inc., v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 328 (1979); Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. Univ.

of Illinois Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971)).

A criminal conviction “conclusively establishes the defendant’s civil liability” as to those

legal or factual issues that were resolved in the criminal proceeding. See Anderson, 698 F.3d at

164. For example, Defendants who are convicted of wire fraud are “precluded from contesting

most of the facts upon which the SEC relies in proving his liability under Section[] 10(b) . . . and

Rule 10b-5.” S.E.C. v. Chapman, No. 13-CV-5648, 2021 WL 199539, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 20,

2021). This rule rings true here, where there can be no dispute that “the criminal case covered the

same conduct during the same time frame at issue in this civil action [and] concerning the same

fraudulent scheme.” S.E.C. v. Paul, No. 16-CV-1326, 2023 WL 2562977, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 17,

2023). Indeed, collateral estoppel applies in the securities context as to any overlapping elements

between the civil case and related criminal conviction. See id.; see also S.E.C. v. Lazare Indus.,

294 Fed. App’x 711, 714–15 (3d Cir. 2008); S.E.C. v. Georgiou, No. 09-CV-0616, 2023 WL

2351692, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 2023); S.E.C. v. Parker, No. 15-CV-1535, 2020 WL 6899795, at

*1 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 24, 2020).

In relevant part, the jury convicted Cammarata of four counts of wire fraud under 18 U.S.C.

§ 1343. In doing so, the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Cammarata: (1) “knowingly

devised a scheme to defraud and to obtain money or property by materially false or fraudulent

pretenses, representations, or promises or willfully participated in such a scheme with knowledge

of its fraudulent nature”; (2) “acted with the intent to defraud”; and (3) used interstate wire

communications in furtherance of the scheme. Oct. 26, 2022 Crim. Tr. 147:11–154:14 (jury

instructions).

As to the first element, the Court instructed that the jury could not convict Cammarata

“unless all [jurors] agreed as to at least one of the material misrepresentations.” Id. at 149:14–15.

Additionally, the Court clarified that: (1) “a statement, representation, claim, or document is false

if it is untrue when made and if the person making the statement, representation, claim or

document, or causing it to be made, knew it was untrue at the time it was made”; (2) “a

representation or statement is fraudulent if it was falsely made with the intention to deceive”; and

(3) “a material fact is one . . . which would reasonably be expected to be of concern to a reasonable

and prudent person in relying upon the representation or statement in making a decision.” Id. at

149:16–150:13.

As to the second element, the Court provided that: (1) “to act with an intent to defraud

means to act knowingly and with the intention or the purpose to deceive and to cheat in order to

thereby obtain money, property, or something of value”; (2) the jury could “consider, among other

things, whether the defendant acted with the desire or purpose to bring about some gain or benefit

to himself or someone else or with a desire or purpose to cause some loss to someone.” Id. at

151:21–152:5.

These elements, which the United States proved beyond a reasonable doubt in the criminal

case, address the same issues as the first two elements of the Commission’s claim under Section

10(b) of the Exchange Act. Indeed, the first element of the securities fraud claim (that a defendant

made a material misrepresentation or omission) is encompassed within the first element of wire

fraud described above. The second element of the securities fraud claim (scienter) is encompassed

within the second element of wire fraud. Accordingly, the factual issues necessarily decided by

the jury in convicting Cammarata of four counts of wire fraud “conclusively establish [his] civil

liability” here, see Anderson, 698 F.3d at 164, and Cammarata is therefore “precluded from

contesting most of the facts upon which the SEC relies in proving liability under Section[] 10(b) .

. . and Rule 10b-5.” Chapman, 2021 WL 199539, at *5.

For the reasons described above, collateral estoppel bars Cammarata from re-litigating the

first two elements of the Commission’s claims under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5(b) and such

elements are established against Cammarata as a matter of law.23

23 It bears brief mention that the criminal jury, when confronted with a higher burden of proof

than would be required here, soundly and resolutely rejected Cammarata’s narrative. Cammarata

has claimed, and continues to claim, that the trades were “his” trades that he had simply assigned

to the Sham Clients. This fable was wholly uncorroborated by the evidence introduced at trial other

than Cammarata’s self-serving, bald assertions. Fireman’s Ins. Co. v. DuFresne, 676 F.2d 965,

969 (3d Cir. 1982) (The party opposing a motion for summary judgment may not “rely merely

upon bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions”). In addition to relying on the criminal

proceedings, the Commission attached to its motion nearly 900 pages of proffered evidence in the

form of sworn declarations, text messages, emails, phone call transcripts, and falsified documents.

Cammarata offers nothing other than the bald assertions that the criminal jury quickly rejected.

Thus, even if collateral estoppel did not apply, there is no genuine issue of material fact because

no reasonable jury could find for Cammarata on the first two elements of Count I.

iii. Cammarata’s Conduct Was Done in Connection with the Purchase or

Sale of Securities

As described by the Third Circuit, “[t]he Supreme Court has addressed the meaning of ‘in

connection with’ in two relevant opinions” related to securities transactions. Taksir v. Vangaurd

Grp., 903 F.3d 95, 97 (3d Cir. 2018). In the first case, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc.

v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71 (2006), the Court “embraced a seemingly broad interpretation of the phrase.”

Id. However, more recently, in Chadbourne & Parke L.L.P. v. Troice, 571 U.S. 377 (2014), the

Court asked “whether the meaning of ‘in connection with’ extends further than misrepresentations

that are material to the purchase or sale of a covered security” and concluded that it does not. Id.

(cleaned up). Accordingly, unless a fraudulent misrepresentation or omission is “material to a

decision by one or more individuals . . . to buy or sell a ‘covered security,’” it is not made “in

connection with” a securities transaction. Id. (quoting Troice, 571 U.S. at 397). However, the

Troice decision clarified, rather than modified, Dabit. Id. Thus, the Court must keep in mind both

Troice’s requirement that the material misrepresentation in some way induce the purchase or sale

of a security and Dabit’s broad interpretation of Section 10(b).24

24 The Court notes that prior to Troice, the “in connection with” requirement was exceedingly

flexible. For example, the Court previously observed the understanding that securities laws

prohibited “all fraudulent schemes in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, whether

artifices employed involve a garden type variety of fraud or present a unique form of deception.”

Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10 n.7 (1971) (quoting A.T.

Brod & Co v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2nd Cir. 1967). Accordingly, “[n]ovel or atypical methods

[of fraud] should not provide immunity from the securities laws.” Id. Later, the Court wrote that

the Exchange Act must be construed “not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate

[the Act’s] remedial purposes.” S.E.C. v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002) (quotations omitted).

The Court notes these cases because Troice did not overrule them but, instead, provided a limiting

principle to the broad interpretation of Section 10(b). See Taksir, 903 F.3d at 97. Indeed, two things

can be true: Section 10(b) can be interpreted flexibly and there must be some eventual stopping

point.

With these principles in mind, clearly, although Cammarata’s scheme was not the “garden

variety” type of securities fraud, it still violated securities law. The requirement articulated in

Troice, that the fraud be material to the decision to buy or sell securities is satisfied here, where

settlement funds that were held in escrow in money market accounts (which are securities) were

liquidated to pay Sham Clients based on Defendants’ fraudulent claims. ECF No. 260-7 ¶ 25; ECF

No. 260-9 ¶¶ 3–4; ECF No. 260-10 ¶¶ 3–4; ECF No. 260-11 ¶¶ 4–7; ECF No. 260-12 ¶¶ 4–5; ECF

No. 260-13 ¶¶ 3–6; ECF No. 260-14 ¶¶ 4–7; ECF No. 260-15 ¶¶ 4–6. The evidence leaves no

question that administrators, in at least 130 instances, liquidated securities because of and

subsequent to AlphaPlus’ fraudulent claims on behalf of Sham Clients, thereby depleting the

ownership interest in the relevant securities of both the administrators and the true class members.

There is no genuine issue of material fact on this point. Therefore, though Cammarata’s

sophisticated fraud may be atypical, his misrepresentations were—at least in some instances—

made in connection with the sale of securities. This holding involves both a flexible understanding

of the statute, as guided by Dabit, while still requiring that the fraud be material to someone’s

decision to purchase or sell securities, as mandated by Troice. For this reason, the final element of

Count I is satisfied.

However, the Court thinks it appropriate to describe all the ways in which Cammarata’s

scheme related to securities transactions more broadly. Put simply, Cammarata’s scheme did more

than “touch upon” securities transactions—it hinged upon them. Specifically: (i) the settlement

distribution funds existed because of securities class actions or enforcement actions by the

Securities and Exchange Commission; (ii) the settlement distribution funds were often held in

securities until they were liquidated and distributed to claimants; (iii) Cammarata obtained and

misused trade data about securities transactions; (iv) Cammarata only had access to such trade data

because of his role as an executive of a broker-dealer; (v) Defendants lied about who purchased

securities; (vi) Defendants lied about who sold securities; (vii) Defendants lied about the price of

securities purchased or sold; (viii) Defendants lied about the quantity of securities purchased or

sold; (ix) Defendants lied about which entities cleared trades; (x) Cammarata used his expertise of

the securities industry to guide AlphaPlus, by way of Cohen and Punturieri; (xi) Defendants

submitted phony records of securities trades, including falsified brokerage records that used

broker-dealers’ logos to bolster their believability; (xii) Cammarata exploited his position as an

executive of a broker-dealer to vouch for the fraudulent claims; (xiii) Sham Clients collected over

$40 million because of the fraudulent claims; and (xiv) the scheme had the effect of diminishing

the funds available for the actual victims of the underlying securities fraud.

Though the “in connection with” language of Section 10(b) may require something more

than any fraud that tangentially relates to a securities transaction, see Levine v. Diamanthuset, Inc.,

940 F.2d 1478, 1485 (9th Cir. 1991), that is not the case presented here. There was nothing

tangential about the role of securities transactions in Cammarata’s scheme and, moreover, its

success culminated, at least in part, in liquidating securities to pay out the fraudulent claims.

Indeed, securities transactions were at the very heart of Cammarata’s fraudulent activity.

Accordingly, there can be no question that Cammarata’s material representations were made in

connection with the purchase or sale of securities and no reasonable jury could find otherwise.

Thus, the final element of the Commission’s claim under Section 10(b) is satisfied and summary

judgment is appropriate.

B. Section 20(e)

Section 20(e) of the Exchange Act allows the Commission to pursue claims against “any

person that knowingly or recklessly provides substantial assistance to another person in violation

of a provision of [the Act], or any rule or regulation issued [thereunder].” 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e).

Accordingly, to establish its claim against Defendant for aiding and abetting securities law

violations, the Commission must show: “(1) the existence of a securities law violation by the

primary (as opposed to the aiding and abetting) party; (2) ‘knowledge’ of this violation on the part

of the aider and abettor; and (3) ‘substantial assistance’ by the aider and abettor in the achievement

of the primary violation.” SEC v. Apuzzo, 689 F.3d 204, 206 (2d Cir. 2012).

First, there can be no genuine dispute that AlphaPlus violated securities law and

Cammarata is precluded from arguing otherwise.25 Additionally, Cohen has admitted liability

under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act for this scheme. ECF No. 279. Thus, the first element of

Count II is satisfied by the securities law violations of either AlphaPlus or Cohen. Second, put

simply, Cammarata had actual knowledge of the fraud. As discussed, supra, Cammarata was the

25 Cammarata, in defending against the criminal charges, fully litigated the issue of whether

his jointly owned company, AlphaPlus, filed fraudulent claims on behalf of Sham Clients. Though

the Commission has not moved for summary judgment against AlphaPlus, the Court notes that

collateral estoppel applies with equal force against AlphaPlus. “[C]ourts frequently find privity

between a corporate entity and its controlling owner” where the party to the previous litigation

adequately represented interests that are the same as those of the nonparty. Reach Commc’n

Specialists, Inc. v. Williams, No. 13-CV-2388, 2023 WL 1967940, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 2023)

(collecting cases). While this rule more frequently applies to bind individuals to prior litigation

involving a corporation, it also works in the reverse. See id. Indeed, collateral estoppel extends to

“binding a corporation to the findings of a previous criminal proceeding against an owner or

controlling shareholder.” Id. (emphasis added). Cammarata, along with Cohen and Punturieri,

owned and controlled AlphaPlus. Ruta Decl. ¶ 12; Oct. 20, 2022 Crim. Tr. at 197:14–22; 200:8–

14. Accordingly, there is privity between Cammarata and AlphaPlus. Cammarata’s wire fraud

therefore has the same preclusive effect on AlphaPlus as it does on Cammarata.

Additionally, Cohen and Punturieri, pled guilty to, inter alia, conspiracy to commit wire

fraud, the elements of which are: (1) two or more people agreed to commit wire fraud; (2)

Defendants were members of that agreement; and (3) Defendants shared a unity of purpose and

the intent to achieve a common goal. United States v. Rankin, 870 F.2d 109, 113 (3d Cir. 1989).

In pleading guilty, both Cohen and Punturieri admitted to the scheme in which they knowingly

submitted false claims through AlphaPlus. As Cohen and Punturieri also owned and controlled

AlphaPlus, their admissions similarly have a preclusive effect.

mastermind behind the scheme and all Defendants were entirely aware of its illegality. Indeed,

Cammarata is precluded from arguing otherwise based on collateral estoppel principles and his

wire fraud convictions. Additionally, the overwhelming evidence attached to the Commonwealth’s

Motion leaves no genuine question as to Cammarata’s knowledge. Third, the evidence clearly

demonstrates that Cammarata substantially assisted in AlphaPlus’ fraud and, by extension, that of

Cohen. Other courts have held that, to prove this element, the Commission must show that the

defendant “in some sort associated himself with the [fraudulent] venture, that the defendant

participated in it as in something that he wished to bring about, and that he sought by his action to

make it succeed.” Apuzzo, 689 F.3d at 212–13 (cleaned up).26 The evidence submitted by the

Commission clearly demonstrates his substantial assistance in aiding AlphaPlus’ and Cohen’s

securities law violations. For example, Cammarata did the following, among other things: (i) aided

in setting up off-shore shell companies; (ii) acquired the relevant trade data from SpeedRoute; (iii)

drafted emails to be sent by Cohen and Punturieri27; and (iv) vouched for the trades as a purportedly

independent broker-dealer. Accordingly, there is no genuine dispute that Cammarata aided and

abetted in AlphaPlus’ and Cohen’s securities law violations. For these reasons, summary judgment

is appropriate against Cammarata on Count II.

26 This standard, which is borrowed from Judge Learned Hand’s “canonical formulation” for

proving that a criminal defendant has aided and abetted in the commission of a crime makes good

sense here. See Rosemond v. U.S., 572 U.S. 65, 76 (2014).

27 One who drafts a statement that is ultimately “made” by another person in furtherance of a

securities law violation is squarely within the scope of Section 20(e). Janus Cap. Grp., Inc. v. First

Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135, 144 (2011) (“[T]he maker of a statement is the entity with

[ultimate] authority over the content of the statement and whether and how to communicate it”

rather than the individual who drafted the statement, accordingly, the “maker” is liable under

Section 10(b) and the “drafter” is considered an aider and abettor under Section 20(e).).

VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court will enter judgment in favor of the Commission

and against Cammarata as to his liability on both Counts I and II. The parties may submit a

proposed scheduling order to address the issue of damages. An appropriate order follows.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Chad F. Kenney

CHAD F. KENNEY, JUDGE