WILLIAMS v. SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

LEROY WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION

v. NO. 22-3313

SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELHIA,

Defendant.

PAPPERT, J. May 12, 2023

MEMORANDUM

Leroy Williams has long worked as a counselor for the School District of

Philadelphia. In December of 2020, one of his female colleagues, Jennifer Barbo,

accused Williams of sexually harassing her. Williams is black; Barbo white. Pursuant

to a process that had been in place for at least four years, the District required Williams

to report each day to a designated “reassignment room” while it investigated the

allegations against him. The use of the reassignment room while an employee is under

investigation for sexual harassment was agreed to between the District and the

Philadelphia Federation of Teachers. Taking out the periods of time during the Covid-

19 pandemic where Williams worked virtually from home, he reported in person to the

reassignment room for roughly six months.

While under investigation, Williams received full pay and benefits. He was

never suspended, his title never changed and he retained his seniority with the District.

The conditions of his employment and his daily responsibilities were altered; Williams

contends he did “nothing” except sit around all day on a “hard chair” in a dirty, poorly

ventilated, windowless room. At the conclusion of a lengthy, “multi-level” investigation,

the District found that Williams engaged in conduct that was inappropriate and

offensive, but did not rise to the level of unlawful discrimination or harassment on the

basis of sex. Williams received only a written warning that, pursuant to the Collective

Bargaining Agreement between the District and teachers’ union, was placed in his

personnel file for eighteen months. He returned to his regular duty station.

Williams subsequently filed this lawsuit against the District asserting claims of

racial and gender discrimination and retaliation under Title VII and racial

discrimination and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The District moved for

summary judgment on all claims. Williams did not contest the motion with respect to

the retaliation or § 1981 claims and at oral argument agreed that the Court should

enter judgment in the District’s favor on both of them. (Hr’g Tr. 2:25—3:19.)

After reviewing the parties’ submissions and holding oral argument, the Court

grants the motion with respect to the remaining claims and enters judgment for the

District. Williams did not suffer an adverse employment action. While his

reassignment was for a longer period of time than Williams cared to endure, it was still

temporary and lacked the hallmarks of a “serious and tangible” action. Even if the

reassignment could constitute an adverse employment action, nothing in the record

presents a jury question as to whether Williams’s race or gender played any role in the

District’s decision to follow the established and agreed upon practice of reassigning an

employee pending an investigation of alleged misconduct. The only record evidence

Williams points to under his preferred “cat’s paw” theory is that he was alleged to have

called his accuser “thick for a white girl,” something he denies saying. But that alleged

comment, whether Williams denied making it or not, does not allow a jury to infer that

Barbo’s allegations give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination or that the

reassignment was pretext for illegal discrimination.

I

A

Williams concedes the entirety of the Defendant’s statement of facts; none of the

following is in dispute. (Hr’g Tr. 36:25–37:10.) Barbo accused Williams of sexually

harassing her on November 30, 2020 in a December 1 complaint she filed with the

District’s Office of Employee and Labor Relations. (Ex. 4.) Barbo and Williams were

both counselors at Furness High School; Williams was the lead counselor and Barbo

worked with him. (Ex. 1 7:17–21; Ex. 10 at Request 10.) Barbo’s complaint alleged

Williams made various comments to her at work, including “[d]epressed?! But you’re

too fine to be depressed;” “[y]ou’re thick for a white girl;” and “[t]he boys must love you.”

(Ex. 4.)

After receiving Barbo’s complaint, the Office of Employee and Labor Relations

conducted a brief investigation to determine whether the allegations required

Williams’s reassignment pending their formal review. (Ex. 8 ¶¶12–14.) Traci Gardner,

a District labor relations officer, interviewed Barbo on December 3, 2020. (Ex. 13.)

Based on this interview and the nature of the allegations, Ronak Chokshi, Interim

Deputy of the ELR office, temporarily removed Williams from Furness and assigned

him to the District’s reassignment room on December 11. (Ex. 8 ¶ 12.) Mr. Chokshi

notified Williams of his reassignment by letter, writing:

[Y]ou are to be removed from your regular assignment

pursuant to outcome of an investigation and disciplinary

process. Therefore, pending completion of the disciplinary

process, you are temporarily reassigned to The Education

Center at 440 North Broad Street. You are to report to room

3068A, 3rd floor, Portal A. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic,

you are not required to physically report to The Education

Center at this time.

(Ex. 11.) Williams reported to the reassignment room virtually from December 11

through the end of the school year, and in person from the start of the 2021–2022 school

year until February 22, 2022, when the investigation was complete. (Ex. 11; Ex. 1

36:3–11; Ex. 26.)

The District has utilized the “reassignment room” as a temporary assignment for

employees accused of misconduct posing a risk to students or staff since at least 2016.

(Ex. 8 ¶ 6.) Employees assigned to the room remain there while allegations against

them are investigated. If the allegations are deemed unfounded or otherwise not

supported, employees are returned to their appointed or permanent assignments; if the

reports have merit, disciplinary action is taken. (Ex. 8 ¶ 7.)

In the case of a sexual harassment allegation, it is standard for the District to

remove and reassign an alleged perpetrator. (Ex. 9 34:11–20.) Use of the reassignment

room is an agreed upon practice between the teachers’ union and the District, and the

process is specifically outlined in their Collective Bargaining Agreement. (Ex. 8 ¶¶ 8–9;

Ex. 9 35:4–8.)

B

Williams claims that his time in the reassignment room constitutes an adverse

employment action because Barbo filed her report out of racial and gender animus and

the reassignment itself substantially changed his duties. (Resp. Opp. 8.) When asked

to describe the basis for his belief Barbo was “racially-motivated,” Williams stated:

I as a black male was targeted by a white female who ran out

of options and was desperate. The allegations against me

accused me of referring to Ms. Barbo’s race as well. She had

made various attempts to move me out of my position at

Furness as lead counselor, and she was plagued by years of

mental health issues. When the minor attempts to avoid the

focus on her lack of work ethic failed, she moved to playing a

race card that often has proved to be favorable in history

against African American males—accusing a black male of

sexual harassment and/or inappropriate behavior. This

diverted attention from her incompetencies [sic] and her

failures at work. The timing of the “me too movement” was

of significance at the time of her accusation. My

determination of this being racially motivated is also based

on the fact that I never said anything appropriate or sexual

in any way, shape or form.

(Ex. 10 at Request 10.)1 Williams also claims that the School District accepted Barbo’s

story as true because “she is Caucasian and [he is] not.” (Ex. 27.)

While reassigned, Williams received his full rate of pay, was not suspended, and

retained his seniority. (Ex. 1 35:10–14, 67:6–10.) He also received his lunch and prep

period each day. (Ex. 1 40:8–9, Ex. 9 41:16–19.) Williams conceded that his race and

sex did not factor into Mr. Chokshi’s decision to temporarily reassign him; rather, he

admits that the decision was based strictly on Chokshi’s determination that allegations

had been made against him that implicated the safety and/or well-being of another

member of the Furness staff. (Ex. 8 ¶ 14.)

1 Williams’s speculation as to why Barbo would target him is not sufficient. See Betts v. New

Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 252 (3d Cir. 2010). In any event, at oral argument counsel

acknowledged that his client’s subjective belief is not relevant and that he relies only on the fact that

Williams denied making the comment attributed to him. (Hr’g Tr. 38:15–39:10.)

II

A

Summary judgment is warranted if there is “no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(a). The movant bears the initial responsibility of informing the Court of the basis

for its motion and identifying those portions of the record which it believes demonstrate

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas

Co., 364 F.3d 135, 145 (3d Cir. 2004), holding modified by Erdman v. Nationwide Ins.

Co., 582 F.3d 500 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323

(1986)).

A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return

a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). A fact is “material” if it may affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

law. Id. A mere scintilla of evidence supporting the nonmoving party will not suffice

for a court to deny summary judgment. Id. at 252. Rather, the nonmovant must “set

forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 256. A court “must

view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all

inferences in that party's favor.” Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, 579 F.3d 285, 286 (3d Cir.

2009). But it need not credit “[u]nsupported assertions, conclusory allegations, or mere

suspicions.” Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 252 (3d Cir. 2010). Nor

may a court make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. See Parkell v.

Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 323 (3d Cir. 2016).

III

A

Discrimination claims based on circumstantial evidence are analyzed under

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 793 (1973). Under this framework, a

plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. This requires showing

that the plaintiff (1) “is a member of a protected class;” (2) is “qualified for the position”

he seeks to retain; (3) “suffered an adverse employment action;” and (4) “the action

occurred under circumstances that could give rise to an inference of intentional

discrimination.” Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2008). “The burden of

establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous.” Tex. Dep’t of

Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).

The District concedes that Williams is a member of a protected class and

qualified for the position at issue—so the Court is left to decide whether he has

established that he suffered an adverse employment action under circumstances that

support an inference of discrimination. (Hr’g Tr. 11:12–22.)

Williams argues that his requirement to “physically report to the ‘reassignment

room’ (also referred to as the ‘rubber room’)” was an adverse employment action. (Resp.

Opp. 6). An adverse employment action in the discrimination context is an action

“serious and tangible enough to alter an employee’s compensation, terms, conditions or

privileges of employment,” including “firing, failing to promote, reassignment with

significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in

benefits.” Jones v. SEPTA, 796 F.3d 323, 326 (3d Cir. 2015); Remp v. Alcon Labs., Inc.,

701 F. App’x 103, 106–107 (3d Cir. 2017).

Williams contends, and the District concedes, that his duties changed upon his

reassignment. (Hr’g Tr. 22:12–14, 7:6–13.) He further alleges that the condition of the

room—that it was “windowless, often dirty, and poorly ventilated” contributed to the

reassignment’s impact on him. (Resp. Opp. 6–7.) He relies on Burlington Indus. Inc. v.

Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) to support this proposition, citing language that an adverse

employment action is a “significant change in employment status such

as…reassignment.” (Resp. Opp. 6) (citing Burlington, 524 U.S. at 761).

But Williams’s alleged adverse employment action was temporary. He suffered

no permanent change to his employment status; he was not fired, demoted, suspended,

docked pay, or permanently transferred. The only discipline he did receive, a note in

his file, was to be removed after eighteen months. (Ex. 2 at D000223.) The actions

taken against Williams were temporary, standard, and pursuant to a procedure

established in his employment contract and specifically bargained for by his union.

(Ex. 1 8:20–24; Ex. 8 ¶¶ 8–9.)

Other courts in this Circuit have found that a temporary reassignment, without

any other change to employment status, does not constitute an adverse employment

action under Title VII—in either the discrimination or retaliation context. See Young v.

St. James Mgmt., LLC, 749 F. Supp. 2d 281, 298 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (where a maintenance

man’s reassignment to “housekeeping duties” was not permanent and did not reduce

his wage); Ferguson v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 560 F. Supp. 1172, 1202 (D. Del.

1983) (in the retaliation context, where a secretary’s transfer from a fixed position to

the secretarial pool was temporary and pay and benefits remained the same).

Williams knew his reassignment was temporary. See (Ex. 11). Although his

responsibilities and duties did change during his reassignment—he was not counseling

students—they were not permanently altered. (Hr’g Tr. 7:2–12.)2 Because the process

by which he was reassigned was clearly established, temporary and without any other

change to his employment status, his reassignment was not so “serious and tangible” to

constitute an adverse employment action.

Even if the temporary reassignment could constitute an adverse employment

action, Williams cannot establish that the circumstances of that reassignment support

an inference of discrimination. Whether analyzed as a traditional discrimination claim

or, as Williams requests, through the lens of the “cat’s paw” theory, there is no evidence

in the record that would allow a reasonable juror to conclude that the District

reassigned Williams because of his race or gender. Williams conceded that Chokshi’s

decision to reassign him was devoid of any racial or gender bias, and for the reasons

discussed in Section III.B, infra, there is no evidence in the record to support Williams’s

theory that Barbo was motivated to file her complaint because of gender or racial

animus.

While the bar for proving a prima facie case is “not onerous,” Williams has not

met it here. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, 450 U.S. at 253. Because Williams’s removal

was temporary and no evidence could support an inference of discrimination, Williams

has failed to show a prima facie case of discrimination.

2 District officials testified that the disciplinary process can take a long time for a variety of

reasons and the length of Williams’s process was not unique. (Ex. 9 43:11–23, 44:11–14.)

B

McDonnell Douglas presents a burden shifting framework. The plaintiff “has the

ultimate burden of persuasion at all times,” Carvalho-Grevious v. Del. State Univ., 851

F.3d 249, 257 (3d Cir. 2017), but once he establishes a prima facie case of

discrimination, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to “articulate some

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the adverse action. McDonnell Douglas, 411

U.S. at 802. If the defendant does so, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to

prove that the defendant’s nondiscriminatory reasons were pretextual and the real

reason for the adverse action was illegal discrimination. Burton v. Teleflex, Inc., 707

F.3d 417, 426 (3d Cir. 2013).

Even if Williams could make out his prima facie case, the District had a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the reassignment: it is standard practice when

investigating complaints of sexual harassment. There is no record evidence that the

reassignment was pretext for illegal or invidious discrimination.

Williams concedes that the District did not demonstrate discriminatory animus

in its decision to assign him to the reassignment room.3 (Ex. 8 ¶ 14.) He instead

proceeds under the cat’s paw theory of discrimination where employers are liable when

an employee performs an act, motivated by animus, to cause an adverse employment

action and that act is a proximate cause of the action. (Resp. Opp. 1); Jones, 796 F.3d

at 330 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 562 U.S. 411, 422 (2011));

McKenna v. City of Philadelphia, 649 F.3d 171, 178 (3d Cir. 2011). To stave off

3 To the extent comparator evidence is relevant to the Court’s analysis, there is no record

evidence that a similarly situated white or female employee was accused of sexual harassment and

not required to report to the reassignment room. (Hr’g Tr. 12:22–25; 25:21–26:7.)

summary judgment under a cat’s paw theory, Williams must establish (1) a genuine

issue of material fact concerning the bias of the subordinate and (2) a genuine issue of

material fact as to whether there is a causal relationship between the subordinate’s

actions and the employment decision. See Afrasiabipour v. Penn. Dept. Trans., 469 F.

Supp. 3d 372, 386–87 (E.D. Pa. 2020). The subordinate employee must be motivated by

discriminatory animus. McKenna v. City of Philadelphia, 649 F.3d 171, 179 (3d Cir.

2011). To meet the proximate cause requirement, there must be “some direct relation

between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged” and this excludes links

that are “remote, purely contingent, or indirect.” Jones, 796 F.3d at 330 (3d Cir. 2015).

On this record, Williams cannot show Barbo was motivated by discriminatory

animus when she filed her complaint against him. Williams propounds a unique

theory: the fact that Barbo accused Williams of referring to her race and gender when

he allegedly called her “thick for a white girl,” and particularly that Williams denies

doing so, shows that Barbo’s allegation was based on Williams’s race and gender. (Hr’g

Tr. 27:10–17.) In other words, falsely accusing someone of making a racial or gender-

tinged comment supports the inference that the allegation itself is motivated by racial

or gender animus. (Id. at 32:1–5.) See also (id. at 19:12–20, 28:6–18, 29:13–21, 32:22–

23 and 36:8–24). That is obviously not the law.

Williams argues that the District is not entitled to summary judgment merely

because he denies Barbo’s allegations and “any and all doubts must be resolved in the

plaintiff’s favor.” (Resp. Opp. 8.) Williams is mistaken. While the Court must resolve

any reasonable doubts in favor of the plaintiff at summary judgment, it need not credit

“[u]nsupported assertions, conclusory allegations, or mere suspicions.” Betts, 621 F.3d

at 252 (3d Cir. 2010). Williams’s contention that Barbo acted out of animus is

unsupported and conclusory; the mere nature of the remarks Barbo reported and

Williams denies cannot be enough to establish Barbo’s own animus. Although his

denial may constitute an issue of material fact as to whether her complaint was

fabricated, there is no evidence on the record to support it was fabricated because of

Williams’s race or gender.

An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Gerald J. Pappert

GERALD J. PAPPERT, J.