holding that federal agencies “are not citizens of any State, but have the same relation to one State as to another” (footnote omitted)
How later courts described this case
- holding that federal agencies “are not citizens of any State, but have the same relation to one State as to another” (footnote omitted)
- “The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction rests with the party asserting its existence.” (citation omitted)
- explaining that “an objection to subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time [and] a court may raise jurisdictional issues sua sponte”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RACQUEL LEWIS, :
Plaintiff, :
:
v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 23-CV-1649
:
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA PARKING :
VIOLATIONS, et al., :
Defendants. :
MEMORANDUM
PADOVA, J. MAY 9, 2023
Racquel Lewis, a citizen of Delaware, filed this civil action against the “City of
Philadelphia Parking Violations”1 and the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) apparently based
on tickets she received for an expired vehicle inspection. (ECF No. 2.) Lewis also filed a
Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and a Motion to Seal.2 (ECF Nos. 1 & 3.) For
the following reasons, the Court will grant Lewis leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss
her Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
1 It is unclear to what entity “City of Philadelphia Parking Violations” refers. Since
Lewis uses the address of 913 Filbert Street in Philadelphia for this entity, (Compl. at 2), which
correlates with the address for the Philadelphia Parking Authority (“PPA”), see
https://philapark.org/ (May 4, 2023), the Court understands her to be suing the PPA, especially
considering the substance of her claims.
2 Lewis has not satisfied the heavy burden of establishing that this docket must remain
sealed. See Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 16 F.3d 549, 551 (3d Cir. 1994) (explaining that a “party
seeking to seal any part of a judicial record bears the heavy burden of showing that ‘the material
is the kind of information that courts will protect’ and that ‘disclosure will work a clearly defined
and serious injury’ to the party seeking closure” (quoting Publicker Indus. Inc. v. Cohen, 733
F.2d 1059, 1071 (3d Cir. 1984)). Accordingly, the Court will deny her Motion to Seal.
I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Lewis’s Complaint is sparse and vague. The thrust of her Complaint is that she received
an improper ticket for having an expired vehicle inspection and related communications about
the ticket. Lewis claims she was subjected to: (1) constant letters about the expired inspection;
(2) “fraudulent notices”; (3) “duplicate notices”; (4) “police actions on parking/enforcement of
violations”; and (5) “ongoing retaliation due to protected activity.”3
Documents attached to the Complaint reflect that Lewis submitted a complaint to the
Civil Rights Division of the DOJ based on the ticket. (ECF 2-1 at 2.) The substance of Lewis’s
complaint to the DOJ indicated that Lewis “was given a ticket for an expired inspection May
2022” even though she had her car inspected in April 2022 and passed. (Id. at 4-5.) Lewis
claimed her inspection “is not expired and has not been.” (Id. at 5.) She also stated that she
received notices showing she owed $106.00, which was “past due,” and claimed that police were
“retaliating” against her because she “filed a claim against them in Philadelphia.” (Id. at 5.)
By checking the appropriate locations on the form Complaint, Lewis indicates that she
brings her Complaint in the instant civil action pursuant to the Court’s diversity jurisdiction.
(Compl. at 2.) She seeks an unspecified “complete injunction” and $1 million in damages to
compensate her for mental distress and financial hardship. (Id. at 4.)
3 It is unclear whether Lewis is complaining about additional tickets she received or
whether she is claiming that the conduct at issue predominately relates to the ticket concerning
the vehicle inspection. To the extent Lewis is bringing claims about additional tickets, including
tickets that may have issued in New York and Maryland, (see Compl. at 3), her allegations
underlying those claims are entirely undeveloped and it is unclear how they translate into a basis
for liability against the named Defendants.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court will grant Lewis leave to proceed in forma pauperis because it appears that she
is not capable of paying the fees to commence this civil action. Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) requires the Court to screen the Complaint and dismiss it if it is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks damages from an immune defendant.
Furthermore, the Court must dismiss the Complaint if it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the
court must dismiss the action.”); Grp. Against Smog and Pollution, Inc. v. Shenango, Inc., 810
F.3d 116, 122 n.6 (3d Cir. 2016) (explaining that “an objection to subject matter jurisdiction may
be raised at any time [and] a court may raise jurisdictional issues sua sponte”). A plaintiff
commencing an action in federal court bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. See
Lincoln Ben. Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 105 (3d Cir. 2015) (“The burden of
establishing federal jurisdiction rests with the party asserting its existence.” (citation omitted)).
III. DISCUSSION
Lewis raises state law claims pursuant to the Court’s diversity jurisdiction against the
PPA, a local agency, and the DOJ, a federal agency.4 (See Compl. at 3.) Diversity jurisdiction is
set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), which provides that “district courts shall have original
4 There is no indication that Lewis intends to bring federal claims in this case pursuant to
the Court’s federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (See Compl. at 2-3.) Notably, Lewis
is a regular pro se litigant who has raised federal claims in the past, yet she has not done so here.
See Lewis v. City of Phila. Police, Law Enforcement, Civ. A. No. 23-80 (E.D. Pa.); Lewis-Davis
v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civ. A. No. 21-4052 (E.D. Pa.); Lewis-Davis v. PEC-Gloria’s Place,
Civ. A. No. 21-2180 (E.D. Pa.). In any event, the Court cannot discern any plausible basis for a
federal claim against the named Defendants based on the facts alleged. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between—
(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state, except that the
district courts shall not have original jurisdiction under this subsection of an
action between citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state
who are lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States and
are domiciled in the same State;
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state
are additional parties; and
(4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title, as plaintiff and citizens
of a State or of different States.
28 U.S.C. § 1332. Notably, “[t]he United States and its agencies are not a “citizen” for diversity
jurisdiction and cannot be sued in diversity.” Mohn v. Cardona, Civ. A. No. 22-773, 2022 WL
1121414, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 2022) (citing Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. U.S., 999 F.2d
581, 584 (D.C. Cir. 1993) and 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)); see also State of Texas v. Interstate
Commerce Comm’n, 258 U.S. 158, 160 (1922) (holding that federal agencies “are not citizens of
any State, but have the same relation to one State as to another” (footnote omitted)).
Accordingly, because the DOJ cannot be sued under diversity jurisdiction, § 1332 does not
provide a basis for jurisdiction over Lewis’s claims.5
5 It is not clear what state law claims Lewis intends to bring. The Court need not
determine the contours of any such claims, however, given the conclusion that jurisdiction is
lacking. In any event, it is worth noting that the PPA “is a ‘local agency’ within the meaning of
the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8541 (and see id. at § 8501), and hence
enjoys the ‘governmental immunity’ conferred by the Act.” Five Star Parking v. Philadelphia
Parking Auth., 662 F. Supp. 1053, 1055 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (citation omitted). The Political
Subdivision Tort Claims Act does not contemplate liability under the circumstances at issue in
Lewis’s Complaint. See 42. Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8542(b).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Lewis leave to proceed in forma pauperis
and dismiss her Complaint without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court
concludes under the circumstances of this case that amendment would be futile. An appropriate
Order follows, which finally dismisses this case.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ John R. Padova
___________________________________
JOHN R. PADOVA, J.