Opinion

LEWIS v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA PARKING VIOLATIONS

Court
District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
Filed
May 9, 2023
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 29.0%

holding that federal agencies “are not citizens of any State, but have the same relation to one State as to another” (footnote omitted)

How later courts described this case

  • holding that federal agencies “are not citizens of any State, but have the same relation to one State as to another” (footnote omitted)
  • “The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction rests with the party asserting its existence.” (citation omitted)
  • explaining that “an objection to subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time [and] a court may raise jurisdictional issues sua sponte”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RACQUEL LEWIS, :

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 23-CV-1649

:

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA PARKING :

VIOLATIONS, et al., :

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM

PADOVA, J. MAY 9, 2023

Racquel Lewis, a citizen of Delaware, filed this civil action against the “City of

Philadelphia Parking Violations”1 and the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) apparently based

on tickets she received for an expired vehicle inspection. (ECF No. 2.) Lewis also filed a

Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and a Motion to Seal.2 (ECF Nos. 1 & 3.) For

the following reasons, the Court will grant Lewis leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss

her Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

1 It is unclear to what entity “City of Philadelphia Parking Violations” refers. Since

Lewis uses the address of 913 Filbert Street in Philadelphia for this entity, (Compl. at 2), which

correlates with the address for the Philadelphia Parking Authority (“PPA”), see

https://philapark.org/ (May 4, 2023), the Court understands her to be suing the PPA, especially

considering the substance of her claims.

2 Lewis has not satisfied the heavy burden of establishing that this docket must remain

sealed. See Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 16 F.3d 549, 551 (3d Cir. 1994) (explaining that a “party

seeking to seal any part of a judicial record bears the heavy burden of showing that ‘the material

is the kind of information that courts will protect’ and that ‘disclosure will work a clearly defined

and serious injury’ to the party seeking closure” (quoting Publicker Indus. Inc. v. Cohen, 733

F.2d 1059, 1071 (3d Cir. 1984)). Accordingly, the Court will deny her Motion to Seal.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Lewis’s Complaint is sparse and vague. The thrust of her Complaint is that she received

an improper ticket for having an expired vehicle inspection and related communications about

the ticket. Lewis claims she was subjected to: (1) constant letters about the expired inspection;

(2) “fraudulent notices”; (3) “duplicate notices”; (4) “police actions on parking/enforcement of

violations”; and (5) “ongoing retaliation due to protected activity.”3

Documents attached to the Complaint reflect that Lewis submitted a complaint to the

Civil Rights Division of the DOJ based on the ticket. (ECF 2-1 at 2.) The substance of Lewis’s

complaint to the DOJ indicated that Lewis “was given a ticket for an expired inspection May

2022” even though she had her car inspected in April 2022 and passed. (Id. at 4-5.) Lewis

claimed her inspection “is not expired and has not been.” (Id. at 5.) She also stated that she

received notices showing she owed $106.00, which was “past due,” and claimed that police were

“retaliating” against her because she “filed a claim against them in Philadelphia.” (Id. at 5.)

By checking the appropriate locations on the form Complaint, Lewis indicates that she

brings her Complaint in the instant civil action pursuant to the Court’s diversity jurisdiction.

(Compl. at 2.) She seeks an unspecified “complete injunction” and $1 million in damages to

compensate her for mental distress and financial hardship. (Id. at 4.)

3 It is unclear whether Lewis is complaining about additional tickets she received or

whether she is claiming that the conduct at issue predominately relates to the ticket concerning

the vehicle inspection. To the extent Lewis is bringing claims about additional tickets, including

tickets that may have issued in New York and Maryland, (see Compl. at 3), her allegations

underlying those claims are entirely undeveloped and it is unclear how they translate into a basis

for liability against the named Defendants.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court will grant Lewis leave to proceed in forma pauperis because it appears that she

is not capable of paying the fees to commence this civil action. Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B) requires the Court to screen the Complaint and dismiss it if it is frivolous,

malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks damages from an immune defendant.

Furthermore, the Court must dismiss the Complaint if it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the

court must dismiss the action.”); Grp. Against Smog and Pollution, Inc. v. Shenango, Inc., 810

F.3d 116, 122 n.6 (3d Cir. 2016) (explaining that “an objection to subject matter jurisdiction may

be raised at any time [and] a court may raise jurisdictional issues sua sponte”). A plaintiff

commencing an action in federal court bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. See

Lincoln Ben. Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 105 (3d Cir. 2015) (“The burden of

establishing federal jurisdiction rests with the party asserting its existence.” (citation omitted)).

III. DISCUSSION

Lewis raises state law claims pursuant to the Court’s diversity jurisdiction against the

PPA, a local agency, and the DOJ, a federal agency.4 (See Compl. at 3.) Diversity jurisdiction is

set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), which provides that “district courts shall have original

4 There is no indication that Lewis intends to bring federal claims in this case pursuant to

the Court’s federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (See Compl. at 2-3.) Notably, Lewis

is a regular pro se litigant who has raised federal claims in the past, yet she has not done so here.

See Lewis v. City of Phila. Police, Law Enforcement, Civ. A. No. 23-80 (E.D. Pa.); Lewis-Davis

v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civ. A. No. 21-4052 (E.D. Pa.); Lewis-Davis v. PEC-Gloria’s Place,

Civ. A. No. 21-2180 (E.D. Pa.). In any event, the Court cannot discern any plausible basis for a

federal claim against the named Defendants based on the facts alleged. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of

$75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between—

(1) citizens of different States;

(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state, except that the

district courts shall not have original jurisdiction under this subsection of an

action between citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state

who are lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States and

are domiciled in the same State;

(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state

are additional parties; and

(4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title, as plaintiff and citizens

of a State or of different States.

28 U.S.C. § 1332. Notably, “[t]he United States and its agencies are not a “citizen” for diversity

jurisdiction and cannot be sued in diversity.” Mohn v. Cardona, Civ. A. No. 22-773, 2022 WL

1121414, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 2022) (citing Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. U.S., 999 F.2d

581, 584 (D.C. Cir. 1993) and 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)); see also State of Texas v. Interstate

Commerce Comm’n, 258 U.S. 158, 160 (1922) (holding that federal agencies “are not citizens of

any State, but have the same relation to one State as to another” (footnote omitted)).

Accordingly, because the DOJ cannot be sued under diversity jurisdiction, § 1332 does not

provide a basis for jurisdiction over Lewis’s claims.5

5 It is not clear what state law claims Lewis intends to bring. The Court need not

determine the contours of any such claims, however, given the conclusion that jurisdiction is

lacking. In any event, it is worth noting that the PPA “is a ‘local agency’ within the meaning of

the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8541 (and see id. at § 8501), and hence

enjoys the ‘governmental immunity’ conferred by the Act.” Five Star Parking v. Philadelphia

Parking Auth., 662 F. Supp. 1053, 1055 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (citation omitted). The Political

Subdivision Tort Claims Act does not contemplate liability under the circumstances at issue in

Lewis’s Complaint. See 42. Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8542(b).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Lewis leave to proceed in forma pauperis

and dismiss her Complaint without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court

concludes under the circumstances of this case that amendment would be futile. An appropriate

Order follows, which finally dismisses this case.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ John R. Padova

___________________________________

JOHN R. PADOVA, J.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.