HENDERSON v. PHILADELPHIA HOUSING AUTHORITY "PHA"

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

YUZZA HENDERSON,

Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION

v. NO. 22-00129

PHILADELPHIA HOUSING AUTHORITY

et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION

Slomsky, J. January 5, 2023

I. INTRODUCTION

This case arises from allegations by pro se Plaintiff Yuzza Henderson (“Plaintiff”) that

Defendants Philadelphia Housing Authority (“PHA”), and Bernadette Smith, Zachary McNeil,

Lauren Bishop, Stacey Collins, and Joshua McQuoid1 (the “Individual Defendants”), collectively

referred to as “Defendants,” violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), the

Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”), and other laws. (Doc. No. 9 at 1.) Plaintiff claims

that Defendants discriminated and retaliated against her after she raised concerns with the human

resources department about her pay rate and other wrongdoings at work.2 (See id.) She also

1 As of the date of the filing of the Amended Complaint, the Individual Defendants had different

roles in their employment with PHA. According to the Amended Complaint, Bernadette Smith

was an Executive Assistant, Zachary McNeil was Operations Manager, Lauren Bishop was a

Director, Stacey Collins was Manager of Human Resources, and Joshua McQuoid was Vice

President of Human Resources. (See Doc. No. 9 at 1.)

2 Although Plaintiff alleges that she was discriminated against, she fails to allege the protected

class she was in, such as, for example, race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or

disability.

alleges that Defendants took retaliatory adverse employment action against her, insulted her, and

“isolated” her for reporting the wrongdoings. (See id.) Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on

February 25, 2022. (Doc. No. 9.) Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Amended

Complaint. (Doc. No. 13.)3

II. BACKGROUND

On January 16, 2022, Plaintiff instituted this action against Defendants by filing the form

Complaint used for employment discrimination cases. She attached to the Complaint a Right to

Sue Letter, dated October 18, 2021, issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

(“EEOC”). On February 25, 2022, Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 9.)

Thereafter, she sought leave to file a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), which was granted.

(Doc. No. 31.) She had until September 22, 2022 to file the SAC, but did not do so.4 Therefore,

3 Since Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court has construed her Amended Complaint liberally

and has attempted to identify the claims that appear to be alleged. Because the Amended

Complaint lacks the required clarity set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) (a

pleading must contain a short and plain statement of the claims showing the pleader is entitled

to relief), this task has been demanding.

4 Plaintiff has been provided numerous opportunities to file a Second Amended Complaint and

also has been granted extensions of time to seek legal counsel. In this Court’s October 4, 2022

Order denying Plaintiff another extension of time to file a Second Amended Complaint, the

prior efforts to accommodate Plaintiff’s requests are detailed:

Plaintiff Yuzza Henderson (“Plaintiff”) filed her Complaint (Doc. No. 1) on

January 16, 2022. In an Order dated January 26, 2022, the Court dismissed the

Complaint without prejudice because “Henderson has failed to state a claim.”

(Doc. No. 5 at 6.) Plaintiff was granted leave to file an Amended Complaint within

30 days of the Court’s Order. (See Doc. No. 6 at 1.)

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 9) was filed on February 25, 2022 with

a Motion for Leave to Proceed pro se (Doc. No. 11) and Motion to Appoint Counsel

(Doc. No. 12). (Doc. No. 9.) On March 11, 2022, Defendant [PHA] filed a Motion

to Dismiss the Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 13.) Then, on March 14, 2022, the

Court directed the Clerk of Court to place this case on the extranet to determine if

any lawyer would agree to represent Plaintiff. (Doc. No. 14.) The Court also

ordered the Clerk to place this case in suspense. (Id.)

On June 30, 2022, because no attorney had volunteered to represent Plaintiff, the

Court informed Plaintiff she must represent herself and restored this case to active

status. (Doc. No. 20.) On July 13, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Motion for a Continuance

to obtain counsel (Doc. No. 22), and the Court granted the Motion in a July 14,

2022 Order. (Doc. No. 26.) In the Order, the Court informed Plaintiff that she had

until August 3, 2022 to obtain counsel to represent her and granted Plaintiff leave

to file a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) by August 17, 2022. (Doc. No. 26

at 1.)

The day before the August 3, 2022 deadline to obtain counsel, Plaintiff filed a

Request for Further Extension of Time to Search for Legal Counsel. (Doc. No. 28.)

On August 4, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Request and ordered that she had

until September 8, 2022 to obtain counsel. (Id.) Plaintiff also was granted leave to

file her SAC by September 22, 2022. (Id.) In that Order, however, the Court also

informed Plaintiff that “[n]o further continuances will be granted.” (Id.) By this

time, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss had been pending for almost five months.

On August 16, 2022, although the Court had already done so, Plaintiff moved to

extend the deadline to file her SAC to September 22, 2022. (Doc. No. 30.) In

granting her Motion, the Court referred to the August 4, 2022 Order. (Doc. No.

31.) On September 8, 2022, because she could not find counsel to represent her in

this case, Plaintiff filed a motion to proceed pro se and to reinstate her in forma

pauperis request. (Doc. No. 32.) The Court granted the Motion and again reminded

Plaintiff that [she] must file her SAC by September 22, 2022 or respond to

Defendants’ outstanding Motion to Dismiss. (See id. at 2.)

Now, Plaintiff has filed a Motion for an Extension of Time to File a Second

Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 34.) For the following reasons, it will be denied.

First, she filed her extension Motion with the Clerk’s Office on the September 22,

2022 deadline despite the Court granting her several extensions of time to file her

SAC. (See Doc. No. 34-1.) No proposed Second Amended Complaint was

attached to the Motion. Second, in the August 4, 2022 Order, the Court informed

Plaintiff that no further continuances would be granted. (Doc. No. 31.) Third, on

March 4, 2022, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Defendants in state court. (See Doc.

No. 35-1.) On August 10, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Praecipe to Reinstate the complaint

in state court. (See id. at 4.) Fourth, as noted above, Plaintiff was granted several

extensions of time by this Court during the pendency of her state lawsuit. See, e.g.,

Lasher v. Rubinaccio, 860 F. App’x 821, 823 (3d Cir. 2021) (affirming district

court’s denial of continuance to amend complaint where court granted six requests

in over a year and where the plaintiff had been litigating other matters). Fifth,

Plaintiff has not filed a SAC by September 22, 2022.

the Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 9) remains the operative Complaint in this case. Plaintiff was

ordered to respond to the Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint by October 25, 2022. (Doc.

No. 37.) On October 25, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss. (Doc. No. 38.)

To fully understand Plaintiff’s claims, the Amended Complaint will be quoted from

extensively.5 In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff states, using her own numbering system:

(1) Yuzza Henderson (hereinafter π) (2) worked at Philadelphia Housing Authority

(hereinafter ∆) (3) from March 24, 2017 (4) until September 25, 2020 (5) as a Case

Manager (6) [which was the π’s fourth position and (7) third promotion during her

tenure] (8) [w]hich does not include added raises[.] (9) However, during one of π’s

positions (10) she was not paid according to the allotted funding by said FSS

Grant[.] (11) Though she addressed the issue to HR [human resources] and (12)

received an increase (13) it was still below the grant pay rate for an FSSC [Family

Self-Sufficiency Coordinator 2018 at $69,000.] (14) Throughout the π’s tenure ∆

made many false allegations 2018-2020 (15) retaliated (16) harassed (17) insulted

with comments (18) isolated (19) when π reported (20) inconsistencies, (21) varies

[sic] unprofessional conduct, (22) discrimination, (23) other unacceptable and

unprofessional behavior. (24) The HRD never investigated the complaints (25)

submitted against the π. (26) π was suspended, February 12, 2020, after reporting

to the CEO (27) and without prior meeting (28) without pay. (29) On March 4,

2020, ∆ submitted the same false allegations [never investigated] to an outside

government agency, e.g., Unemployment Compensation. (30) π[‘s] last salary

[was] $49,747. (31) π was terminated for three reasons: insubordination, neglect

of duty and unsatisfactory job performance. (32) π was still under [intermittent]

FMLA (33) at the time of termination, (34) which began December 2019 and (35)

was due to end in December 2020. (36) π was also in a 5-year contractual

agreement that was to result in [π] becoming a first-time homebuyer. (37) π was

represented and in [the] process of closing on the home through [the] PHA Family

Self-Sufficiency Program[6] where she obtains her approved HUD [(“United States

(Doc. No. 37 at 1-2.) On the September 22, 2022 deadline for Plaintiff to file her SAC, Plaintiff

instead filed another Motion for an Extension of Time to File a Second Amended Complaint.

(Doc. No. 34.) For reasons stated in the October 4, 2022 Order, the Court denied the Motion

and afforded her twenty-one (21) days “from the date of this Order to file a Response to the

Motion to Dismiss.” (Id. at 2.)

5 Plaintiff included a memo attached to the Amended Complaint titled “Opening Statement” in

which she provides “further explanation & Substantial Evidence.” (See Doc. No. 9-1.)

6 As explained in more detail, infra, the Family Self-Sufficiency (“FSS”) Program is a program

administered by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”)

Department of Housing and Urban Development” or “Housing and Urban

Development”)]/PHA voucher to purchase a home--after achieving required years

of Housing Counseling, Credit Counseling and other set goals such as obtaining a

degree and maintaining employment (39) π applied several times, to other

departments and positions but was blocked from interviewing with the department

within the company. (40) π is a PHA Housing Choice Voucher Resident in good

standing whose only objective was to excel, grow with the company and become a

pillar in the communities. (41) π is a PHA PhillySeeds Scholarship Recipient since

2014-16, 2018-2021] Currently attends Drexel University Thomas R. Kline School

of Law for her Masters of legal studies w/Concentration in Human Resource

Compliance with an Expected graduation date of May 2022. She will pursue her

Doctor in Law and Public Policy on May 25, 2022.

(Doc. No. 9 at 3.)

In the Opening Statement attached to the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that PHA

started discriminating and retaliating against her in response to her reporting various instances of

misconduct to Human Resources. Plaintiff describes these instances of misconduct as “numerous

inconsistences,” again using her own numbering system:

(1) client-complaints regarding promised relocation according to the Choice

Neighbor Initiative Grant (2) Missing funds as per the FSS-Escrows accounts

before the outsourcing to Compass/Redi, (3) issues related to PHA Partner

Customer Bank Program for homeownership, (4) missing-files, shredded-files, (e)

questionable tax-credit sites, (5) clients owing extreme back rents after recent

move-ins, (6) suspicious rental activity, (7) unauthorized rental activities, (8)

unauthorized PECO usage and (9) questionable shut-off notices, (10) mishandling

of Septa merchandise and Septa Theft Cover-up, (11) Managerial and (12)

Administrative mismanagement, and (13) misappropriations of government

program funds (14) incorrect salaries per government grant allowance, etc.], (15)

misuse of authority, (16) concerns with improper record management and (17)

unethical conduct as per the handbook and other regulations. Moreover, areas

concerning (18) nepotism/favoritism and (19) intentional lack of due diligence from

the PHA HR Department [including “conveniently” removing and replacing an

assigned Human Relations Specialist before an unknown five-day suspension

without pay and deliberately false statements via the termination letter], (20)

harassment and direct and indirect threats, (21) gatekeeping internal job

opportunities. In addition to (22) other clever forms of retaliation, (23)

questionable discriminatory behavior, (24) compromised Performance Evaluation,

(25) patented file, and (26) high levels of micro-managing. (27) I was even refused

to “enable eligible families to achieve economic independence and self-sufficiency” in

coordination with local public housing authorities. 42 U.S.C. § 1437u(a).

employee’s tuition assistance for classes, later to reapply and learned a year later

[from HR Department VP Assistant] I was eligible. Furthermore, (28) I received

other indirect threats. (29) [M]y work was stolen, (30) suspicious computer hacks

and/or back-to-back hard-drive crashes conveniently left with (31) unretrievable

files, and (32) name-calling[,] (33) unauthorize[d] adjustment to time records as per

specified administrative leave to name a few. There were also (34) countless false

allegations in my employee’s file as a smokescreen to justify what happened during

daily operations over the years.

(Doc. No. 9-1 at 5.)

The Amended Complaint apparently boils down to the following: Plaintiff reported

misconduct she observed while working for PHA to Human Resources and also informed Human

Resources that she was being paid a lower salary than she was entitled to. Because of her reports,

PHA retaliated against her by forcing her to endure a hostile work environment and subjecting her

and other employees to “questionable discriminatory behavior,” name-calling, and other

unidentified threats. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that her termination prevented her from closing

on a house in violation of the terms of the “PHA FSS [Family Self-Sufficiency] Program.” (Doc.

No. 9 at 6.) It is necessary here to describe this Program in more detail.

The Family Self-Sufficiency (“FSS”) Program was created by the Department of Housing

and Urban Development (“HUD”) pursuant to its authority under 42 U.S.C. § 1437u. Section

1437u provides that:

The purpose of the Family Self-Sufficiency Program established under this section

is to promote the development of local strategies to coordinate use of public housing

and assistance under the certificate and voucher programs under section 8 [42

U.S.C. § 1437f] with public and private resources, to enable eligible families to

achieve economic independence and self-sufficiency.

42 U.S.C. §1437u(a).7 Eligible families include those that participate in the Housing Choice

Voucher programs established under Section 8.8 It appears that Plaintiff was already participating

in the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher program and was receiving rental subsidies. Therefore,

she was eligible to participate in the FSS program.

Section 1437u also provides that “[e]ach public housing agency carrying out a local

program under this section shall enter into a contract with each leaseholder receiving assistance

7 24 C.F.R. § 984.102 provides:

The objective of the FSS program is to reduce the dependency of low-income

families on welfare assistance and housing subsidies. Under the FSS program,

HUD assisted families are provided opportunities for education, job training,

counseling, and other forms of social service assistance, while living in assisted

housing, so that they may obtain the education, employment, and business and

social skills necessary to achieve self-sufficiency, as defined in § 984.103.

24 C.F.R. § 984.102.

8 As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals explained:

Section 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f, established

a housing program to help eligible low-income families afford safe and sanitary

housing. [HUD] oversees the program, which is administered by local agencies in

accordance with federal guidelines.

Henry v. City of Erie, 728 F.3d 275, 277 (3d Cir. 2013). Under HUD’s Housing Choice

Voucher (“HCV”) Program:

HUD pays rental subsidies so eligible families can afford decent, safe, and sanitary

housing. The HCV program is generally administered by State or local

governmental entities called public housing agencies (PHAs). HUD provides

housing assistance funds to the PHA. HUD also provides funds for PHA

administration of the program.

. . .

Families select and rent units that meet program housing quality standards. If the

PHA approves a family’s unit and tenancy, the PHA contracts with the owner to

make rent subsidy payments on behalf of the family.

24 C.F.R. § 982.1(a)(1)-(2).

under section 8 or residing in public housing administered by the agency, that elects to participate

in the self-sufficiency program under this section.” Id. § 1437u(c)(1). These contracts are called

“Contracts of Participation” (or “CoP”) and are entered into by an “eligible family that is selected

to participate in an FSS program” and by the “[public housing authority] or owner that operates

the FSS program in which the family will participate.” 24 C.F.R. § 984.303(a). “Each [FSS]

family. . . shall be required to fulfill its obligations under the [CoP] not later than 5 years after

entering into the contract.” 42 U.S.C. § 1437u(c)(3). In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff does

not describe the terms of her CoP.

But as an incentive to participate in the FSS Program, participating families are generally

protected from rent increases based on increases in family income unless it exceeds a specified

amount and are entitled to an escrow savings account in which the family shall earn interest based

on “the adjusted income of the participating family and the amount of rent paid by a participating

family.” Id. § 1437u(d). In exchange, the FSS family is required to meet “specific interim and

final goals by which the PHA or owner, and the family, measures the FSS family’s progress

towards fulfilling its obligations under the CoP and becoming self-sufficient.” 24 C.F.R. §

984.303(b)(2). A family receiving assistance through the HCV program under Section 8 must

achieve a “final goal . . . that every member of the family become independent from welfare

assistance before the expiration of the term of the CoP.” 9 Id. Upon completion of the FSS, the

FSS family is entitled to receive the “amount in an FSS escrow account in excess of any amount

owed to the PHA . . . by the FSS family.” Id. § 984.305(c)(1). While the form of FSS contracts

are provided by HUD, local public housing authorities are free to create their own incentives to

provide eligible families. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437u(d)(3) (“The plan shall require the establishment

9 The CoP between Plaintiff and Defendant is not attached to the Amended Complaint.

of escrow savings accounts . . . and may include any other incentives designed by the public

housing agency.”).

Although the Amended Complaint does not have specific numbered counts, the Court has

scrutinized the Amended Complaint and identified the following claims in the pleading:

a. Discrimination under Title VII;

b. Retaliation under Title VII;

c. Hostile Work Environment under Title VII;

d. Violation of Due Process Rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution;

e. Interference under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”);

f. Retaliation under the FMLA

g. Discrimination under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”);

h. Retaliation under the PHRA

i. Hostile Work Environment under the PHRA;

j. Wrongful Termination;

k. Breach of Contract; and

l. Defamation.

(See Doc. No. 9 at 3.)

On March 11, 2022, Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal

Rule of Evidence 12(b)(6). (Doc. No. 13 at 9.) In their Motion, Defendants argue that “Plaintiff

has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as to all counts in her Amended

Complaint.” (Id. at 12.) More specifically, Defendants submit that Plaintiff failed to exhaust her

requisite administrative remedies, does not state a claim against Individual Defendants because

they are not subject to suit under Title VII, and fails to state a claim for discrimination, hostile

work environment, retaliation, wrongful termination, and her other causes of action. (See id. at

12-34.) For reasons that follow, the Motion will be granted.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The motion to dismiss standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is set forth in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662

(2009). After Iqbal, it is clear that “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” to defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to

dismiss. Id. at 678; see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). “To survive

dismissal, ‘a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Tatis v. Allied Interstate, LLC, 882 F.3d 422, 426 (3d Cir.

2018) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Facial plausibility is “more than a sheer possibility that a

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

Instead, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

(quotation marks omitted) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

Applying the principles of Iqbal and Twombly, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in

Santiago v. Warminster Township, 629 F.3d 121 (3d Cir. 2010), set forth a three-part analysis that

a district court in this Circuit must conduct in evaluating whether allegations in a complaint survive

a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss:

First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a

claim.” Second, the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no

more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Finally, “where

there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and

then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.”

Id. at 130 (alteration in original) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675, 679). The inquiry is normally

broken into three parts: “(1) identifying the elements of the claim, (2) reviewing the complaint to

strike conclusory allegations, and then (3) looking at the well-pleaded components of the

complaint and evaluating whether all of the elements identified in part one of the inquiry are

sufficiently alleged.” Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).

A complaint must do more than allege a plaintiff’s entitlement to relief, it must “show”

such an entitlement with its facts. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir.

2009) (citing Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234-35 (3d Cir. 2008)). “[W]here the

well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,

the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 679 (second alteration in original) (citation omitted). The “plausibility” determination

is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and

common sense.” Id.

IV. ANALYSIS

In their Motion, all Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to allege any federal claim upon

which relief can be granted. (See Doc. No. 13-2 at 12-34.) Individual Defendants contend further

that they are not subject to suit under Title VII and Plaintiff has failed to exhaust against them the

requisite administrative remedy prior to filing the Amended Complaint. (See id. at 12-15.) For

reasons that follow, the Court agrees with Defendants’ arguments and will dismiss all of Plaintiff’s

claims.10

10 The Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 9) suffers from the same defects the Court identified in its

January 26, 2022 Memorandum (Doc. No. 5) in dismissing the original Complaint (Doc. No.

1), but with leave to amend. In dismissing Plaintiff’s Title VII discrimination and retaliation

claims, the Court noted:

A. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Against Defendant Philadelphia

Housing Authority

Plaintiff fails to state a federal claim against Defendant Philadelphia Housing Authority,

the only defendant named in the EEOC charge and the only Defendant to whom any actionable

conduct is attributed in the Amended Complaint. Consequently, for reasons that follow, each

federal claim against Defendant PHA will be dismissed with prejudice.11 The Court will address

seriatim each federal claim it discerns Plaintiff is alleging against PHA.

The Complaint is devoid of any factual allegations. There is no information

concerning . . . her membership in a protected class, or what discriminatory or

retaliatory acts allegedly took place. The Court is unable to evaluate Henderson’s

claims because it is not clear what happened to her, when it happened, and why she

believes she was discriminated against or retaliated against.

There are no facts to indicate that the PHA discriminated against or harassed

Henderson based on her race, color, gender/sex, or membership in another

protected class. The same is true for Henderson’s retaliation claims. For

Henderson to state a claim, she must describe the events that happened to her so it

is clear why she believes she was discriminated against, forced to endure a hostile

work environment based on harassment, and/or terminated because of her race,

color, or gender, or as a result of retaliation. Henderson’s Complaint does not do

this. Accordingly, Henderson has failed to state a claim.

(Doc. No. 5 at 5-6.) Regarding her PHRA hostile work environment and retaliation claims, the

Court stated in the January 26, 2022 Memorandum:

Henderson alleges only that she filed a charge with the EEOC and that she was

terminated. She does not provide any context for these allegations from which it

can be inferred that her termination was motivated by retaliation. . . . She provides

no facts from which a causal connection could be inferred between her filing of the

EEOC charge and her termination.

(Id. at 8.)

11 Plaintiff’s state-law claims under the PHRA are assessed under the same framework as her Title

VII claims to the extent the PHRA does not require a particular provision be interpreted

differently. See Jones v. SEPTA, 796 F.3d 323, 327 (3d Cir. 2015) (“[T]he PHRA is to be

interpreted as identical to federal antidiscrimination laws except where there is something

specifically different in its language requiring that it be treated differently.”) (quoting Fogleman

v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 567 (3d Cir. 2002)).

1. Discrimination under Title VII and the PHRA

Federal law prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, sexual

orientation, national origin, age, and disability. See EEOC v. Allstate Ins. Co., 778 F.3d 444, 448-

49 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); 29 U.S.C. § 623; 42 U.S.C.§ 12112). In general,

to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she

is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position in question; (3) she suffered

an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse action occurred under circumstances giving

rise to an inference of discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802

(1973); see also Ali v. Woodbridge Twp. Sch. Dist., 957 F.3d 174, 180 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation

omitted). Although a plaintiff need not necessarily establish a prima facie case to survive dismissal

for failure to state a claim, she still must “allege enough facts to ‘raise a reasonable expectation

that discovery will reveal evidence of [each] necessary element.’” Martinez v. UPMC

Susquehanna, 986 F.3d 261, 266 (3d Cir. 2021) (citation omitted) (“To defeat a motion to dismiss,

it is sufficient to allege a prima facie case. . . . But it is not necessary.”)

Here, the Amended Complaint fails to state a discrimination claim under both Title VII and

the PHRA because Plaintiff does not meet the first element—that she is a member of a protected

class. She does not state whether she was being discriminated against based on race, color,

religion, sex, sexual orientation, national origin, age, or disability. Consequently, viewing the facts

alleged in the Amended Complaint in the light most favorable to her, Plaintiff does not show that

Defendant PHA took adverse employment action against her because of her membership in a

protected class. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Title VII and PHRA discrimination claims will be

dismissed.

2. Hostile Work Environment under Title VII and the PHRA

For a plaintiff to establish that she was subjected to a hostile work environment based on

her membership in a protected class, she must show that:

1) [she] suffered intentional discrimination because of [her membership in a

protected class], 2) the discrimination was severe and pervasive, 3) the

discrimination detrimentally affected [her], 4) the discrimination would have

detrimentally affected a reasonable person in like circumstances, and 5) the

existence of respondeat superior liability.

Castleberry v. STI Grp., 863 F.3d 259, 263 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Mandel v. M & Q Packaging

Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 167 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted)).

Similar to her original Complaint and for reasons discussed above in dismissing claims

under Title VII and the PHRA, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint does not allege facts indicating

that Defendant PHA discriminated against or harassed her based on her race, color, gender/sex, or

membership in another protected class. No facts are alleged to show that any discrimination was

based on a hostile work environment that was the result of severe and pervasive conduct by

Defendants. Only mere conclusions are stated. Therefore, Plaintiff’s hostile work environment

claims under Title VII and the PHRA also will be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

3. Retaliation under Title VII and the PHRA

A plaintiff properly alleges a retaliation claim if she “tender[s] evidence that: ‘(1) she

engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2) the employer took an adverse employment action

against her; and (3) there was a causal connection between her participation in the protected

activity and the adverse employment action.’” Kengerski v. Harper, 6 F.4th 531, 536 (3d Cir.

2021) (quoting Moore v. City of Phila., 461 F.3d 331, 340-41 (3d Cir. 2006)).

As for the first prong—engaging in Title VII-protected conduct—Title VII prohibits an

employer from retaliating against an employee for opposing any act made unlawful by the

employment discrimination statutes, or because she made a charge, testified, assisted, or

participated in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under those statutes. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-

3(a). The employee-plaintiff must “show that [s]he held ‘an objectively reasonable belief, in good

faith, that the activity [she opposed] is unlawful under Title VII.’” Kengerski, 6 F.4th at 536

(quoting Moore, 461 F.3d at 341).

In the Opening Statement attached to her Amended Complaint, which is quoted above,

Plaintiff alleges as her facts thirty-four “inconsistencies.” They include, for example, that she

reported misconduct including “questionable discriminatory behavior,” harassment, name-calling,

and other references that appear to diminish pursuit of her legal career. (See Doc. No. 9-1 at 5, 7.)

However, none of these facts specifically show that she engaged in activity protected by Title VII.

The closest she comes to protected activity is item 22 (“other clever forms of retaliation”) and item

23 (“questionable discriminatory behavior”). These are conclusions and not plausible facts on

which a court may conclude she engaged in protected activity.

Moreover, filing a complaint with the EEOC is an activity protected by Title VII. See

Nelson v. Upsala Coll., 51 F.3d 383, 386 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[I]t is settled that a cause of action exists

pursuant to Title VII when an employer has retaliated against an employee for filing a charge with

the EEOC.”) (citation omitted). Additionally, lodging concerns of discriminatory conduct with

human resources also constitutes Title VII-protected activity. See LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish

Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 232 n.9 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Opposition to discrimination under the

retaliation provision can take the form of informal protests of discriminatory employment

practices, including making complaints to management.”) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). On July 21, 2021, she filed a charge with the EEOC to investigate allegedly

discriminatory actions by her employer under Title VII. This filing was about ten (10) months

after she was terminated. Accordingly, although Plaintiff engaged in protected activity in filing

the EEOC charge, there was no adverse employment action against her in connection with that

filing.

With respect to the second prong of retaliation, adverse employment action is “a significant

change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with

significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.”

Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998). The Third Circuit has extended the

actions that fall within the ambit of “adverse employment actions” to include suspending an

employee without pay. See Remp v. Alcon Labs, Inc., 701 F. App’x 103, 107 (3d Cir. 2017)

(citing Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 430 (3d Cir. 2001)). Here, Plaintiff alleges that she

was suspended without pay on February 12, 2020. And while Plaintiff does not provide dates of

when she reported the “inconsistencies” to human resources, she presumably did so while still

employed by Defendant. Therefore, the second element of retaliation is met here.

Plaintiff fails to establish, however, the third prong of retaliation—causation. To show

causation, a plaintiff “must establish that his or her protected activity was a but-for cause of the

alleged adverse action by the employer.” Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338,

362 (2013). “She can meet this burden by proffering evidence of an employer’s inconsistent

explanation for taking an adverse employment action, . . . a pattern of antagonism, . . . or temporal

proximity ‘unusually suggestive of retaliatory motive’ . . . .” Carvalho-Grevious v. Del. State

Univ., 851 F.3d 249, 260 (3d Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). As for the last method of showing

but-for causation, the Third Circuit explained that:

[T]he timing of the alleged retaliatory action must be ‘unusually suggestive’ of

retaliatory motive before a causal link will be inferred.” Moreover, causation, like

any other fact, can be established from the evidence gleaned from the record as a

whole. “[W]here the temporal proximity is not so close as to be ‘unduly

suggestive,’” the appropriate test is “timing plus other evidence.”

834 F.3d 417, 424 (3d Cir. 2016) (citations and footnotes omitted).

Here, regarding the causation factor, Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing that her

protected activity was a but-for cause of her termination. First, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts

suggesting inconsistent explanations offered by Defendant PHA or any of her supervisors. Second,

there is no unusually suggestive timing between when Plaintiff filed an EEOC charge or allegedly

engaged in any other protected activity and when she was terminated; she does not provide any

dates on which she reported alleged misconduct to Human Resources. The timing between

Plaintiff’s filing of her EEOC complaint and Defendant PHA’s allegedly discriminatory conduct

is not unusually suggestive and does not raise any such inference because she filed the EEOC

complaint on July 21, 2021, which is almost ten months after she was terminated on September

25, 2020. (See Doc. Nos. 9 at 5; 9-1 at 11.) Without a concrete timeline showing when the actions

against Plaintiff occurred in relation to her protected conduct, a causal connection has not been

properly alleged. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not established the third element of retaliation under

Title VII and the PHA. Thus, the Title VII and PHRA retaliation claims against Defendant PHA

will be dismissed.

4. Violation of Due Process Rights under the Fourteenth Amendment

to the United States Constitution

Plaintiff claims that Defendant PHA violated her due process rights guaranteed by the

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution12 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.13 This claim

12 The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution provides that no State shall “deprive any person

of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.

13 Section 1983 provides, in relevant part:

fails for two reasons. First, a municipal subdivision is not a proper party in a Section 1983 action.

See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Erie, 834 F. Supp. 873, 878 (W.D. Pa. 1993) (concluding that a city

police department could not be sued because it is “a sub-unit of the city government”). Cf. Martin

v. Red Lion Police Dep’t, 146 F. App’x 558, 562 n.3 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that municipal police

department was “not a proper defendant in an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983”) (citing

Johnson, 834 F. Supp. at 878). Therefore, Defendant PHA is not a proper defendant in Plaintiff’s

Section 1983 claim and that claim against PHA will be dismissed.

Second, even if Plaintiff properly sued the City of Philadelphia rather than PHA, her

Section 1983 claim would still fail because she does not sufficiently allege a claim under Monell

v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). This Court has described Monell as follows:

The gravamen of Monell and its progeny is that “recovery from a municipality is

limited to acts that are, properly speaking, acts ‘of the municipality’—that is, acts

which the municipality has officially sanctioned or ordered.” Pembaur v. City of

Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986). In other words, the constitutional deprivation

must have its origin in the policy, custom, or deliberate indifference of the

municipality, and liability based on the actions of city officials exists only where it

can be shown that the officials acted in accordance with that policy, custom, or

deliberate indifference. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. Moreover, municipalities

cannot be held liable under Section 1983 for acts of its employees based on the

doctrine of respondeat superior or for other forms of vicarious liability. See id. at

692 (noting that the language of Section 1983 “cannot be easily read to impose

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or

usage, of any State. . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United

States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to

the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for

redress . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

In the Amended Complaint, using the Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s standard form for an

employment discrimination case, Plaintiff asserts only that Defendant PHA “[v]iolated [her]

Constitutional Rights to Due Process.” (Doc. No. 9 at 3.) But it is not clear whether Plaintiff

alleges a substantive or a procedural due process claim. Regardless, since her allegations in the

Amended Complaint would not support either claim, they will be dismissed.

liability vicariously on governing bodies solely on the basis of the existence of an

employer-employee relationship with a tortfeasor”); see also Reitz v. Cnty. of

Bucks, 125 F.3d 139, 146 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[M]unicipal liability simply cannot be

predicated upon a showing of respondeat superior.”).

Ewing v. City of Phila., No. 20-3170, 2021 WL 1581186, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2021) (Slomsky,

J.).

Thus, under Monell, to state a claim against a municipality under Section 1983, a plaintiff

must establish that (1) a constitutionally protected right has been violated and (2) the alleged

violation resulted from a municipal policy, custom, or deliberate indifference. See Monell, 436

U.S. at 694–95; Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990).

There are a variety of ways a plaintiff may establish the existence of a municipal policy or

custom to satisfy Monell. For example, a plaintiff can cite an official policy. See id., 436 U.S. at

690 (holding a municipality may be sued under Section 1983 when it “implements or executes a

policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that

body’s officers.”); see also Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 263 (3d Cir. 2010)

(“‘Policy’ includes official proclamations made by municipal decision makers with final authority

. . . .”). A policy also may arise from the municipality delegating to employees the authority to set

policy or from the municipality ratifying actions taken by employees without policymaking

authority. See id. at 264.

Custom, on the other hand, “is defined as practices of state officials . . . so permanent and

well settled as to virtually constitute law.” Id. (citing Berg v. Cty. of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 275

(3d Cir. 2000)). A plaintiff may establish custom by specifically referring to “multiple incidents”

implicating that a particular custom exists. See Harris v. City of Phila., 171 F. Supp. 3d 395, 401–

02 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (finding a custom where there were “multiple incidents” of police officers using

reckless and excessive force in their use of batons). A plaintiff may also establish custom through

a statistical analysis of lawsuits against a municipality for a violation of a particular constitutional

right. See Simpson v. Ferry, 202 F. Supp. 3d 444, 452 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (permitting a Monell claim

to proceed following a review of the plaintiff’s statistical analysis about the number of lawsuits

against the Philadelphia Police Department for use of excessive force).

A plaintiff also may satisfy the second prong of Monell by showing that official

policymakers were deliberately indifferent to known incidents of constitutional violations towards

its inhabitants. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388–92 (1989). In the Third Circuit,

to make a claim for deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must show that: “(1) municipal policymakers

know that employees will confront a particular situation[,] (2) the situation involves a difficult

choice or a history of employees mishandling[,] and (3) the wrong choice by an employee will

frequently cause deprivation of constitutional rights.” Est. of Roman v. City of Newark, 914 F.3d

789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019) (alterations in original) (quoting Doe v. Luzerne Cnty., 660 F.3d 169, 180

(3d Cir. 2011)).

Here, Plaintiff’s claim under Monell of a violation of due process by PHA or the City of

Philadelphia fails for several reasons. First, she has not alleged facts that show a denial of due

process, which is the constitutional claim. Second, she does not identify any policy statements,

regulations, ordinances, or decisions officially adopted and promulgated by Defendant PHA, nor

does she allege any facts suggesting that Defendant PHA had been acting against her pursuant to

a custom. Furthermore, she does not establish that PHA was deliberately indifferent to a known

constitutional violation. For these reasons, her due process claim under § 1983 fails.

5. Interference under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”)

Construing the Amended Complaint liberally, Plaintiff apparently alleges that her rights

under the FMLA also were violated.14 (See Doc. No. 9 at 3.) The Third Circuit has held that:

To make a claim of interference with her rights under the FMLA, Plaintiff must establish:

(1) . . . she was an eligible employee under the FMLA; (2) the defendant

was an employer subject to the FMLA’s requirements; (3) the plaintiff was

entitled to FMLA leave; (4) the plaintiff gave notice to the defendant of . . .

her intention to take FMLA leave; and (5) the plaintiff was denied benefits

to which . . . she was entitled under the FMLA.

Capps v. Mondelez Glob., LLC, 847 F.3d 144, 155 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Ross v. Gilhuly, 755

F.3d 185, 191-92 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted)). “The FMLA is meant to prohibit employers

from retaliating against employees who exercise their rights, refusing to authorize leave,

manipulating positions to avoid application of the Act, or discriminatorily applying policies to

discourage employees from taking leave.” Callison v. City of Phila., 430 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir.

2005).

In Callison, the Third Circuit held that the City of Philadelphia had not engaged in any of

these prohibited acts since it “provided Callison with the entitlements set forth in the FMLA (e.g.,

a twelve-week leave and reinstatement after taking leave.”) Id. Here, Defendant granted Plaintiff

twelve months within which to exercise her medical leave. She does not specify, however, how

many weeks of unpaid medical leave Defendant PHA afforded her, how many weeks of leave she

exercised, or whether she was currently exercising her medical leave benefits at the time of her

termination. (See Doc. No. 9 at 3); see also 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (providing that an “eligible employee

shall be entitled to a total of 12 workweeks of leave during any 12-month period”). Because

14 Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that she was “still under [intermittent] FMLA” starting from

December 2019 and ending in December 2020 when she was terminated on September 25,

2020. (Doc. No. 9 at 3.)

Plaintiff was provided her FMLA entitlements and was not denied any such entitlements, her

FMLA interference claim will be dismissed.

6. Retaliation under the FMLA

The Amended Complaint also appears to allege that Defendant PHA retaliated against

Plaintiff for exercising her FMLA benefits. Courts apply the McDonnell Douglas framework to

FMLA retaliation claims. See Canada v. Samuel Grossi & Sons, Inc., 49 F.4th 340, 346 n.36 (3d

Cir. 2022) (citing Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294, 302 (3d Cir. 2012)).

But at the motion to dismiss stage in a FMLA retaliation case, Plaintiff only has “the initial burden

of establishing a prima facie case”: “(a) invocation of an FMLA right, (b) termination, and (c)

causation.” Lichtenstein, 691 F.3d at 302. Because the first and second prongs are met here,15

only the third prong is contested. Applying the same framework here as the Court did with

Plaintiff’s Title VII and PHRA retaliation claims above in Section IV.B.3, Plaintiff has not

established a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation because she fails to show a causal relationship

between invocation of her FMLA rights and her termination.

Plaintiff does not allege whether she was exercising any of her twelve (12) weeks of unpaid

medical leave as afforded under the FMLA at the time of her termination. Rather, the Amended

Complaint’s only reference to her FMLA entitlements is its allegation that Plaintiff “was still under

[intermittent] FMLA . . . at the time of termination, . . . which began December 2019 and . . . was

due to end in December 2020.” (Doc. No. 9 at 3.) The Amended Complaint contains no evidence

15 To satisfy the first prong of FMLA retaliation—invocation—“employees must provide adequate

notice to their employer about their need to take leave.” Lichtenstein, 691 F.3d at 303 (citing

29 U.S.C.§ 2612(e)(2)). Because Defendant PHA granted her intermittent leave under the

FMLA, Plaintiff is presumed to have provided notice of invocation of her FMLA benefits to

Defendants. With respect to the second prong, it is uncontroverted that Plaintiff was terminated

on September 25, 2020.

other than the fact of her termination during her entitlement to intermittent FMLA leave and does

not state whether she was actively on medical leave when she was terminated. Likewise, Plaintiff

does not allege plausible facts that Defendant terminated her as a result of her exercising her FMLA

entitlements, which would establish the causation element. Thus, Plaintiff’s FMLA retaliation

claim against Defendant PHA will be dismissed.

B. The Amended Complaint Will Be Dismissed Against Individual Defendants

for Lack of Personal Involvement

Defendants Smith, McNeil, Bishop, Collins, and McQuoid (collectively “Individual

Defendants”) argue that Plaintiff’s claims in this case should be dismissed against them for two

reasons16: (1) as to the Title VII claims, Title VII does not impose individual liability on the agents

or employees of a defendant employer17; and (2) as to the balance of the federal claims, she fails

to assert that they were personally involved in any of the allegedly actionable conduct.18 (Doc.

No. 13-2 at 13-15, 31-33.)

In Evancho v. Fisher, the Third Circuit held that:

16 Individual Defendants also argue that her claims should be dismissed against them because she

failed to exhaust her administrative remedies by failing to name them in the body of the EEOC

Charge. See Dixon v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 43 F. Supp. 2d 543, 545 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (“A Title

VII action ordinarily may be brought only against a party previously named in an EEOC

action.”) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)). However, while Individual Defendants may have

been on notice of Plaintiff’s discrimination allegations, given the impediments identified in the

Amended Complaint, there is no need to extensively discuss this argument.

17 In Emerson v. Thiel Coll., the Third Circuit reaffirmed that “individual employees are not liable

under Title VII.” 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours

& Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1078 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc)).

18 Individual Defendants also claim that Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed because she failed

to exhaust her administrative remedies by “fail[ing] to name the individually named

Defendants” in the body of the EEOC charge. (Doc. No. 13-2 at 14-15.) However, the Court

need not address this point since Plaintiff’s claims will be dismissed for failing to allege

Individuals Defendants’ personal involvement in the acts alleged in the Amended Complaint.

“A[n individual government] defendant in a civil rights action must have personal

involvement in the alleged wrongdoing; liability cannot be predicated solely on the

operation of respondeat superior. Personal involvement can be shown through

allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge or acquiescence.” Rode v.

Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).

. . .

[A] civil rights complaint is adequate where it states the conduct, time, place, and

persons responsible. Boykins v. Ambridge Area Sch. Dist., 621 F.2d 75, 80 (3d

Cir. 1980) (citing Hall v. Pa. State Police, 570 F.2d 86, 89 (3d Cir. 1979)).

423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005). As noted above, Plaintiff raises many causes of action.

However, aside from naming the Individual Defendants in the heading of the Amended Complaint,

Plaintiff does not identify any actionable conduct by the Individual Defendants. In other words,

the Amended Complaint does not “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged” since it does not allege which Individual Defendant

engaged in which conduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Accordingly, since the Amended Complaint

fails to allege facts that, if proven, show that the Individual Defendants were personally involved

in the alleged wrongful conduct, all claims against them will be dismissed. Id.

C. Plaintiff’s Remaining State Law Claims Will Be Dismissed Because All Claims

Over Which the Court Had Original Jurisdiction Are Being Dismissed

As noted in Section II, supra, Plaintiff has also alleged several causes of action under state

law. They are: discrimination under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”); retaliation

under the PHRA; hostile work environment under the PHRA; wrongful termination; breach of

contract; and defamation. Under 28 U.S.C.§ 1367, a district court may exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over state law claims if it has jurisdiction over federal claims and if the state law claims

“form part of the same case or controversy” as the federal claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). However,

because all of Plaintiff’s federal claims are being dismissed and because this is not a case where

the parties are citizens of different states for purposes of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, this

Court will decline to exercise jurisdiction over her state law claims. See id. § 1367(c)(3)

(authorizing district courts to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims if

the “district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction”); see also Talley

v. Wetzel, 15 F.4th 275, 281 (3d Cir. 2021) (“[W]here the claim over which the district court has

original jurisdiction is dismissed before trial, the district court must decline to decide the pendent

state law claims unless considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties

provide an affirmative justification for doing so.”) (quoting Borough of W. Mifflin v. Lancaster,

45 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 1995)).

Here, as a matter of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties, Plaintiff’s

state law claims are better suited for adjudication by Pennsylvania state courts. See Annulli v.

Panikkar, 200 F.3d 189, 203 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that “comity favor[ed] allowing the state court

to hear [the plaintiff’s] state law claims” where only pendent state law claims remained after

dismissal of all federal claims). First, as to judicial economy, this Court’s docket has a considerable

number of federal cases over which it has jurisdiction. To preside over a case in which only state

claims are alleged would have some burden on the federal court. No discovery has yet occurred

in this case and it appears that the parties will engage in considerable litigation before this case is

terminated. Simply put, there is no strong reason or federal policy to retain jurisdiction over the

state law claims. Second, convenience to the parties would be a neutral factor. Finally, it would

be unfair to Defendants to litigate state claims in federal court where there is no subject matter

jurisdiction over those claims, and judicial economy compels that the state law claims be

adjudicated in state court. Apart from the claims under the PHRA, which are being dismissed for

the reasons noted above in discussing their analogous federal claims, the only claims that remain

are wrongful termination, breach of contract, and defamation. These claims are suitable for

adjudication in state court. In fact, Plaintiff has pending in state court a lawsuit against PHA and

the claims raised in that case appear to be the same as the claims raised in this federal case. (See

Doc. No. 35-1 at 9.) Therefore, considering 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) and the interests of judicial

economy, convenience, and fairness, Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims also will be

dismissed.19

One final reference must be made about the Family Self-Sufficiency (“FSS”) Program,

which is extensively described above and which Plaintiff heavily relies upon in her Amended

Complaint. Although it is difficult to decipher to which claim the FSS Program relates, it appears

that the breach of contract claim is the one in which she alleges that PHA caused her to lose her

benefits under this Program. However, no contract has been produced in this case and, therefore,

this claim has been insufficiently alleged.

D. Amendment of the Complaint Is Futile

After Plaintiff filed her initial Complaint, she “was put on notice as to the deficiencies in

[her] complaint,” was given specific instructions on how to amend it to survive dismissal, “but

chose not to resolve [the deficiencies].”20 United States ex rel. Schumann v. AstraZeneca Pharms.

L.P., 769 F.3d 837, 849 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Krantz v. Prudential Invs. Fund Mgmt. LLC, 305

F.3d 140, 144 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted)). She filed an Amended Complaint which

contained only general or conclusory allegations and was afforded several occasions to file a

19 In Dirauf v. Berger, the court noted that although it is “prefer[able for a] district court to state

its basis for dismissing state claims,” it is not required when dismissal is based on 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(c)(3). No. 21-1044, 2022 WL 17972518, at *4 (3d Cir. Dec. 28, 2022) (quoting Figueroa

v. Buccaneer Hotel Inc., 188 F.3d 172, 181 (3d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted)). Moreover, there

is a presumption that a district court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if it

has dismissed all original-jurisdiction claims. Id. at *4 n.6. It is a presumption and not a rule.

Id.

20 In the Order dated October 4, 2022 (Doc. No. 37), which is quoted supra in footnote 5, the Court

detailed the many opportunities it provided Plaintiff to amend the Complaint or to find legal

representation in this case. She did not do so.

Second Amended Complaint and failed to comply with the deadlines. Because there is no reason

to believe that Plaintiff can allege plausible facts, it would be futile to allow her to file another

amended complaint. Consequently, leave to file another Complaint will be denied.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 13) will be granted and all

claims against Defendants PHA, Smith, McNeil, Bishop, Collins, and McQuoid will be dismissed

with prejudice. An appropriate Order follows.